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Abstract: 
This dissertation is an analysis of the political economy of the Republic of 
Ireland’s television broadcasting policy in the period between 1997 and 2007. It is 
primarily concerned with Irish policy approaches to the introduction of digital 
terrestrial television (DTT) and the restructuring of public service broadcasting 
(PSB). Whereas policy addressing these two policy areas had been articulated in 
the late 1980s, it was not until the period under review that significant policy 
endeavours took place. The research is primarily concerned with identifying the 
articulation of state/market relations as manifested in policy making and 
assessing the relative effectiveness/success of such policy changes relative to 
specific policy aims in communications and media and the larger strategies and 
activities of the Irish state. 
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Chapter One  
1.1) Introduction  
 
This dissertation is an analysis of the political economy of the Republic of 
Ireland’s television broadcasting policy in the period between 1997 and 2007. It is 
primarily concerned with Irish policy approaches to the introduction of digital 
terrestrial television (DTT) and the restructuring of public service broadcasting 
(PSB). Whereas policy addressing these two policy areas had been articulated in 
the late 1980s it was not until the period under review that significant policy 
endeavours took place. The research is primarily concerned with identifying the 
shift in state/market relations as manifested in policy making and assessing the 
relative effectiveness/success of such policy changes relative to specific policy 
aims in communications and media and the larger strategies and activities of the 
Irish state. The core claim is that policymaking is shaped through its positioning 
within a nexus of institutions. It takes an institutionalist approach to policy making 
wherein policy is contextually produced relative to the wider strategies and 
activities of the state and/or government, and, policy choices arise from these 
strategies and activities. However, wider contexts constitute the terrain in which 
policy is made creating policy opportunities for variable interests and actors in a 
given policy area. One key definer of these contexts is the political economy of 
policymaking, that is the structural inclination towards state/market relations as 
expressed in public policy and policy choices. So, for example, the introduction of 
DTV was framed within the wider contexts of the development of digital 
infrastructure for the realisation of a proposed informational dimension of 
economic growth, but was developed within a market framework for realisation of 
these aims. The thesis will evaluate the relationship between the former and the 
latter whilst detailing the changes that new policy paradigms and their political 
economy entail for the policy area of broadcasting in the period under review.  
 
Broadcasting as a distinct mode of social communication is undergoing myriad 
structural changes relative to wider political, economic, socio cultural, 
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technological and spatial changes experienced in the late 20thC. Taken together, 
the mutually constitutive processes of globalisation, digitalisation, pluralisation 
and marketisation are generating new contexts and strategies for development of 
public policy towards broadcasting. Whereas the present dissertation arose out 
of questions concerning the introduction of digital television in Ireland, it became 
necessary to shift the analysis towards the changing nature of the fundamental 
basis of governance of broadcasting and the emerging contexts for that 
governance. The inclusion of broadcasting and its infrastructure within varied 
formulations of a digital informational economy, the emerging influence of the 
European Union in the governance of communications, the changing form of the 
Irish state in its relatedness to the global economy all pointed towards the 
emergence of new contexts for policy making in broadcasting. Policy making 
towards broadcasting itself appeared to be undergoing significant change in its 
mode of governance, away from state lead national governance towards market 
lead multilevel governance. Market lead governance implied the institution of 
market structures into broadcasting twinned with new combinations of state and 
market lead governance techniques, where governance refers to the ‘complex 
reciprocal co-ordination of interdependences’ (Jessop, 2005, p3). These are the 
emphases of a particular type of economic globalisation. Thus the research 
question became more specifically focussed on the political economy of public 
policy and its relatedness to structural change, emerging policy paradigms, new 
governance structures and their implications for broadcasting policy in Ireland.  
 
The theoretical framework developed throughout the research project and 
involves a combination of materialist macro analyses, political economy 
approaches and institutionalist analyses. The materialist perspective provides the 
macro analytical perspective drawing as it does on the French Regulation School 
of political economy to provide a socio historical context to current adjustments in 
political economy and their implications for both state strategies and the media 
and communications fields of activity. The Regulation School approach exposes 
the fiction of separating out states and markets as independent entities 
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illustrating how they mutually constitute each other in the search for renewed 
modes of economic growth. It also advances analysis beyond consideration of 
political economy to consider the political and economic goals to which policy 
addresses itself. Political economy itself is a multi varied theoretical framework 
utilised across many disciplines. In media and communications analyses, political 
economy approaches involve the analysis of the ‘social relations and particularly 
the power relations which constitute the production distribution and consumption 
of resources in society’ (Mosco, 1996, p25). For the most part the political 
economy referred to in this study is that strand concerned with the balance of 
state, market and civil forces in the distribution of goods and opportunities in 
society.  This is a structural oriented political economy that provides contexts for 
the more agential analyses of political and economic actors/interest groups and 
their role in the policy process. Finally the institutionalist perspective is 
recognition of the necessity of understanding how global processes such as 
economic liberalization are negotiated by the specific institutional configuration of 
supra national entities, nation states and specific policy sectors. The variant of 
institutionalism draw on here is historical, sociological and focussed mainly on 
formal organisations such as state departments, broadcasting organisations and 
sectoral interest groups.   
 
The core of the substantive research consists of two related case studies, the 
introduction of digital television into Ireland and the restructuring of public service 
broadcasting in the period from 1997 to 2007. Initially the plan had been to 
examine the impact of digitalisation on the public broadcaster, but it was the 
trouble that the broadcaster experienced in developing a strategy that brought 
the issue of governance and its changing contexts and modes into sharper focus. 
Instead the analysis concentrates on the political economy of the public policy 
generated to address both of these issues. In dealing with ‘live’ policy issues it 
was necessary to adapt both flexible and reflexive approach to both the 
theoretical and methodological dimensions of the dissertation. To this extent both 
theory and method changed in the process of the analysis giving rise to what can 
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be labelled an inductive critical policy analysis. Whereas case studies were 
chosen as the research strategy the methods used in this strategy were also 
reflexively developed and adapted. The core of the research draws upon 
documentary analysis utilising access to official, media, institutional, and 
governmental material and archives to determine positions, relations, practices, 
ideas and rules in the policy making process and how these were undergoing 
change. An extended use of Freedom of Information documentation 
supplemented this approach and provided a rawer version of the policy making 
process than that which was articulated in the public sphere. Where possible the 
documentary analysis was supplemented by semi structured interviews including 
interviews with politicians, industry professionals, trade union representatives, 
interest group spokespersons and policy insiders. Alongside these approaches, 
participant observation was also drawn upon in relation to the attendance of 
public forums such as the forum on broadcasting’s public sessions, the 
attendance of general meetings such as the Broadcasting Commission of 
Irelands public outings and participation in consultations such as consultations 
arranged by the BCI and the parliamentary select committee on varied 
dimensions of broadcasting and communications policy. Whereas there is no 
specific comparative dimension to the analysis close attention was paid to the 
developments in the UK, justified in retrospect by the UK’s paradigmatic 
influence on broadcasting policy at European level, its articulation of a market 
liberalist approach and the impact and influence of both its mediascape and 
policyscape in the Republic of Ireland. These mixed methods gave rise to 
extensive data gathering and subsequent data analysis.  
 
The chapter breakdown of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter Two introduces 
the theoretical positions of materialist, political economic and institutionalist 
approaches to studying the governance of media and communications sectors. 
The theoretical framework draws upon Regulation Theory, Critical Political 
Economy and Neo-Institutionalism to develop both a framework for 
understanding the diffusion of market logics through global political economy, 
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their consequences for state/market relations and the way in which institutional 
practices are shaped by these wider contexts of operation. The framework will 
provide the basis for a contextual approach to policy critique that positions policy 
analysis within a wider theoretical frame. It will position the policy making bodies 
of the state within wider institutional change. The chapter will also consider the 
contexts of policy change providing one possible account of why marketisation 
has become a central thrust in broadcasting policy and the ways in which market 
governance are superseding bureaucratic governance in broadcasting. The 
political economic/institutionalist account also points to the emergence of new 
policy paradigms and new state activities and strategies and how they impact on 
public policy. The chapter then surveys the way in which these theoretical frames 
have been utilised in media studies thus far whilst drawing attention to the 
possibilities of synthesising them for the present analysis. The end of this section 
of the chapter then presents a model for the analysis of media policy in general 
and broadcasting policy in particular, drawing on the theoretical concepts 
outlined above. Finally, the chapter recounts a number of theoretical frames for 
positioning broadcasting as an object of study, pointing to its multidimensional 
characteristics as a social, cultural, economic and political practice. Here 
broadcasting as a social institution, as a cultural industry and as a 
technology/medium will be considered. It is the multidimensionality of these 
characteristics that helps to explain the complexity of broadcasting as a social 
practice, the policies that address it and the pitfalls of reducing a particular 
medium of broadcasting into generic economic or communications policy.         
 
The third chapter focuses on a historical example of the development of market 
modes of governance in UK broadcasting in order to provide an overview of 
paradigmatic changes in the nature of broadcasting governance; the knock on 
effects of developments in large European mediascapes and their implications 
for smaller states; and, the emergence of nationally based ‘European 
Champions’ such as BskyB and their constitution of the internationalisation of 
broadcasting at the level of distribution. The chapter will outline the paradigmatic 
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institutional change in broadcasting policy from an analogue, national public 
service system to a digital, international market led system. These changes are 
positioned relative to the wider socio historical contexts which shaped their 
development. It will point to the degree to which policy norms, thinking and 
knowledge have shifted from socio-political to market lead governance. The UK’s 
policy shifts in broadcasting have three levels of effect on the Irish mediascape;  
1. The UK’s embrace of the Washington Consensus via its political Third Way is 
indicative of policy logics at work that Ireland has also embraced,  
2. Changes in the UK mediascape have direct and material consequences for 
broadcasting in Ireland,  
3. The UK is an influential policy pathfinder in the development of European 
Union communications policy which has consequences for all member states.     
 
The following chapter addresses the role of the European Union in developing 
media policy which has direct consequences for policy making at the national 
level. It evaluates and tracks the increased activity of the EU in the audiovisual 
sector, contextualising it in relation to the EU’s own strategies and activities as a 
supranational competition state shaped by its own negotiation of economic and 
political globalisation. The chapter surveys the EU’s negotiation of the changing 
global dynamics of the media and communications industries and its internal 
approaches to co-ordinating audio-visual industrial development, regulation and 
technological co-ordination. It evaluates the EU’s co-ordination of trans-national 
broadcasting, digital television development and the wider process of media 
convergence and assesses what this means for broadcasting policy 
developments at European and member state level. It will identify the emphases 
that arise from EU level policy relative to its own positioning as a competition 
super-state (Michalis, 2008).     
 
Chapter Five then turns its attention to the historical development of broadcasting 
policy in the Irish context, evaluating the impact of structural change on the 
contexts, objectives and contents of Irish media policy and the particular changes 
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experienced in the areas of broadcasting in the late 20thC. The chapter provides 
an overview of the contexts, processes and approaches to earlier phases of 
broadcasting policy development in Ireland including the introduction of Radio, 
the introduction of Television and the introduction of the dual system of 
commercial broadcasting. It then proceeds to provide a context to the policy 
approaches taken to DTT and the restructuring of Public Service Broadcasting by 
evaluating typologies of the Irish State in the Celtic Tiger period. It is proposed 
that policy changes are informed by the Irish state’s re-articulation as a flexible 
competition state undergirded by a political economy of neo-liberal corporatism. It 
is suggested that this state form has an impact in shaping all public policy either 
as a direct element of the new state style or as a by-product of its systemic 
consequences.  
 
Chapter Six is the case study of the introduction of DTT into Ireland. The case 
study will evaluate the state/market dynamics in the policy approach to 
introducing DTT into Ireland as part of a wider approach to digital television 
development and convergence led policy in Ireland. It will trace the way in which 
broadcasting policy has now become intertwined with general communications 
policy which is directed to the development of digital networks and converged 
media architectures. It will consider the interplay of institutions, interest groups 
and ideas in the policy approach and the extent to which the political economy of 
policy towards DTT echoes the wider state form of negotiated market 
governance and the degree to which policy does or does not demonstrate a 
move towards market/competition led norms in governance. It will assess the 
relative peculiarities and effectiveness of these policy approaches in the Irish 
context.    
 
Chapter Seven presents an analysis of the restructuring of the institution of 
Public Service Broadcasting, RTE, in the same time period. The chapter 
assesses the policy processes surrounding the restructuring of Public 
Broadcasting in Ireland whilst evaluating the contexts, objectives and contents of 
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the policy approach. The interplay of interest groups, institutional interests and 
ideas is once again considered relative to the changing relationship of state and 
market governance approaches and the institutional norms of governance and 
how they are diffused through broadcasting policy. Analysis of policy towards the 
public broadcasting institution provides a key focal point for evaluating the logics 
of governance and their relatedness to wider processes of marketisation logics. 
The case study of the restructuring of public service broadcasting provides a 
further test bed for assessing the degree to which market logics penetrate, not 
only the economic concerns of the state, but also, what may be termed the socio-
institutional dimension of state activity that is closer to the realms of democratic 
politics, social and cultural policy than economic policy per se.        
 
The final chapter presents the conclusions from the overall analysis.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Political economy, institutionalism and public policy  
 
2.1) Introduction: 
The present research is centrally concerned with the restructuring of public 
communication and the role of public policy in the process. Political, economic, 
socio-cultural and technological factors all form the backdrop of restructuring in 
media and communications and are steadily altering the familiar mediascapes of 
the 20th century. The thesis is centrally concerned with the way in which the 
political economic determinants of change interact with the political, spatial, 
socio-cultural and technological in a way that is mutually constitutive. In 
particular, the thesis is concerned with the political economy of public policy in 
television broadcasting and the move towards marketisation as a primary 
organisational principle in the overall negotiation of re-structuring, its implications 
for governance and therefore policy making in broadcasting. Marketisation here 
refers to both the institution of market structures, market logics of operation and 
the process of governance via re-regulated markets. It will evaluate these 
changes through case studies of two key interrelated policy issues for television 
broadcasting in the Republic of Ireland: the transition to digital television, and, the 
re-negotiation of the role of public service broadcasting within the Irish 
mediascape.   The purpose of the present chapter is to both outline some of the 
macro determinants of public policy change in the Irish context and introduce the 
key theoretical tools which will inform this analysis and the knowledge that is 
presented in the following research. 
 
The key analytical frameworks are those of Regulation Theory, Political 
Economy, and Neo-Institutionalism. Regulation theory points to broad changes in 
the nature of late capitalism and the search for new modes of growth through 
paradigms such as the Information Society, Knowledge Based Economies and 
the Creative Industries. The political economic dimension highlights the new 
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configuration of state/market relations as nation states seek to pursue these 
paradigms amongst changing technological, spatial and socio-cultural contexts. 
The institutional dimension positions institutions, such as broadcasting and policy 
making institutions, within these contextual changes and draws on institutional 
dimensions as both an outcome and a shaper of the new governance of media 
and communications.    
 
These theoretical perspectives underline a central concern with the social 
relations, and particularly the power relations, that constitute the production, 
distribution, regulation and consumption of communication resources and their 
implications for communication, representation and identity formation in modern 
social formations. As such they also entail consideration of normative arguments 
about the structures of communication and the degree to which they may offer 
optimal outcomes for human welfare, individual autonomy and collective social 
development. In so far as the research is concerned with the interplay of macro 
and meso contexts of institutional restructuring the methodology concentrates on 
the fulcrum of policy making and governance. What follows is a brief overview of 
the theoretical premise of the argument put forward, and, some of the features of 
the theoretical framework that have been elaborated upon in the existing 
literature. It thus expounds upon the contexts, features and implications of a 
paradigm shift towards marketisation and the various features that influence its 
expression in socio-historical contexts.   
 
2.2) Theoretical framework 
The first section of the chapter will give a brief account of materialist theoretical 
approaches that point to a fundamental shift in the nature of capitalism, whilst 
asserting the continuation and indeed deepening of that mode of production. 
Whereas it is routinely asserted that marketisation is a fundamental reality of 
restructuring in communications, there are few attempts within the 
communications literature to ask why. To answer the question, the materialist 
theoretical insights afforded from the Regulation School of political economy, and 
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particularly its development in the work of Robert Boyer and Robert Jessop, will 
be considered. In general the theory emphasises the exhaustion of a long wave 
of capitalist development, the political economic reactions to establishing a 
renewed growth regime (emerging in the 1970s) and the socio-institutional 
adjustments that result from such a conjuncture. The proposition is that the 
political formation of the centralised state has been transformed in its ability to 
project power as it attempts to regulate capitalism, in the way the 
Keynesian/Fordist State has hitherto, it implies the search for a new state 
structure, its activities and its policies. This entails a structural moment for the 
market and its political ideologies that is neither inevitable nor irreversible. 
However, the real emphases of structural change are not to be dismissed and 
the structural adjustment represents different logics and causal mechanisms with 
implications for how public communication and media are structured and 
organised in society. But an ideological and pragmatic reliance on the market in 
the search for regulating/realising new modes of accumulation and new 
paradigms for capitalist growth is pervasive, in so far as it has implications for 
multi-scalar economic strategy, social policy and governance. In short, the 
structural emphases of the market in the search for new modes of accumulation 
and economic growth affect all varieties of capitalism, and underline developing 
modes of governance which in turn shape the terrain for policy making. However, 
the degree to which the state is re-articulated and marketisation is negotiated 
within particular socio-historical sites will be affected by path dependent factors 
such as the existing regime type of fordist welfare states, the formative strategies 
for securing economic post-fordist development and the varying 
influence/resistances/accommodations of myriad institutional features and 
interest groups in any given policy ecology.  
 
The Regulation theory framework informs the political economy approach. In 
brief, political economy is taken to refer to the power relations inscribed in 
economic systems (and structurally in the state/market relationship) that have 
causal consequences for multiple areas of human experience. According to 
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Nicholas Garnham political economy in communications analysis asks the broad 
question of who gets to say what to whom in what form, for what purpose, with 
what effect and why? (Garnham, 1999A). Part of that formula is shaped by the 
balance between state and market organisation of communications/media and 
the forms of state intervention in media markets. As we will see political economy 
is a polyvalent concept in which all of its variant uses provide critical purchase in 
understanding contexts and structures in media and communication studies. 
 
Having considered the influence of political economy and materialist change, the 
analytical framework of institutionalism and its compatibility with political 
economy will be considered. At its most basic institutionalism refers to the insight 
that institutions matter in the analysis of social change. The term institution refers 
both to formal organizations and the established pattern of doing things over 
periods of time, and thus represents a broad set of theoretical tools that also 
allows for consideration of meso level change. As such, institutional mediation of 
the various pressures and emphases arising out of the structural moment of the 
market will be the in-point for the analysis of specific policy developments. 
Institutionalism is a broad approach and representatives of what Galperin refers 
to as the ‘old’ and the ‘new institutionalism’ will be assessed (Galperin, 2004A). 
Galperin suggests that the macro level of institutionalist analysis tends to be 
concerned with the relationship between states and markets. The contributions of 
the new institutionalism will then be discussed with particular attention to some of 
the work emerging in the communications literature. Following the review of 
theoretical perspectives that make up the framework, the chapter will consider 
how these perspectives have already been articulated in the communications 
lecture. The proposition is that the synthesis of all three in the present study 
represents a relatively novel approach.    
 
The chapter will also consider the rudiments of public 
sphere/citizenship/capabilities theory and its implications as a normative 
dimension of policy critique. The question arises as to whether these norms are 
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still relevant and whether they are translatable into an emerging socio-
institutional framework. In specific terms it raises the question as to whether 
public policy such as public service broadcasting, universal service, universal 
access and plurality and diversity are still relevant in the marketised, international 
digital media landscape. If they are, the question of the extent to which market 
fundamentalism informs policy in these areas raises question for the continued 
generation of those norms in public communication structures and institutions. 
 
2.2.1) Media, communications and culture: advanced capitalism, markets 
and policy 
The current dynamics of re-structuring in media and communications is closely 
related to (but not wholly determined by) the broad dynamics of global economic 
re-structuring overall. Globalisation as an external variable shapes media and 
communications policy development at national level. The political economy of 
globalisation has been shaped by the ‘Washington consensus’ as it instituted 
global governance based on the general principles of liberalisation, privatisation, 
de-regulation and monetarist economic policy (Held, 2004). It is thus important to 
locate marketisation as residing at the level of these governance objective in the 
international economy .  However, it can be argued that the organisations such 
as the IMF, WTO and the World Bank are but institutional carriers of market logic 
but not its only source. A more detailed account of marketisation needs to go 
beyond the instrumental power of developed nations in the international system 
and take into account how marketisation is more than the globalisation of an 
ideology and more so the universalisation of a superficially successful response 
to wider structural problems in capitalist political economy. Here it is necessary to 
consider the broad premise of long wave theory to position marketisation as a 
means to an end in a more complex set of institutional responses to economic 
crisis.           
 
Scholars have posited that one long wave of socio-economic development came 
to an end in the late 1960s, and media and communications have since become 
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increasingly implied in the efforts to find a new paradigm for growth capable of 
sustaining the next long wave of economic development (Preston, 2001, 
Hesmondhalgh,  2002, Jessop, 2001). Drawing on this political economic 
juncture as his in-point, Hesmondhalgh has sifted the literature on political, 
economic, cultural, spatial and technological change that account for how and 
why the 'cultural industries' and communications networks have become central 
to the survival of advanced capitalism (c.f. Castells, 1999, Hobsbawn, 1994, 
Webster and Robbins, 1996) . These constitutive factors are outlined in the figure 
below. 
 
Media, Culture and Communications
Political Change: Crisis of
social state, rise
of neo-liberalism
Economic Change:
From Fordism to Post Fordism
Global Competition
Move from investment in
extractive and transformative
to the distributive
Organisational Innovation
Socio-Cultural Change:
Pluralisation, Multiculturalism and
the rise of consumer society
Centrality of culture in modern life
Technological Change: 
Rise of digital network communication
technologies with implications for 
production distribution and consumption
 
 
(Based on Hesmondhalgh, 2002) 
 
Hesmondhalgh, following on from the vast detailing of change in the political 
economy of communications literature then posits that the conjunction of these 
various factors has led to policy changes which premise the market as the key 
underlying logic that informs policy decisions in regards to media, 
communications and cultural policy. Central to this approach is the reliance on 
markets as the key means of organising, distributing and producing networks, 
services and symbolic goods. However, whereas Hesmondhalgh (and the 
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growing literature on marketisation) provides a comprehensive overview of the 
literature, including a concise summary of the ideological and interest group 
motivations behind the promotion of markets, he fails to deal with the issue of 
why marketisation appears as hegemonic even in nation states which do not 
align themselves to market ideology. Nor does he consider how the meta 
strategies of marketisation are mediated by particular political-
economic/institutional arrangements at the various sites in which policy has been 
formulated (allowing for ‘third ways’ etc). Lastly, in positing marketisation as an 
end in itself, it is easy to overlook the projects, strategies and activities that 
marketisation and market governance are instituted to address. That is, 
marketisation and market governance are strategies for realizing certain ends, 
ends which have significant impact on the shape and purposes of market making 
and market governance. For example marketisation in communications and 
media is usually linked to vague policy goals related to ‘informationalism’, 
‘knowledge industries’ or the ‘creative industries’. Thus we can propose that 
marketisation does not necessarily displace the state but can be seen as a 
process instituted by the state or states and a form of co-ordination utilized by the 
state, a form of governance. To understand why markets have become 
fundamental to resource allocation, governance and policy formulation, the 
theoretical framework drawn upon here offers potential structural orientation. 
First however it is necessary to probe the phenomena of marketisation more 
deeply  
 
2.2.2) Defining Marketisation  
Marketisation has been defined as the ‘elevation of markets to a general social 
principle’ (Leys, quoted in Hesmondhalgh, 2002) and/or the way in which states 
‘orientate themselves to a general market regime’ (Zhu and Nieland, 2002). 
Thus, marketisation refers to both the institutionalisation of structural 
arrangements (market relations) for allocating resources in society 
(buyers/sellers/price mechanisms) and the belief that markets are the most 
efficient means of allocating resources in society. The deepening of market 
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relations in broadcasting as a social practice, with the marketisation of content, 
resources and audiences, is part of a wider dynamic of marketisation which can 
be traced to both systemic logics and ideology and the inter-relations between 
the two. The phenomena of marketisation, as channelled via macro and meso 
institutional adjustment, refers not only to an ideological project but also a 
structural process of adjustment that has both structural and agential dimensions. 
As a structural adjustment it channels a promotion of market relations, market 
logics and market modes of operation. This changes the environment, 
governance and logics of formal organisations organised within a marketising 
environment, and, crucially, governance and policy. Marketisation refers thus to 
liberalisation, privatisation, re-regulation and commercialisation (Murdock, 2000). 
It also refers to the realignment of the state and public sector to market logics of 
governance, organisation and activity. 
 
Market structures are generated by variable processes of liberalisation, 
privatisation and corporatization (re-aligning public institutions to commercial 
market practices). Market logics are instituted by changes in the form of 
competition, the definition of property and the forms of exchange within a given 
sector. Market governance refers to the combination of state steered 
development of market structures for developing a given sector and/or a 
regulatory regime that operates to guarantee the functioning of competitive 
markets whilst minimalising intervention. It is proposed that it is this institutional 
redesign that is at the centre of the restructuring of broadcasting in the period 
under review. It is also proposed that whereas institutional redesign is a 
necessary element of renewed growth and development, the market structure 
that goes with is not necessarily the key dimension of its success. Boyer points to 
the institutional alternatives of the social democratic states to highlight equally 
successful approaches (Boyer, 2001).  
 
A key proposal of the present thesis is that the structural dimension of 
marketisation refers to 1. the rolling forward of market dynamics as a response to 
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the process of economic globalisation and 2. the dismantling of previously 
existing market regulation, in the name of market efficiency, in support of neo-
fordist dynamics of political economy. The latter is directly an outcome of neo-
fordist logics, the assumed mechanisms of a renewed growth regime. A key 
argument is that it is not purely the result of neo-liberal philosophy that we are 
witnessing a two pronged marketisation, this second structural adjustment occurs 
at the level of systemic changes in capitalism. At myriad levels there are attempts 
to adjust to neo-fordist dynamics, which have been characterised by the drive to 
de-regulate market protections in the name of market efficiency. This dynamic 
encapsulates different orders of structural change at the economic level that are 
seen as being successors to the Fordist mode of accumulation. This comes in 
the wake of global adaptation of market structures as an outcome of economic 
globalisation. It takes on an institutional dimension that has an effect across 
spheres of experience and geographical spread. It can be assumed from 
Regulation theory, that this is only one emergent model, and de-regulation for 
market efficiency reflects particular political cultures and social relations engaged 
in struggle/negotiation/strategy across different levels of economic organisation.  
To further develop the theoretical dimensions of neo-fordism it is necessary to 
consider Regulation theory.   
 
2.2.3) A structuralist approach to marketisation 
For the Regulation school the long downturn arises out of the exhaustion of a 
complimentary pattern of production and consumption which sustained economic 
growth for fifty years. In the 50 years from roughly post world war one to the 
1970s, the mass production of goods and services (the mode of accumulation) 
was complemented by state management of the economy through Keynesian 
demand side mechanisms and the advent of mass society wherein cultural 
developments supported a mass/state consumerist source of demand (the mode 
of regulation). Moving towards the end of the decade this complementary mode 
of growth, state management and consumption have shown signs of exhaustion 
(hence the long downturn) and both governments and capital seek a new way of 
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instituting a new mode of accumulation. The figure below demonstrates all the 
various elements that contributed to the pressure on Keynesian demand side 
management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Generalised from Jessop, 2000, 2002) 
 
From the 1980s various successors to this mode of accumulation have presented 
themselves as possibilities for succeeding Fordism and Keynesian regulation of 
the economy. The Regulation School, however, suggest that singular paradigms 
such as ‘informationalism’ or the ‘digital economy’ are unlikely to signal the 
emergence of a new mode of accumulation. In keeping with their Marxian roots, 
they tend to see new growth regimes emerging via change in a number of 
institutional co-ordinates such as the wage labour nexus, the forms of 
competition, governance of financial markets, norms of consumption, forms of 
state intervention in the economy and organisation of the international system of 
exchange. Through analysis of these various elements Robert Boyer has 
suggested that the USA has produced a variant regime of accumulation that 
undertakes a number of institutional adjustments. Crucially, this new institutional 
Keynesian Welfare
National State
Economic:
Opening of national economy
through internationalisation
State failure in regional eco.
Competition from Asian Eco
Feminisation of labour force
Fordism to post fordism 
Political:
Resistance to higher tax
Resentment towards 
bureaucratisation
Inflexibility and cost of welfare state
Exploitation of above by neo-liberals
Socio Cultural Change:
Decrease in national identification
Pluralisation of values, identities
and interests
Technological Change:
Utilisation of technology for 
de-nationalised economies of 
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architecture is underlined by market logics and market governance methods. It is 
the adaptation of this institutional architecture that the institutional features of the 
market and market governance are adapted across different political economies. 
Arguably, these features are adapted relevant to specific institutional 
arrangements such as the European Union (Europeanization) or its varied 
capitalisms, but, the concept of the market remains hegemonic. Here it is 
necessary to enter into more detail on the basic elements of regulation theory 
and its relatedness to political economy and neo instituitionalism, to put 
‘marketisation’ in its place and account for its expression in myriad areas of 
governance, and no less so in the market-centric policy in the media and 
communications field.  
 
2.2.4) Regulation theory, political economy and neo-institutionalism 
The theoretical framework composes of a number of theoretical and analytical 
approaches that will elaborate the hypothesis and allow for a set of research 
parameters and analytical categories for explaining and understanding the 
phenomenon of marketisation and its relationship to media policy making. 
Together, Regulation Theory, Political Economy and New Institutionalism posit a 
relationship between structural change, policymaking and marketisation which 
underlines the research question; 
• To what extent is the phenomenon of institutional change channelling 
market logics an explanatory variable in the media policy making oriented 
towards structural adjustment in the media in the Republic of Ireland in the 
period from 1997 to 2007?  
• What will two case studies tell us about the influence of the phenomenon 
of marketisation in Irish media policy making?  
• Have market lead policy adjustment been beneficial for the democratic, 
cultural, social and economic development of media in the Irish context?  
 
In summary, the framework poses the hypothesis that marketisation has been 
central to structural adjustments in political economy which have been 
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generalised by the global order, locally adapted, and diffused throughout the 
institutional order and taken up by numerous fields of activity in national and local 
contexts, leading to new rules, norms and knowledge that influences 
organisational capacity within those fields. It emphasises that at the varied 
different levels of policy making (macro and meso) there are choices open to 
political and social agency and these choices provide the basis on which we may 
assess the diffusion of marketisation through existing institutional filters. What 
follows is a brief overview of these analytical and theoretical frames followed by a 
more in depth explanation of the theoretical contributions from Regulation 
Theory, Critical Political Economy and New Institutionalism. Finally, in this 
section of the chapter, the consequences of these theoretical and methodological 
approaches will be related to the processes of policymaking.  
 
The thesis draws upon three conceptual frameworks which both set a hypothesis 
and provide the theoretical bearings for the overall thesis. All of these 
frameworks can be seen as combinations of institutionalism and political 
economy but each provides different conceptual frames, levels of analysis and 
methodologies that are nevertheless inter-related. In all they provide a tiered 
approach that allows for a holistic positioning of questions of public policy within 
a wider contextual/dynamic analysis. They provide a hypothesis and framework 
for understanding the political economy of media and public policy and the 
institutional dynamics of political economy.  
 
2.2.5) Regulation Theory 
Regulation theory is a programme of research that has emerged as a key means 
of understanding long waves of capitalist development. Based for the most part 
in French academia, scholars such as Michael Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Alain 
Lipietz have developed a political economic research agenda that is concerned 
with long term transformations in capitalism, understanding the extra economic 
factors which stabilise economic transformations and critiquing the short comings 
of neo-classical economics and its hegemony within reactions to structural 
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transformations on a global and local scale. Regulation theory presents a 
theoretical starting point for understanding marketisation as the outcome of 
institutional adjustments that structure the regime of accumulation in addressing 
macro structural change in capitalist political economy. It also presents an 
account that maps the features of capitalist societies after fordism and a rigorous 
critique of the presumptions of neo classical economics that are at the core of 
neo-liberal ideologies but also located, structurally, within programmes of reform. 
To make clear the intellectual premise for these claims it is necessary to consider 
the key theoretical innovations of the Regulation Theory approach, its critique of 
neo classical economics and the implications of its analysis for locating 
marketisation within macro political economic theory.  
 
Regulation theory (RT) is a historical and longitudinal political economy that 
examines long-term transformations in capitalism and provides insights into both 
the economic and extra economic adjustments that are emerging as a feature of 
neo-fordist political economy. Centrally, it is in the regulation school’s (RS) 
approach to ‘regimes of accumulation’ that we find macro institutional 
adjustments that provide a causal explanation for the pervasiveness of re-
structuring for market efficiency. Emanating from Anglo-American political 
economy and carried and diffused via the Washington consensus, macro 
institutional adjustments suffused with market logic have global structural 
emphases, as a neo-fordist political economy is generalised to the global scale. 
Here we locate a structuralist explanation for marketisation which builds on the 
emphases on the ideological ones. It is also at the level of neo-fordism that the 
political economic structural transformation in the media are contextualised 
relative to an emerging regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation. Also 
important is the emphasis placed on macro institutional adjustments as being the 
manifestation of ‘codified social relations’, thus regulation theory avoids the 
pitfalls of overly rigid structuralism.  
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Core to Regulation theory’s explanation of long waves of economic growth such 
as that of the Fordist period is the concept of compatibility between a regime of 
accumulation and the modes of regulation. If the regime of accumulation points 
to maco institutional dynamics that differentiate periods of capitalist accumulation 
then the mode of regulation points to the extra economic factors which stabilise 
and embed an accumulation regime. The mode of regulation itself is an 
ensemble of institutional forms which arise through ‘latent or overt conflicts 
originating in distinct sources of difficulty’ (Boyer and Saillard, 2002, pp37). The 
regulation school identify six key institutional categories which offer the macro 
institutional framework for any given regime of accumulation.  
 
These are; 
1. The wage-labour nexus. Under this heading come the nature of the social 
division of labour; the type of employment and the mechanism of 
govemance of industrial conflict; the existence and nature of union 
representation; the systems of wage formation; and so on.  
2. The forms of competition in the product markets (whether nearly-
competitive or oligopolist: the related mechanism of price formation; and 
so on).  
3. The institutions governing financial markets and monetary management 
(including the relationships between banks and industry, the role of stock 
exchanges in industrial financing, the mechanisms of liquidity creation in 
the system, etc.).  
4. The norms of consumption (that is, the composition and changes in the 
baskets of consumption and their différences across social groups).  
5. The forms of state intervention in the economy (for example, monetary 
and fiscal policies; 'state as arbiter' versus state as an active player with 
respect to social conflict, income distribution, welfare and so on).  
 6. The organization of the international system of exchanges (for example, 
the rules of international trade; the presence/absence of a single 
hegemonic power; the patterns of specialization; and so on). 
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(Coriat and Dosi, 1998) 
 
According to Boyer a mode of regulation; 
 
‘establishes a set of procedures and individual and collective behaviour 
patterns which must simultaneously reproduce social relations through the 
conjunction of institutional forms which are historically determined and 
supported by the current accumulation routine’. (Boyer and Saillard, 2002, 
pp 41).  
 
These institutional forms ‘forge a passage from micro to macro economics’. 
Whereas these macro institutional forms of accumulation offer an alternative 
explanation of economic development to neoclassical economics, they are, 
according to Regulation Theorists, also a potential vehicle for the diffusion of 
neoclassical economic logics on a macro institutional basis. According to Boyer, 
it is both a feature and potential crisis of neo-fordist political economy that 
‘institutional innovations channelling market logic’ are prevalent (Boyer, 2002, pp 
15). Moreover, it is at the macro institutional level, the very shape of the 
emergent regime of accumulation, that we find that market dynamics are hard 
wired to a mode of production, which, in itself, is increasingly global in nature. 
Therefore, moves to adapt to/compete with the US’s model of a successor 
regime of accumulation to Fordism, generalise market dynamics through the five 
institutional forms that structure any growth regime. It is this adoption of a ‘type of 
capitalism’, (flexible, reflexive, informational) at global level that explains the near 
universal diffusion of market logics. Thus the extension of market dynamics 
underline the wage labour nexus (flexibilisation/neo-fordism), the forms of money 
(financialization/floating exchange rates), the forms of competition (competitive 
mechanisms replace monopoly/social supply), the state form (in the oversight of 
the other institutional forms, the state’s management of the relationship between 
economic growth and political citizens favours the former) and the mode of 
insertion into the international regime (decisions regarding accommodation to the 
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dynamics which shape the international management of political economy which 
is itself shaped by the dominant economy). These institutional forms are to a 
degree internal to capitalist dynamics but also the product of ‘codified social 
relations’ or historically sedimented structured action. The regime of 
accumulation that has emerged from the US, as a neo-fordist alternative, thus 
generates a dynamic towards marketisation that is unprecedented, as expressed 
through its institutional forms. Adaptation to the US’s new liberal regime of 
accumulation entail engagement with market led logics which structure its neo 
fordist model of capitalism.        
 
Regulation Theory also posits the necessary compatibility between economic 
and extra economic regulation, an ensemble of institutions that have the potential 
to stabilise a growth regime as a ‘mode of regulation’. Economic regulation and 
‘societellization’ provide institutional forms which stabilise (or not) the regime of 
accumulation. The mode of regulation of neo-fordism is the level at which neo-
liberal ideology has been most hegemonic with requisite impact on the regime of 
accumulation. It posits that market logics are best applied to all levels of human 
activity replacing socio political regulation of social systems of production with 
neo-classical economic regulation and the penetration of market dynamics into 
the extra/non-economic dimensions of social relations, what Habermas has 
called the lifeworld (Habermas, 1989). Thus it is the neo-classical economism 
prevalent in the institutional logics of regulation which replace a potential politico-
social infrastructure which would stabilise a potential growth regime. This leads 
to what Robert Boyer has referred to as a ‘potentially explosive’ combination of 
market dynamics (Boyer 2002 p15) Thus the critique of neoclassical economics, 
a central guiding principle of neo liberal theory, is an important strand of the 
Regulation theorists critical approach. 
 
Regulation Theory presents itself as an alternative to the hegemony of neo-
classical economics. It has critiqued neo-classical economics on the basis of the 
methodological individualism that is at the heart of its ontology. The concept of a 
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universal rationally maximising individual operating out of self interest and 
providing a constant for understanding economic/human behaviour is patently 
unsustainable at either the theoretical or empirical level. Regulation theory posits 
the importance of institutions i.e. rules, norms and knowledge, which are socially 
produced, as orienting social actors in their economic behaviour. Collective 
actors and institutions pre-exist individuals, the social is deposited in the 
individual in terms of guiding activities. Actors only engage in economic 
behaviour via a density of existing rules, behaviours and knowledge which arise 
from their social position within given historical time. Macro institutional 
structures, as recounted above, provide meta rules, behaviours and knowledge 
that structure both economic and social life. However, contrary to an overtly 
structuralist take on human behaviour, Regulation Theory points to the degree to 
which macro institutional and meso institutional practices are the outcome of 
struggles between social groups ‘arbitrated via political and legal processes’ 
(Boyer, 2002, p 17). Thus the social scientific ontology of regulation theory 
provides an understanding of economic behaviour of individuals that challenges 
the naturalism of neo-classical economics and helps to illustrate how that 
theoretical presupposition itself, presents an instance of ideology.  
 
Regulation theory is equally critical of some of the other axioms of neoclassical 
economics that structure so much of political economic strategy of globalised 
capitalism. Accompanying the universality of rational maximisation are two other 
bad universalisms, the concept of equilibrium and the promotion of interaction 
through ‘the sole intermediary of a group of interdependent markets’ (Boyer, 
2002 p 4). For Regulation Theory, equilibrium is the exception in capitalism and 
indicative of its inherent instability. It is the reason that extra economic factors are 
necessary to stabilise the mode of production and the reason why new growth 
regimes are necessary as it is inevitably prone to crisis. Thus, the Regulation 
School avoids assuming consistency in the mode of production or predicting the 
end of capitalism only through theoretically viable structural modelling. It is better 
positioned to analyse change in the form of emerging growth regimes ( e.g. from 
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Fordism to neo-Fordism), and how these substantive changes in the mode of 
production occasion conjunctive moments of change in the mode of regulation or 
vice versa (the latter being a composite of institutional forms). A key point here is 
that macro institutional change is not the outcome of free floating ideology but is 
anchored in the necessity of finding a socio institutional adjustment to structure 
emerging growth regimes, levels at which the logics of capital asserts itself. This 
leads to the last axiom of neoclassical economics, that interdependent markets 
offer the best means of organising systems of social production. Here is where 
we can locate the predominance of market logics in meso-institutional 
adjustments and the consequent universalisation of regulatory adjustment to 
market logics and market practices. The meso institutional adjustments of the 
previous 30 years and their rootedness in neoclassical economics have been 
predicated on the infallibility of markets in organising human systems of 
production and social relations more generally. In the six institutional forms noted 
above the logics of market efficiency are dominant in the emergent regime of 
accumulation whereras neoclassical economics structure supposedly extra 
economic dimensions of the mode of regulation. Whether it be in relation to 
wages, money and credit, competition, the state form or the international regime, 
the logic and reforms of the market have become a principle axiom of economic 
growth. Marketisation as an underlying logic of macro institutional reform has 
been universalised as a bridge to a new growth regime via the pivotal hegemony 
of the US in the international system and varied responses to that hegemony 
though processes such as Europeanization. For the Regulation approach, it is 
the regime of accumulation, the new capitalist form of the late 20thC that is 
loaded with de-regulatory and re-regulatory dynamics, not just the neoclassical 
schooled modes of its regulation.                      
     
2.2.6) Political Economy   
Following Suzanne Strange (1994) and, from an Irish perspective, Peadar Kirby 
(2002), Political Economy (PE) provides an analytical frame for understanding 
the relationship between states and markets as the outcome of political choice. 
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This is thus one of the macro institutional forms identified by the Regulation 
School that structure a regime of accumulation. Political authority shapes the 
relationship between economic development and civic, political and social 
citizenship. This reintroduces the problem of structured power relations, relative 
to state/market relations, into debates over recent innovation in state forms. 
 
Political Economy (incorporating the institutionalist variant of Regulation Theory) 
more generally refers to the interplay of social relations which shape the 
production distribution and consumption of resources in society. Of importance 
here, is an understanding of the embeddedness of economic systems within 
political contexts and their consequences for particular social groups and society 
as a whole. Political economy scholars take many different approaches to the 
role of power relations within the nexus of political and economic power. One 
particular strand places emphasis on the structural relationships between state, 
market and society. The state/market/society relationship theorises the 
relationships between markets and authority as the outcome of general value 
systems and the implications they have for different social groupings (Strange, 
1994). Referring back to Regulation Theory, this framework represents one 
strand in the macro institutional forms which structure economic behaviour and 
point to the complexity of power relations which are inherent in any given political 
economy. The changing form of the state relative to its relationship with the 
market can signal new forms of state strategies which may offer success in 
relation to economic criteria relative to a given states insertion into the 
international regime, but, will entail power relations relative to the relationship 
between authorities and markets that need also to be assessed on the basis of 
their social contexts and consequences.    
 
According to Kirby’s review of political economy approaches in the Irish context, 
state/market political economy tends to be empirically oriented, less dependent 
on theoretical exegeses and primarily focussed on providing detailed research 
accounts of ‘how economic and social processes interact in a particular way and 
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from which policy and theory could usefully be informed’ (Kirby, 2002, pp96). If 
there are benefits to be gained from the pragmatic nature of political economic 
analysis along these lines there are, according to Kirby, also shortfalls as the 
theoretical gain are somewhat neglected in favour of empirical analysis. Kirby 
suggests a combination of insights from the work of Karl Polanyi and Susanne 
Strange as offering more theoretical grounding for a critical political economy 
approach. Susanne Strange posits power as central to the question of balance of 
influence that is achieved between political authority and markets. Whether this 
power is structurally wielded through setting the rules of the game or agentially 
expressed through direct political will, it is the outcome of power relations. This 
directly ties into Regulation Theory’s concept of macro-institutional arrangements 
being the outcome of codified social relations, power expressed and struggled 
over in everyday settings, leading to greater sedimentations of power through 
institutionalisation. Kirby also points to the historical insights of Karl Polanyi to 
elucidate the historically specific nature of fault-lines between markets and socio 
institutional practices, the latter which stabilises the former and the former which 
threatens the latter if over-extended to become the chief means of organising 
exchange in these spheres. The maintenance of spheres of influence that exist 
as social relations, beyond the necessities of capital accumulation, offer an 
alternative to systems logics that tend to carry neo-classical presumptions, and 
benefit the interests of capital and/or narrow interest groups. 
 
An important related concept in political economy/state theory is that of 
governance. Distinct from government it has been defined by Bob Jessop as the 
‘co ordination of complex and reciprocal interdependences’ (Jessop, 2005). 
Governance can occur as constitutive combinations of bureaucratic governance, 
market governance and networked governance and is operationalised at different 
levels of experience, such as the global, supranational, national, regional and 
local. The degree to which states rely on each of these governance styles and 
interact with governance levels, can be an indicator/shaper of the prevailing state 
market relations in the overall state form. However, it is a necessary caveat to 
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stress that management of the economy can occur with different emphases of 
these governance styles relative to specific spheres and subsystems of 
production/re-production. Also, the degree to which states are instrumental in 
shaping markets and market relations points to new levels of state 
interventionism, called neo-interventionism, wherein intervention acts to correct 
market failure and shape markets without unduly interrupting the logic of market 
operation (Jessop, 2005).           
 
2.2.7) Neo Institutionalism  
New institutionalism is the meso level analysis of institutions as separate from 
the framework of Regulation Theory. It links in with Regulation Theory and 
Political Economy on the basis of its focus on one instance of macro level 
institutionalism, i.e., analysis of the relationship between formal political systems 
and economic dynamics. At the level of neo-institutionalism, we find an analytical 
frame for understanding how the institutional components of the state/economy 
absorb, negotiate and express the structural affects of macro institutional change 
as outlined by the Regulation school. It is this frame which positions the formal 
organisations where policy is made, and where the pressures and emphases of 
macro and meso institutional change and the state/market negotiation of this 
change is both manifested and articulated. Neo instituionalism is the nexus 
where macro institutional adjustments meet local institutional arrangements.  
 
Institutions refer to recognisable patterns of ‘doing things’ that are codified in 
social relations and reproduced over time and space in individual, organisational 
and societal contexts which have relevance for different levels of governance and 
are relative to different subsystems of human organisation. Institutions are 
produced by their environment, generalised to different fields of activity and find 
expression in the organisations that make up these fields. Neo institutionalism 
provides a bridge between the macro institutionalism of Regulation Theory and 
the meso contexts within which formal organisations operate within particular 
fields of activity. It thus provides a means of considering the ways in which the 
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macro institutional changes (and their market underpinnings) analysed by the 
Regulation School have meaning and consequences for different fields of human 
activity and the organisations which structure those fields, which may, for 
example, be at the national level. The myriad formal organisations which 
structure a given field of activity adapt to contextual institutional pressures 
relevant to the acceptable ‘ways of doing things’ which then tends to reproduce 
patterns of behaviour, norms, rules and knowledge across organisational fields 
(Powell, 2007). Powell and DiMaggio have identified coercive (force), normative 
(value based) and mimetic (imitation) processes as being the key ways in which 
‘ways of doing’ things are institutionalised/diffused. Neo institutionalism further 
draws on Scott’s identification of ‘three pillars of the institutional order’, those of 
the cognitive (knowledge), regulative (maximisation) and normative (values) , 
point to the way in which ways of doing things are legitimised and generalised to 
formal organisations such as public service broadcasters, policy makers and 
regulators (Galperin, 2004). If we follow the Regulation School analysis of market 
innovation as occurring at the level of institutional adjustment, then, by coercive, 
mimetic and normative processes of reproduction these logics are diffused and 
re-produced at the meso institutional level of cognitive, regulative and normative 
legitimacy across given fields of activity. 
 
Neo-institutionalist proponents are aware of the overly structuralist interpretations 
of their work and point to the degree to which cognitive, normative and regulative 
legitimacy is struggled over. Historical institutionalism, for example, points to the 
phenomena of path dependency wherein institutional paths taken in the past 
have implications and causal consequences in the present. Other scholars such 
as Colin Hay point to the role of ideas in shaping institutional pathways whereas 
further branches point to the complexity of institutional practices at work across 
different fields of activity as creating variance in institutional practices (Hay, 
2004). It is thus important to take on board the multi causal dimensions that 
characterise institutional diffusion. However, taking into account such caveats 
does not detract from tracing the causal consequences of structural change.  
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To distil this into concrete terms, the following hypothesis emerges. The long 
down turn has prompted varied responses in the search for the basis for a new 
growth regime. The move towards a neo-fordist, informational, global economy 
as accompanied by attendant macro institutional re-design along the six 
institutional forms identified by Regulation Theory, channels market logic as 
inimical to the ‘new growth regime’. The US has been to the fore of such an 
adjustment in the last thirty years and through its shaping of the processes of 
globalisation. Through the diffusion of these logics via the US’s hegemony and in 
the organisational arrangements involved in the development of global 
governance, meso institutional adjustments across different organisational fields 
have diffused the logic of neoclassical economics to the organisations which 
structure those fields, albeit, as contested by social struggle and institutional 
inertia.          
 
2.2.8) Policy Studies  
To understand the international level of broadcasting governance, the national 
context of governance and the performance of the outcomes of policy against the 
normative dimensions of public communications policy it is necessary to do so 
through a number of inter-related frames already referred to throughout the 
framework. The external determinants relate to those constitutive factors of 
technological change, spatial re-ordering, socio-cultural developments and, 
particularly political economic transformations (the shift to market governance in 
response to structural changes in the economic realm) (Humphreys, 1996). 
Reactions to these contextual factors will be considered through the process of 
governance which, influenced by ideas, interests and institutions, contextualises 
policy making which moves through the cycle of agenda setting, policy formation, 
policy adoption, policy implementation and policy outcome. The site specific 
factors which impinge on this process include those of state, interest groups, 
ideologies, the assemblage of institutions and institutional interests at the varied 
levels of local, regional, national and supranational co-ordination. Policy 
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outcomes can then be judged against McQuail's criteria of access, freedom, 
control/accountability (or participation, representation and recognition) and added 
to this must be the degree to which these objectives are squared with the socio-
economic dimensions of public policy and the balance maintained between 
socio-cultural and economic objectives (McQuail and Van Cuilenberg, 2003). 
 
Model of structural and institutional dimensions of policymaking in 
communications 
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2.2.9) From Framework to Analysis: Policymaking and Institutionalisms 
The core claim of the theoretical framework is that policymaking is shaped by its 
location within a nexus of institutions. As is clear from the regulation school’s 
varied categories and tiers of analysis and the approaches of state theory within 
political economy and neo-institutionalism, there are different frames for the 
analysis of institutional relations relative to both the scale and content of the 
analysis. There are a number of centrally important insights and frames of 
analysis that arise from the theoretical framework as recounted above. Working 
backwards from the activity of policymaking, in terms of levels of abstraction, 
these frames of analysis are outlined below.  
 
1. Policymaking is the outcome of problem solving by formal organsiations 
operating within fields/subsystems that are shaped by institutional 
contexts affecting the knowledge, behaviour and strategy of policy making.  
2. The State provides the key context for policy making even as it contends 
with different levels of governance. The state is in itself a macro-
institutional form and in itself a key mediator of the other macro 
institutional forms. It is the point at which macro-institutional and meso 
institutional adjustments meet. 
3. The dynamics of institutional change, as recounted above, have two levels 
of expression; macro-institutional change and meso-institutional, the 
former accounted for in Regulation theory, the latter in neo-institutionalist 
analyses of governance. 
4. Macro institutional change relate to longitudinal changes in the mode of 
production and at the level of the regime of accumulation. This is one 
frame for institutional analysis, related to the impact of systemic logics of 
the macro institutional forms which structure a given regime of 
accumulation. 
5. The meso-instituional is a second frame of analysis related to the 
instituitional changes apparent in the ‘mode of regulation’. This is a 
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second institutional frame of analysis and is concerned directly with the 
institutional norms, behaviours and strategies inherent in modes of 
governance that attempt to regulate a regime of accumulation. 
6. All of these levels have consequences for policymaking and the 
expression of marketisation which is both systemic and ideological.     
 
This posits a number of questions/problems that will be addressed throughout 
the thesis; 
 
• How are macro institutional adjustments expressed in the field of 
broadcasting, particularly in relation to competition and the wage labour 
nexus and how does policy manifest these adjustments? 
• What are the norms, knowledges and strategies shaping broadcasting 
governance? 
• How does the state mediate relationships with the macro institutional form 
of the international regime and meso institutional emphases of different 
levels of governance? 
• How do these institutional changes affect the management of the balance 
between 1. economic activity, promoting the systemic and/or ideological 
norms of marketisation, and 2. citizenship with its civic, political and social 
norms? 
• Are macro and meso institutional changes a channel for marketisation, are 
there resistances/inhibitors at work within the institutional nexus of the 
state form and the different levels of governance? 
 
It is proposed that the key analytical frame here is an evaluation of the balance 
between market, bureaucratic and networked governance as an inpoint for wider 
observations relative to the market logics channelled through the institutional 
frames already recounted. This involves an evaluation of both the reliance on 
market mechanisms, the institution of market dynamics through governance 
activity and the development of regulatory systems that operate on the basis of 
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overseeing market activities relying on economic regulation and responsibility to 
the consumer.     
 
2.3) Regulation Theory and Media Theory 
Bob Jessop is not a media theorist per se, but his applications of Regulation 
Theory to the anglo-centric world have proved influential. His theorisations on 
post fordism has proved influential in the works of media scholars such as 
Katherine Sarikakkis, Maria Michalis and Terry Flew (Sarikkakis, 2006, Michalis, 
2008, Flew, 2007). Jessop's ongoing analysis of the shifting modes of 
accumulation and regulation provides a theoretically informed analysis of the 
after-fordist period. Jessop separates out the mode of accumulation into the 
labour process and the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation into 
the mode of economic regulation (organisational formations) and the mode of 
societelization (general social cohesion). According to Jessop, utilising these four 
key indicators of the mode of accumulation it is possible to indicate changes 
between different periods of capitalism’s long waves of development. The key 
differentiation between the emerging mode of accumulation and fordist mode can 
thus be outlined as follows.  
 
In relation to the Labour process,  
 
‘Fordism was characterised by mass production of consumer durables, 
typically on moving assembly lines tended by concentrated masses of semi 
or un-skilled labour. In contrast, ‘after fordism’ we have the production of 
consumer disposables by means of ‘flexible specialisation’ based 
increasingly on human and intellectual as opposed to material capital. In 
relation to the regime of accumulation, in fordism capital accumulates in a 
virtuous circle of rising production, productivity, wages, consumption and 
profits in which mass consumption is a key driver. In the period after fordism 
we have diversification of products for differentiated, polyvalent markets 
maximising profligacy, instantaneity and consumptional display'.  
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Moving to the mode of regulation,  
 
‘the mode of economic regulation in fordism relied on large-scale powerful 
steering systems to regulate economic activity, including monopolistic 
sloanist corporations, mass trade unions and bureaucratised state systems. 
Following Fordism, we have differentiated re-regulated and flexible labour 
markets, individual and enterprise contractualisation, smaller quasi-collegial 
organisations and rapidly accumulating credit and capital. In relation to the 
mode of societellization Fordist society is standardised and massified with a 
consistent emphasis on family nucleation, monocultural nationalism and 
bureaucratisation. Post Fordist Society has a hyper differentiated emphasis 
on difference, individuation, and reflective construction of taste’ (Waters, 
2001, pp215).   
 
The move from Fordism to Post Fordism thus appears, at least initially,to afford 
less of a role for the state in terms of providing the mode of regulation. This 
arises out of the perceived role of state failure in relation to the fordist period, a 
real inability of the state to project power in its present shape, the opportunism of 
capital, individual capitalisms and global financial capital, that arises of the states 
inability to project power, and the slow process of re constituting a mode of 
regulation in local national, supranational and global terms. In the shifting regime 
of accumulation there has also been a shift, as noted earlier, in investment 
strategies towards the 'distributive services' which include media, culture and 
communications goods and services (Castells, 1999).  
 
It follows that post fordist capitalism is also ‘informational’ and ‘reflexive’ as well 
as flexible and global (Wood and Isin, 1999). David Harvey and Scott Lash and 
John Urry have traced the interplay of post fordist restructuring with culture and 
communications pointing to the degree to which advanced capitalist economies 
have become ‘economies of signs and space’ (Harvey, 1989, Lash and Urry, 
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1994). Lash and Urry argue that late capitalism has become ‘disorganised 
capitalism’ in which the production and distribution of informational and aesthetic 
goods is central to the regime of accumulation. They propose that the culture 
industries have to a certain extent always been post fordist (that is, design and 
research intensive) in so far as informational and reflexive goods have always 
been produced, distributed and consumed in a flexible/reflexive way, dependent 
on network organisation. They argue that these characteristics are being 
generalised to all modes of production through the shifts from fordism to post 
fordism. Broadcasting, which was previously organised under Fordist dynamics, 
is thus increasingly subject to the post fordist logics which structure other cultural 
industries. However, the theoretical approaches of the Regulation school would 
infer a greater degree of caution in relation to emerging post-fordisms than either 
Jessop or Lash and Urry display. Their overall research project is careful to 
document continuities as well as changes and cautious in declaring world 
historical transitions if the evidence relative to change in the macro-insitutional 
forms is not present.    
 
Terry Flew has recently reflected upon the importance of Regulation Theory in 
relation to evaluating shifts in the mode of governance (relative to emerging 
modes of regulation) and their implications for media and communications policy 
(Flew, 2007). He suggests that what we are seeing is the transition to a new 
state form that can best be described as ‘the enabling state’ Flew pp. This is a 
model of state governance that sees the state moving into a position of enabling 
or promoting certain economic and social projects by intervening on the ‘supply 
side’ as opposed to the demand side. The enabling state is also the regulatory 
state in so far its dependence on the use of markets for co-ordination is 
accompanied by a regulatory infrastructure which oversees these markets. This 
is a far cry from the regulatory interventionist state of the short twentieth century, 
but states may retain an interventionist approach to their co-ordination of the 
market.  
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Because of these reorientations, the suitability of market governance has 
become hegemonic and is rarely challenged. However, it continues to be the 
case that there are political, economic and social purposes/norms that will not 
necessarily be addressed by an enabling state that acts purely as a market 
making state. Thus, an additional insight from Regulation Theory is as follows, 
whereas the market can play a productive role both economically and socially, 
marketisation per se, whether it is pragmatic or ideological, is quite simply the 
wrong response to the long downturn. As Flew has pointed out, one of the central 
insights of the Regulation school is that outright marketisation will hinder the 
emergence of new economic paradigms precisely because it often acts as a life 
support to unproductive segments of the economy and it ignores the need for 
institutional adjustment that secures social and cultural support and legitimization 
for a new regime of accumulation (Flew, 2007). So normative arguments aside, 
economic growth and future productivity will simply not be bedded in via 
marketisation and the State still has an interventionist role to play. The way in 
which these purposes/norms are most likely to be met are through the 
development of institutions aligned to social, political and cultural norms as 
opposed to simply rolling back towards Fordian statist solutions or rolling forward 
the market with light touch regulation. It can also be argued that the size of a 
state and its markets will have a particular inflection on its ability to successfully 
engage in steering markets and/or new modes of intervention. Further to this, the 
place of states within larger political economic formations will both constrain and 
enable it in certain respects, whereas finally, the failure of the market, its inability 
to marginalize market logic where necessary, is particularly acute in areas such 
as media and cultural production, education, health and political citizenship. All of 
the above are central to any developing mode of accumulation, be it 
informationalism, the knowledge based economy or networked economies, that 
claim to be based primarily on human capital (Boyer, 2001).          
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2.4) Critical political economy and communications 
Political economy is a central theoretical strand for analysing media production in 
media and communication studies. In the literature, political economy is 
employed in myriad different ways which are utilised in understanding the 
material conditions of policymaking in the present study. In its most general 
usage specific to the study of communications it is taken to refer to the ‘social 
relations and particularly the power relations that constitute the production, 
distribution and consumption of communication resources in society’ (Mosco, 
1996, p25). However, political economy as a discipline has many variants which 
employ different emphases in how they approach resource allocation and its 
implications. Mosco has proposed that critical political economy is the variant 
centrally concerned with the ‘power relations’, not just the social relations of 
economic production. Below is a brief overview of how the term political economy 
is employed involving critical, international, positive and institutional 
interpretations of the approach and what we know vis a vis its application; 
 
1. Political economy refers to the degree to which the economy is politically 
embedded and structured by power relations (Gandy, 1994) 
 
2. Political economy refers to the normative arrangements between state, 
market and society in specific social formations that arise out of socio-
historical dynamics. (Strange, 1994, Polanyi, 1975) 
 
3. Political economies are local, regional, national, supranational and global. 
(O’Riain, 2000, Castells, 1999) 
 
4. Political Economy refers to the limitations placed on human agency and 
activity vis a vis material and structural limitations, pressures and 
emphases. (Williams, 1974) 
 
5. Political Economy refers to the structural features of an economic system 
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that generates effects in areas of human experience organised under its 
logics. (Garnham, 2000) 
 
6. Political Economy refers to the political and economic actors, practices, 
projects and institutions which mediate the allocation of resources at 
varied levels of human activity such as the global supranational, national 
and local. (Galperin, 2004) 
 
Translated into specific questions related to the interplay of politics, economics, 
technology and society there are certain implications for the knowledge that we 
accept to be valid when approaching questions such as re-structuring in 
broadcasting. At a meta level it is clear that some of these formulations of 
political economy refer to structural dimensions of economics (Polanyi, 1975) 
whereas others have a more agent led bias (Galperin, 2004a). As such a 
combination of approaches alerts us to the interplay of structure and agency. 
However, to consider the variants listed, firstly, any political economy will 
generate a given set of social and power relations that are to a degree, 
structured by, and, reified in the political system and other social systems that 
are organised within that logic. Secondly, such power relations can be 
compromised under a given set of socio-historical conditions and within specific 
socio-cultural formations giving rise to differential state/market relations in given 
societies. It is this level of political economy that is central to the present thesis. 
Thirdly, political economies are generated and have generative effects at myriad 
levels of human organisation.  In the fourth case, at the level of structure, as a 
dominant mode of material provision the given features of a political economy 
places limitations on what is possible at given times of its internal dynamic of 
reproduction. In the fifth case, also at the level of structure, if the capital 
relationship is generalised to areas of social experience it can be expected that 
the expression of its internal logics will also have implications in that specific 
area, for instance economic productivity as opposed to social outcomes may 
become the bases for rationalisation of public services etc. In the last case, it is 
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recognised that the economy is as much a product of social relations as it is of its 
own internal logics. It is mediated at varied different levels by varieties of interest 
groups, social arrangements, institutions and organisations that have differential 
ability to shape the growth dynamic itself and shape its implications for social, 
political and cultural life. In this case we can reflect upon the globalisation of 
governance that has followed the internationalisation of capitalism in search of a 
spatio temporal fix in the last century. Various levels of agencies consisting of 
specific interests, ideologies, coalitions and pragmatisms, both stated and un 
stated, which inform the involvement with resource allocation, have contributed to 
what has been labelled the Washington Consensus as a paradigm for global 
political economic development (Held, 2004) . This represents a distilled ontology 
of political economy arising out of varied literature and approaches that operate 
under that description. This ontology underlines the general theoretical 
approaches of the political economy of communications, media and cultural 
studies drawn upon here.   
 
The political economy of communications represents a fundamental theoretical 
strand in the broad subject area of communications. Whether it is taken as being 
ecologically dominant (or essentialist) in terms of being the key determinant in 
constituting outcomes or a contingency amongst other factors, it is nevertheless 
recognised in myriad interdisciplinary studies. Both Mosco and Hesmondhalgh 
have catalogued the development of the critical political economy approach in 
communications and pointed to three broad strands identifiable as the 
UK/European, American and Third World schools. The European/UK, and 
especially the UK, is the key approach that underlines the present study. Central 
to the knowledge generated by the political economy approach is what it tells us 
about the economic characteristics of the cultural industries in general, particular 
institutions of cultural production (such as broadcasting, cinema, performance, 
music and new media), the interplay of politics and economics in relation to the 
influence of political, economic and social interest groups in shaping media 
structures and contents, the implications of funding, organisation and ownership 
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for the production and distribution of culture and public communication networks, 
the underlying conditions necessary for indigenous cultural production within a 
given socio-economic context and the relationship of the cultural industries and 
public communication structures with general political economy, for example, in 
relation to restructuring of the growth dynamic and marketisation . And, crucially, 
how all of these factors play a role in shaping the availability, origination, 
contents and limitations on cultural texts and what the consequences of these 
are for the cultural frames we draw upon to interpret our social realities and 
identities. These elements will be dealt with more thoroughly in the ensuing 
literature reviews but for the time being it is useful to reflect on Murdock and 
Golding's summation of the critical political economy approach in 
communications. According to the authors, critical political economy is; 1. holistic; 
2. historical; 3.concerned with the balance between capitalist enterprise and 
public intervention and; 4.goes beyond technical issues of efficiency to engage 
with basic moral questions of justice, equity and the public good (Murdock & 
Golding, 2000, pp72-73).  
 
One key theorist within the critical political economy tradition with relevance to 
the present thesis is Nicholas Garnham. Garnham points to the importance of 
political economy or the impact of the economic structure within communication 
practices. Firstly, any area organised under the logics of a given economic 
system will be subject to some of the emphases of that system. Thus the 
‘economy is determining because it produces systemic contexts which no single 
actor planned or desired’, but must act within. This is accurate, from the global to 
the national to the sectoral.  Secondly, the ‘complex system of specialisation of 
function and scale of co-ordination which the capitalist mode of production made 
possible is a necessary condition for the levels of production necessary to 
sustain societies at the size and with the complex characteristics they now have’ 
(Garnham, 2000, pp42). 
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In recent years Garnham has elaborated on the political economy of 
communication through analyses of the fault line between public ownership 
structures, the increasing centrality of the cultural industries to advanced 
capitalism, the global and European integration of cultural markets, technological 
change, and, the role of regulation in ensuring optimal outcomes for democratic 
processes (Garnham 1990, 1999C, 2000).  As such Garnham has developed a 
sub field within the discipline that he himself has termed 'information politics' 
(Garnham, 1999a). In general information politics can be summed up in the 
proposition that 'who gets to say what to whom, in what form, for what purposes 
and with what effect is both determined by and determining of political, economic 
and social structures' (Garnham, 2000). Garnham’s conceptualisation of 
information politics entails a close consideration of the changing structures of 
public communication and in particular their implications for public policy, 
especially public service broadcasting. In a key passage from Capitalism and 
Communication Garnham outlines the broad concerns of information politics as 
follows;  
 
‘Within the political realm the individual is defined as a citizen exercising 
political rights of debate, voting etc within a communally agreed structure of 
rules and towards communally defined ends. The value system is 
essentially social and the legitimate end of social action is the public good. 
Within the economic realm on the other hand, the individual is defined as 
producer and consumer exercising private rights through purchasing power 
in the market in the pursuit of private interests, his or her actions being co-
ordinated by the invisible hand of the market’ (Garnham, 1990).  
 
Whereas Garnham has previously underlined the genuinely libratory potential of 
the market in delivering cultural goods, he suggests that a mixed economy in 
cultural production provides guards against both state and market failure and an 
imbalance between the socio-political and economic value systems. It is on this 
premise that the increasingly ‘less mixed’ economy of communication becomes a 
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concern and the overall process of marketisation in political economy prompts a 
paradigm shift in how communication structures are developing and how 
questions of production, distribution, representation and policy are conceived. 
 
Garnhams’ political economy also has significance for the analysis of media 
systems relative to their national economic contexts, available market size, and 
their geographic and demographic characteristics. Part of the determining nature 
of political economy is that any given national media system is structured by the 
material resources available for media production and consumption.  The 
‘amount of resources made available for communication is determined by the 
amount of economic surplus in general’ (Garnham, 2000, pp43). We can see this 
dynamic at work in different national media systems; the range of different 
communication media and their level of output is closely tied to GDP and 
disposable income; the availability of advertising revenue is relative to population 
size, the availability of talent is also relative to population size and the availability 
of consumers time is relative to available leisure time. The resources available 
within national media systems for production and consumption also tends to re-
enforce the influence of media output and structure in the international system as 
well as the strengths and influence of the relevant national government in 
international media governance. This analysis has particular relevance for a 
small media state such as Ireland.      
 
2.5) Institutionalism and communications policy analysis 
Whereas state/market relationship analysis resides at the level of classical 
political economy, and is centrally concerned with the balance between states, 
markets and societies ‘new institutionalism’ tends to operate more so on meso 
and micro levels. Hernan Galperin, citing Peter Hall, has defined Karl Polanyi's 
as the meta level at which institutionalist policy analysis can work, i.e. the 
analysis of the basic organisational arrangements associated with the state and 
economy such as formal democracies and market economies. In Galperin’s 
institutionalist analysis of communications policy he distinguishes the meso level 
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of a political institutionalism as being concerned with the specific organisational 
arrangements of the state such as (political) regime type, the organisation of 
interest groups, the electoral system and the regulatory design. Here, 
institutionalism regularly refers to 'recognisable formal organisations of social, 
political and economic life' it also refers to the 'informal arrangements such as 
routine organisational procedures and accepted behavioural norms’ (March and 
Olsen, 1984, cited in Galperin, 2004A, p163). It is the former which is the variety 
of meso-institutionalism utilised in the present research. And finally, the micro 
level consists of 'the standard procedure and routines of bureaucratic agencies' 
(Galperin, 2004A, p163). As is evident from this tiered structure the new 
institutionalism is sensitive to the meta determinants of policy making in a way 
that makes it compatible with political economy approaches. Policymaking does 
not occur in a vacuum but in specific socio historical sites with both general and 
particular pressures and emphases bearing down on policy makers. However, 
the neo institutionalist approach to policy analysis, as outlined by Galperin, does 
take as its starting point, the state and state structures that absorb these 
pressures at local, national and international levels of governance. But policy 
making is not simply seen as a pluralistic exercise arising out of countervailing 
state-level institutional arrangements. As Galperin suggests, whereas policy is 
not reducible to the preferences of powerful interest groups, access to the policy 
process is widely divergent. On the latter point he suggests that 'in order to 
understand why certain stakeholders are consistently favoured over others, why 
only certain governments are capable of pressing reforms and others are not, or 
why diffused interests are represented in some cases but not in others, it is 
necessary to examine the institutional fabric that underlies the making of 
information and communication policies' (Galperin, 04). This is not to say that 
interest groups and ideologies do not have an impact on policy formation, they 
patently do, it is more so the case that they do when they match the structural 
orientation of state and supranational institutions relative to institutional 
knowledges, behaviours and incentives  (Jessop, 2001). Thus state goals and 
activities and the political economy of governance both structure the playing field 
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upon which ideologies and interest groups realise success in influencing policy. 
Institutions of policymaking are constituted by both the political economy of 
governance and the statist strategies towards which governance is oriented. And, 
space must be allowed for the potential of policymakers to influence institutional 
preferences from within those institutions.             
  
What emerges from the institutional literature is that states, depending on their 
size and GNP, are still relevant in relation to the construction and structuring of 
new media markets and significant political effort is being expended in the 
development of communications networks to the degree that convergence may 
be described as politically led but executed through markets. In relation to the 
regulatory environment, policy makers are engaged in different capacities in 
securing the development of a regulatory environment that ensures continuity for 
existing operators and continuity of levels of regulation for a new paradigm, but 
are critically circumscribed by the market methods and public/market power 
imbalance. At national, supranational and global level the interplay of interest 
groups has been crucial in shaping the agenda of policy making and national 
influencing of supranational policy has led to smaller nations being potentially 
wrong footed by regulatory regimes suited to larger mediascapes.  
 
Thus, from the Regulation School we may suggest, at a materialist level, one 
institutional change is the form of state/government intervention in the economy 
as an institutional change that is part of a wider architectural restructuring 
pursued to develop a new mode of accumulation. Thus the state becomes the 
enabling state intervening on the supply side. One of the activities or goals of this 
new state intervention is to realise the media/communications as a sector of the 
post industrial knowledge based economy, to open it up for capitalistic 
diversification or otherwise. This is generalised to the meso level of policy 
making. This in itself is then underlined by a habitual or negotiated recourse to 
the state market relationship (macro political economy) that is involved in 
achieving the aim. What type of market structure? What role for regulation? What 
Chapter Two 
 
47 
 
form of competition/property/exchange will prevail? How will extant public policy 
be translated into the environment? What role for public enterprise? What are the 
wider political, cultural and social goals of such an approach? Should the market 
be marginalised for the purpose of these and other extra economic goals? The 
state/market approach is thus a lynchpin in the search for a new mode of 
accumulation and the degree to which it will have a wider developmental agenda. 
Crucially however, policy is linked to state activity and the institutional expression 
of governance and state policy, its activities, its goals its resources and its 
machinery. However, according to Boyer the state or supra state should not 
mistake the US market led adjustment as being the basis for its successful 
growth regime.    
 
2.6) Normative theory and media/communications public policy analysis   
In western media systems, Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) no longer 
represents a holistic broadcasting system, but instead can be conceived of as 
individual institutions in politically shaped markets. Public service broadcasting 
has survived as a social institution but is increasingly subject to market liberal 
criteria for fiscal responsibility and efficiency whilst circumscribed by its position 
in an open media and communciations market. However public policy, in order to 
remain legitimate in democratic societies, must still concern itself with the 
normative dimensions of media, cultural and communications policy. These 
norms have historically arisen from the media’s relationship to democracy, 
pluralism and equity, and their expression within given societies. Denis McQuail 
and Jan Van Cuilenberg propose that the key policy goals of the digital, 
international, market co-ordinated media system will be issues of freedom, 
access and control/accountability. However, it is arguable that these are policy 
concerns that have had historical expression in media systems and have been 
addressed for example, in broadcasting policy through the emergence of 
universal access, universal service, public service and diversity and plurality 
criteria. As such they are norms that tend to be agreed upon but are given 
different emphases relative to the social, political and cultural position of a given 
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group or individual. In this research the benchmarks of the public sphere arising 
from Habermassian debates, but by no means restricted to Habermas’ 
conception of it, provide benchmarks for the political functioning of public media 
systems. In terms of the cultural policy dimensions, the concept of cultural 
citizenship also provides normative criteria for how public policy should address 
issues of plurality and solidarity in advanced capitalist nations. It is proposed that 
these approaches connect to a wider organisational concept of social justice in 
the 21st century relative to issues of redistribution, representation and recognition 
(Fraser, 1995, Sarikakis, 2006).   
 
2.7) Broadcasting, digitalisation and socially shaped technology  
Positing marketisation as a key phenomena arising from institutional change and 
constituting the structure of broadcasting de-centres technological developments, 
such as information communication development, as a key narrative in the 
transformation in broadcasting structures. Underlining the political economic 
determinants in the constitution of media as a social institution, it is argued that 
technologies of media are ‘socially shaped’. Social shaping theory turns the oft 
posed problem of the ‘impact of technological change on society’ on its head, 
and asks instead ‘to what extent and how, does the kind of society we live in 
affect the kind of technology we produce’ (MacKenzie and Wacjman 1999). The 
characteristics of any social formation play a considerable role in constituting 
which technologies are produced, how they come to be diffused and whether or 
not they are open or closed systems. The simultaneous discoveries of 
comparative technologies in atomised conditions throughout history suggest that 
technology development is indeed a social rather than individualist phenomenon. 
The economic conditions that shape technological development are reason 
enough to see technology as inextricably part of society. The economy, which is 
also characterised as being independent of society, is ‘politically and socially 
embedded and structured by power relations’ (Gandy, 1994). At a preliminary 
level it can be appreciated that many of the early industrial technological leaps 
are down to concerted efforts to eliminate uneconomical and inefficient elements 
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from an overall technological system. Following on from this it is also true that 
economic laws and economic calculation are specific to ‘particular forms of 
society, not universal’ (MacKenzie and Wacjman 1999). Thus where labour 
saving calculations may figure largely in one specific set of social relations it may 
pose a threat to social order in another. Social relations as defined and affected 
by economic organisation, thus shape technology. However other factors such as 
gender and conditions of patriarchy inform social relations which can also shape 
technology. Social need created by changed social relations may or may not 
bring forth new technologies that meet that need. Politically, the states’ 
historically symbiotic (as opposed to dependent) relationship to national capital 
through national security has encouraged its sponsorship of military technology 
research, which within the capitalist criteria of profit and loss may never have 
occurred. A key consequence of the social shaping approach to technology and 
society is the possibilities it opens up for thinking about the future of 
technologies. Technology may be shaped by openly deliberated decisions which 
originate from society as a whole rather than as an inflection of existing power 
relations. Whereas this possibility does not imply success it creates an agenda 
for non-positivist reasoning and action. It also allows for the reclamation of the 
history of technology from the technological determinist approaches that have 
colonised it thus far. However, as a counterbalance it must be stressed that this 
line of reasoning does not deny the reality that technology has effects. 
 
2.7.1) Media Technology and Society 
This brief overview of approaches to structural change in the media leads directly 
to the question of media technology and the current wisdom that they are central 
factors in ushering in an information ‘revolution’ (Negroponte 1994). It is 
suggested that an overview of the history of media technology centring on 
broadcasting provides a more measured view of the current environment. In his 
study of the history of media technology, Brian Winston has observed patterns of 
change which have lead him to propose a model for understanding change and 
developments in communication technology.  In Winston’s model these ‘patterns 
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implicitly suggest the primacy of the social sphere as the site of these activities 
conditioning and determining technological developments’ (Winston, 1998). 
Science and technology intersect within the social sphere and are thereby both 
constituted by it. The social sphere as such maintains consistency between the 
past and the future, debunking the myth that new technologies result in wholly 
new social relations even as they may change social interaction. In synoptic 
terms, Winston proposes a number of key stages through which all technologies 
go, whether the product of individual inventors or industrialised innovation. At 
base level the scientific competence must pre-exist as a basis for development. 
For example, the scientific understanding of electricity must pre-exist for Edison’s 
light bulb to be a possibility. Next, ideation needs to occur, that is, a technologist 
or any number of technologists must envisage an ‘invention-to be’ at some level, 
regardless of their ability to create it. Eventually the ideation phase will lead to 
the creation of some working prototypes if scientific and technological ability (not 
necessarily knowledge) allow it. The transformation from prototype to invention 
and the further diffusion of that invention into a social technology depends on the 
social sphere providing a ‘supervening social necessity’. A supervening social 
necessity usually takes the shape of (1) that occasioned by the consequences of 
another technological development; (2) a complex of social forces working 
directly on the processes of innovation and (3) commercial needs. To take an 
example, the locomotive made the transformation from prototype to invention 
through the social complex of industrial capitalism. In turn the telegraph which 
had existed in various prototypes for a number of years previously only found a 
supervening social necessity with the development of the railroads. An invention 
may then move into the ‘market place’ and its diffusion is once again determined 
by supervening social necessity. Also technologies may be produced directly for 
the market place, e.g. consumer technologies such as digital music players, 
digital cameras, games consoles etc However, whereas a supervening social 
necessity may accelerate an invention into society, the existing social sphere 
may also apply the brakes to technologies that threaten upheaval or even ‘radical 
potential’. A recent example would be the use of the law by the established music 
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industry to suppress the music network file share software, Napster, and its 
subsequent efforts to create a pay network along the same lines as Napster. It is 
Winston’s contention that new communication technologies are thus the outcome 
of socio-political development and are routinely absorbed into the existing social 
fabric without major changes in social relations. Whereas technology may have 
de-stabilising effects within capitalist structures they rarely, on their own, 
destabilise a social order. It is within this framework that we come to 
broadcasting. From Winston we take forward the knowledge that any history of 
broadcasting as a technological medium will have to be a socio-political-
economic one as well as a technological one.  
 
2.7.2) Technological change, the new media and market failure 
Technology led arguments suggest that technological innovation has created the 
means whereby barriers to entry in broadcasting will eventually be reduced, and 
thus, extant public policy will soon be rendered obsolete . Such arguments 
appear to be the result of technological determinist reasoning and a blurring of 
the ontology of already existing media (the old Media) with the convergent media 
of the web/internet (new media). History demonstrates that old media are rarely if 
ever replaced by new media, even as they mutually constitute each others 
development (Holmes, 2005). Further to this, as demonstrated above, 
broadcasting as a particular mode of social communication compliments and co-
exists with others and therefore fulfils a social need within a particular socio-
historical matrix, this will only change if socio-historical conditions radically 
change, (Williams, 1974). And lastly, as above, the political economy of 
broadcasting sketched above demonstrates how particular institutional features 
emerge out of and around the co-constitution of media, relative to its media 
specific features. The economics of broadcasting, the organizational logic of 
broadcasting organisations, the legislative basis of broadcasting, the regulatory 
structure of broadcasting, scheduling, prime time, generic convention, the role of 
broadcasting in political communication, audience expectations etc, will not 
disappear and in fact will persist into the digital environment without sudden or 
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radical alteration.  
  
The current emphasis on information communication technology (ICT) and its 
promotion by political and economic interests can lead to the inference of a 
homology between the rhetoric of digital emancipation and all digital media. 
However the history of digital networking technology, as with the history of 
broadcasting (following chapter), is indicative of how technology is both socially 
produced and socially shaped, displaying its own communicative profile and 
emerging institutional/systems features (Wacjkman and MacKenzie, 1999). This, 
however, does not deflect attention from political and economic agency and its 
constitution of the uses, design, regulation, promotion and diffusion of new 
technologies, whatever their origin (Sussman, 1997, Williams, 1974, Winston 
1998, Galperin 2004B). Digital Television has emerged out of a variety of 
emphases. Centrally it is linked to the development of a new technological 
system emerging under the banner of digital communication technology and 
media. At the basis of ICT’s, digitalisation has allowed for networked one to one 
or one to many communication providing the user has access to networks, 
hardware and software, and, these are designed to be interoperative and 
interconnected (cf Winston and Lister et al for a history of the internet and the 
web, Winston, 1998, Lister et al 2003). Whereas the web/internet is a fully 
convergent media, however, the characterization of all digitised media as 
convergent tends to be driven by ideological and economic agendas. Movements 
towards a fully digital television system have a different history to the internet and 
the web and are illustrative of political, economic, social and commercial 
agencies involvement in the adoption of existing media and their communications 
technology to an emerging technological paradigm. Digital Television has been 
shaped by the move to develop high technology economies and create the 
appropriate infrastructure for the development of reflexive, informational and 
knowledge intensive economies. In Europe the project has been organised under 
the rubric of the information society and latterly the knowledge based economy. 
The degree to which this technological emphasis has asserted itself in the realm 
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of broadcasting occurs at a number of different levels and can be seen to the 
outcome of political planning and its attempts to harness market resources. The 
waltz between political and economic interests manifests itself in the overall 
structure and deployment of the technology in relation to, on the one hand, the 
preferring of private development above public investment, and on the other, 
political attempts to re-interpret the public interest within an overall economic 
rationale (Humphreys and Patterson, 1988). As with Winston’s analyses of 
previous technological innovations there are considerable forces acting to shape 
the deployment of digitalisation and minimise disruption within broadcasting, 
however, unlike Winston’s analyses of innovation in broadcasting, there are 
technological emphases that enable unexpected and pervasive change in the 
organisation and practice of digital communication that, for once, can be 
accurately described as disruptive (Christensen, 1997). To begin with, 
digitalisation enables compression which will allow for the transmission of a 
vastly increased amount of channels. Digitalisation allows information to be 
transmitted from dispersed settings, across multiple networks and accessed in a 
non-linear fashion that also opens it to manipulation. However, whereas this is 
what the technology enables it is not guaranteed that this is what will occur. It is 
often posited that these various characteristics of digital are de facto rationale for 
why market failure will no longer pertain in digitally networked distribution 
environments. However, whereas broadcasting is increasingly becoming 
integrated within the architecture of digital networks it is not necessarily 
comparable to the organisation/institutions/ or communicative profiles of the 
internet/web. It is worth noting then, that the post fordist industrial logics for 
broadcasting will most likely alter the norms of production, distribution and 
consumption, but not all of its social, cultural and economic characteristics.      
 
Whereas technological change will have a pervasive impact on the production, 
distribution and regulation of broadcasting, tendencies to market failure will still 
persist, and, thus so to will public service rationale in policy and regulation 
towards broadcasting (Garnham, 1999B). Graham and Davies have argued that 
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technologically based arguments for complete de-regulation of the broadcasting 
sector are highly ideological and considerably flawed (Graham, 1997, Graham 
and Davies, 1999). Centrally, concentration and monopoly are likely to persist in 
multichannel and/or digital environments. In relation to production, fixed costs will 
remain high because the key costs in broadcasting, talent, craft and staff for 
original programming and high costs for acquisitions will persevere. Thus entry 
costs will remain high and concentration will ensue. In addition to this, economies 
of scope will, in a digital environment, encourage a higher degree of cross media 
mergers and concentration. In distribution, proprietary control will persist in 
relation to the deployment of Electronic Programme Guides (EPG), Conditional 
Access Systems (CAS) and Application Protocol Interface (API), all technological 
elements of the set top box architecture through which multichannel television 
arrives. Established channel packagers, distributors and technology proprietors 
will thus have significant control over the access of consumers to broadcasters 
and vice versa. These issues all find an inflection in what Van Cuilenberg has 
referred to as the emerging shifting policy issues of access, competition and 
diversity (McQuail and VanCuilenberg, 2003). In relation to consumption, this 
latter point is instructive. Consumers will have access to choice on the terms of 
monopoly providers who also determine the menus, prompts and guides through 
which the programming is delivered. In general, these issues point to the future 
necessity of intervention and regulation in the digital environment. However, with 
such strong caveats against marketisation in broadcasting, the question still 
arises as to why and how the market has become the central mechanism in 
broadcasting development.              
  
2.8) Marketisation and broadcasting  
The exhaustion of the previous growth paradigm, the changing investment 
strategies of capital, the potential convergence of broadcasting, 
telecommunications and information communication technology, the increasing 
centrality of reflexive and communication goods, services and infrastructures to 
advanced post fordist capitalism have all meant that Broadcasting has been at 
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the centre of processes of marketisation arising out of reactions to the long 
downturn. The changing political economy of broadcasting in Europe has been 
documented in detail by both liberal pluralist and critical communication scholars 
(Blumler, 1992 Dyson and Humphreys, 1990, Mc Quail and Siune, 1998,  Tracey, 
1998, Garnham, 1990, Murdock and Golding, 2000, Curran and Seaton, 2003) 
with the broad shift from a public service system of broadcasting to mixed 
economies, and the growth of corporate power within overall market structure 
being well documented.  
 
At present a brief sequential outline of marketisation in broadcasting points to; 
1. An initial development of commercial elements within the overall public service 
system,  
2. Liberalisation through cabling followed by liberalisation through satellite, as the 
potential of new technologies becomes a policy priority  
3. A re-regulation of domestic broadcasters to allow for lighter touch content 
regulation and ownership regulation in order to allow a more level playing field (in 
relation to lightly regulated global corporations) and the creation of national 
champions,  
4. Re-regulation and supply side intervention to encourage market interests to 
sink investment into digitalization.  
5. Moves towards the promotion, creation and regulation of convergent markets 
with new emphases on extant public broadcasters as both the focus of, on the 
one hand, neo-interventionism and on the other, regulatory scrutiny vis a vis 
market power, competition and trading practices.  
6. The incorporation of broadcasting into the creative industries paradigm with 
requisite policy attention to its developmental as an internationally traded 
service/commodity. 
 
These developments towards marketisation all involve manoeuvring at the 
parallel institutional levels of the national, global and supranational. At a global 
level the potential of developing hardware, software and distribution markets has 
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incentivised the major trading blocks to develop policy in this area whilst trying to 
influence the developing global trade agenda. Thus the US, with its perceived 
comparative advantage in entertainment production has strongly lobbied through 
the Gats for the inclusion of audio visual service in the agreement on traded 
services. Europe on the other hand has sought to consolidate open markets 
within Europe via TVWF whilst also determining a balance between the 
economic value of its audio visual infrastructure and their political, economic and 
cultural value to the 'European model of society' (CEC, 1999b). It has thus 
secured a freeze in relation to introducing free trade in audio visual services. 
Ward claims that the EU's interventions within the audio-visual sector was itself 
prompted by the interstices of marketisation of broadcasting at national level with 
the development of transfrontier broadcasting and the necessity of developing 
international regulations for the default internationalisation of the commercial 
sector (Ward, 2001). This scenario presented the opportunity for the stimulation 
of a single market approach to the audiovisual sector and industrial policy to 
stimulate a tangential growth in content production within Europe.  
 
Peter Humphreys has traced the cracks in the public service consensus as 
emerging from changes in government in the large audio visual markets of 
Germany, France and the UK in the early 1980s. Under the auspices of 
information infrastructure upgrade, the neo-liberal accent of the new 
governments and their policy regimes opened up broadcasting ecologies to 
liberalisation as a light touch regulatory regime acted as incentive for investment 
from media and non media corporate interests (Humphreys and Dyson 1990, 
Humphreys, 1996). The European response in television without frontiers cleared 
the way for these interests to capitalise on economies of scale by preventing 
national regulators from blocking the provision of audio visual services by 
broadcasters licensed in another member state. At national level, liberalisation 
and potential liberalisation via satellite technology created new competitive 
economic rationale for policy makers. Smaller Western European countries were 
significant in so far as they represented an extension of the larger geo-cultural 
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markets. This points to the importance of the historical relationship between the 
UK and Ireland, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
2.8.1) A marketising policy environment: The WTO and the EU 
The World Trade Organisation has become the global level organisation 
concerned with the negotiation, implementation and governance of international 
trade and the development of markets at the international level. As the successor 
to the GATT’s, the WTO has emerged as the site through which the terms of 
global trade in communications goods and services is debated and acted upon. 
As a forum, the implementation of markets in varied spheres is emphasised, it is 
the key site wherein the US has continued to put pressure on the EU to 
dismantle the perceived ‘trade barriers’ or ‘cultural derogations’ that the EU has 
developed in relation to the audio-visual sector. These barriers can be summed 
up as the policy tools of public broadcasting structures, programme quotas, 
spending rules, ownership policy, competition policy and subsidies (Grant and 
Woods, 2004) The key objections revolve around the quota systems in Article 5 
of Television without Frontiers, legal arrangements placing barriers to ownership 
on non EU interests and the protectionist aspects of public subsidy to public 
broadcasters, defended through the constitutional provision of the Amsterdam 
Protocol. Although the WTO’s agenda is that of marketisation and the 
governance of markets, its is a forum for negotiation and therefore its market 
goals tend to be diffused through this negotiation. At present, however, the EU 
appears to be getting its house in order in expectation of increased pressure from 
the US in relation to the complete liberalisation of audio-visual sectors such as 
broadcasting, under the auspices of digitalisation. Evidence for this is presented 
by Pauwels and Loisen who point to fact that audiovisual services, as a services 
sector, are not exempted from the Gats, but are subject to derogations within the 
overall agreement (Pauwels and Loisen, 2003). Further evidence however is 
apparent in the market liberal frame in which digital broadcasting has been 
introduced. As Freedman has argued, the impact of the WTO has had 
implications on the European audiovisual sector, despite the continuation of 
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resistance to full marketisation. According to Freedman, the inclusion of services 
in the 1994 GATS imposed some crucial general obligations on member states 
'notably, not to discriminate against foreign suppliers, to minimise domestic 
regulation and to avoid the trade distortive effects of subsidies' (Freedman, 
2003). Beyond this, he suggests, there is little appetite for liberalisation and de-
regulation amongst member states until Europe is in a position to compete 
economically in this sphere. However, even these general obligations have 
considerable impact on the EU's internal approach to liberalisation and re-
regulation and have proved as a point of pressure being absorbed by the EU 
from the US. Allison Harcourt cites Scharf’s observation that ‘EU bias towards 
regulatory policy is producing negative integration based on an over-emphasis of 
economic competition’ (Harcourt, 2005 pp 2). Levy has previously noted how 
technological imperative have allowed the EU to press through reforms in 
culturally sensitive areas (Levy, 1999), perhaps, the same can be said of 
economic imperative. In general, free trade and open markets became the policy 
hinterland for policymakers in this larger environment. Within Europe, the 
interests of larger markets dominated as the policymaking agenda was led by the 
larger countries audiovisual markets and their close alliance with 'local' 
conglomerates (Murdock, 2000). 
 
2.9) Summary 
The present analysis of marketisation and policy change in the Republic of 
Ireland will operationalise the theoretical frames as outlined above. To sum up, at 
the level of Regulation theory’s forms of macro institutional adjustment, neo-
fordist ’regimes of accumulation’ carry and diffuse market logics, altering 
state/market relations that are nonetheless negotiated at global, supranational 
and national levels of meso institutional negotiation/struggle, which codify social 
relations at different levels working to shape macro and meso institutional 
adjustment. The institutional adjustments are diffused through different fields of 
activity at state level and impact on the frames through which organisations 
conceive of the best practice relative to the wider schema of institutional 
Chapter Two 
 
59 
 
adaptation. At present such codified social relations signify a victory for market 
logics underpinning the global response to political economic restructuring. 
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Chapter Three 
Structural change and the Structural relationship between Irish and British 
broadcasting 
 
3.1) Introduction 
One of the implications of various strategic projects to find new modes of 
accumulation in changed circumstances has been the progressive marketisation 
of broadcasting and the prioritisation of economistic and technological logics in 
the governance of media overall. McQuail and VanCuileberg have referred to this 
as a paradigm shift in media and communications policy (McQuail and 
VanCuilenberg, 2003). They suggest that policy development in communications, 
over the last two centuries, can be periodised relative to the key characteristics of 
policy arising out of prevailing socio, technical, cultural and economic contexts. 
The period in which public service broadcasting systems developed, 1945-
1980/90, is characterised as primariliy public service media policy, whereas the 
emerging period, late 1980s on, is labelled emerging communications  policy 
(McQuail and VanCuilenberg, 2003). In this periodisation, television broadcasting 
developed in the secondary period of socio normative policy and is currently 
negotiating the transition to the later phase of communications policy which is 
technology lead, pragmatic and economistic. Hesmondhalgh proposes that four 
waves of marketisation in communications policy have created a situation 
whereby this last paradigm now is descriptive of the media policy approaches of 
nation states across the globe (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). It is thus worthwhile 
reflecting on the institutional and structural changes that these two approaches 
entail. As outlined in the previous chapter, marketisation involves the following 
meta approaches to governance; liberalisation, commercialisation, privatisation 
and re-regulation. In this chapter the focus will be on the structural dimensions of 
broadcasting in the UK and Ireland and the evidence of their transition to this 
latest phase of policymaking. The comparative use of the UK is justified through 
its paradigmatic influence on broadcasting policy in Western Europe, the overlap 
of its media system with Ireland’s media system and its influence in shaping EU 
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level media policy.   
 
An additional purpose of this chapter is to evaluate some of the ways in which 
broadcasting has been constituted as a socio-political institution and provide 
some historical context to emerging present-day structures and institutions of 
television production and distribution. For the benefit of clarity, the public service 
system and the market system will be presented as models or ideal types which 
can be considered as conceptual schema regarding the proper use of 
broadcasting in society, as each of the models encapsulate a different 
perspective on the social relationships which underpin their operation. This 
approach will provide an overview of the structural and institutional conditions 
which exist or are coming into existence for broadcasting as a practice. It is 
intended that the review will provide an overview of the political, technological, 
economic and social factors which constitute the institutional embedding of 
broadcasting. The importance of these factors have been alluded to in the 
previous chapter regarding the medium of broadcasting and this chapter will 
point to their continued significance throughout broadcasting’s century old 
history. The two models are in many ways generalisations but not abstractions 
and reference to their real world articulation will be highlighted. The models, the 
public service system and the market liberal model, can both be traced to wider 
political economic, technological cultural and social processes and as such 
encapsulate some of the central characteristics of their organisation. As such 
policy making is de-centred to  capture how policy is constituted by ideas, 
interests and institutions expressed in the contexts of wider structures that both 
constrain and enable certain outcomes in the policy making process. Once again, 
the objectives of policy can be related to the structure, selectivity and varied 
activities of the state without being reducible to them. 
  
Both models can claim to offer superior rationale for organising the production 
and distribution of broadcasting. To get beyond the institutional self-claims of 
these models the present analysis will apply a four part approach to these 
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governance regimes in order to highlight their institutional features. The first part 
will look at both the socio normative arguments and the conditions which 
engender and inform the model. The second part will then consider the structures 
which have been developed to actualise these principles. The third part will look 
at the relative success of the models in combining principles and structures to 
become social institutions with normative relationships organising production 
distribution and consumption. The order of the parts of the critique does not imply 
chronology as in some cases structures have pre-dated principles. It is 
contended that each of the models offers an insight into the contending 
‘structures of ambition’ which have variously battled with each other to direct the 
course of broadcasting within western nation states since its inception 80 years 
ago. The latter half of the section will look at the factors which render these 
nation based models in need of re-thinking.  
 
3.2) Broadcasting: Ireland and the UK 
Due to geographical proximity and the former quasi colonial relationship between 
Ireland and Britain, there are considerable overlaps between these two states 
and their media systems. Arising out of geographical proximity and technological 
promiscuity, developments in broadcasting in the UK have always had 
implications for the constitution of Ireland’s broadcasting landscape. Off air 
signals have been available in Ireland from the earliest days of radio and 
television broadcasting, whereas broadcasting industries located in the UK have 
latterly sought to realise Ireland as an extension of their UK markets. Thus 
Ireland and the UK make up a geo-linguistic region on the edge of Europe, and 
UK broadcasting represents the systemic context within which Irish broadcasting 
has developed. So whereas UK broadcast content has provided a tier of 
preferred viewing/listening for Irish audiences, and potentially opens up an 
avenue for contra flow of Irish broadcasting content and services, it has also 
provided a systemic context and a systemic example of how broadcasting may 
be structured, rationalised and regulated as well as cultural familiarity with the 
production, organisation and normative dimensions of its content. Thus Irish 
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broadcasting policy as with many other broadcast systems across Western 
Europe has adapted the UK system to its own particular political, social and 
cultural contexts, but uniquely has also had to adapt to the co-presence of the 
UK broadcasting system in Ireland, as a context for developing its own structures 
and institutions. In this way, what has happened in the UK and how the UK’s 
broadcasting and communications structure is developed, has both an ideational 
and a material impact on the Irish broadcasting infrastructure. Not only did the 
development of public broadcasting in the UK generate a co present public 
sphere of ideas about broadcasting, (when the meaning of that new medium was 
still un-clear to contemporaries) it also created a co-present broadcasting 
structure that continues to co-constitute and pre-empt structural developments in 
broadcasting in Ireland.  In this respect, to understand Irish broadcasting one has 
to understand British broadcasting, although one is not reducible to the other. 
This chapter attempts to tie the ideational and material development of 
broadcasting in the UK and Ireland together in order to understand their co-
constitution whilst pointing to the singular characteristics of each system. Irish 
broadcasting policy has always been socially and culturally distinctive as well as 
economistic and pragmatic relevant to the reduced resources at its disposal, but 
has been so within the ideational and material influences of the UK system. It is 
thus historically the case that, whereas, at key junctures, Ireland has 
contemplated different structures and regulations for broadcasting it has for the 
most part adapted elements of the British system.         
 
3.3) The public service system 
A broad definition of the public service system would be a publicly governed 
broadcasting system which addresses the political, cultural and social needs of 
society. According to Paddy Scannell, it is only now as we see this system 
retreating that we can begin to recognise its essential systemic or structural 
characteristics (Scannell, 1991). The ‘creation’ of public service broadcasting is 
routinely attributed to individuals such as John Reith, the driving force behind the 
early BBC. As Curran and Seaton have pointed out this version of events usually 
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chimes in with the view that public service broadcasting is largely an accidental 
outcome of a number of pragmatic choices or one approach to the problem of 
spectrum scarcity. It thus represents ‘a depoliticised account of the political and 
social factors which shaped broadcasting’ (Curran and Seaton, 1997/2003). The 
structural contexts of PSB thus need to be brought into view with reference to the 
early 20thC role of the state in providing merit goods on a non market basis, the 
institutional features of state ownership and non-market governance methods, 
the associated assumptions of socio-normative principles in managing state 
market relations and addressing issue of social justice as part of institutional and 
economic management and the parameters and features of historically 
contingent public space as imagined with reference to class, culture, nationality 
and gender (Tracey, 1998, Marquand, 2004). Since these socio-political contexts 
of public broadcasting will be dealt with elsewhere this chapter will address the 
concept of public service a little closer. The concept of public service arose out of 
both a sense of pragmatism and a general humanist perspective handed down 
from the enlightenment which held that, through collective endeavour, justice and 
equality were promoted through the widespread provision of public/merit goods 
(Garnham, 2000). As noted, this normative approach represented and was 
further enabled by the social embedding of a particular mode of Keynesian 
economic regulation. It was this sense of opportunity which informed political 
drives towards the universal provision of education and the expansion of the 
national healthcare system. Public service came to refer to the extended 
availability of basic goods and services to all members of a society, regardless of 
their wealth or geographical location, that is public service enabled the provision 
of both public and merit goods. Raymond Willams has pointed out that, 
historically, such conceptions of public service have represented the concealed 
self interest of the power elite, conscious of the alternative of socialism and 
fearful of the repetition of the upheavals of Eastern Europe (Williams 1974). Even 
when de-coupled from elite self interest, in the UK, public service usually implied 
the reification of existing power relations and the imparting of a world view that 
was consonant with middle class liberal sentiment informed by an elitist 
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conception of culture, ‘an authoritarian system with conscience’ (Williams 1966, 
p90). In Ireland, the introduction of state radio broadcaster 2RN in 1926 was less 
shaped by the ethic of public service and more so by political concern over the 
cultural and informational autonomy of the fledgling state and presented an 
opportunity to maintain political control over the development of broadcasting in 
Ireland (the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions of Irish 
broadcasting will be further discussed in chapter five). However, beyond these 
analyses, it is possible to rescue the concept of public service from historically 
specific instances of its expression, while also noting the contested nature of its 
historical expression. In relation to the BBC, for example, Paddy Scannell has 
illustrated through a number of studies how the institutional ethos changed from 
paternalist public service to pluralistic public service assimilating more 
democratic forms of representation and opening itself to increased socio-cultural 
stimuli (Scannell 1989). Likewise, in the Irish context, 2RN was seceded by RTE 
which had considerably more legislative and organisational autonomy than its 
predecessor and also benefitted from ongoing efforts to give that broadcaster 
more of a public service character. Scannell argues that criticism of public 
service broadcasting concentrates on its resemblance to other state institutions 
and fails to note its communicative achievements in society. The concept of 
public service is therefore not a static concept. Added to this, the dismissal of 
John Reith as a moral dictator obscures his important role in helping to create a 
space wherein socio normative principles would open out the potential space for 
broadcasting to develop institutional practices at a distance from the logic of 
capital accumulation/commercial imperative.   .  
 
Asa Briggs’ account of the BBC’s early years suggests that Reith acted as a 
megaphone for a wide spectrum of influential opinions regarding the use of 
broadcasting in society (Briggs, 1966). Reith articulated the moral 
purposefulness of the 1920’s. In Ireland, the Reithean argument had influence in 
so far as it articulated suspicion towards the commercial organisation of 
broadcasting that was developing in the United States (cf Pine, 2003). As John 
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Horgan has suggested, policy transfer from the UK meant that Ireland was to be 
‘saddled with a broadcasting model and a broadcasting philosophy which was 
not of its own choosing’, (Horgan, 2001, p16).  However, arguably, it was a 
model that was potentially generative and could be shaped by prevailing political, 
religious and social elites. Opposition in the UK to the public broadcasting model 
was palpable and Reith had fashioned an argument in answer to the convincing 
push for a system of perceived commercial democracy akin to that which existed 
in the US (Briggs, 1966). Crucially, Reith’s ideas were generally shared by  
political elites careful to maintain control over broadcasting whereas commercial 
actors saw little benefit in providing content for their hardware. In his submission 
to the 1926 Crawford commission Reith outlined the following four conditions for 
public broadcasting; 
  
(1) Broadcasting should not be compelled to operate on a ‘for profit’ basis, nor 
should it be treated as an ancillary of state machinery  
(2) Broadcasting should be universally available, in a geographical sense,  
(3) Control over broadcasting should be centralised and unified, that is it should 
be a monopoly,  
(4) Broadcasting should always retain high standards (Briggs, 1966).  
 
Since this early articulation, the conditions for public broadcasting being the 
product of both history and experience have been elaborated upon. One 
formulation of the conditions for public broadcasting that has broad support 
throughout the literature, are those summarised by the Broadcasting Research 
Unit which was convened in Britain in the 1980’s (Blumler 1992, Tracey 1998, 
Wheeler 1997, Humphreys 1996). These eight points are deemed to cover the 
features that a public broadcasting system cannot do without. The principles are 
as follows; 
  
(1) the principle of geographical universality, that everybody should have 
access to the same services;  
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(2) Broadcasting should also cater for all interests and tastes;  
(3) ‘all interests’ includes those of minority groups;  
(4) Broadcasting should also play a central role in the national life of the 
country as well as the community;  
(5) Detachment from vested interests and the government is essential; 
(6) At least one broadcasting system should be funded directly from the 
corpus of users; 
(7) Competition should occur in relation to good programming rather then 
audience ratings; 
(8) The guidelines adopted by institutions should be fashioned so as to 
liberate programme makers and not restrict them (BRU in Hood: 1997). 
 
Thus the institutional norms of the public service system can be summed up by 
reference to policy goals of universal access, universal service, public service 
and plurality and diversity. Not all of these elements can be generalised to the 
system that developed in Ireland. State control and government influence in 
Ireland has been more pronounced than in the UK system. 2RN, the State’s first 
radio broadcaster, was essentially a division of the Department of Post and 
Telegraphs and was constrained both financially and ideologically to operate as a 
cultural extension of the state charged with a minimal remit for informational 
programming. Later, RTE (1961), although enjoying more autonomy, has 
historically and contemporarily had to contend with a political culture that tends to 
blur the boundaries between the public and the national to the degree that RTE’s 
identity as a public broadcaster has routinely been under pressure for re-
definition as a national broadcaster, the latter implying less autonomy and 
criticality in its operation. In terms of representing minorities, Ireland has been 
culturally homogenous for most of the history of the State, and broadcasting has 
been central in this project of imagining the nation with the affect that minority 
groups or interests that are not represented through the political/cultural nexus of 
first, catholic corporatism, and later, neoliberal corporatism, tend to be under 
represented.  Thus if it is possible to characterise the ideological struggle over 
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PSB in Ireland one could see it in terms of the balance between RTE’s identity 
and practice as a national, cultural institution reflecting the catholic (and later, 
consumerist) values of the state or as a public informational broadcaster 
reflecting the UK and continental leaning towards ‘a liberal pluralist public 
sphere’. RTE, has, arguably, always attempted to balance these dimensions 
through its operation and output.     
  
3.3.1) Structural dimensions of public service system 
The structures of a public broadcasting system, its operation within an industrial 
system of production, can be broken into the four cognate areas of organisation, 
finance, regulation and accountability. The organisations such as the BBC and 
RTE, reflect the culture of centralised production of the time in which they were 
conceived, subject to the forces of centralisation and hierarchy in terms of 
organisation and management structure. The hierarchy of organisation tended to 
be a pyramid structure with engineers, technicians at the bottom, programme 
makers in the middle and departmental and station managers at the top (Curran 
and Seaton, 1997/2003). At the very top some form of administrative structure, 
broadcasting executive and a board of governors would act as the interface 
between the government or state department responsible for broadcasting. Unity 
of control however, did not prevent the establishment of regional structures as  
was the case with BBC regional radio broadcasting, regional stations provided 
alternatives to the national programme, and later, were realised in television in 
the regional structure of the ITV network. In Ireland, the Dublin based production 
network was complimented by a regional station in Cork, but for the most part the 
development of public broadcasting has reflected the centralised political 
structure of the state. 
 
A public broadcasting system is a heavily regulated system in comparison to the 
other mass media of the film, press and publishing industries. However this 
heavy regulation paradoxically created the scenario whereby ‘the legislative and 
regulatory shell had protected and encouraged the growth of a complex 
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philosophy of broadcasting' (Negrine, 1994, p89).The regulatory structures in 
place for UK broadcasters allowed for a degree of institutional autonomy within 
the pluralist ideals of the liberal democratic state. In the Irish context, in the case 
of radio broadcasting, until 1960, this autonomy was more notional than 
concrete. The staff at 2RN were civil servants seconded from the Department of 
Post and Telegraphs and the content was shaped to support state building 
projects through cultural nationalism and informational support for industrial 
sectors. However with the introduction of Television, and a new structure for 
broadcasting, the principles of autonomy were inscribed in legislation and 
subsequently negotiated in the various clashes between broadcaster and 
government over programming. Arguably, it was in 1960 that public broadcasting 
was instituted in Ireland. Thus broadcasters worked within a normative balance 
between rights and responsibilities. The regulatory structure ensured that only 
elected and accountable power premised on the public interest was in a position 
to make decisions regarding the fundamental structure of the system. Regulatory 
frameworks and obligations made public a number of public policy objectives, 
chief amongst which is the public interest goal which seeks to furnish citizens 
with the requisite social and political information to partake in the democratic 
system. Once again institutional norms developed over time included the need 
for balance, objectivity and impartiality in factual programming (Crissel, 2002). 
Other regulations dealt with questions of public taste, decency, industrial 
objectives, cultural policy, industry structure and finance (Feintuck, 1999). The 
emphasis was on finding the sophisticated balance of regulation to best utilise 
resources in order to ensure maximum efficiency and diversity in programme 
production across a variety of broadcasting organisations, for both majority and 
minority audiences (Negrine, 1994). Regulatory objectives and methods have 
changed and developed with the system itself but a central feature is the goal of 
constraining broadcasting from only realising its commercial and economic 
potential. Thus socio-political objectives are inscribed into broadcasting practice 
alongside the attainment of legitimation through answering the varied needs of 
large audiences. Regulation aims to harness the market and commercial 
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revenues to fulfil these objectives, developing a relatively balanced mixed 
economy of broadcasting either through a dual system of public/commercial 
provision or through dual funded broadcaster such as RTE in Ireland. In a ‘light 
touch’ regulatory system, broadcasting as an area of investment for capital, a 
source of commercial revenue and a means of valorisation for other areas of the 
economy can ease out forms of programming which do not sit comfortably with 
the culture of consumption. Added to this the economics of broadcasting will still 
place it beyond different social groups no matter how much liberalisation takes 
place (Keane, 1990, Garnham 1990, Mosco, 1996). Public service regulation, 
however, has not existed apart from economic and political pressure but has 
developed ways of minimising the worst features of both. Intervention through 
regulation aimed to direct those pressures towards an acceptable concept of the 
public interest. In public broadcasting systems in the UK and, with the advent of 
television broadcasting in Ireland the regulatory bodies were somewhat 
internalised within the organisations themselves but were notionally publicly 
accountable and subject to government approval. In the UK, the chief regulatory 
bodies were the government appointed BBC Board of Governors and the ITA 
(now respectively absorbed into the BBC Trust and Ofcom). In Ireland the RTE 
Authority oversaw RTE’s operations until the recent legislation for a Broadcasting 
Authority of Ireland (2008 Broadcasting Act) to oversee both the public and 
commercial broadcasters. The governors were ultimately accountable to 
parliament and appointed by the government of the day. The governors 
periodically reviewed the work of the broadcasting authorities and acted as an 
interface between government and broadcaster. One important institutional point 
is the fact that the governance structure consisted of more than public bodies 
and involved developed structures of governance including secretariats, national 
and regional advisory councils and elaborated procedures for overseeing the 
work of broadcasters. They provided a notional distance between editorial control 
and government interference. It is possible to argue that the existence of 
differential regulators for the BBC/RTE and the commercial ITV/TV3 leant itself to 
a degree of regulatory plurality wherein different structures allowed different 
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thinking on policy objectives. With the legislation for commercial broadcasting in 
1954 the Independent Television Authority (later the IBA, then ITC) was 
established within a similar framework as the public service authority defining 
itself in relation to public service objectives. In Ireland, from 1989, the Irish Radio 
and Television Commission (later the BCI, 2001) performed the same function. 
Essentially the IBA/IRTC regulated the commercial broadcasters in the public 
interest. A key point to note is that public regulation was systemic, pluralistic, 
interventionist and sector specific 
 
The key sources of funding for public broadcasters, as the primary institutions of 
the public service system in Western Europe, has traditionally come from either a 
licence fee mechanism, government grants, taxes or a combination of either of 
these with advertising revenue. The licence fee is held to be symbolic in 
expressing the direct relationship between the purposes of a broadcaster and the 
licence paying audience. It creates a bond of public ownership which in turn 
affects the relationship between them, each other and the broadcaster  Although 
a financial relation it became imbued with a symbolic dimension that became part 
of the broadcasters overall contribution to the public imaginary. However, 
historically, the licence fee was designed to offset the financial risks of the 
original British Broadcasting Company and originally had very little ideological 
significance. A licence fee would provide revenue up front unlike the relatively 
untested commercial system. It guaranteed payment for a service that could not 
restrict access to its goods. The licence fee represented ‘money in the bank’, 
although, from an early stage, the licence fee came to be recognised as a 
potential buffer zone against unwanted commercial interference (Briggs, 1966).In 
Ireland both 2RN and later RTE were dual funded principally to balance the 
commercial imperative of those broadcasters with political and cultural missions, 
and because the small population (on average, 1.3 million television households) 
and depressed levels of economic development prevented the funding of a 
broadcasting institution from licence fee revenue alone. With the establishment of 
the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1926 Reith had successfully used the 
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licence fee to distinguish it from the growing commercially based mass culture 
which was attracting criticism from both conservative and radical quarters in 
relation to charges of cultural debasement. However, whereas the licence fee or 
a grant of some kind freed public institutions from commercial pressures, it still 
left them open to pressure from civil servants or the government of the day. 
Those who would eventually lobby for commercial television also argued that it 
left those broadcasters more open to elite public opinion. This is a dimension of 
public service broadcasting that has been resolved in some systems but remains 
in many (Humphreys, 1996). The ability of government to set the licence fee has, 
to many commentators, always existed as a form of soft control, with 
broadcasting executives aware that licence fee may be curtailed if a the political 
establishment is displeased with its performance. Accompanying the publicly 
funded element of the system, a further element of non competition for finances, 
seeks to lessen the worst features of an openly competitive broadcasting system. 
As the British broadcasting system was expanded to include a commercial 
franchise, the revenue from advertising entailed that neither the BBC nor the ITV 
network were chasing the same revenue. In Ireland, however, with the 
introduction of the dual system, all broadcasters, public and commercial compete 
for advertising revenue not only against each other, but with broadcasters 
operating from within the UK system. Within the independent network in the UK, 
the regional bidding for franchises and the relationship between the various 
independent companies was structured in such a way so as to avoid direct 
competition between the companies (Wheeler 1997). In order to maintain parity 
between the public broadcasters and the commercial broadcasters, a 
discriminatory tax was placed on the latter to keep profits down and encourage 
re-investment in programming as the use of broadcast time was ‘the use of a 
national asset’ (Pilkington cited in Hood 1997). With the setting up of Channel 
Four the finance structure was designed so that the broadcaster did not raise its 
own advertising revenue and thus would not be in direct competition with ITV 
(Hood 1997). Implicit in this overall approach to financing is a resistance to the 
commodification of the audience, whereby broadcasters sell audiences to 
Chapter Three 
 
73 
 
advertisers and the raison d’être of the broadcaster becomes maximisation of 
audience size. According to Michael Treacy, ‘in a public system television 
producers acquire the money to make programmes. In a commercial system they 
make programmes to make money' (Treacy 1998, p18). A further element of this 
logic was the institutionalised distance between editorial responsibility/creativity 
and advertising. The BBC had no advertising revenue, the ITV companies 
eventually had their advertising sold by the regulator, the IBA, and Channel Four 
had its advertising sold by the advertising companies. These structural features 
maintained that the purposes of programming should be cultural, political and 
social as opposed to commercial. The public service model suggests that the 
extent to which commercialisation effects cultural production depends on how it 
is balanced or regulated (Curran &Seaton, 1997). As has been the situation in 
Ireland, commercial funding can become an important element of raising revenue 
and ensuring plurality in funding, together with a regulatory structure that 
manages the commercial relationship. However, this assertion raises the 
question of who oversees regulators and according to what criteria can 
programme making be accounted for.  
 
If broadcasting is managed in the public interest, then standards of accountability 
must exist within the system. Accountability structures in theory link broadcasting 
to the wider society in which it operates (Garnham, 1980). In a large industrial 
society limitations are placed on the scope of feedback that can be directed at 
the broadcasters. Thus structures of accountability tend to be representative, 
either through public bodies or through the political system itself. In Ireland the 
latter structure has characterised the public broadcasting system. The 
government as a democratically elected body appointed the RTE authority. Thus, 
accountability was negotiated between the institution, a representative body and 
a government minister/cabinet. In theory, broadcaster accountability was 
achieved whereas direct state interference was circumscribed. The chief criticism 
of these boards of governors was and continues to be the inherent contradiction 
in their operation. On the one hand they represent the public to the broadcaster 
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whereas on the other they represent the broadcaster to the state. At various 
different junctures boards or authorities have shown themselves to be subject to 
the ‘capture’ of the broadcasters or the politicians, failing the public interest they 
are meant to represent (Wheeler 1997, Curran and Seaton, 1997, Negrine, 
1996). Scannell has identified this as a problem of representative democracy 
itself, wherein power accrues to representatives rather then those they are 
elected to represent (Scannell, 1991). 
 
The structures of public broadcasting have been developed to guarantee that 
central objectives, such as the eight outlined by the BRU, have been realised in 
practice. Official histories of public broadcasting (and any other type of 
broadcasting), such as those produced by the institutions themselves often 
provide uncritical accounts of the relationship between structures and objectives 
(Whittaker 1999, Branston 1997). Nicholas Garnham has pointed out that these 
histories must be interrogated as historical evidence is ‘the only evidence we 
have against which to test theories’ (Garnham 1998). In more critical accounts of 
the institutional performance of public broadcasting in Ireland and the UK, 
normative claims about the relationship between broadcasting and the State and 
the relationship between broadcasting and the public have been opened up to 
scrutiny. Initially the relationship between broadcasting, state and public was one 
of consensus. A general agreement pervaded that broadcasting was a public 
utility to be managed in the public and/or state interest (Horgan, 2001, Scannell 
and Cardiff 1991). According to Benedict Anderson a broad identification with the 
nation as ‘imagined community’ in which the nation is always conceived of as ‘a 
deep horizontal comradeship’, is one that has both been mobilised by media 
(print) and has shaped media (broadcasting) (Anderson 1983, p7). Whereas, 
early on in its development, politicians may not have grasped the full significance 
of broadcasting in relation to ‘nation building’, John Reith’s vision of ‘making the 
nation as one man’ summed up the potential of the new medium. Following the 
disruption of war, an identification of the national interest with the public interest 
was one that was subscribed to by voters, broadcasters and key industrial 
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interests (Curran and Seaton, 1997). The model of corporatism was, post war, 
broadly consensual. Thus the concept of broadcasting being independent from 
political interests was unproblematic when the broadcaster resided neatly within 
the framework of the liberal democratic state or, in the Irish case, the catholic 
corporatist state. However, if the concept of autonomy was relative, at this stage, 
it was also formative in creating expectations of the public broadcasting system 
in years to come (Wheeler 1997, Kumar 1986). Throughout World War Two, 
radio broadcasting was utilised as an instrument of state, through careful 
negotiation between parliament and the broadcaster. The purported 
independence of the BBC became a key ideological tool in the war time effort 
legitimising its claims to truth when contrasted with the directly propagandist use 
of broadcasting by the Axis powers (Negrine 1986). Government pressure on 
broadcasters in the UK was of the informal kind. The centralisation of 
broadcasting that had occurred under Reith made a single national broadcasting 
system responsive to a single government communiqué, in what had become 
during war time, a single party state (Treacy 1998). Responsiveness to 
government wishes was informed by the financial threat of licence fee curtailment 
as well as threats to the institutional future of the BBC. Despite the many 
documented cases of broadcaster subservience during and after the war, 
Scannell has highlighted that there also occurred many spirited displays of 
independence and opposition from within the public broadcaster (Scannell 1991). 
Its maintenance of independence from centralised governmental control, within 
the limitations of a national emergency and its openness to institutional pressure, 
had catapulted the Corporation and broadcasting into a central position in 
relation to mediating the political life of the UK. Thus, according to Scannell, at 
the political level, the public broadcasting institution was open to the forces of 
political and cultural consensus, but at the level of social institution of 
communication it was developing more influence and power than had been 
previously foreseen. In Ireland, the long reign of Fianna Fail in power from 1932 
to 1948, saw the state broadcaster become for all intent and purposes a 
megaphone for that party and its national project of realising Ireland as a 
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independent self sufficient catholic community. With the introduction of television 
broadcasting the state had become politically mature enough and relatively free 
of political violence to afford some degree of institutional autonomy to RTE. 
Added to this the Irish state had, by the late 1950s, signalled an interest in 
Keynesian central planning legitimising public companies in distinction to statist 
enterprise. The legislation that outlined the structure and function of RTE 
borrowed from the UK institutional solutions to the political role of the broadcaster 
in society.  
 
Following World War 2, in the UK, broadcasters had to develop new practices in 
relation to the two party state. The BBC adopted a policy of impartiality within the 
frameworks of the liberal democratic state adhering firmly to representation of 
only elected political viewpoints. According to Negrine, this lead to an ideology of 
balance which reflected the reality of a two party democracy. The role of the BBC 
was best seen as ‘impartial brokerage in a prevailing political system’, not as 
some thought, independence from that political system (Smith cited in Negrine 
1994, p104). This broadcasting convention was also grafted onto the new Irish 
television service which was legislated for in 1960. RTE was legislatively 
mandated to be objective, impartial and balanced in its informational 
programming. This combination of broadcastings social power, the contested 
nature of the consensus undergirding nation building and the symbolic narrowing 
of politics to two party liberal democracy all presented problems for how the 
structure of the public service system could, later, deal with dissent, discensus 
and difference within democratic nation states.  
 
In the UK, the end of the monopoly in television broadcasting in response to 
private, political and commercial lobbying in 1954 was to do little to change the 
relationship between broadcasting and the state (Scannell, 1996). The late 
introduction of TV3 in Ireland (in 1997, nearly a decade after it was legislated for) 
also seen little innovation in the structure and funding of that institution. ITV 
supervised by the public body, the ITA (later IBA, then ITC), was set up as an 
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extension of the public service concept (Crisell, 2002). The ITV network 
embraced the BBC’s by then well established approach to politics and both 
settled into a relationship that has since been described as ‘competing 
complimentary’ failing to produce the kind of diversity that the political supporters 
of commercial television had hoped it would (Blumler, 1992, Hood,1994). 
However, by the 1960’s, the concept of objectivity and impartiality, in both Ireland 
and the UK had become increasingly problematic when faced with the agenda of 
radical pluralist politics (Kumar, 1977, Garnham, 1978). Radicalism from both the 
left and right of the political spectrum, international political crises and economic 
downturn engendered a more complex political landscape for the broadcasting 
system to come to terms with. The BBC and ITV networks’ reaction to this 
challenge to consensus was one of uncertainty, and to many, failure (Hall, 1977). 
Antagonism between broadcasters and government were symptomatic of larger 
changes in society, culture and politics as the contradictions inherent in British 
nationalist welfarism became increasingly apparent. For the UK and Ireland, 
challenges to the status quo went beyond political protest as the resurgence of 
sectarian strife in Northern Ireland, where the very legality of the democratic state 
was contested, lead to a divergence in interpretation of the national media’s role 
in such circumstances. From either side of the battle lines, broadcasting was 
accused of complicity with the state, producing representations of events that 
were skewed along the lines of official definitions of social reality (Curtis 1984, 
Miller 1994, Schlesinger, 1991, Horgan 2001). Professional ideologies, the 
political appointment of the board of governors, the control of finance by the 
government, the web of class relations that existed between politicians, civil 
servants and broadcasters were all highlighted as self evident factors of why the 
existing public broadcasting system could not engender plural and diverse 
broadcasting. In both Ireland and the UK challenges to the state from paramilitary 
actions prompted curtailments on the freedom of broadcasters to interpret events 
via their own professional ideologies of objectivity and impartiality. The State was 
not to be a party to conflict but represented the contexts within which that conflict 
should be interpreted.  
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In the UK, one political response to this groundswell towards pluralism was the 
policy processes that lead to the creation of Channel Four, via the Annan 
Committee, by the 1980 Broadcasting Act (Hood, 1997). Again the financing and 
regulation of Channel Four were carefully crafted so that it became an expansion 
of the existing public service system, guided by the principle of pluralism and a 
‘wider range of programmes that spoke not just to the mass audience’ (Hood, 
1997). In Ireland, similar pressures took on culturally divergent forms in the illegal 
development of community and pirate broadcasting and legislation for the 
liberalisation of broadcasting was introduced in 1988. Cultural populism in the 
form of Anglo American pop culture represented an alternative to the catholicised 
form of Irish folk culture that had become institutionalised in Irish cultural policy 
which was already somewhat challenged by the cultural populist programming 
available via the British television system (UTV) and the ideological utopianism of 
Hollywood. Language nationalism articulated the tension that was emerging in 
the turn away from an agrarian vision of Ireland and the move to foreign direct 
investment, increased urbanism and ongoing political centralisation. For RTE, the 
aphorism that the ‘centre cannot hold’ was looking particularly prophetic.   
 
Criticism of political bias in public broadcasting system could be answered by 
expanding the systemic objective of pluralism and diversity across the range of 
channels. Curran and Seaton point to a further consequence of this period in 
British broadcasting wherein the broadcasting professionals within the BBC also 
questioned the consensual shell of the public service system to embrace 
ideologies of institutional professionalism, demanding autonomy in broadcasting. 
This push to independence left the integrity of the Corporation as a public service 
broadcaster open to attack when Margaret Thatcher’s radical right came to  
power in 1977 (Curran and Seaton, 2003). The consensus that broadcasting be 
run systemically as a public utility in the public interest was soon to be 
questioned by a new politics of private enterprise,
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political economic projects that placed the social contract which underlined 
broadcasting under increased scrutiny.   
 
In Paddy Scannell’s extensive treatment of broadcasting’s relationship with the 
public, he has identified three broad phases of public broadcasting in the UK; 
1927-1954 paternalism;1954-1977 populism; and 1977-1990, multiculturalism (it 
could be argued that 1990-Present is characterised by popular, multicultural 
postmodernism) (Scannell 1996). The fundamental expression of public 
broadcasting’s relationship to its public, which has underpinned all the shifts in 
the phases above, is its definition as a public good. That is, its consumption by 
one individual does not reduce or prevent consumption by another and therefore 
it can be consumed by an unlimited amount of others. Further to this, its 
provision to as many as possible had positive externalities for the whole 
community (Graham and Davies, 1997). The early paternalist Corporation under 
John Reith, has often been cited as evidence of the fundamentally anti-
democratic foundations of public service broadcasting. Krishan Kumar, however, 
points out that the in early years of the corporation, even though it had the 
support of political will, it continually had to justify its existence. Its eagerness to 
impress a broad range of intelligentsia, civil servants and government ministers 
meant it had little time to imagine any other audience (Kumar, 1977). According 
to Asa Briggs, despite this, Reith’s conception of the audience began with a view 
of them ‘as a public, a series of publics and not as a mass aggregate of 
consumers’. Early attempts to tap into the current of public opinion through local 
committees were attempted but failed as they did not ‘reach deep enough or 
sufficiently democratically into the subsoil of the community to ensure that people 
felt that the BBC was theirs’ (Briggs, 1966). The representative structures of 
accountability, allowed Reith to claim responsiveness in fashioning his particular 
mixed service of ‘quality programming’ in entertainment, education and 
information. The ‘quality’ facet of his formula tended to reflect particular criteria of 
quality rooted in male, middle class and south east English value judgements 
(Branston, 1997). However, even as Reith might be castigated for embodying the 
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paternalist value judgements of his day, his own normative vision ensured that a 
universal broadcasting system was available for progressive interpretations of 
public service norms from wider sources of influence (Scannell, 1991).  
 
In the shift to populism and then multiculturalism, the concept of public service 
was expanded from a single broadcaster to a number of broadcasters catering 
for different taste publics within a systemic concept of regulation (Treacy, 1998, 
Scannell 1991, Branston, 1997). Commercial and private motives were 
harnessed with ITV, ploughing its profits back into ‘popular’ programming to 
avoid excessive taxation and Channel Four prevented from competing for 
advertising through populist programming through both the IBA’s sale of its 
advertising spots and a clearly determined programming remit. In Ireland, the 
IRTC developed licenses for broadcasters which included public service 
commitments, even as these were not adhered to. A strong argument has been 
made by Scannell that both the move to populism and then to multiculturalism is 
evidence of the potential of a responsive public service system of regulation. 
Audience demands for increased programme options through commercial 
broadcasting may have been originally lacklustre but the potential 
responsiveness of commercial broadcasting eventually emerged and is 
empirically evident in the changes the public broadcaster’s schedules. In the UK 
the regulatory structure meant that the BBC 1 and ITV went head to head to 
compete in programming, addressing popular tastes without diminishing each 
others revenue, whereas the same was broadly true of BBC2 and Channel Four 
in relation to minority audiences, whether cultural, political or ethnic minorities. 
The whole system, however, was available to all recognising the fact that at 
certain times individuals belong to a minority and at others is part of a majority. 
The broad concept of responsiveness to divergent tastes, while maintaining 
‘quality’ production values was met through the avoidance of competition for 
revenue, whereas definite programming remits ensured that diversity in 
programming, whether popular or minority based, existed. In Ireland, plurality 
was driven by demands for geographical, populist and linguistic expression .In 
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1972 an Irish language radio station had been introduced as an extension of 
RTE’s service to appease the demands for increased access to Irish language 
programming.  From 1990 on regional and local broadcasters were licensed to 
compete with the public service broadcaster and a long demanded Irish language 
television broadcaster, TnaG (later re-branded TG4) was introduced in 1996. 
Cable and MMDS distribution networks were extended throughout the 1970s/80s 
to appease those who did not have access to the increased plurality of choices 
available in the UK system via multichannel television.  
  
Absent from such a formulation of a public service system is recognition of the 
‘minimum structured public control’ that a representative system of accountability 
fails to deliver, a concept which the anti statist liberal model of broadcasting 
further critiques (Garnham, 1980). However this relatively positive assessment of 
the institutional features of ps system needs to be balanced against its criticisms 
and its failure to meet some of its objectives in the real world application. 
Perhaps the most sustained critique of these shortcomings was articulated in the 
process of widening the public service system itself.  
 
3.4) Anti Statist Liberal/Radical Democracy models 
Anti-Statist Liberal critiques, coupled with Leftist critiques of UK broadcasting, 
arose chiefly as an alternative to, and a critique of, the public service system 
itself. It is possible to trace some of its defining concepts to the classical 
arguments surrounding the freedom of the press as expressed in the anti-statist 
and liberal democratic arguments of John Locke and John Stuart Mill (Wheeler, 
1997). Central to the argument are the core concepts of the rights of individuals 
and the pursuit of truth through unrestricted public discussion among citizens 
(Keane, 1990). As such the ASL critique seeks to build upon a tradition of 
philosophical arguments for press freedom developed in Europe and North 
America from the end of the 17th Century to the present. The key obstacle to 
press freedom, observed by Locke, Mill and others, was the various forms of 
state censorship practiced through regulation, taxation and legislation. The state, 
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which had proved an essential innovation in the re-structuring of power relations 
in the transformation to a capitalist mode of production (the systems world), has 
also overextended itself into the life of citizens (the lifeworld) and the socio-
institutional infrastructure (Habermas, 1989). The concurrent rise of a bourgeois 
society utilising reason to question these objectified power relations, mobilised 
the press for this purpose. Keane highlights three of Mills propositions from ‘On 
Liberty’ as having direct bearing on anti statist sentiment. 
  
(1) Any opinion which is silenced by government or civil society because it is 
allegedly false may prove to be true, in so far is truth is certifiable. By disallowing 
opinion the censor is imposing their own view of the world by suppressing others.  
(2) If an opinion is somehow false, it may also contain an ounce of truth.  
(3) Truth if unchallenged retreats into dead dogma. (Keane, 1990). 
 
In the 1960’s, the claim of public broadcasting to be representative of the ‘public’ 
appeared to many to be dead dogma. Perceived state intervention into 
broadcasting practice and broadcastings legitimation of two party politics lead  
organised groups such as  academics, trade unionists, radical politicians and 
various minority groupings to draw on the anti statist liberal critique as a 
corrective to the paternalist/populist/consensualist dimensions of the public 
service system (Garnham, 1980). In addition to the political argument for 
increased plurality of political forms a cultural argument arose that campaigned 
for the democratisation of cultural production so that the diversity of forms of life 
that made up Britain along gender, race, class and political lines would find a 
presence in the national airwaves. These arguments would find further 
expression in the discourse of cultural citizenship which presents the cogent 
argument for a balance between autonomy of cultural forms coupled with 
representation in wider group frameworks such as national television (Miller, 
2007).                                     
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The radical democratic critique of the public serviced system has been 
articulated at various stages in the development of broadcasting and is worth re-
visiting as a set of policy norms. This is best seen as a structure of ambition, a 
normative ideal that may nevertheless have the potential to influence the shape 
and structure of the marketised model of broadcasting and re-think normative 
potential for policy design.  It is possible to outline its central ideals through the 
early writings of Nicholas Garnham and Raymond Williams and the more 
developed approaches of the Annan committee, John Keane and Stuart Hood as 
well as the various advocates of Channel Four in the policy cycle running up to 
its establishment. A primary principle of the model is the potential autonomy of 
broadcasting institutions from the state, with representative bodies such as the 
broadcasting authorities being replaced by publicly controlled and locally sourced 
representatives. The state, in the interests of democracy, must guarantee the 
autonomy of the broadcasting institutions and independent bodies through 
legislation. Broadcasting institutions would be primarily publicly funded whereas 
commercial funding would be regulated to avoid market pressure. The institutions 
of broadcasting would be thoroughly decentralised, regionally dispersed and 
community oriented. Genuinely independent sources should provide the majority 
of content in the interests of pluralism and diversity. The ultimate goal of the 
model would be to facilitate; 
  
‘a genuine commonwealth of forms of life, tastes and opinions, to empower 
a plurality of citizens who are governed by neither despotic states nor by 
market forcesOenable citizens to live democratically within the framework 
of multilayered constitutional states, go about their business within 
independent self organising civil societies which underpin and transcend the 
narrow boundaries of state institutions’ (John Keane, 1990, p126) 
 
In many ways it has to be acknowledged that the radical democratic model is 
also the ‘civil society’ model. In turning to the structures that underpin an radical 
democratic model it is important to note a divide between those who advocate a 
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more structured approach and those who advocate a more libertarian tack. The 
latter approach can be discerned in the Annan Committee report of 1977, 
convened three years earlier by the UK Labour government of the day. The 
Annan report noted a more multi racial plural society in which the Reithean or 
populist notions of a single public no longer sufficed. Instead, it advocated 
extended broadcasting services together with structures of public control and 
access (Crisell, 2002). Garnham has noted that Annan implicitly endorsed a 
producer ideology wherein creative individuals and small scale decision making 
teams would provide the requisite programming. However, as Crisell has pointed 
out, this producer ideology was contradicted by the advocating of increased 
public access and control, which would essentially mean greater 
bureaucratisation of the production process (Crisell, 2002). Raymond Williams 
suggests a more familiar model of four to five public corporations, independent of 
government interference and regionally dispersed to provide geographic 
coverage. The existing commercial and public networks would be replaced with 
these decentralised public corporations ‘holding production and transmission 
facilities in trust’ and by a ‘wide range of leasing programme companies which 
should be responsible for production policy’ (Williams, 1966). Williams’ model 
was partially realised in the regional structure of the ITV network, (but Williams 
would of course deem it unacceptable on the grounds of its commercial status). 
John Keane proposes that a combination of the ITV regional network with the 
BBC model of organisation partly financed by heavily regulated advertising. The 
new networks would also be free of any government involvement, relieved of the 
Reithean agenda of comprehensive service and internally democratised. 
Cheaper recording technologies could offset the smaller revenue base for each 
of the corporations (Keane, 1990). The chief criticism of this regional model has 
come from Nicholas Garnham who points out its mismatch with existing political 
structures. Regardless of political, economic and cultural differences in society, 
the state is still ‘the site and source of political power’ (Garnham, 1990). As such, 
individuals are always part of a national public who need a national media 
system to reflect and negotiate public opinion.       
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The proposed financing of such institutions also reveals a diversity of positions. 
According to Williams, the corporations would be publicly funded as broadcasting 
represented social rather then fiscal capital, and should therefore attract 
educational funding on a par with universities (Williams, 1966). All structures 
should be de-commercialised guaranteeing independence from vested interests, 
emphasising the use of broadcasting for social purposes. Keane, conscious of 
the high costs of such a strategy suggests that advertising may be harnessed to 
fund the corporations. He states that in a commercial system the key effect of 
advertising is that it tends to ‘edge out from the public domainOnon commercial 
opinions and non market forms of life’ (Keane, 1990). However, if regulated so as 
to be clearly separated from structure and content, advertising can provide a 
beneficial service to specific communities. The ASL/radical democratic critique 
however does not reflect upon the consequences of the fragmenting of revenues 
that its structure entails. In general terms, it envisages expanded public spending 
or guaranteed advertising revenue for what can be perceived as political 
purposes that go beyond the political and economic interests expected to support 
them  (Garnham, 1980). Revenue fragmentation can be offset by lowering 
production values (but not necessarily quality) but high start up costs, 
educational initiatives and ongoing capital costs persist.  
 
A regulatory regime for this model is also proposed by Williams who suggested a 
Broadcasting and Television Council consisting of both members of the public 
and the broadcasting corporations which would oversee the programming and 
educational functions of the regional corporations. The Annan report suggested 
an Open Broadcasting Authority which ‘would not make programmes but be a 
publisher and commissioner of programmes made by others, and its funding 
would come from a variety of sources: the Open University, the Arts Council, 
charities, the TUC, the confederation of British industry and advertising’ (Crisell 
2002, p204). Keane has suggested more informal and visible measures which 
would exert pressure to develop programming policies in support of de-
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commodification as well as decentralised public regulation covering all 
institutions of the media framed within a national legal and political regulatory 
structure. This broader scope of Keane’s highlights some of the complications 
facing this possible institutional assemblage. Whereas day to day regulatory 
objectives may be possible, carried out by regional bodies independent of the 
state, the state would have to be the ultimate guarantor of these structures, 
especially if as Keane implies, national media policy is to be implicated. In 
addition, the participation of the state is necessary in the long term structural 
planning regarding finance, capital grants, infrastructure etc. Also, technical 
questions regarding the allocation of spectrum, in the light of security and 
emergency issues, would also involve state agency. In relation to accountability, 
this is the strongest and perhaps most realisable aspect of the ASL model. 
Whereas output may remain representative as in the public service model, the 
role of the public in deciding what is produced is central. Public bodies drawn 
from various sectors of society (including parliamentary politics) and continuously 
re-elected, would provide a balance to the varied power-relations that constitute 
broadcasting both internally and externally. The motivation and decisions of the 
broadcasters would be open to the full scrutiny of these representative bodies 
whereas dealings between the bodies and the broadcaster would be fully open to 
the public. Thus the public would exercise both rights and duties in relation to the 
exercise of cultural power (Garnham, 1980). 
 
Unsurprisingly, there are few concrete examples of an anti-statist liberal model of 
broadcasting in practice. In countries such as Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands there has existed federalist approaches to broadcasting which have 
been nonetheless ‘elite’ controlled (Humphreys, 1996). In Britain a concerted 
effort to break the perceived monopolies of BBC and ITV led to a particular 
compromise in the setting up of Channel Four. The Annan Committee supported 
the existing public service system and the concept of broadcasting as a public 
good, but also assimilated with the mounting social pressure for a less 
consensus driven approach to broadcasting (Crissell, 2002). Anthony Smith, a 
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former BBC producer, framed an ‘open access policy’ whereby programmes 
would be produced by disparate groups, free of the editorial control which 
underlined BBC/ITV perspectives, given to ‘openness rather than balance, to 
expression rather than neutralisation’ (Smith cited in Wheeler, 1997). The Annan 
Committee recognised the inadequacies of both ITV and BBC populism in the 
face of multiculturalism. It recommended the setting up of an Open Broadcasting 
Authority which would act as a publisher of the airwaves with the programmes 
coming from ITV companies or independent producer’s non-aligned to an 
institutional philosophy. The authority would only be regulatory in so far as it 
applied existing press laws to its output. Funding would be garnered from a 
number of different sources ensuring private finance would not influence output 
(Hood, 1997). The ensuing Labour debate regarding the likely implementation of 
Channel Four was, however, brought to an end by the Conservative electoral 
victory in 1979. 
 
Both the Labour party debates and the Conservative party approach in the UK 
highlighted ‘the difficulty in persuading any government to relax its controlling 
powers over broadcasting’ (Hood, 1997). The model of the OBA was dropped, its 
duties instead being taken up by the IBA which already oversaw the ITV network 
and was indeed subject to parliamentary accountability. The ITV companies 
would sell the new channel’s advertising space and support it through a levy if 
revenue dropped below a certain amount. The structure of the channel itself, took 
on conventional company form with a corporate body made up of a chair, a board 
and a chief executive. For many of those who had lobbied for a new institutional 
settlement, the outcome was a disappointment. According to Hood, the radical 
proposals which had emanated from disgruntled producers shared ‘an optimistic 
belief that it is possible to work as radicals within the institutions of bourgeois 
democracy and within television organisations in particular’ (Hood, 1997). The 
publisher model disappointed many who felt that ‘open access’ should mean just 
that, with direct participation from various minority communities. However, the 
channel was to be representative of an expanded concept of the public, like the 
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other available terrestrial channels. Channel Fours’ pluralistic broadcasting found 
an audience that often peaked at 14% (Hood, 1997). Its popularity lead to a re-
think of the BBC 2 channel which also moved towards a more pluralistic 
approach (Wheeler, 1997). The irony of Channel Four is that it still represents 
part of the overall make-up of the public service system, extending choice 
available within a balanced system of regulation. According to Hood it was a 
‘model without parallel anywhere in the world and in many ways a very desirable 
one’ (Hood, 1997). However it was a model that was to be challenged not long 
after its inception. 
 
In Ireland the closest variant of the ASL/radical democratic model has been 
expressed in the struggle for, and subsequent development of, community 
broadcasting structures. Community broadcasting in Ireland has been predicated 
on principles of not for profit, public access, public control and community 
specific programme orientation and has variously been articulated relative to 
issues of plurality along the lines of language plurality, geographical plurality and 
social group plurality. From the 1990s a number of radio community broadcasters 
were licensed by the IRTC under these principles. However community radio and 
television had a pre-history in the impetus to develop decentralised programming 
services either for pirate radio pop music or the protest television of Irish 
language stations. In general, community media has defined itself from the 
mainstream media of public service and commercial broadcasting and adhered 
to a notion of democracy that is more akin to direct as opposed to representative 
democracy. However, there has been little impetus to link this more direct form of 
representation to the possibility of accessing mainstream or national audiences 
via a relationship between community production and national broadcasting. This 
is a systemic lack that takes on increased importance as Ireland’s immigrant 
population and its accompanied cultural diversity seeks to find expression in the 
national dialogue.     
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In general, the de-commodification of one area of national cultural production 
amongst many, with state support, is a concept which as Garnham notes is 
suffused with the possibilities of the radical pluralist politics of the sixties but 
impractical at a time of recession and a rising radical right. However, what can be 
held onto is the deeply pluralist communicative norms that it suggests wherein 
majority and, minority audiences are brought into contact with each other, and 
varied levels of social, cultural and political life become a constitutive element of 
the public sphere. Added to this, the constitutive force of the idea as realised in 
the eventual development of Channel Four indicates the possibility of an input for 
critical policy norms in the governance of broadcasting.  
 
3.5) The market liberal/neo-liberal model of broadcasting 
Political and economic crises, ideological shifts, shifting policy paradigms 
internationalisation and technological change (as outlined in chapter one) all form 
the background to the advance of the market liberal model in general and its 
institutional overhaul of broadcasting. As suggested, longwave theory proposes 
the structural impetus for the development of a new mode of accumulation, 
drawing on structural change and giving rise to the adjustment of institutional 
forms in the search for a social regime of accumulation. Marketisation or the 
elevation of markets to a chief mode of governance arises out of both ideological 
commitments, international pressures, the real difficulties facing the Keynesian 
state and the perception that the market will deliver results in the search for new 
paradigms of economic and social development. However, in the governance 
approaches to the varied post fordist alternatives of the information society, the 
knowledge based economy, the creative industries (which all have direct 
implications for media and communications), the market has tended to be the 
chosen mode of governance in their implementation.    
 
The first wave of marketisation was very much delivered within a framework of 
ideological justification and normative arguments. Anglo-American neo-
liberalism, as argued by Mark Blyth played a key role in providing the ideational 
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basis for the resolution of the long-downturn (Blyth, 2002). At its core, neo-
liberalism as ideology  rejects state intervention, whether regulatory or financial, 
as supposedly self regulating markets are the sole efficient in distributing 
resources. Neo-liberalism has its roots in the very origins of Adam Smiths’ 
political economy in which society is conceived of as a competitive market and 
individuals are ‘the source of enterprise and wealth’ (Wheeler, 1997). State 
regulation has the potential to stifle enterprise and therein distort the natural 
trajectory of human development. Conversely, the market represents the best 
mechanism for harmonising and integrating individual behaviour and allocating 
resources in a given social formation (Roll, 1994). The propensity of individuals 
to enter into relationships of exchange, according to Adam Smith, created an 
organic order where overall economic performance contributes to the public good 
by ensuring national superiority through national wealth. In the late 20th Century, 
Smith was re-invested with political vigour by a collection of neo-liberal 
economists and philosophers organised around the Mt Pelerin Society, most 
notably F.A. Hayek and Milton Freidman (Swann, 1993). Hayek has been central 
to the post Keynesian renewal of faith in the superiority of the free market 
system. Hayek et al dismissed as moral sentiment old liberal free marketers 
belief in the moral obligation of the state to engage in redistributive practices. 
Price mechanisms represent the only regulatory system capable of dealing with 
the ‘sheer volume of information flow and the complexity of its interconnections’ 
(Swann, 1993). According to Hayek, state intervention affecting price 
mechanisms represents a ‘fatal conceit’ (Hayek, 1997). Whereas deregulation 
and the turn to market making is best seen as the product of a variety of social, 
political and economic forces and influences, there is little doubt that market 
liberal philosophy has had a steering role in both articulating, shaping and 
packaging change (Swann, 1993). In broadcasting, a market model is coming to 
represent the international model of broadcasting, whereas at national level it has 
led to compromises for public service systems which now must adjust to internal 
and external pressures towards re-regulation within an overall market system 
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(Mosco, 1996, Murdock, 2000). The broad shift is from public service systems to 
public service institutions existing within rules based regulatory market systems.  
 
In considering neoliberal ideology it must be noted that it claims that there are no 
such things as social purposes, only individual self interests (Hayek, 1997). It is 
therefore a systemic objective to channel the myriad choices made by 
individuals, as humans primarily existing at the level of self interest, into resource 
allocation in a way that does not affect individual rights or choices, or impose 
moral values. At the core of this ideology then is the rationally calculating 
individual who can always be relied upon to make rational calculations based on 
self interest that maximise the potential resources to him/her. Both Pierre 
Bourdieu and David Harvey have noted that neo-liberalism is not only an 
ideology but it is also a utopia on a par with, and just as potentially disastrous as, 
communism. It claims to know human nature and behaviours, and, to be able to 
create the ideal social system to harness that knowledge (Bourdieu, 1998, 
Harvey, 2007). It is implicit in both the Regulation School and neo-institutionalist 
accounts developed in the previous chapter that neo-liberalism is highly 
erroneous in its dismissal of the social, cultural and regulative dimensions of 
economic embedding. And, this is its ideological dimension at its strongest, neo-
liberalism claims to be an economic and naturalist philosophy while masking the 
hierarchical social systems and identities that results from its development. 
 
However, neo-liberalism does not explain in itself the turn to the market and can 
be seen as having a motivational/legitimating role in elevating market 
governance to primary importance in developing specific projects aimed at re-
invigorating capitalist growth. Important however, is the degree to which neo-
liberalism has informed the development of the world economy (GATS, WTO, 
World Bank, IMF) which in turn has the force of a pressure on the individual state 
projects and supranational projects involved in re-structuring. In the case of 
Europe, state corporatism is giving way to the corporate liberalism of the USA. 
This is what is at root of the various projects coming under the label of the third 
Chapter Three 
 
92 
 
way. As has been pointed out, this is not a third way between capitalism and 
socialism but a third way between social democracy and neo-liberalism. There 
are very few examples of strong democratic socialist third ways in the western 
world. However, because of the persistence of social regulatory measures, 
institutional variations and public interest agendas in most third way countries, 
the market governance mode will be referred to as market liberalism, the key 
difference being its more pragmatic, less ideological dimensions.   
 
When market liberalism is translated into broadcasting the purpose of a 
broadcasting service, like any other service, is the satisfaction of the individual 
consumer. Here it is worth considering the Peacock Report produced by market 
ideologues for the Thatcher government in 1986, as has been remarked 
elsewhere, this document expresses some the key concepts that have become 
central features of the architecture of broadcasting policy over the last 20 years. 
Whereas its outright neo-liberalism has been reigned in by the ascendance of re-
regulatory initiatives by subsequent governments, its underlying neo-liberal 
ideology has been influential.  It provides a proto blueprint for re-imagining 
broadcasting as an element in the commodified informational economy and 
provides a route map for how it can be achieved via deregulation, market 
creation and re-regulation. It can also be seen as a precursor of the later 
European Commission Bangemann report (see next chapter). Peacock 
demonstrates how technological developments can be appropriated in order to 
justify political economic adjustments.  
 
According to Peacock, as with any other service provision, a wide number of 
broadcast services result in competition and hence, a widening of the choices 
available to the consumer. A broadcast service can therefore best be appreciated 
as a service delivering commodities. State control over market entry and state 
support is thus undesirable; the state must be neutral in relation to the provision 
of commodities. The price mechanism is the key to providing broadcasting 
services and a direct relationship between payment and broadcast will provide 
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accurate information about what type of broadcasting is desired and hence, what 
will be produced in the future. Regressive collective taxes such as the licence fee 
and public subsidies can only serve to distort the information from the price 
mechanism and should therefore be discontinued. The sheer number of 
broadcasters in the market, enabled by technological change, will eventually lead 
to such levels of competition, that all markets will have to be pursued and 
diversity will exist across the complete output. Minimum regulations such as 
those applied to the press in relation to libel, copyright and privacy issues should 
also be post facto, preventing political censorship. Broadcasters should be 
accountable to their audiences only as an aggregate of consumers, not through 
any public bodies. Taken together these conditions for a market liberal model of 
broadcasting will provide for the public interest. However the concept of the 
public interest is a radically revised one, perceived of as giving ‘the public what 
they want at prices they can afford’ (Rupert Murdoch quoted in Wheeler, 1997). 
According to Veljanovski the market liberal model in broadcasting thus treats 
broadcasting; 
’like any other economic activity. It should be provided competitively unless 
there are compelling reasons for not doing soOThere is a consensus that 
the justification for the existing system (public service) and the rationale for 
the states encroachment on the media are rapidly being undermined by 
technological advances, and the growing demand that it is the viewers and 
not broadcasters and regulators who should decide what we see, hear or 
read’ (Veljanovski, 1989). 
As is evident, the market liberal model restricts the role of the state in economic 
practices and therefore broadcastings institutions are wholly privately owned 
institutions. Who owns the media organisations does not really matter as it is 
consumers who decide what is produced. A post-fordist model of production 
enabled by technical advance (digitalisation, computerisation) would engender 
multiple production centres responding to the market in a dynamic fashion. In the 
market liberal model, the broadcasters are not the programme makers. Low cost 
technology combined with expanding bandwidth makes the broadcasting industry 
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analogous to the publishing industry, with market entry open to all who can avail 
of falling entry costs. Common carrier laws ensure that all distribution systems 
are open to the various broadcasting interests, thus network regulation is based 
on liberalised telecoms regulation. Finance is an important structural element as 
it creates the conditions for responsiveness and incentives for efficiency. If the 
market first appears as chaotic, it will eventually set prices leading to the 
complete efficiency in the use of broadcast resources. The optimal financial 
model is that of pay per view, with consumers only paying for what they actually 
watch (Veljanovski, 1989). Users pay for discrete programme items, creating 
their own schedules and buying from whoever offers the most suitable goods at 
the best prices. Samuel Brittan in his contribution to the Peacock report argued 
for the creation of a levy on advertising or the provision of some form of tax 
finance to create a public service fund within the market liberal model. 
Independent broadcasters could then compete for the funds on the basis of 
competitive proposals for minority or educational programming which may be 
neglected by the market. Thus the concept of public service could be relegated to 
certain programming genres. However, as Crisell has pointed out, this also 
indicates that the market liberal model implicitly recognises that ‘markets can be 
driven by something other then direct consumer demand’ (Crisell, 2002, 
p213).Viewers demand broadcasting services as citizens willing to pay tax for 
them, not only as consumers willing to pay to view.    
 
The regulatory model proposed is one of re-regulation as the free market 
negates the need for heavy regulation, creates competition, stimulates efficiency 
and fosters choice. Minimal legal provisions comparable to the existing western 
press laws would apply in areas such as copyright and libel whereas competition 
law would oversee the industry. The broadcasting industry would be therefore 
essentially self-regulating in the interests of avoiding prosecution. Samuel Brittan 
suggests that extra legalities would guarantee market entry for programme 
makers who can cover their costs or otherwise finance production and common 
carrier rules which would ensure that operators of transmission equipment carry 
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all services which meet the criteria for market entry. The market is in Hayek’s 
formulation far superior to the ‘expert government administrators’ whereas 
programme producers and audiences will be liberated from the dominance of 
state backed orthodox values (Veljanovski, 1989). The market also replaces 
formal structures of accountability. Broadcasters, compelled to make money in a 
competitive environment, will necessarily have to give the public what they want, 
to maximise ratings and hence profit and investment. In relation to the provision 
of choice ‘there is a critical level of channel competition, after which diversity 
becomes the profit maximising strategy for some channels’ (Veljanovski, 1989). 
A transfer of power results, from administrators to consumers, in relation to who 
decides what is in effect produced (Peacock, 1986). Along with the deregulation 
and liberalisation, privatisation of formerly public networks should take place to 
allow for full scale competition. 
 
A significant element of the market liberal model is the power it transfers from 
accountable public representatives, to unaccountable corporate interests. 
However, leaving aside the regulatory challenges of media market concentration 
and corporate power, even Hayek suggests that ‘where it is impossible to create 
the conditions necessary to make competition effective, we must resort to other 
methods of guiding economic activity’ (Hayek, 1997, p37).  
 
A central element of the Peacock Report is the role that new technology plays in 
ideally enabling a full market structure in broadcasting. The introduction of cable 
and satellite technology was seen as central in expanding the bandwidth 
available for broadcast content allowing for increased availability of content, 
increased choice in content and the potential of flexibility in consumption of 
content. This, it was argued, was reason enough to allow for a de-regulated 
structure wherein as many content producers as is possible should be licensed, 
stringent content provisions should be dropped, competition law should be 
adapted and press like content provisions should be introduced. Whereas the 
political economy arguments for market failure in cultural and informational 
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production expose the ideological nature of these arguments, the potential 
digitalisation of broadcasting has given a renewed boon to these calls for de-
regulation. Digitalisation, the reduction of media content to a common code 
allows for the potential of convergence which can refer to convergence (or 
increasing similarity)  in distribution networks, convergence in content production, 
convergence in consumption, convergence in content forms (Garnham, 1999B). 
However, the likelihood of convergence occurring at all of these levels at once 
requires a medium to be characterised by the convergence of digital networks, 
digital content and digital information communication technology. This is the 
system characteristics of the internet but, for the most part, not the systemic 
characteristics of digital broadcasting. However it is these systemic 
characteristics that have been utilised to argue for the further re-regulation of 
broadcasting along the lines of the light touch regulation of the internet/web. The 
imagining of the internet as an infrastructure for international commodified 
informational markets has created the ideational basis for the re-regualtion of 
digital broadcasting along the same lines. This is the market liberal vision of 
digital broadcasting, as an element of digitalised informational markets, that has 
driven much debate at different levels of policy making for broadcasting. In the 
market liberal model, broadcast content would potentially become the driver for 
the development and uptake of the cable, satellite and spectrum based networks 
that would become the infrastructure of networked informational economies. The 
broadcast sector itself would potentially develop new markets based on its 
proposed expansion and its new technological flexibility.             
 
In the UK, from the 1950’s the idea of a  market liberal model in broadcasting 
was confined to debates within policy cells until Margaret Thatcher’s conservative 
government brought it to the centre of broadcasting policy. The Peacock 
Committee presented the main arguments in its 1986 report on the future funding 
of the BBC, within the framework of market liberalism. Echoing government 
thinking on privatisation, deregulation and re-regulated competition, the Peacock 
report provided the basis for the Conservative broadcasting policy that 
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culminated in the 1990 Broadcasting Act. However, as some of the authors of the 
Peacock Report themselves noted, the Conservative government were not 
essentially interested in neoliberalism, but rather, were interested using it as 
rhetoric for deregulation and expansion of commercial activity (Brittan, 1990). 
The radical right elements of the government demonstrated a desire for free 
markets, but governments, more usually, support marketisation as a shot in the 
arm for the economy and the potential means of building a new mode of 
accumulation. As a pro-business, de-regulatory boon to private capital, a short 
term measure for economic growth, a means of patronage, marketisation has 
proven a considerable temptation to governments answering short term interests, 
but not necessarily the longer term ones of sustainable social and economic 
growth (Garnham, 2000).  The new liberals were also intent on maintaining the 
presence of leaner but no less powerful state. A State which would be less 
subject to democratic accountability if powerful social institutions such as the 
public broadcasters were reigned in by the forces of competition (Keane 1990, 
Curran and Seaton, 1997). However, it was not the BBC that was to be crippled 
by impending legislation but the structural features of the public service system 
itself. With the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the core concept of non competition for 
revenue was removed from the broadcasting landscape. From there on in, 
Channel Four was to be allowed to sell its own advertising revenue in direct 
competition with ITV. The ITV franchises which had been previously given to 
those companies which presented the most comprehensive programming policy 
were to be, for the first time, auctioned. The IBA which had imposed public 
service criteria on the independent broadcasters was reconstituted as the ITC, 
overseeing the new commercial system with no power over prescribing 
programming and no recourse to economic sanctions. The broadcasting system 
was to be in effect a commercial system into which extant public service 
elements were to be gradually re-assimilated (Negrine, 1996). From this point on 
the structural and behavioural logics that underpinned the institutional bases of 
the public service system where gradually rearticulated or replaced by the logics 
of an open market system, based on the production and distribution of products 
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and services. This became the sine qua non of other developments relative to 
internationalisation, pluralisation and digitalisation of broadcasting.  
 
Along with the re-articulation of the public service system relative to the logics of 
market relations and competitive production and supply, liberalisation, 
commercialisation, privatisation and re-regulation re-ordered the overall 
communications landscape in the UK. These projects were crucially tied to wider 
goals of re-inventing Britain’s industrial structure along the lines of post-
industrialism, with reflexive/symbolic goods and communications infrastructure 
being at the heart of that design. Private initiatives were introduced to develop 
the cable sector whereas lightly regulated content rules were designed to help 
drive this development. A private satellite broadcasting concern was also 
licensed to drive the development of that technology whilst creating new markets 
for pay per view and thematic television. BSkyB was awarded a non domestic 
television licence that allowed it to work within a lighter system of content 
regulation. In the 1990s, the regional structure of the ITV system was de-
emphasised as ownership of the regional broadcasters was allowed to 
consolidate and ITV plc was given a role in the development of new media 
venture such as internet service provision and DTT. The public broadcaster was 
encouraged to commercialise its assets abroad whilst developing itself as a 
global media brand. In the mid 1990s its internal structure was re-organised 
under John Birt under what was called the new public managerialism wherein 
autonomy was restricted in favour of accountability and efficiency procedures. 
This managerialism was accompanied by the development of an internal market 
structure and a rationalisation of programme production (Borne, 2004). This all 
had knock on effects in the Republic. The liberalisation of satellite provision had 
created a commercial operation that had the distributive capacity to develop its 
operations within Ireland, creating another platform for broadcast distribution, 
based in and operating from the neighbour state. The ongoing development of 
cable had created the availability of increased channel provision and new 
broadcasting market segments that were reflected in their availability in the Irish 
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cable system. Added to this, the developing market structure was changing the 
culture of television production and content and this, as Ireland’s other 
mediascape, had an impact on the tastes and expectations of audiences in 
Ireland. The ideational, structural and cultural impacts of the increasingly 
marketised British mediascape were beginning to be felt throughout the 1990s. 
As broadcasting became more internationalised and marketised and the hype of 
the oncoming digital revolution promised a virtual goldrush, Ireland began to look 
more and more like a potential market extension for broadcast interests operating 
out of the brave new informational capital of informational capitalism, London. 
Chapter Five will address this period of development and its impact in Ireland 
more fully.   
          
The limits to national marketisation and the relative strengths of the UK 
broadcasting sector in industrial terms were recognised by most politicians and 
the 1996 Broadcasting Act guaranteed the future of the BBC with the justification 
of its significance as both a commercially successful international player and an 
important source of pluralism in concentrated domestic media markets (Levy, 
1999). The election of a New Labour government in 1997, however, did not 
noticeably disrupt the logic that had been outlined as policy in the Peacock report 
and if anything New Labour, courtesy of the third way and digitalisation, has been 
far more proactive in introducing its structural features, albeit, with a clearer 
understanding of how extant public service features could work to deepen and 
legitimise the new system. Thus new labour has presided over communications 
policies centred on the central organisational principle of ‘liberalised 
convergence’ and re-regulated digital broadcast markets. The question was, 
would Ireland, once again, be influenced by the British model at this juncture? 
 
For broadcasting, the market liberal model transforms the institutional norms 
outlined above and they are worth contrasting before the ideological, 
technological and materialist shapers of the market liberal model in Europe and 
Ireland are considered. 
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Public service system 
1926-1990 
Market liberal system 
1980s- 
Small number of licensed broadcasters As many broadcasters as the market will 
support 
Plurality via structured system Plurality via commercial competition 
Interventionist regulation Light touch regulation/self regulation/ horizontal 
regulation 
Integrated oligarchic corporations Oligarchic structures characterised by 
integration, network and synergistic relations 
Plurality of production arrangements and state 
control over distribution 
Economic competition at all levels of the 
production/distribution process 
National dynamics of competing complimentary National/International/Global 
production/distribution and competitive 
structure 
National/international regulatory structure Supranational and global regulatory structure 
Public good status of broadcast forms Negotiated intellectual property regime 
Free to Air Free to Air, Subscription, Pay per View 
 
The critical political economy critique of the marketisation of broadcasting has 
been summarised in the previous chapter. Suffice to say that activities that 
involve the cultural production of values, ideas and identities do not fit into the 
formulas of neoclassical economics or their expression through technological 
arguments based around convergence. There are non economic rationales for 
regulating the cultural industries and there are industry specific rationales for 
regulating the peculiar economics of the varied sectors of the cultural industries 
(Grant and Wood, 2004). These facts tend to be elided in both market liberal 
ideology and generalist economistic policy approaches such as information 
society and knowledge based economy policy. The institutionalist based critique 
of the regulation school point to the degree to which markets do not occur 
naturally (meso level institutionalism) or exist outside of social and political power 
relations (macro level institutionalism). Added to this, markets in communications 
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and media bring with them their own set of institutional and economic features 
that have implications for what the media produce, who gets access to 
production, who gets access to what cultural frames, and, more broadly, how the 
realm of publicity and the public is to be constituted. Thus the role for policy and 
regulation still require the institutional capacity to positively influence structure 
and output relative to the normative criteria of pluralist democratic societies. 
Neither the ideal types of public service or market media suffice. 
 
Summary 
The drive towards marketisation cannot be discussed in isolation of the 
increasingly international contexts of broadcasting and the emerging paradigms 
of an informational or knowledge based economy. The US was beginning to 
expand its (selective) agenda of barrier-free exchange between nations in all 
markets including cultural goods. The EU, from 1984, was also showing intent to 
develop a Europe wide ‘common programme production and distribution market’, 
in the interests of creating economies of scale capable of competing with the 
larger markets of the US (Collins, 1994). At European level, the inevitability of an 
internationally competitive broadcasting environment, enabled by developments 
in technology, and the switch to a regulatory regime based on ‘lighter’ regulatory 
structures at national level helped to institutionalise a re-orientation towards pan 
European market governance (Humphreys, 1995). While generally sceptical 
about EU intervention in broadcasting affairs, and more involved in trading 
television programmes with the US, the UK, as did Germany and France, 
perceived possible advantages in the Television without Frontiers directive of 
1989. With these larger international economic imperatives in the background 
(there has been an over-emphasis on the national political ones), UK government 
policy was increasingly directed towards creating an industrial sector capable of 
taking its place in an internationally competitive environment. It is the European 
level of restructuring that will be addressed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
European Broadcasting Policy in Transition 
 
4.1) Introduction 
One key influence on Irish broadcasting policy, from the the 1990s on, has been 
the increasing Europeanization of communications and media policy. The 
European Union, with its own institutional makeup, selectivities and activities has 
become a key shaper of its member states media policies. Initially its key 
intervention was in relation to transnational broadcasting but it has latterly 
become involved in policies related to the restructuring of mediascapes relative 
to the international, digital, multichannel environment. Via Television without 
Frontiers, competition policy and convergence policy, the EU has been 
instrumental in shaping the emergence of a regulated market regime, the digital 
transition and the restructuring of public broadcasting in its member states. The 
present chapter will provide an overview of the EU’s core broadcasting policy 
directions, their contexts and their objectives. At the core of the EU’s policy 
drives has been an interest in;  
• developing the economic potential of the audiovisual sector;  
• ensuring the informational infrastructure for the proposed information 
society is put in place;  
• maintaining the competitive basis of European AV industries;  
• developing the internal market;  
• stimulating both hardware and software development as elements of the 
knowledge based economy;  
• stimulating the growth of European champions capable of succeeding in 
international markets;  
• protecting the development of European culture and supporting the public 
service model of European broadcasting.  
 
As will be clear from this catalogue of objectives, some elements of the EU’s 
economistic drive will inevitably clash with the perceived democratic and cultural 
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roles of the media industries and it is therefore a feature of European policy that 
it promotes dualistic elements of liberalisation and rationalisation of broadcasting 
as well as protection and derogation from trade rules. On the whole, however, it 
has been argued that the EU has taken the lead from some of its larger member 
states in marketising the audiovisual sector, seeking comparative dimensions of 
advantage to those enjoyed by the US AV industries and mindful of the 
opportunities arising from the marketisation of broadcasting sectors on a global 
basis. Evidence for this has been documented by a number of media policy 
scholars. David Levy’s analysis of the European Union’s co-ordination of the 
digital transition points to the influence of the large member states in setting the 
agenda (Levy, 1999). Granville Wiliams has made similar observations in relation 
to the machinations surrounding the development of the audio visual media 
services directive (Williams, 2007). Whereas this analysis has been contested by 
others such as Harcourt (2007) and Michalis (2007), there are strong grounds to 
suggest that member states do exert influence when their goals/agendas can be 
shaped to match those of the EU institutions. Richard Collins work on audio-
visual policy in the EU has pointed to the degree to which comparative 
advantage is an important element of EU a-v policy (Collins, 1994). The 
intergovernmental organisation of the EU, thus mediates and promotes, to a 
certain extent, member states relationship to the globalisation of broadcasting. 
Since its accession to the European Community in 1973, Ireland has for the most 
part embraced the European project.         
 
The  decades that span from the gradual introduction of cable and satellite into 
broadcasting to the digitalisation of all existing transmission systems encapsulate 
change in broadcasting that points to the emergence of a new economic 
emphasis, pragmatism and technology led strategising within European 
broadcasting policy (Mc Quail and Van Cuilenberg, 2003). The re-orientation 
from national broadcasting structures dominated by public service systems 
(however configured) to a gradually established international market structure 
with an increasing imbalance between public and private provision is a feature of 
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this changing mediascape. The degree to which this shift reflects changes in the 
wider political economy exposes technology bound explanations of structural 
change. At a general level, the most consistent policy moves that have 
underpinned change in broadcasting have been the processes of marketisation, 
rationalisation and internationalisation. In order to understand national 
approaches to convergence and the restructuring of public broadcasting it is 
necessary to track these processes as they have occurred at various levels of 
decision making, illustrating the institutional diversity at work in the development 
of media, communications and cultural policy at European level. Broadcasting 
policy at European level has thus been, from the 1990s, concerned with issues 
of; 
• global competitiveness;  
• the re-regulation of liberalised broadcasting ecologies;  
• the development of the single market in broadcasting;  
• digital television policy;  
• the rationalisation of communications competition policy;  
• the convergence paradigm .  
 
4.2) Cable, satellite and new broadcasting markets 
The deployment of cable networks in European countries signalled the beginning 
of a discourse involving new communication technologies that has remained 
characteristic of subsequent technological developments. In contra-distinction to 
the limited bandwidth and centralisation tendencies of broadcasting, broadband 
cable became associated with the potential of ‘abundance of production and 
supply; freedom of choice; interactivity; narrow casting; loss of central control; 
de-centralisation; search and consultation’ (Mc Quail, 1986). The gap between 
the political, economic and social potentials of the new technology and the 
subsequent reality of their deployment served to underline the gap between the 
rhetoric and the reality of technological change. The new technology was in fact 
not that new. Cable had been used from the earliest days of radio but was 
eventually de-emphasised as a distribution technology to allow free to air 
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broadcasters to establish themselves (Winston, 1998). The early deployment of 
cable technology in television also had mixed rationale resulting from peculiar 
national circumstances. In the Benelux countries it existed as an alternative to 
terrestrial broadcasting allowing for an increased number of public service 
broadcasting channels (Humphreys, 1996). In Ireland, Rte used cable to relay 
the British free to air channels to urban populations, reclaiming some of its lost 
advertising revenue in multichannel households through cable subscriptions 
(Horgan, 2001). Additional multichannel relay services were developed by myriad 
commercial interests throughout the key urban areas of Dublin, Cork and Galway 
whereas wireless multichannel distribution was developed to supplement channel 
provision in rural areas. In both France and Britain the potential benefits of an 
improved information technology infrastructure underlined cable development 
(Humphreys and Dyson, 1988). The high cost of infrastructure build, however, 
acted as a deterrent to both public and private investment in wide scale 
development. Where development was undertaken, the ability to provide 
multichannel in broadcasting systems characterised by a low number of existing 
channels offered significant possibility of returns on investment. Thus the 
potential of commercial channels to exploit new markets via cable technology 
was a significant factor in driving cable expansion. Conversely, according to 
Peter Humphries, ‘despite the qualifications, multi-channel cable television was a 
key factor for the remarkable extension of commercial broadcasting in a large 
area of Northern Europe’ (Humphreys, 1996, p166). The earlier alternatives 
envisioned by many community broadcasting pioneers enthused by cable had 
thus become subordinate to commercial logic (Drijvers, 1991). However, the 
impact of cable was redoubled with the development of satellite transmission 
technologies.  
 
Ceding technological development to the market as a policy option gained further 
ground with satellite broadcasting. Initially feeding cable head ends with 
European programming, the development of direct to home (DTH) satellites 
opened up new opportunities for commercial broadcasters to enter national 
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markets whilst also avoiding the regulatory regime of the relevant state. In certain 
cases, governments who were politically aligned to liberalisation were complicit in 
instituting these potentials. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher’s government awarded 
a non-domestic broadcasting licence to Rupert Murdoch's Sky broadcasting in 
1986 undercutting domestic ventures in both cable and satellite. BSkyB 
introduced its services in 1989 offering a basic tier of programming later 
complimented by pay per view thematic services such as sports, movie and 
entertainment channels. BskyB’s satellite footprint extended into Ireland, 
although it did not extend its DTH offering there until 1998, initially distributing its 
channel packages via the cable companies.   
 
Lack of co-ordination and support on the part of European governments and a 
strong commercial lobby led to a situation wherein ‘European satellite policy was 
effectively privatised and commercialised in the sense that private companies 
took over much of the initiative and the decision from the public bodies that 
started development in the late 1970s’ (Ostergaard and Kleinsteuber, 1992, p68). 
Along with the privatisation of the technology came a further expansion of 
commercial channels and pay TV services available via satellite or cable. The 
balance was rapidly changing between public and private provision. From 1980 
where most countries had access to no more than 4 domestic channels, by 1990, 
15-20 channels became available via satellite or cable or a combination of both 
(Brants and Siune, 1992). The arrival of satellite had particular saliency for 
national sovereignty and called into question the strategy of ‘controlled de-
regulation in one country’ (Mc Quail, 1992). The increasingly transnational basis 
of broadcasting also brought it within the scope of European Community 
competence.  
 
The pressure for de-regulation and liberalisation took on multiple forms. 
Governments pursued various strategies for controlled de-regulation but 
eventually resorted to competitive de-regulation as they sought to keep up with 
market and technological change. In some countries such as Britain and Italy de-
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regulation had ideological connotations but more generally it related to factors 
such as information society policy, locational policy or the desire to shape the 
national broadcasting sector before the onset of European and Global 
liberalisation (Humphreys and Dyson, 1988). In the smaller countries of Europe, 
the process appeared to be occurring with a degree of time lag as competition in 
small national broadcasting ecologies appeared to have effects which 
undermined their supposed benefits (Grissold and Preston, 1995, Meier and 
Trappel, 1992). If an American model of social communication, with an emphasis 
on competition and commercialism, was to prevail, national governments wanted 
national competitors fit to compete, even it seemed, if it was at the expense of 
the existing public service. Vested interests came to the fore of communications 
policy making. These new media interest groups were made up of the electronics 
industry, cable and satellite television lobbies, postal, telegraph and telephone 
companies, newspaper publishers, the advertising lobby, independent producers 
and finance companies. Various combinations of these interests became active 
within the fora of decision making at national, European and global level 
(Humphreys and Dyson, 1990). Each had their own agenda for de-regulation and 
liberalisation motivated either by power, commerce or a combination of both. The 
prospects of diversification into untapped media markets underpinned by the 
positive projections of the advertising industry attracted media and non-media 
actors alike (Collins, 1994). However, it was rarely a case of whole scale de-
regulation (excepting Italy) as different national political cultures and socio-
cultural contexts gave different emphases to the degree, selectivity and timing of 
what turned out to be essentially market sector re-regulation. In Italy, non-
decision making as a policy option led to the single-stroke marketisation of the 
broadcasting sector by Berlusconi. In France, marketisation was accompanied by 
strict regulation regarding quotas that re-enforced the general policy of cultural 
protectionism. In Britain the marketisation of the commercial dimension of the 
public service system, the ITV network, was hastily curbed as quality thresholds 
were added to the franchise auctions. In Germany, marketisation was 
accompanied by increased investment in the public service broadcasters ( cf 
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Curran and Seaton, 1996, Dyson and Humphries, 1988, Mc Quail, 1992 for 
Europe wide changes). The proliferation of new regulators and new regulatory 
bodies was significant, but, in general terms, the new consensus was for light 
touch regulation. Increased public intervention and economic regulation in the 
interests of creating structural pluralism along public service criteria were, for the 
most part, off the agenda. The structural wisdom of non-competition for revenue 
amongst broadcasters lost saliency in a rapidly marketised broadcasting ecology.   
 
It is difficult to generalise about the motives, actions and rationale of European 
countries in their move towards liberalisation and re-regulation. It is possible 
however to recognise some common features in the changed media structure. To 
begin with, the broadcasting structure had become fragmented, moving from 
monopoly to duopoly with eventually a profusion of commercial channels 
available via pay-TV operators. The justification underlining these moves was the 
potential of increased efficiency and choice via competition. However, this 
appeared to be all but a convenient rationale for the myriad motivations of the 
political and economic actors involved. With the marketisation of the 
broadcasting sector the shift in the balance of power was towards private 
ownership and influence in the development of broadcasting. Multiple ownership, 
cross holdings, joint ventures, horizontal, diagonal and vertical integration etc led 
to the rise of pan European media conglomerates and the entrance of industrial 
conglomerates into the media sector (Palmer and Mazzoleni, 1992). At both 
global and European level opportunities arose to exploit the new technologies 
leading to trans-global and pan-European broadcasting within geo-lingusitic 
markets characterised by common language groups (Collins, 1994, Sinclair and 
Jacka, 1996). At national level, public broadcasting systems had largely given 
way to dual systems with ‘private monopoly elements’ competing for the various 
resources of time, finance, and talent on the basis of commercial imperative. 
Europe’s second wave of analogue broadcasters where for the most part uniform 
in their industrial ownership structure and according to some studies, 
entertainment-led in programme output (DeBens, Kelly, Bakke, 1992). These 
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widespread changes prompted one other considerable structural change as the 
European Community moved to become a policy maker and shaper in the 
emerging pan European broadcasting environment. 
 
4.3) Towards a European single market 
Within the Community, two general positions had already been developing in 
relation to the changes in Europe’s mediascape. Within the European 
Parliament, the Hahn Resolution of 1984 stressed the cultural significance of 
broadcasting in helping to encourage national citizens’ broader identification with 
their European neighbours, urging intervention to create Europe wide 
broadcasting channels. The emphasis was on creating a Europe wide public 
sphere. The reality of fragmented language markets however led the Parliament 
to re-orientate towards the importance of, and tolerance of, diversity in European 
cultures and the need for quotas in broadcasting to prevent the erosion of these 
diverse cultures (Collins, 1994, Humphreys, 1996). Another strand of media 
intervention arose from the activities of the European Court of Justice which, in a 
number of media centred cases, had designated broadcasting as a service which 
under the treaty of Rome gave the Community competence to ensure that the 
‘conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community’s industry exist’ 
(Treaty Of Rome: Article 130). This economic tack provided a clearer precedent 
for community action in a developing industry that was fairing badly against 
American imports (Hirsch and Petersen, 1992). The lead directorate for a 
developing directive, DG III, the internal market directorate, identified the 
fragmented nature of European markets and the resultant lack of economies of 
scale as the key determinant in the programme trade deficit. This is hardly 
surprising as the directorate general in question was chiefly concerned with 
development of the internal market and the maintenance of competitiveness of 
the EC. The concomitant policy action came in the commission directorate known 
as as the Television without Frontiers (TVWF) directive. However, the journey of 
TVWF from green paper in 1984 to directive in 1989 served to highlight the 
divisions in the EC in relation to audiovisual policy. Those who supported the 
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paradigm of a free trade in services with the market acting as the chief allocative 
mechanism in production and distribution, labelled ‘liberals’, where in 
confrontation with those favouring support mechanisms and quotas in the 
interests of protecting national and European audio-visual space, labelled 
‘dirigistes’ (Collins, 1994). The linguistic origin of these terms highlighted the 
important part played by the British in ‘liberal’ initiatives and the French in 
steering dirigiste goals. The Directive was to a certain extent an attempt to 
balance these two extremes, but to most commentators represented ‘more’ of a 
victory for the liberal camp (Humphreys, 1996). Behind the scenes in Europe, 
commercial lobby groups, trans-national companies and US lobby groups had all 
applied pressure to facilitate the greatest degree of de-regulation possible 
(Hirsch and Petersen, 1992, Humphreys 1996). The success of these groups in 
influencing the policy making process was a significant indication of the shift in 
the balance of power in relation to the fora of policy making and shaping. The 
European Broadcasting Union, broadcasting professionals, the European Trade 
Union confederation, parties of the left and right and the smaller countries in the 
Community, including Ireland, were sidelined by the policy process that mainly 
took place within DGIII.  
 
The key thrust of the TVWF directive was to remove the barriers to entry into 
neighbouring European broadcasting markets for members of the community. 
Essentially it created the condition of ‘mutual recognition’ wherein the legal 
recognition of a broadcaster in one state entitled its recognition in another state 
once the broadcaster met the minimal requirements of the directive. The goal 
was to create a single European market for broadcasting allowing the European 
industry to capitalise on economies of scale and tackle its supply side deficit with 
minimal regulatory disparity. Regulatory regimes in relation to advertising and 
sponsorship were harmonised, but, in general, ‘the de-regulatory principle of 
mutual recognition as against re-regulatory harmonisation’ was the central tenet 
(Humphreys, 1996, p276). The additional quotas which sought to ensure a 
majority share of broadcast time for European works and the proposed 10% for 
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independent production companies where weakened by the legally ambiguous 
qualification of ‘where practicable’ in article 4. The complimentary positive 
intervention in the subsequent Media programme was also to a certain degree 
undermined by its limited budget. In retrospect, the directive failed to recognise 
the largely national basis of European broadcasting markets (Levy, 1999). At an 
earlier stage the directive was criticised for being a ‘clear victory for commercial 
forces’ and ‘a clear victory for US interests and other commercial broadcasters’ 
that happened to be based and licensed in Europe. The Commission denied 
these charges claiming in 1996 that ‘at least half the output of most mainstream 
terrestrial EU channels was European in origin in 1994’ (Hutchison, 1999, 208). It 
was the other half of the output that caused concern for the smaller countries in 
Europe where the quotas often proved counter-productive. Limited GNP imposed 
limitations on programme budgets that were stretched even further as 
programmers sought to meet their quota of more expensive European material. 
In a small country such as Ireland where cheap imports helped free up revenue 
for the national broadcaster to concentrate on funding prime-time domestic 
programming, the implications of fragmenting programme spend for the purposes 
of a quota pointed to arbitrariness in the policy (Humphreys, 1996, Horgan, 
2001). In general terms, the lack of definition of what was ‘European’ and what 
was ‘independent’ allowed member states to interpret the directive liberally. The 
de-facto inducement of further market liberalisation, via international competition 
in distribution brought the smaller countries into the liberalisation slipstream with 
the effect that many governments ‘sought to encourage domestic commercial 
interests to get something out of the new situation’ (Humphreys, 1996, pp187-
189). Humphreys identifies the three chief outcomes of the directive as being the 
removal of national sovereignty over broadcasting policy, the favouring of 
commercial interests as opposed to protectionist policies and the gradual spread 
of light touch regulation to domestic broadcasters disadvantaged by competition 
from lighter regulated foreign based channels. A further outcome was an 
increase in the investment of non-European media interests in European 
ventures to gain access to markets (Goldsmith, Thomas, O’Regan and 
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Cunningham, 2002). However, as the Commission argued, the directive was 
designed to be refined with subsequent dates set for renewal. The changes to 
TVWF in 1997 and 2007 have not altered the core element of mutual recognition 
but have introduced significant changes that will be dealt with subsequently. 
 
The Community however was not operating in a vacuum. At the Global level, 
within the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, later the WTO), the 
US was pressuring for the inclusion of broadcasting within the trade agreements 
as an internationally traded service. The previous attempts to establish a New 
World Information and Communication Order had fallen foul of British and 
American intransigence and was therein replaced by a internal push for 
audiovisual governance based on free trade in communication and information 
(CF Girard and O’Siochru, 2002). The potential of binding quotas in European 
markets led the US to threaten various retaliatory measures against the EC, such 
as import quotas, at the GATT negotiations in Uruguay (Hirsch and Petersen, 
1992). Even the ambiguity of the ‘where practicable’ clause was not enough to 
allay US concerns that its substantial export trade would be damaged. The 
negotiations continued with no real advance and eventually had to be set aside 
to allow progress on other issues. The US maintained pressure in this area and 
via the subsequent development of the General Agreement of Trade in Services 
(Gats) secured the re-insertion of the ‘where practicable’ clause in the run up to 
the renewal of the directive in 1997 and the general ascent of the audiovisual 
sector into a traded services category (Hutchison, 1999). A concomitant policy of 
stepping up investment in the European audiovisual industry also sought to 
convince Europe of the benefits of positive relations with the US in this matter. 
The cultural exemption (sought but not actually achieved) for broadcasting, 
fought hard for by the EU and led by France and Canada, was to come under 
increased pressure in the approach to the millennium round of the GATS. This 
time the US came down heavily against an ‘opt in’ agreement whereby nations 
opted in to some agreements on goods and services but stayed out of others 
(Winseck, 2002). The WTO, via the Gats, still accepts cultural derogations in 
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relation to the cultural industries of broadcasting, film and publishing but has also 
elicited reassurance from the EU that liberalisation proceeds apace in these 
areas (Hutchison, 1999). The emergence of a global policy regime in relation to 
the ‘new media’ of the internet and the world wide web illustrate the degree to 
which the WTO has become involved in shaping emergent communication 
systems, which in a convergent media environment will impinge on all producers 
of digital media (Winseck, 2002). The United States now framed digitalisation as 
the key impetus for instituting commodified information markets. In relation to 
broadcasting, the strategies of the WTO can be construed as having shaped 
European policy making as the push to commodified information liberalisation 
becomes a policy context. 
 
With the onset of liberalisation this growing gap between the sites in which policy 
was shaped and where it was actualised was not apparent but was becoming so. 
At national level, governments had to come to terms with some of the 
externalities arising from marketised international broadcasting structures, such 
as the emergence of new European ‘national champions’ which were in effect 
local corporate interests that posed some of the same problems locally that US 
corporations did in global terms.  National attempts to place limits on media 
concentration now centred on rules based intervention triggered by various 
quantitative measurements for media concentration (Feintuck, 1999). That these 
re-regulatory dimensions were needed was a tacit acknowledgement of the 
failure of the market to produce a plurality of media sources without regulation. 
However, national governments were to a certain extent powerless against the 
manoeuvrings of cross border international entities such as BskyB, Premier and 
Canal+, and were consistently lobbied by would be domestic national champions 
not to restrict domestic players confronted with such competition. Efforts made at 
European level to introduce a harmonisation of ownership and control legislation 
however failed to win community support (Harcourt, 2006). Trappel and Meier 
point to a number of complexities which hampered the effectiveness of the anti 
concentration strategies such as; 
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o The extension of (licence) controlees into political actors; 
o The reluctance of governments to engage in trans-national regulation; 
o The lack of legislative flexibility and adjustment in existing rules; 
o A reluctance to put media concentration on the public agenda; 
o A reluctance to execute existing media concentration regulation with a 
resulting raising of the bar in relation to ownership limits.  
(Trappel and Meier, 1998, p192). 
 
In those countries where expansion was stymied by ownership and control 
regulation, such as Germany, internationalisation strategies included developing 
strategic alliances in other countries, investing in foreign enterprises, attracting 
the advertising spend from neighbouring markets, creating linkages both 
horizontally and vertically through synergies, amongst others (Humphries, 1996, 
Mazzoleni and Palmer, 1992).The international corporate model developing its 
reach across international markets thus became established in the formerly 
national and public service led European mediascape .Within the EU, there was 
significant support within the commission for this development with European 
conglomerates seen as being the answer to competing with the US corporations 
with significant involvement in the rapidly developing global audio visual industry.  
 
Pressure for community action in relation to concentration of media ownership 
came initially from European media unions, journalist associations, the Council of 
Europe and the European Parliament. In 1992, Directorate General III, working 
from an influential report from the consultants Booz Hamilton, responded by 
producing the ‘Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal 
Market’. The Green Paper harboured the characteristic duality in Commission 
policy shaping by stating the necessity of pluralism in media structures but 
rejecting any action that would hamper the operation of the single market. The 
green paper thus, instead of examining the internal contradictions between 
competition and concentration in media markets, relied on the over-simplification 
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that increased competition would eventually lead to diversity. At this juncture a 
1993 white paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment in the 
Community’ emphasised the information society project and the audio-visual 
sector as a key area for growth and job creation. It predicted that employment in 
the sector would rise from 1.8 million in 1993 to approximately four million in the 
new millennium (Humphreys, 1996). It also stressed the strategic importance of 
the sector as being protected from competitive low cost labour markets, an 
important consideration in a global economy that was continually being 
integrated on the basis of neo-liberal competitiveness. Directorate General XIII, 
the home directorate for telecommunications and the information society also 
signalled the importance of the audiovisual sector while criticising the ‘financial 
and organisational weakness of the European programme industry’ (Levy, 1999). 
DG III had already backed away from the issue of plurality and diversity at this 
point suggesting that it was an area of competence for national governments. 
Instead DG XV, the directorate now concerned with the operation of the internal 
market sought support for a directive that would implement community action to 
harmonise European laws on media ownership. The 1994 ‘Communication on 
Media Ownership’ sought to put an end ‘to the disparities between national rules 
concerning the media’ (cited in Levy, 1999, p53). The directive essentially aimed 
to remove national regulation for pluralism and replace them with community law 
that protected the internal market. The commission turned to the commercial 
interests/lobbies to bolster support for the directive by convincing them of the 
convenience of harmonisation. In the ensuing debate in which the Parliament 
and various national governments attempted to refocus the debate on pluralism, 
new policy paradigms concerning the information society, digitalisation and 
convergence became increasingly significant in the policy discourse.  
 
4.4) The economics and politics of digital television technology 
The 1994 green paper ‘Europe and the Global Information Society; 
Recommendations for the European Community’ mooted the potential offered by 
digitalisation to promote pluralism as against concentration in multimedia 
Chapter Four 
 
116 
 
markets. The prospect of technological convergence and digital compression 
offered a vision of Europe’s audio-visual future as being one of as many 
producers as there were receivers. Digitalisation would free up existing 
bandwidth for extended channel choice whereas convergence would allow for the 
functionality of telecommunications networks and the personal computer to be 
incorporated in the television set. In the same year a green paper appeared on 
the ‘Strategy Options to Strengthen the European Programme Industry’ displayed 
equal concern about the onset of the ‘digital revolution’. It recommended that the 
‘EU press ahead with the introduction of technologically advanced infrastructure’ 
and re-enforced the potential economic   significance for Europe of exploiting the 
opportunities offered by the new technology. That Japan or the US could benefit 
from the European countries tardiness or lack of co-ordination in this area was at 
the fore of the Commissions thinking. The emphasis was placed on European 
level initiative that would guard against further fragmentation of technology, 
markets and regulatory regimes.  
 
The prospects for a European approach to the specific development of digital 
television technology had its origins in an earlier initiative to co-ordinate the 
introduction of High Definition Television (HDTV). HDTV was considered by 
many within the industry to be the next significant leap in television technology 
offering 35mm film resolution and CD sound quality. The Japanese national 
broadcaster NHK had already developed production, transmission and reception 
standards for HDTV in the early 1980s. In Europe the EBU worked closely with 
the Advanced Television System Committee in the US, following the Japanese 
lead with the intention of reaching an agreed global standard for production and 
transmission in HDTV (De Bruin, Smits, 1999). However the EBU were 
outmanoeuvred by the consumer electronics industry lobby, which had 
considerable economic interest in this area. The latter successfully lobbied, the 
Commission to switch the initiative on HDTV from the EBU to the inter-
governmental Eureka technological research programme. The industry was 
authorised to initiate its own research programme known as Eureka95, which 
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was nevertheless funded by the governments (625Million ecu in total). Behind 
the consumer industry’s’ interest in the area was the looming expiration of the 
European colour transmission system patents, Pal and Secam. The control of 
these patents had allowed the electronics industry to restrict production of 
television reception hardware to mostly European firms (Ostergard and 
Kleinsteuber, 1992). Following the Commission’s lead, Eureka95 adopted the 
Multiplexed Analogue Components (MAC) transmission standard for a HDTV 
standard comparable but not compatible with the Japanese standard (Collins, 
1994). The standard required elements of digitalisation but was not yet a fully 
digital system.  
 
Despite industry consensus on the part of the European manufacturers, the 
newly liberalised commercial broadcast industry was not supportive of a 
technology that required significant consumer investment in receiver/conversion 
equipment while also entailing increased cost for the broadcaster. The MAC 
directive of 1987, which ensured that all European satellites conform to the 
various Mac standards, had already raised the ire of the emergent commercial 
broadcasters (Ostergard and Kleinsteuber, 1992). At the same time, in the United 
States, lobbying from the American Electronics Association and the commercial 
broadcasting industry had led the US away from finding a standard compatible 
with the Japanese MUSE or European MAC standard in favour of a HDTV 
standard for terrestrial broadcasting. Marshalled by the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Grand Alliance consisting of General Instruments, 
AT&T/Zenith/DSRC/Philips/Thomson and MIT set to work on a fully digital 
standard (De Bruin, Smits, 1999). In Europe the MAC standard was facing 
considerable resistance from the broadcasting industry. A dearth of programming 
and the high cost of the HDTV hardware also contributed to likely consumer 
resistance to the new technology. Private operators such as the newly 
established British Sky Broadcasting circumvented the costly venture by 
bypassing the intergovernmental DVB satellites and broadcasting via the private 
Astra satellite run by SES based in Luxembourg. Unharnessed by the MAC 
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standard, BskyB along with RTL and Premier set about building a viable 
European analogue pay TV business via satellite. European governments 
demonstrated themselves increasingly unwilling to underwrite the mounting costs 
of the MAC initiative and in 1992 the UK government, ideologically aligned to 
BskyB’s market approach, withdrew its support for a European HDTV system. 
The scenario was indicative of the new ecology of broadcasting and the variety of 
interests that now needed to be marshalled for any coherent and workable 
technology policy to emerge.  According to Levy, the failure of previous initiatives 
and the inability of the Commission to keep up with market developments 
influenced its future delegation of responsibility in relation to standard setting. 
Thus, in policy terms, a market led corporatism was emerging as the chief means 
of instituting policy measures already broadly decided upon by the European 
Commission. This stood in contrast to the state and public service led 
corporatism of the statist mode of regulation. 
 
At this point, following developments in the US, the European Commission had 
already convinced itself of the necessity of an all-digital system. The perceived 
failure of the HDTV/MAC initiative however led to a sea change in how the 
process of digitalisation was to be approached. In DG XIII, the telecom directive, 
the arrival of Martin Bangemann signalled the beginning of the end of the 
electronics consumer industry’s hegemony over the MAC directives and the 
whole HDTV project (Levy, 1999). Instead a German government initiative, 
mindful of the potential of convergence through digitalisation, was to steer the 
introduction of a fully digital system. Established in September 1993 the Digital 
Video Broadcasting project consisted of European broadcasters, 
telecommunication organisations, manufacturers and national regulatory 
authorities. The Commission deferred to the DVB group, essentially endorsing a 
market led approach to digitalisation. All of the existing transmission networks for 
broadcasting would be digitalised and brought into competitive relationship with 
each other in terms of service provision. That is satellite, cable and terrestrial 
networks/platforms would be digitalised via shared technological standards and 
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consumer choice would be enhanced via offers of multiple competitive services. 
Digital compression would allow for multiple channel provision, whereas the 
manipulable, non linear, de materialised nature of the content would potentially 
facilitate the development of enhanced television services and networked 
interactive dimensions. However these potential developments depended 
crucially on technological standardisation that would allow content  providers to 
operate cheaply and flexibly across service providers.  
  
The DVB group set itself the goal of establishing industry wide consensus and 
therein avoiding fragmentation in the European market. The European 
Commission, determined to take a back seat, appointed but one representative 
to the steering board. Initially the DVB appeared to justify the Commissions 
initiative when an early agreement on an MPEG-2 video compression standard 
was reached. By 1997, 300 satellite-broadcasting services in Europe were using 
the standard. However the DVB group was unable to elicit the same level of 
consensus in relation to standardised conditional access systems (CAS). 
Conditional access systems had been developed in the United States in the 
1980s to prevent satellite dish owners from receiving content from television 
network and cable system satellite feeds without payment. CAS thus became a 
central technology in developing European pay television markets in the 1990s 
acting as the gateway technology through which cable and satellite pay services 
could be delivered and customers managed. The problem confronting the DVB 
group was that all digital services would have to be delivered through such 
gateway technology. Within the DVB group the crucial matter of interoperability of 
this technology brought forth conflicting positions. For digital broadcasting to be a 
competitive business, the ability to switch between services without having to 
invest in multiple reception devices was a necessity. Added to this the 
Applications Protocol Interface (API) which was the middleware that would allow 
enhanced television services such as interactive television would also need to be 
standardised. For content producers a degree of harmonisation was necessary 
so that enhanced digital television services could operate across the varied 
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platforms and through the key channel packagers such as BSkyB, NTL and 
Chorus in Ireland. However, for the pay TV operators who had invested heavily in 
proprietary technology in order to gain first mover advantages in pay TV markets, 
throwing open their proprietary technology would not best please shareholders. 
For example, in the UK the only CAS in operation at that time was VideoCrypt, 
owned by Datacom, a subsidiary of News International that also had a 40% stake 
in BskyB. Any broadcaster wanting to do business in the UK via satellite would 
have to do so via VideoCrypt and BskyB, or alternatively, develop a maverick 
CAS, develop enough broadcasting services to make it attractive, manufacture 
and diffuse satellite dish and set top box equipment, establish a distribution 
system via a satellite operator and create its own subscriber management 
services. Free to air broadcasters and third party programme operators were 
necessarily concerned about the potential network and gateway issues that had 
now shifted away from government to commercial control. A summary of the 
issues that exercised these operators included; 
o The question of access, would competitors be granted access to the 
digital platform and if so, at what price; 
o How many services would the programme provider have to purchase from 
the service provider; 
o Could the service provider misuse its access to information about the 
programme provider’s customer base; 
o How much control would a service provider have over the packaging and 
marketing of its service; 
o Would the service provider use the electronic programme guide to 
influence the use of services offered? (Humphreys and Lang, 1998). 
 
By 1997, the fact that BSkyB’s DTH satellite service was now becoming an 
established platform for digital distribution in the Irish market meant that all of 
these issues arose for Irish content providers. What would the developing 
relationship between Irish broadcaster such as RTE, TG4 and TV3 be in relation 
to the emerging platforms of cable, satellite and the planned for DTT? Would it 
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be necessary to attain carriage on each service? Would it be possible to develop 
new services that were able to negotiate the proprietary technology of each 
service provider? Given that some of the emerging distributors such as BskyB 
were also the producers of broadcast services and content, what forms of 
regulation would oversee their treatment of would be competitors?  
 
In general terms the use of proprietary technology was to lead to a fragmentation 
of digital markets and a failure to establish interoperability and interconnectivity. 
Despite the Commissions aim to achieve the opposite, the DVB group proved 
unable to resolve the issue. The pay TV operators offered to comply with a code 
of conduct that would essentially be self-regulatory whereas the free to air 
broadcasters and third party operators sought intervention from the commission 
on the issue. Following a vote which was according to David Levy ‘less than 
satisfactory’ the DVB announced an ‘industry wide agreement on the issue’ 
(Levy, 1999, p71). 
 
The 1995 Advanced Television Standard Directive detailed the aforementioned 
transmission standard as well as agreements on common scrambling algorithms, 
wide screen and high definition specifications but left it up to the industry to 
negotiate the conditional access issues (Gibbons, 1998). According to the 
wording of the directive  
‘member states shall take all the necessary measures to ensure that the 
operators of conditional access services irrespective of the means of 
transmission, who produce and market access services to digital television 
servicesOoffer to all broadcasters on a fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory basis, technical services enabling the broadcaster digitally 
transmitted services to be received by viewers authorised by means of 
decoders administered by the service operators, and comply with 
community competition law, particularly if a dominant position appears’ 
(ATSD 95/47 art 4 (c)).   
 
Chapter Four 
 
122 
 
 According to Levy, handing the competence to nation states inevitably ensured a 
proliferation of fragmented regulation on the issue while ignoring the 
transnational basis of European satellite broadcasting. How would smaller states 
such as Ireland, which is in the UK’s satellite footprint, impose compliance on the 
UK based commercial broadcasters? As Humphreys and Lang have suggested 
in relation to the failure to agree standards on CAS, ‘for a piece of single market 
legislation the directive had a glaring weakness’, that is, its lack of single market 
outcome (Humphreys and Lang, 1999). According to Levy, the outcome was 
unsurprising as ‘the growth of private standards consortia was accompanied by 
all the social risks inherent in the privatisation of a sphere of national and 
international co-operation for the provision of public goods’ (Levy, 1999, p69). 
Thus the market making policies of the EU, by deferring to market actors, were 
accelerating market development but not necessarily supporting the goal of a 
single market or competition between comparative providers. In the long term the 
lack of decision making at European level would influence policy at national level, 
most notably in relation to government decisions to sanction Digital Terrestrial 
Television, an option promoted by public and free to air broadcasters first in 
Sweden, and then in the UK. DGXIII was disappointed with the outcome of the 
DVB project and keen to reassert the commission’s preference for harmonisation 
of regulation and would do so in anticipation of the technological convergence of 
distribution systems. These developments also had resonance of a more general 
nature in relation to the evolution of competition policy in the media sector and 
the subsequent renewal of the TVWF directive. 
 
4.5) Convergence and digital broadcasting policy 
The technological possibilities of digitalisation brought the increasingly 
economically significant area of broadcasting within the competence of the 
telecom directorate DGXIII. Having had considerable success in overseeing the 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, the directorate sought to transfer 
this successful approach across the media via the potential of convergence in 
communications networks. Telecommunications liberalization had been co-
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ordinated within the framework of the information society project, a framework 
that could also be applied to all digital media if interpreted within the paradigm of 
convergence. Convergence, or the coming together of content, communications 
network and information communication technologies, was a fairly accurate 
description of what was occurring with the development of the internet/www. The 
fact that there were technological, sociological and institutional barriers to this 
occurring in a straightforward or immediate way in relation to the medium of 
broadcasting points to the degree to which the convergence paradigm, when 
used in relation to broadcasting was highly ideological. Thus the concept of 
vertical disintegration of monopolistic/integrated broadcasters accompanied by 
liberalisation and re-regulation of the subsequent competition in old and new 
services under girded the Commission’s initial approach. In essence, 
Commissioner Martin Bangemann’s 1994 report suggested that the technological 
potential of convergence would remove the barriers to entry in content creation 
creating the conditions wherein telecommunications regulation combined with the 
non interventionist regulatory approach to publishing would prove adequate for 
ensuring growth and diversity in new media services. Bangemann relied heavily 
on the support of information technology and telecommunications professionals 
who urged the creation of a new liberal regime for multimedia markets centred on 
digital television. From an early stage the Directorate recognised the importance 
of broadcasting as a prime driver in the early adoption of digitalised network 
services. The Commission’s first draft of a green paper on convergence 
underlined its contention that de-regulation would eventually lead to technological 
innovation, commercial dynamism, oligopoly and eventually competition. 
Competition would hence lead to choice. The Directorate primarily responsible 
for broadcasting, DGX, questioned these assumptions and forced DGXIII to re-
draft its green paper including recommendations on some options for 
intervention.  
 
The ‘Green Paper on Convergence’ eventually proposed three possible 
directions that future communications policy could take. The first option proposed 
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the adaptation of existing regulatory structures at national and European level. 
The second option proposed creating new regulatory structures for the new 
services which fell between the separate categories of broadcasting, 
telecommunications and internet such as e-mail, web TV, video on demand, 
video conferencing etc. The third option, and the option most promoted by the 
Directorate, proposed regulatory convergence wherein broadcasting, narrow 
casting, internet, telecomm etc would all be dealt with by the same regulatory 
regime (Holznagel, 1998). DGXIII reasoned that technological convergence 
should entail regulatory convergence and therein finally bring to an end the 
increased fragmentation of markets throughout Europe. A number of other 
interests were also actively seeking acceptance for the last option including EU 
and national telecommunications policy makers, representatives of the 
information technology industry and the emerging multimedia businesses. These 
groupings accepted the necessity of public interest objectives such as universal 
service and access but opposed the movement of public service institutions into 
new areas of activity. The Green Paper proposed a public library model for future 
public service delivery whereby citizens could access public goods 
commissioned from myriad producers and funded by public money. The paper 
appeared to be influenced by the publishing model of broadcasting which had 
been sharply critiqued when it appeared ten years previously in the UK Peacock 
Report (see previous chapter). Its critical miss-understanding of the peculiarities 
of the broadcasting sector and the necessity of structural design in providing 
pluralistic public goods undermined the Commissions rationale that it was now in 
a position to develop regulation for the member states. However by the late 
1990s Member state governments were now more acquainted with the failings of 
liberalised markets and less disposed to technological arguments based on 
digitalisation and potential convergence then previously had been the case 
(Holznagel, 1998). The British Government adopted a stance against the 
regulation of a situation that did not yet exist and furthermore was impossible to 
predict. In addition the powerful analogue pay TV operators and the DVB group 
opposed any moves towards European level convergent regulation. Behind the 
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caution was the realisation that the evolution of broadcast systems into fully 
converged systems, in the short term, was less than convincing, and thus far, 
digital television equated to the differential digitalisation of multiple platform 
systems and the ongoing digitalisation of production processes within the 
industry. However the Commission was to successfully establish its competence 
to set about regulating the various platforms for media and communication 
distribution on the basis that, when digitalised they all offered themselves as 
possible carriers of multiple services be it broadband, telecommunications or 
television based. It was this logic and rationale that established the horizontal 
regulation of networks via the 2002 Frameworks directive.   
 
4.6) Competition policy, rationalisation and public broadcasters in EU 
markets 
Liberalisation in national and international broadcasting systems had entailed a 
role for European competition law in overseeing the shaping of the competitive 
structure of emerging markets. The failure of the Commission to gain sufficient 
support for the harmonisation of ownership and control legislation enhanced this 
role. The Commission’s green paper had outlined three possible directions for 
dealing with concentration in the media;  
 
(i) no specific community action,  
(ii) action to improve transparency and  
(iii) community action to harmonise laws.  
 
With the failure of the Commission to convince European based conglomerates 
of the desirability of option three, the Commission’s preferred path was blocked. 
Option two had already to some extent become extraneous, as DGXV had 
moved to create transparency measure for member states regulation dealing with 
developing digital services. The first option thus re-enforced a strong preference 
on the part of the member states for subsidiarity in this area. Directorate General 
IV, the competition directorate, turned its generic socio-legal power to lower 
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market entry barriers by confronting the abuse of dominant positions within the 
broadcasting sector. Initially DGIV proved itself insensitive to the normative basis 
of member states broadcasting ecologies and set about pursuing the former 
monopolist public broadcasters at the behest of nationally based commercial 
broadcasters. In particular, the European Broadcasting Union’s collective 
bargaining arrangements for sports and film rights, and, its internal distribution of 
news and documentary programmes was challenged and curtailed (Humphreys, 
1996). However the appointment of Karl Van Miert to the directorate appeared to 
signal a more nuanced approach to the public service broadcasters and their role 
in ensuring pluralism in national markets. Instead the Directorate and Its Merger 
Task Force (MTF) turned their attention to the spate of mergers and joint 
ventures that were occurring in the commercial sector as the pay-TV operators 
positioned themselves for digitalisation (Ward, 2002). The Commission was now 
of the mind that a structural move towards the vertical dis-integration of 
production distribution and reception functions in broadcasting would allow 
competition to develop at all three levels. On the other hand the pay TV 
operators recognised the value of strategic alliances or mergers that would 
create or simulate vertical integration (Duffy, Davis and Daum, 1998). The 
Merger Task Force primarily sought to prevent such alliances even if it entailed 
friction between it and member states whose concern with creating national 
champions had not abated. High profile cases resulted, such as the MSG case in 
Germany where the MTF intervened to prevent a Bertelsmann, Kirsch and 
Deutsche Telecom joint venture, and in Britain, where BskyB was forced out of 
its joint bid with Carlton and Granada to run the new DTT network in 1997, after 
the case had been referred to DGIV. In the former case the task force faced 
down stern opposition from the German government who approved of the merger 
on the basis of economic policy. The socio-legal basis of the directorate’s 
intervention, however, allowed it to intervene in national markets where 
intervention based on cultural rationale had been rejected (Levy, 1999).  
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In addition to mergers, DGIV developed an interest in the question of access to 
broadcasting rights, the access to networks and CAS, and the ongoing 
relationship between public and private broadcasters. The Commission 
presumed that competition would only develop if all service providers had equal 
access to attractive programming such as sports and film rights. The pay-TV 
operators were aware of this situation too. The cultivation of exclusive rights with 
rights owners or US based agents resulted in virtual vertical integration in a 
crucial period when the various transmission platform and services sought to 
ensure competitive advantage. Having pursued the EBU in this respect, DGIV 
turned its attention to the dominant pay TV operators’ BskyB, Canal Plus and 
Premiers dealings in exclusive rights. The Directorate also used its experience in 
telecommunications regulation to oversee ‘non discriminatory access to essential 
facilities’ wherein both CAS and network services could be described as 
essential facilities. According to the Commission, essential facilities include a 
‘facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide 
services to their customers’ (cited in Levy, 1999, p85). DGIV thus consented to 
hear cases wherein third party broadcasters or rival operators charge 
competitors with abusing their dominant position or proprietary control over 
essential facilities (as is the case with telecommunications, the directorate is 
keen to develop and essential facilities doctrine that will work across the board). 
In relation to its role as an arbitrator between domestic broadcasters DG IV 
placed the onus on member states to develop parameters for public service 
broadcasting in each country so that it could decide whether incumbents have 
gone outside of their remit when accused as such by commercial interests 
(Steemers, 1999). Already protected by the Amsterdam Protocol (see below), the 
definition of public service broadcasting in national legislation now carried great 
import as it determined the boundaries within which public broadcasters can 
operate. The Commission’s 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission on the 
application of state aid rules to public service broadcasting’ recognised the rights 
of member states to maintain public broadcasters but also insisted that such 
broadcasters are only funded sufficient to a legislated purpose, that their use of 
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funds is transparent, and that they do not impinge on competition in emerging 
markets and services (Ward, 2002). However the Commission has demonstrated 
a relatively open approach to the scope of public purposes that nation states 
ascribe to their public broadcasters in relation to channel expansion, digital 
distribution and enhanced digital services (Harcourt, 2006). Whether such 
openness will be sustained in relation to public broadcaster’s moves into online 
markets is another matter. DGIV now deigns to hear all complaints in this matter 
on a case-by-case basis allowing some amount of flexibility. Whereas nation 
states exercise subsidiary powers in relation to their ‘content industries’ it must 
be noted that the Union via competition policy, the content dimensions of TVWF 
and cognate areas in relation to copyright issues was beginning to exercise a 
greater role in determining the contexts in which those industries were to 
operate. The general degree to which Commission policy was orientating itself 
towards creating a level playing field in digital broadcasting was also highlighted 
in the TVWF II directive (1997) which also concerned itself with the issue of 
programme rights. 
 
The revisiting of the Television without Frontiers directive in the mid 1990s 
marked the ascent of the European Parliament as a more active institution in 
European policy making and one in which the discourse remained focussed on 
questions of cultural citizenship and the development of cultural policy tools 
(Sarikakis, 2002). For those supporters of dirigiste policies it marked a shift away 
from supporting ambiguous quotas towards an applied effort to secure latitude for 
member states that deigned to pursue interventionist policy making in relation to 
their media sectors. The importance of subsidiarity in matters of cultural content 
at national level was thus becoming a principle of the EU’s relationship with its 
member states. Ward has called this the emergence of horizontal and vertical 
regulation wherein horizontal regulation applies to rules made for all member 
states across media and communications sectors and vertical regulation are 
zones of media policy making that are still managed at national level and are 
specific to particular media. In general, horizontal regulation has been developed 
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in relation to network regulation and the internal market and vertical regulation 
applies in matters of public intervention and cultural plurality (Ward, 2002). Thus 
intervention such as the listing of sporting events (Article 3a) was voluntary but 
(theoretically) enforceable Europe wide through mutual recognition. Another 
strand of this policy thrust was a more concerted effort to attain special 
exemption for public service broadcasters in the face of the socio-legal rationality 
of European competition law. Support for such an approach came from the 
culture ministers of the various member states following on from a Parliament 
resolution on public service broadcasting which itself was inspired by the Tongue 
Report (CEC, 1998). The sequence of events led to the securing of the protocol 
on public service broadcasting appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam in June 
1997. The protocol proclaimed that ‘the system of public service broadcasting in 
the member states is directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs 
of each society’ and that each member state would therein make special 
provision for the maintenance of public broadcasters providing they did not 
impinge on ‘trading conditions and competition’ (Steemers, 1999). Steemers 
suggests that this latter provision may act to constrain the activities of public 
service broadcasters in the developing environment. The structural changes in 
the shape of the broadcasting industry in relation to vertical disintegration and 
convergence also raised new possibilities in relation to regulatory measures for 
the public interest no longer being tied to the concept of structural pluralism. That 
is, Article 3(A) was indicative of the tendency to develop policy measures that 
shaped the market relative to positive outcomes without preferring public service 
or privately owned broadcasters in the achievement of these aims. It pointed to 
the emergence of a potential post-liberalisation public interest approach to 
broadcasting regulation. 
 
4.7) The state, the EU and the re-regulation of broadcasting 
According to Levy, the failure of the EU to strengthen its role in shaping policy for 
the oncoming digital environment has resulted in the continuity of the nation state 
as the primary site for regulation (Levy, 1999). According to Levy, the large 
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nation states have asserted their influence over EU policymaking with the effect 
that European policy reflects their pathfinding strategies and activities. Harcourt 
however has subsequently pointed out that the EU has increasingly strengthened 
its grip on policy making and, with its re-regulation of telecommunications 
networks, tout court, is developing expertise in post liberalisation digital policy 
that has placed it in a path shaping role (Harcourt, 2005). Perhaps where this 
Europeanization is most marked is in the generalisation of a form of the 
regulatory state to its member states. In the policy literature it has been remarked 
upon how the marketisation of a given industrial sectors tends to be 
accompanied by re-regulation which finds expression in new regulatory bodies. It 
is the combination of marketisation and the regulatory state which suggests that 
this is in fact a regulatory dimension to market governance. The regulatory state 
represents a conundrum as by its very nature it is not neo-liberal nor is it on a par 
with the interventionist dimensions of the social state. It regulates for competition, 
oversees politically shaped markets and tends to shape the behaviour of market 
actors as opposed to the structure of markets.   
 
To a certain extent digital television policy demonstrates how national 
governments interacted with the EU in attempting to regain some of the influence 
they had lost in the previous structural shifts towards liberalisation, but also, 
accepted a European wide mode of governance in the form of new regulatory 
instituions. The EU’s paradigmatic shift to rules based intervention and negative 
regulation was reflected in the proliferation of a number of semi autonomous 
regulatory bodies that now had responsibility for several dimensions of the 
communications sector e.g. ODTR/Comreg in Ireland and Oftel/Ofcom in the UK. 
As well as being the enabling state and/or the competition state, European 
countries were also becoming regulatory states on a par with the institutional 
structure of US industrial and economic policy.   Essentially this implied the end 
of an insulated mode of economic, structural and content regulation in European 
member states broadcasting sectors and the extension of the market shaping re-
regulatory dimensions of EU regulatory state policy.  
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The regulatory state, in line with the enabling state, helps to bed in a new set of 
institutional features that have little to do with digitalisation, but, political actors 
have used the occasion of digitalisation to introduce them. Elements of this 
institutional adjustment include the regularisation of new forms of competition 
arising out of the varied elements that make up product and service markets, an 
increasingly technocratic form of sectoral regulation, the transfer of consumer 
norms/rights into a given sector, the delineation of product/service markets and 
the co-ordination of sectoral initiatives relative to different dimensions/elements 
of industrial development. These regulators also can become the sites in which 
existing normative regulatory dimensions are given a more socio legal 
expression in sector wide initiatives.   
 
For the most part the new regulatory institutions regulate for competition 
attempting to ensure that markets are made up of multiple suppliers and that 
monopolistic practices are open to regulatory intervention. They are part of the 
overall attempt to structure and steer markets to realise certain state 
goals/activities. However, their intervention tends to be mostly negative, there 
expertise in market making activities does not equip them to deal with public 
enterprise or normative policy goals and they lack the institutional or symbolic 
capacity to engage the citizenry in the processes of governance. It could also be 
charged that they institute a normative recourse to market solutions when these 
solutions are not self evidently appropriate. That is, the answer to market failure 
is always, more markets.  
 
The vertical disintegration of the public broadcasting institutions, achieved 
through a combination of convergence and competition policy, is indicative of the 
competitive structure that has been introduced into broadcasting via those 
discourses. The structural paradigm for the digital age is, according to Duffy, that 
of value blocks as opposed to value chains where the blocks include content 
creation; publishing; delivery; and customer interfacing all existing as separate 
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industrial/productive sectors (Duffy et al 1998). Duffy’s model helps to capture 
the structural changes that have been instituted via restructuring towards 
platform neutrality and multi platform activity. The regulatory paradigm pursued 
by the European Commission has aimed to maintain separation between these 
blocks in order to prevent the over development of market power. However, 
linkage between various actors in the value blocks is the key to profitable and 
predictable operations. Thus the successful actions of the original pay TV 
interests, having already created linkages, render this model difficult to realise, 
unless the commission moves to forcibly disintegrate global conglomerates.  
 
The shift to a disintegrated value chain moves the organisation of broadcasting 
closer to the other cultural industries of film production, publishing and new 
media publishing. In itself, the technology of digitalisation does not pre-empt such 
a structure and it is a paradigm that , once again, seems to be more fitting for the 
fully converged media of the internet/www. So whereas Duffy is right to note the 
development of a disintegrated competitive paradigm, it can less be seen as the 
outcome of a technology (although the technology is important in enabling this 
shift) and more as a paradigmatic illustration of the institutionalisation of market 
governance at European level regulation of the media/media policy. This, of 
course, creates a structural pressure for the member states of the European 
Union who may have subsidiary powers in certain areas but are essentially 
bound by the logic of market governance. What we see here, is the institutional 
features of market governance being introduced a sphere previously 
characterised by state governance. However this process is different to a simple 
recourse to de-regulated markets, as market governance attempts to achieve 
public policy goals, albeit through market mechanisms.  
 
The ascent of market governance as an EU wide process, will, it can be 
proposed, have differing effects on different nation states relative to the 
organisation of the media/communications/broadcasting in a given country, the 
size of the potential market in that country and how that country is inserted into 
Chapter Four 
 
133 
 
particular geo-linguistic markets. Thus potential outcomes of public policy via 
market governance, whether of a public interest or pragmatic economistic nature, 
signals new activities on the part of the state in relation to its management of 
market dynamics. 
 
4.8) Neo-interventionism 
In most European countries, however, moves to create a DTT platform 
represented a return to more positive interventionist strategies in the emerging 
digital broadcasting structure. DTT platforms themselves involved various 
combinations of public private partnership to develop the terrestrial broadcasting 
spectrum as a wireless digital broadcast system. DTT in itself was the outcome 
of a steady developmental process involving mainly Sweden and the UK 
pioneering a national reaction to developing multichannel markets and having 
that approach adapted by the EU as a form of neo statist intervention for the 
liberalised digital marketplace. Whereas DTT slots into the market paradigm of 
platform competition, technological neutrality and vertical dis-integration, it would 
not have come to market without significant investment by national governments 
and public bodies, not to mention the support of the EU. It is thus paradigmatic of 
the new state intervention that helps to institute the market but also govern 
through management of the shape and dynamics of the market.  
 
The establishment of Digital Terrestrial Television represented an attempt by 
governments to promote competition and pluralism both in and between the 
various digital platforms. Recognition of the likelihood of a vertically disintegrated 
sector, in which commercial monopolies exercised control over crucial 
bottlenecks, inspired the creation of domestically controlled platforms. Thus far, 
with varying degrees of success most European countries have initiated DTT. In 
many cases the implementation of DTT required the surrendering of transmission 
networks by the former public service monopolies in return for prominent 
positions and significant transmission capacities on the new platforms. In Ireland, 
for example, RTE has received a single transponder with a capacity for six 
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channels as well as shares in the future transmission company. However despite 
being cheaper to develop than cable, DTT has thus far experienced significant 
problems in establishing itself, with the UK operator British Digital Broadcasting 
filing for bankruptcy after just four years in operation. In Ireland failure of DTT to 
get of the ground increased the likelihood of a tough competitive environment for 
it to develop in. For governments keen to avoid the past mistakes of liberalisation 
the benefits can outweigh the costs (especially if the costs are left entirely to 
commercial companies) (Iosifidis, 1999). Firstly, DTT provides the basis for 
continued free to air transmission/reception via a digital standard (Levy, 1999). 
Secondly, it offers a national distribution system allowing governments to sell off 
valuable spectrum for other commercial network services and accrue other 
benefits to the state. (Duffy et al, 1998). Lastly, it creates a rival system to both 
cable and satellite that is under domestic regulatory control (Marsden, 1999). The 
successful diffusion of DTT would seem to offer opportunities for a universally 
accessible  public service platform with an emphasis on domestic and pluralistic 
content providers. However, the lack of public investment may also relegate it to 
a shoddy commercial alternative to technologically superior cable provision or 
content rich digital satellite (see OnDigital).  
 
4.9) Convergence and European regulatory change 
At European level 'convergence', the larger umbrella under which digital 
broadcasting policy had been subsumed, has been negotiated within a 
corporatist market approach, approximating the structural emphases of 
competition led policy. As has been noted, digital television technology involved 
the organisation of commercial, regulatory and public service interests into the 
DVB group. The first key structural change emerging out of this corporatist 
approach has been the assertion of a competitive platform approach and the de-
emphasis of national strategic interest in any single broadcasting platform i.e. be 
it satellite, terrestrial, cable or telecommunication based. Thus, in policy terms, 
what had previously been recognised as the national broadcasting system, no 
longer extended to incorporate the national transmission system. National 
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governments have undertaken to be technologically neutral in their subsidisation 
and policy approaches towards varied technological platforms. This does not 
preclude a state having a financial or controlling interest in any given platform 
once it is deemed that such a move is worthy of investment and occurs within the 
bounds of a level playing field. Thus the over-arching concept of public service in 
infrastructure development has been de-emphasised. However, whereas 
commercial interests are now entitled to policy neutrality they are not compelled 
to realise universal service or universal access obligations. In related terms this 
has the additional effect of emphasising market relations between different 
elements of the value chain in broadcasting, that is, distribution is separated out 
from the processes of content production, publishing and customer interfacing. 
The former inter-firm relations of transmission/distribution thus give way to 
market relations and purportedly provide the basis for competition. However, this 
level of disintegration only applies thus far to public utilities and integrated private 
broadcasters such as BskyB sidestep the market in their inter-firm organisation. 
 
The second key element of European level structural adjustment, involved the 
negotiated convergence policy which has made the clear separation of regulatory 
regimes covering distribution platforms and content providers. This has emerged 
out of the developing position of technological neutrality. The deliberative way in 
which this policy has been developed by the Commission can be tracked across 
the emergence of the Bangemann Report, its pursuit through the consultation on 
the Green Paper on Convergence and the eventual regulatory settlement that 
emerged out of the latter process of corporatist consultation. The EU has been 
far more successful in developing its regulatory sway over the technological 
process of network convergence whereas the regulation of content still remains, 
within limits, a subsidiary issue. This has been described in the policy literature 
as the development of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ regulation with the former 
referring to European level, harmonised regulation and the latter referring to the 
maintenance of national or regional levels of particular regulation (Ward, 2002). 
The harmonisation has been predicated on the assumption of convergence in 
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distribution and the assertion that no 'media specific' regulatory regime is now 
comprehensive enough to cover the converged nature of distribution systems, 
that is, all platforms can potentially be used for broadcast, telecoms or networked 
media  based services. This represents a considerable shift in terms of issues of 
accountability/control wherein the regulatory regime governing communications 
infrastructure is now firmly a European led initiative based on market 
determination, competition policy and harmonisation of regulation. This entails 
that the uses to which convergence is put is occurring largely in a market 
framework led by concerns about the functionality of the single market at 
European level and its competitiveness at global level. 
 
4.10) European level re-regulation: networks 
At the level of horizontal regulation EU policy has focussed first on issues of 
technological harmonisation and then on issues related to competition, market 
determination and socio-regulatory principles. The first set of concerns, 
technological standard based concerns, were dealt with under the auspices of 
the DVB group and the resulting Advanced Television Standard Directive and 
reveal the impact of commercial interests on policy-making in this regard. The 
group was able to set standards for the digital video broadcasting signal, DVB-T 
but could only agree on guidelines for interconnection and interoperability. The 
former refers to the ability for networked services to operate across different 
delivery systems whereas the latter refers to the way in which different 
programme services can be received by varied consumer equipment across 
different platforms. Both of these initiatives would require a degree of openness 
in relation to the technological architecture, such as the conditional access 
system (CAS) and application protocol interface (API) used by the various 
operators working across the different platforms. The proprietary issues involved 
in this architecture has militated against the sharing of such information leading 
to what has been termed as 'crippled digitalisation' in so far as some of the 
'networked' and 'interactive' features of digitalisation have become tied into to 
specific platforms as opposed to being universal services with universal 
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accessibility across different platforms.  
 
Competition issues have been developed mainly by the Competition Directorate, 
DG IV, and have largely sought to maintain plurality of ownership amongst the 
different platforms within national markets and access to media and distribution 
in light of commercial monopolies of content and technology. The approach has 
been successful in terms of a number of high profile attempts to span ownership 
and control of different delivery platforms. DGIV has also been important in the 
area of competition for rights in the contexts of digital delivery and access to 
'essential facilities' such as the CAS. The Merger Task Force has been active in 
attempting to prevent both horizontal integration and vertical integration in 
relation to mergers between delivery systems and the integration of content and 
technology companies with distribution companies.. However, competition policy, 
whilst effective in this regard, does not fulfil all the requirements of sector specific 
policy. It is negative in so far as it prevents undesirable scenarios, but does little 
in terms of positive intervention. Thus the public policy attributes of the DTT 
platform are not acknowledged and flat competition policy can apply where the 
public interest may lie in suspending competition regulations. In addition to this 
the directorate seems largely concerned with high profile mergers across 
platform and content provision but not within platform provision. This remains the 
preserve of national level regulation which is less capable of the independence of 
action of DGIV and more open to political pressure not always based on pursuit 
of the public interest. 
 
The competition directorate has also been highly influential in the determination 
of market segments that crystallise the marketisation of the broadcasting 
landscape that emerged with the diffusion of new technologies. As such it has set 
the overall framework through which the national regulatory structures have 
dissected their broadcasting landscapes. Its distinctions tend to rely on methods 
of payment and technological features of the service under review. Thus markets 
have been segmented into free to air television, pay television, digital television, 
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technical and administrative services for pay television, access to satellite 
capacity, cable television and satellite broadcasting. The most fundamental 
critique of this approach is that it ignores the way in which all these markets are 
inter-related and impact on each other in a way that undermines the semi-public 
good characteristics of broadcasting. Thus the formerly favoured free to air 
television now has to compete in high cost rights bids and routinely loose content 
and talent to the other 'markets'. Access is predicated on the ability to pay basis 
and consumer choice is predicated on consumer spending power. Also such 
markets are only nominally segmented in terms of revenue generation and 
consumers consumption of the services, thus placing free to air television 
broadcasting in a grid of multilayer competition that puts pressure on audience 
attention and advertising revenue. 
 
This technocratic management of the emerging market led digital broadcasting 
landscape has been latterly accompanied by a number of European directives 
developed to harmonise the regulation of analogue/digital networks and realise 
some of the extant socio regulatory principles of analogue broadcasting. The 
directive arose out of the horizontal regulation principle and sets regulatory goals 
that are to apply to all platforms operating throughout Europe. Essentially the 
new directives treat the broadcasting infrastructure as converged networks and 
therefore applies regulation that can have resonance in relation to broadcasting, 
telecommunication and computer based services. The key areas that are 
significant in so far as they apply specifically to broadcasting regulation include; 
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Electronic Communications Horizontal Regulation Framework (key elements) 
Framework Directive This provides the legislative basis for the ongoing arrangement of 
Horizontal regulation from the EU and continued vertical or 
subsidiary regulation in relation to content related issues. It 
ensconces the central developmental principle as that of 
competition, technological neutrality and the regulation of 
significant market power. It also sets out more firmly the market 
segmentation that has developed within the competition 
directorate, noting the developing digital markets related to 
wireless network technology. However it leaves it to national 
regulators to set out the relevant markets in a given jurisdiction. 
Regulation on Unbundled 
Access to the Local Loop 
and the Access Directive 
In relation to broadcasting this sets the conditions for the 
negotiation of interconnection (as discussed above). It also re-
enforces the need for access to CAS on a 'fair and reasonable' 
basis. Under the ruling on CAS, both the EPG and API are 
considered to be part of the CAS and thus unfair access to either 
constitutes unfair and unreasonable behaviour. 
Authorisation Directive This essentially provides the basis whereby services may be 
licensed without any specific conditions on their use. Intended for 
the quick diffusion of digital services and decreased national 
specificity of licence conditions. Also allows for the possible 
auction of broadcast spectrum for new service delivery. 
Universal Service Directive Provides a market framework wherein a number of basic 
communication services have to be made available to the 
'consumer'. This includes telephony and internet access. It also 
notes the potential of market failure and the necessity of member 
states of dealing with it. 
The directive contains the 'must carry' directive which allows the 
member states to direct platforms and services to carry a 
minimum number of national services. The basis on which these 
services can be specified relates to the public service 
characteristics of the services i.e. in relation to content and their 
availability on a free to air basis, providing the basis of being 
services in the general interest. 
Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications 
Related to privacy issues associated with mobile digital services. 
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The new regulatory framework thus attempts to transpose some of the features 
related to the nationally regulated analogue environment into horizontally 
regulated digital markets. The key point is that this occurs within the competitive 
paradigm and thus primarily recognises an accommodation with commercial and 
economic bases for policy development. It is as much concerned with 
liberalisation and flexible regulatory initiatives which are now constituted as 
public interest objectives on the basis of competition led policy design. The 
overall approach does little to conceive of public interest objectives that cannot 
be achieved by the market. The overall paradigm is based on a regulatory role 
that is behavioural as opposed to structural. That is, there are no provisions for 
direct intervention (referred to as positive intervention) in relation to infrastructure 
build or state led public interest initiatives. It presumes a role for the state on the 
supply as opposed to the demand side. That is, offering legislation and regulation 
that prompts markets to fulfil the above objectives. The varied public interest 
objectives that do arise out of questions of access do so on the basis of ability to 
pay. Thus the universal service objectives do little to ensure universal access to, 
for instance, networked related digital broadcasting services. Access may be 
prevented on a number of bases. For example, price may act as a barrier to 
access, the lack of comparable infrastructure may cause price and service 
differences, services lack of interconnection may discourage take up etc. Added 
to this the overall application of socio-regulatory principles relies heavily on 
integrating existing norms and practices into a market framework. There is little 
that is expansionary in relation to public interest initiatives or civil society inputs 
into regulatory initiatives. This essentially delegates the necessity of developing 
public service communications at the national level. A final criticism of the logic of 
competition led regulation such as this is its focus on liberalisation and 
privatisation of distribution without recognition of its impact on the vertical 
regulatory initiatives of member states. That is, there is little concern for how the 
marketisation of distribution impacts upon formerly integrated content suppliers. 
For many countries, especially small countries, the subsidisation of content 
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production depended on a tight control over distribution. Thus distributional 
exclusivity has previously allowed local content production and non-market 
operating logics in smaller European countries with public services agendas. 
 
4.11) European level re-regulation: content 
Although firmly rebuffed by nation states in its extension of regulation of 
broadcast content, the Commission has expanded its influence in this regard.  By 
the time DGXIII came to revisit the TVWF directive in 2004 it is evident that the 
vertical regulatory approach is being complimented by pan European initiatives 
with extended principles and guidelines coming into operation. TVWF III has 
been mostly steered by DGXIII which points to the increased implications of 
issues of convergence, and/or digitalisation. As broadcast television forms 
becomes sectioned into markets and distributed via converged media systems 
the commission has sought to extend the scope of TVWF to cover broadcast like 
services (or broadcast forms) regardless of the pay structure, the customer 
relation or the distribution platform. The latest revisiting of the TVWF thus has 
three key implications for digital broadcast content, as follows; 
 
1. It is platform neutral as directive applies to content;  
2. Extends country of origin principle to cross platform services; thus once again 
trying to secure free movement of services and the consolidation of European 
industry 
3. Introduces two tier system of light touch regulation for on demand services and 
continued TVWF regulation of linear services. 
 
The new directive illustrates the accommodation to the separation of production 
and distribution in broadcasting. One of the most noteworthy elements of the new 
directive is its recognition of the internet as a mode of distribution and its attempt 
to define broadcasting as a distinct mode of communication with its own cultural 
forms and therefore the continued necessity of a specific mode of regulation 
independent of its technological delivery. In this regard on-demand services can 
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refer to broadcast forms available via digital pay channels or on internet web tv 
services. These services because of their on demand nature are subject to a 
lighter regulatory regime.  However, on demand services still have to adhere to 
the rules on protection of minors and human dignity; right of reply; identification 
of commercial communications, and minimum qualitative obligations regarding 
commercial communications. The quota rules are however quite watered down 
for on demand services and are framed as an aspiration as opposed to anything 
binding. 
  
4.12) Rationalisation and the re-structuring of public broadcasting 
As has been noted there has been periodic phases wherein the public service 
logic of broadcasting in Ireland has 1. Undergone transformation as part of an 
overall review of the public sector in Ireland (1980s), and, 2. Had to adjust to 
structural adjustments within the broadcasting sector i.e. the move to a dual 
system (1990s). 3. Adjusted to the transposition of EU level directives into PS 
operation (1990-present).  One of the key questions raised by the ongoing 
process of marketisation has been that of the space occupied by the public 
broadcaster in national mediascapes. In Ireland the process was labelled the 
‘reform of public service broadcasting’ involving a publicly orchestrated ‘Forum 
on Broadcasting’, a number of rounds of public consultations and an eventual 
resolution to the ongoing place of PSB in the mediascape. The need to 
determine exactly what role PSB would play in the media landscape and its 
relationship to the commercial sector were partly the result of the EU’s need to 
clarify the socio-legal arrangements surrounding public broadcasters but also the 
outcome of a market enhancing domestic context. Thus questions of definition, 
funding, structure, purpose, commercial practice and governance all came to the 
fore. In the following case study (Chapter 7) it is argued that there were two 
processes of restructuring that occurred, the public one that occurred in the 
public sphere and involved a deliberative process to outline all of those questions 
above. Just below this, there also occurred a more directly political process of 
restructuring wherein political reliance on market methods sought to re-align the 
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production base to a more directly market conscious mode of operation. In 
general this appears to have arisen out of a general policy transfer from other 
approaches to restructuring in the public sector. However, in order to document 
the degree of restructuring the various pressures and emphases that arose from 
European policy towards Europes public broadcasters also needs to be 
considered. 
 
4.13) European Union and public services 
The cultural derogation at Global level has given the EU the time to adjust its 
approach to the shifting political economy of electronic communications within its 
borders. Within Europe there are multiple pressures to re-regulate within the logic 
of market governance from: 
1. Multinationals based within member states, e.g. in the recent debates 
concerning the role of regulation in the 'age of convergence’ BskyB vigorously 
lobbied for the application of general competition law as opposed to sector 
specific regulation for broadcasting. 
2. The private domestic operators that have emerged within the market 
framework, In the UK, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, private operators have 
made cases to the European Competition Directorate alleging market abuses in 
the activities of public broadcasters, ostensibly aimed at reducing public service 
market share. 
3. National governments intent on sponsoring the growth of 'the creative 
industries' e.g. the UK has gradually relaxed ownership regulations that were 
perceived to be a quid pro quo for private operators concerned with the extension 
of the BBC into new ventures. 
4. Elements within the commission (labelled 'Liberals') who oppose intervention 
on ideological grounds 
 
The pressure has tended to focus on the regulatory measures which are aimed 
at limiting concentration, the subsidies awarded to public operators and the 
expansion by public broadcasters into new digital services (broadcast and non-
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broadcast) that are considered to impinge on private market share and profits. 
Thus it is suggested that public services represent ‘opportunity costs’ in relation 
to market growth. The escalation of these cases, the developing market led 
digital environment and external pressure towards liberalisation, has meant that 
the Commission has had to develop a position on the legality of the public 
service subsidy, its uses and the role of regulation in overseeing these factors. 
The outcome of the EU's position on these issues has in turn led to the demand 
for national governments to apply more stringent and transparent measures in 
the regulation of the broadcasting sector and the role of the PSBs within it. It is 
this general pressure which partly explains the restructuring of the public sector 
in Ireland. 
 
The Commissions position has evolved from the early challenges to public 
broadcasters within member states to the ‘Communication on the Application of 
State Aid Rules to Public Service Broadcasting’ in 2001.  As Ward has 
suggested, it is only relatively recently that the place of PSB in the European 
mediascape has become a substantial issue. Within the Treaty of Rome there 
are provisions for ‘services of general interest’ which can be mobilised by the 
Commission to allow subsidiarity on issues of definition and funding of public 
services. The Bangeman Report and its neo-liberal leanings served to mobilise 
opposition towards its vision of a regulatory agenda that sought to marginalize 
public sector elements. The Tongue Resolution, followed by the Amsterdam 
protocol of 1997, reasserted the place of PSB in European mediascapes. 
However, the protocol also left many questions to be answered as it had 
asserted the importance of PSB to the democratic, cultural and social life of the 
member states, but only in so far as this remit was clearly laid out in national law 
and did not interfere with competition and trade in audiovisual services within the 
Union. The 1997 Amsterdam protocol secured the legitimacy of public service 
broadcasting but requested that member states clarify its role in the interests of 
future competition law on the issue. Thus the legislative status of public service 
broadcasting at national level would be a key element in defining its application 
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and utility in the future development of public service communications. The re-
orientation of public policy in a competitive milieu forced the issue of what 
definition, structures and practices would be suitable for public service 
broadcasting. Whereas the Commission thus shifted the issue of definition to 
national level it found itself having to develop a general approach as more 
commercial national broadcasters sought to contest public service practices on 
the latter issue of competition and trade. Within European law the position had 
developed wherein the Commission positioned itself as competent in deciding on 
issues related to funding structures, transparency and proportionality (Ward, 
2003). It thus requires member states to outline the funding allocated to public 
broadcasters, the public purposes of this aid and to ensure that the amount 
allocated is sufficient only for the latter to be carried out. 
 
Whereas this provided a fairly clear cut approach in relation to 'pure publicly 
funded' broadcasters, problems have arisen in relation to mixed funding 
broadcasters such as RTE regarding the possibility that 'the use of state aid 
granted to public broadcasters and whether the aid is used un-competitively to 
the advantage of these broadcasters on secondary markets such as advertising' 
(Ward, 2002, p106). The competition directorate, DGIV, attempted to resolve this 
issue with a discussion paper but was lobbied by member states unhappy with 
the Commission’s seeming willingness to set limits on what they could or could 
not define as a public service programming (Nitsche, 2002). In particular, the 
commission had singled out the mixed funding broadcasters such as RTE for 
special attention. The suggestion was that these broadcasters should outline 
which elements of their service was public broadcasting and which elements 
where commercial. In this way the commission could judge the degree to which 
the public services are proportionally funded and ensure public funds did not sub 
vent their commercial operations. Whereas this position was rejected, it does 
reveal the ambiguity with which the Commission regarded mixed funding 
broadcasters. The result, however, has been that each complaint is dealt with on 
a case by case basis. However, as Ward has observed, there are more general 
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obligations that now have a bearing on the activities of the public broadcasters. 
One set of such obligations arises in the amendments of the Transparency 
Directive which is aimed at all member states' public companies. The two 
provisions of direct relevance to PSBs involve the contention that 'there is 
transparency in financial relations between the state and public undertakings and 
to ensure that these are proportionate to the public service remit'. And secondly, 
to 'ensure transparency and a clear division, including separate accounting 
systems, between the different activities of the public undertaking in terms of 
public and non public service activities' Ward, 2002 p103). From this perspective, 
the definition of the public service becomes a core issue in relation to what can 
and cannot be considered to be outside of the PSBs remit and the relevance of 
the general marketisation of the socio-institutional framework, and its implications 
become more readily appreciable. The various cases brought before the 
Commission in relation to the contravention of trade and competition issues led it 
to a more confident statement of its position on PSB in the 2001 Communication 
on Public Service Broadcasting which essentially re-stated its competency only in 
the areas of adjudging proportionality and transparency and calls on member 
states for; 
1. A definition of public service activities; 
2. An official act entrusting the public service duties to a specific body; 
3. A system of proportionality and assessment to evaluate whether the activities 
of the broadcaster who receives state aid are consistent with the obligations 
imposed on it  
Thus the definition and funding of PSBs remained a subsidiary issue, but one 
that entailed a national level clarification of the public service arrangement. 
 
The following case studies address these varied political economic emphases on 
the digitalisation of broadcasting and the re-positioning of public broadcasting 
within the marketised digital broadcasting infrastructure and how the two policy 
approaches overlap with each other. To re-iterate, marketisation here refers to 
both the institution of market structures and market logics of operation and the 
Chapter Four 
 
147 
 
process of governance via re-regulated markets. All of the issues discussed in 
the present chapter provide the backdrop for the following discussions. The Irish-
specific contexts of a state machinery possessing capacity to steer neo statist 
intervention, the emphases on reduced public spending and the market making 
proclivities of the state are accompanied by the increased influences of European 
policy and its institutionalisation of market structure based on new forms of 
competition, new forms of exchange and new property forms and the re-
regulatory rules and guidelines that oversee this structure. However, before 
turning to the case studies it is  necessary to contextualise present broadcasting 
policy in Ireland through consideration of the historical developments and wider 
policy contexts in Irish broadcasting.    
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Chapter Five 
State Intervention, Governance and Policy Change in Irish Broadcasting 
 
5.1) Introduction 
Broadcasting, as a distinct mode of communication, has long predated its 
technological extension in the early 20th Century. With its realisation in radio and 
later television technology it became the object of institutional concerns regarding 
its appropriate structure, purposes and regulation. Thus from the very inception 
of electronic broadcasting policy makers in Ireland grappled with the 
technological, spatial, political-economic and socio cultural 
constituents/dimensions of broadcasting and the best means of organising it to 
ensure its compatibility with the recently founded new  state. In the 1990s a 
similar engagement with technological, spatial, political economic and socio 
cultural issues surrounds broadcasting and called into question those earlier 
settlements regarding the diffusion of electronic broadcasting in what are now 
increasingly considered to be post-industrial post-national regimes (Esping-
Andersen, 1999). Technological change, in relation to digitalisation and the 
development of the new media centring on the infrastructure of the internet, 
present policy makers with challenges. Spatial issues in relation to the 
internationalisation of distribution and the development of the World Wide Web 
vis a vis new technology also signal the necessity of national adjustment and 
differential levels of governance. In socio cultural terms the pluralisation of 
cultural identities, values and interests have prompted the demand for a more 
differentiated media that spreads out beyond mono cultural nationalism. In 
political-economic terms the rules of the game have also changed. The privileged 
position of the state in Atlantic Fordism is no longer guaranteed as policy and co-
ordination migrate to supra-national and global levels of governance, and the 
market is increasingly premised as the chief means of distributing resources in 
society whereas the state re-structures to manage supply as opposed to demand 
side co-ordination of the economy. The state has also become the 
enabling/regulatory state in so far as it moves to facilitate network governance as 
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a component of the extant and emergent state/market governance mix. Thus the 
state is enabling in so far as it seeks to institute forms of governance and the 
institutional infrastructure that necessarily accompanies emerging modes of 
accumulation. However, despite these shift in the key determinants of media 
development there are continuities in so far as broad stroke questions regarding 
policy orientations have been negotiated throughout the development of 
broadcasting in its analogue, national and state led form. Arising out of 
theoretical formulations of the public sphere, the public interest, cultural 
democracy and citizenship, McQuail has identified the key normative concerns of 
public policy in public communications as involving issues of freedom, access 
and control/accountability (McQuail, 2003). In western democratic states these 
norms were, in the 20thC, translated into regulatory concerns with universal 
service, universal access, public service, plurality and diversity (ownership and 
control issues/access issues) and content regulation realised in different ways by 
varied levels of regulation and subsidy, often as the outcome of social and 
political struggles. Whereas such regulatory approaches point to the meta level 
of market failure, they have not arose out of purely economistic concerns, but 
more so from socio-political and institutional interplay. However, Mc Quail also 
notes the increasingly economic emphases of communications/media policy as a 
by-product of its articulation within the informational and reflexive components of 
late or advanced capitalism. Thus unlike the early days of broadcasting wherein 
economic interest in the new media tended to focus on the sale of related 
hardware and in the American case, the sale of audiences to advertisers, the 
very infrastructure of digital media is implicated in 'the dynamic of any emerging 
economic system' (Jessop, 2001). What is relevant in relation to broadcasting is 
the degree to which broadcasting's infrastructure can be adapted to be a 
distribution/network system for new media, the way in which the public good 
status of broadcasting is now being reconstituted relative to its potential as an 
internally traded commodity and the ways in which media and cultural production 
offer themselves as component dimensions of knowledge based economies. 
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Thus, to understand the macro contexts of broadcasting policy making, the meso 
context of this policy making and the performance of the outcomes against the 
normative dimensions of public communications policy it is necessary to do so 
through a number of inter-related frames already outlined throughout the thesis. 
The external determinants relate to those constitutive factors of technological 
change, spatial re-ordering, socio-cultural developments and, particularly political 
economic transformations (the shift to market governance in response to 
structural changes in the economic realm). Reactions to these contextual factors 
will be considered through the process of public policy which, influenced by 
ideas, interests and institutions, moves through the cycle of agenda setting, 
policy formation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy outcome. The 
site specific factors which impinge on this process include those of state/market 
relations, interest groups, ideologies, the assemblage of institutions at the varied 
levels of local, regional, national and supranational co-ordination. Policy 
outcomes can be then judged against McQuail's criteria of access, freedom, 
control/accountability (or participation, representation and recognition) and added 
to this must be the degree to which these objectives are squared with the socio-
economic dimensions of public policy and the balance maintained between 
socio-cultural and economic objectives. The present chapter aims to sketch such 
an analysis in order to provide the background and contexts to the following case 
studies on the introduction of DTT and the restructuring of public broadcasting in 
the Irish context. As such, it will apply the above frames of analysis to the 20thC 
development of broadcasting policy in Ireland. In keeping with the materialist 
slant of the thesis the key concern will be with the homology between political 
economic and evolving state/market relations, and how changes at this macro 
level alter the contexts for public policy institutions. As such the chapter is 
concerned with the contexts of policy making, the process of policy making, the 
outcomes of policy, what they mean for systems of public communication and 
how they measure up against public interest concerns.  
 
The chapter will first look at the interplay of these dynamics in two earlier phases 
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in the development of broadcasting in Ireland, the introduction of first radio and 
then television broadcasting in Ireland. It will consider how policies centred on 
access; freedom and accountability have developed in those earlier phases of 
electronic broadcasting and outline the key policy infrastructure that was in place 
in those periods. The source material for the historical development of 
broadcasting in Ireland can be gleaned from the combined accounts  of Richard 
Pine, (2002), Maurice Gorham, (1967), Robert Savage (1998) and John Horgan, 
(2001). The chapter will then consider the shift in emphases from political policy 
making to negotiated governance within the contexts of the emergence of the 
competition state in the 1990s. It will finally address the European policy making, 
relative to DTV and PSB in the 1990s.   
 
5.2) Public policy and radio broadcasting in Ireland 
The 'policy community' which anticipated the introduction of radio broadcasting in 
Ireland was very much characteristic of a postcolonial emergent state engaged in 
reconstruction. Political representatives more accustomed to military struggle 
were in the process of building new institutions whilst finding that existing ones 
offered an expedient alternative to starting all over again. As a result, radio, a 
potentially pervasive mode of social communication, was not seized upon as a 
central element of state building. Ireland's adaptation of radio broadcasting can 
best be seen as the result of technological imperative combined with a cautiously 
articulated concern with control of the circulation of information within the 
emergent state. The evidence for this lies in the fact that the various parties 
forging policy and looking for the best structures and regulatory design had little 
conceptualisation of what these structures and regulations might enable in terms 
of harnessing the potential output of broadcasting, c.f. Pine, 2002. Instead, that 
Ireland should have national radio and that it should be under state control 
represented reactive policy that sought to minimise the impact of the technology. 
 
In general terms the young state recognised the development of broadcasting as 
a component element of modernising western states. It also was cognisant of the 
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quick establishment of a broadcasting system by the former colonial master and 
opted to create a domestic information infrastructure which could be contained by 
the state. Unlike the UK or the USA, there was no driving economic imperative, 
as the spare manufacturing capacity that existed in those countries following the 
First World War did not exist in a country that had experienced under 
industrialisation in its quasi-colonial relationship with Britain. The small group of 
interests that banded together to form the broadcasting company, under the 
guidance of the ministry of post and telegraphs, were in fact radio importers or 
hobbyists as opposed to radio manufacturers. Ireland did not experience the 
same level of urbanisation that accompanied industrialisation which Raymond 
Williams points to as a social impetus for the quick diffusion of broadcasting in 
Britain. There was not the same kind of community rupture that led to the 
phenomenon of 'mobile privatisation' which again shaped the form that radio 
broadcasting was to take. Instead the fragility of the new state, cultural policy, 
rurality and the need to develop comparative advantage in agriculture helped 
shape a broadcasting service oriented towards entertainment and agricultural 
news. However, one thing that was shared with industrialising neighbours was 
the official concern with maintaining control over who had access to the 
airwaves. Whereas this was justified according to technological criteria such as 
limited bandwidth and orderly management of spectrum use there was also a 
clear concern with the communicative profile of broadcasting in so far as it 
possessed the ability to be live, immediate and pervasive (point to multipoint). A 
very partial and ideologically driven press had developed via the market model 
and European governments saw this as inappropriate for the new media. What 
was significant was the degree to which an impoverished new state was intent on 
developing the new media within its structures essentially as a public utility with 
little concern for the representations of the commercial interests other than those 
looking to get involved in selling receiver sets.  
 
A more immediate pressure than maintaining a place amongst the nations of the 
world was the early development of broadcasting in the UK. With the 
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development of the British Broadcasting Company and its re-constitution as a 
public corporation the realities of international broadcasting and foreign spill over 
came early to the young state. Overspill from the BBC was audible along the east 
coast and along the border. Although there was little to suggest that the diffusion 
of an Irish broadcast service would prevent the 'listening in' on UK services the 
necessity of providing a platform for what was uniquely Irish in cultural terms was 
a crucial driving force. By a combination of financial necessity and 
resourcefulness the new service broadcast a steady diet of culturally distinct folk 
music, sports, Irish language talks and Anglo-Irish literary culture (Gorham, 
1967). This represented a continuation of the surge of cultural nationalism that 
had emerged in late 19th century Ireland.  Due to factors of cultural relevance 
and nationalism the service was to come to be the first choice of Irish listeners. 
 
The goal of control/accountability was therefore paramount in the model adopted 
for radio broadcasting in Ireland. Operated by the civil service under conditions of 
limited autonomy the service was to be entertaining and, most importantly, 
politically innocuous. Legislated for under the Wireless and Telegraphy Act the 
key conditions of broadcasting were outlined but little was articulated in relation 
to the purposes of the service. These developed incrementally and have been 
described as follows; 
‘in so far as the programming of 2RN in its first years demonstrates any 
attempt (whether tacit or overt) to signify a notion of identity, that 
signification was primarily cultural and social, only marginally political, and 
determinedly non-ideological’ (Pine, 2002, pp145).   
 
To this degree the service was that of a ‘state broadcaster’ with aspirations to 
being a public broadcaster. The tight control of the service regulated access to 
the airwaves with content being de-politicised, rigorously policed and geared 
towards economic goals for the sustaining of the agricultural sector and the 
aforementioned diet of distinctly Irish cultural programming. One derogation from 
this situation was the access given to commercial sponsors who provided either 
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whole programmes or programming as a vehicle for advertising. Advertising, 
however, was adjudged by the department to clash with cultural policy goals, was 
tightly regulated and the eventual limitation of advertising to Irish producers was 
conceived as a support mechanism for the establishment of an industrial 
component of the economy.  Beyond this, early pressures for the regionalisation 
of broadcasting, to reflect the predominantly rural character of the state, tended 
to be passed over on the grounds of cost. Because of this level of control of 
access to the airwaves, the Department had to pursue universal distribution of 
the service and this occurred at a relatively sluggish pace, giving rise to criticism 
over the Dublin centric nature of the service. The development of a transmitter in 
Athlone in 1932 represented a significant advance in this regard. Overall the 
pace of this development was in keeping with the general ambiguity towards 
modernisation which was not pursued energetically by the state. 
 
The policy community which negotiated the varied constituents of new media 
development was rooted firmly within the political sphere. The governance model 
was the top down bureaucratic form that was a feature of the interventionist state 
in 20thc Europe. As elsewhere in Europe, Post and Telegraphs, the ministry in 
charge of other technologies of communication, assumed responsibility for its 
diffusion. The department largely drove policy development with an energetic 
senior civil servant, JJ Walsh, pursuing the model of a licence fee funded, 
independently run broadcaster operating outside the department. In this he was 
aided by advice and support from the BBC which had an interest in preventing 
the possibility of commercial competition emanating from Irish soil. The 
department experienced little interference from the Minister but was answerable 
to a government committee that had been set up to decide upon the best 
possible model for the pursuit of broadcasting. Within the cabinet the other 
influential input came from the Department of Finance which was opposed to any 
state involvement in funding a broadcaster and made it clear that there were too 
many competing welfare claims in the development of the new state. At this point 
the gradual development of UK welfare initiatives set high standards for the 
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Republic to compete against. The key interest groups which had an input into 
policy debates included the existing media industries (concerned with protecting 
their sales and advertising revenues), advertising interests (concerned with 
extending the possible number of outlets) and the hastily assembled set of 
industrial opportunists who sought to constitute the Irish Broadcasting Company. 
Interestingly, as had happened in the UK, the advances of the Marconi Company 
had been rebuffed on the basis of distrust of the companies potential monopoly 
over the broadcasting business. Its drive to control both distribution and 
production was interpreted as anathema to the interest of state and national 
policy initiatives in communications development. Likewise the intrigue 
surrounding the Figgis Belton affair (cf Pine, 2004, Mulryan, 1988) demonstrated 
the governments concerns over the political motivation behind seemingly 
innocent private enterprise as a committee member’s links to high profile 
Unionists latterly came to light in the broadcasting Committees proceedings. The 
state as a catholic-corporatist state with a determination to emphasise its cultural 
difference from Britain, ensured that the broadcasting service also absorbed and 
reflected these values from myriad religious and civil interest groups. What is 
significant from the overall policy process was the ever present politically driven 
option that the state may play a role in the diffusion of the service in the interest 
of ensuring that national policy objectives would not be overridden by commercial 
and political concerns emanating from outside of the state. As such broadcasting 
developed as a public utility primarily oriented towards a policy of cultural 
nationalism. 
 
5.3) Public policy and television broadcasting 
When television technology was developed across Europe it was incorporated 
into the existing institutional and socio-regulatory infrastructure that had been 
developed for radio broadcasting. Again, the UK had been the site of much of the 
development of technology and following the interruption of the Second World 
War, it set about diffusing the technology under the auspices of the BBC. Again 
early development within the UK created the impetus for a speedy resolution of 
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government policy in this area as television receivers picking up British signals 
began materialising on the border with Northern Ireland and along the eastern 
seaboard. Economic policy had moved from that of agricultural comparative 
advantage to import substitution and protectionism, and, under DeValera the 
need to promote an Irish voice in the world had been pursued, albeit with little 
success. It became clear early on that Television would be a considerably more 
complex and resource intensive then Radio had been. Partially because of this, 
and the fact that Television was greeted with suspicion by those who had a firm 
hold on the existing knowledge structure in Ireland the policy process leading to 
the introduction of Television was even more protracted than Radio. This was 
partly down to its communicative profile. Adding pictures to words, the potential 
of Television to create access to a 'virtual reality' presented considerable 
challenge to the knowledge ecology of the country. The official position was to be 
that commercial investment would be necessary as the poor economic 
performance of the country meant that competing welfare claims relegated 
television to the category of a 'luxury good' (Savage, 1996). A singly minded civil 
servant within the Department, Leon O’Broin canvassed the suitability of a public 
service model, but appeared to be going against the grain.  The replacement of 
DeValera with Sean Lemass as a 'modernising' Taoiseach signalled Ireland's 
twin move towards an open economy relying heavily on Foreign Direct 
Investment as a substitute for capital investment and state centred Keynesian 
planning. The eventual decisions made to pursue Television within the 
framework of national cultural interest probably occurred because Lemass had 
only embarked upon his policies at this point in time and was swayed by the 
majority perspective within his first cabinet. It may also be suggested that 
Ireland’s opening out to the world via economic liberalisation prompted an 
acceptance of cultural protectionism in anticipation of increased international 
influences within the country.  
 
Within the founding legislation for RTE and the Broadcasting Authority 
Amendment Act of 1974, the new service benefitted from a decade of pressure to 
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make broadcasting more independent of government and state. Thus the 
legislation stressed the cultural dimensions of RTE's duties but also made clear 
its role in the democratic life of the whole country. An onus to be impartial and 
balanced within the democratic framework created the basis for an ongoing 
negotiation on the degree of freedom the station possessed in covering varied 
and especially political subject matter. The necessity of national access was 
once again stressed. With more focus, and the incentive of increased licence fee 
revenue, RTE pursued the development of its network more vigorously then had 
been the case with 2RN. The goal of Universal service (as far as was practical) 
was realised relatively early demonstrating the social efficiency of the public 
ownership model. RTE however developed within the same centralising 
tendencies working within a broadly representative and Dublin centric model. 
Thus questions of access were institutionalised into sets of normative practices 
and guidelines that related to a public interest agenda which attempted to 
facilitate political and cultural diversity as opposed to advocating one over 
another, not always successfully. This has inevitably led to claims that it has 
favoured one over the other or completely neglected whole constituents because 
of its own liberal urban agenda and its pursuit of a form of consensual democratic 
republicanism (Quinn, 2001). It is this procedural negotiation of function and 
purpose that is common to the public service broadcasters across Europe, one 
that points to the necessity of the maintenance of a degree of freedom from both 
economic and political interference and accountability to the public. Successive 
governments have found it difficult to honour this social contract interfering 
politically on some occasion and failing to intervene economically on other 
occasions when public funding has fallen below acceptable levels. Stymieing 
licence fee increases could avert popular dissatisfaction with governments keen 
to please the electorate, help keep inflation under control and also curb an overly 
critical public broadcaster (Horgan, 2001, Corcoran, 2004). The converse effect 
has been a reliance on commercial income that can lead to contradictions 
between the commercial and public interest duties of the broadcaster. It is on this 
basis that the broadcaster is legally accountable to the public as opposed to 
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government or state, although the structure and mechanisms of such 
accountability have not hitherto developed to reflect this situation. 
 
The policy community that dealt with the introduction of television was much 
more aware of the significance of broadcasting than its predecessor in the early 
twenties. The pervasiveness and potential profitability of the new medium 
brought many interest groups into the debates. One again policy development 
was located firmly within the political sphere. Developments in the UK and the 
presence of television sets in the Republic were responsible for the emergence 
of broadcasting into the public arena whereas the department’s principal, Leon 
O'Broin, was influential in moving it onto the political agenda. O'Broin engaged 
upon a solo run within the Department and along with the help of former director 
of 2RN fashioned a structural model based upon the concept of public 
broadcasting which benefitted from policy transfer from both the BBC and the 
European Broadcasting Union (Gorham, 1967). Again, Finance was influential in 
shaping government policy and the department of trade and industry was also 
involved in the formulation of parameters and objectives. The government 
organised a television committee which sought to develop a model that would not 
lead to any cost falling on the exchequer. The commercial interests who sought 
to shape the development of broadcasting in Ireland had primarily as their goal, 
the possibility of broadcasting a commercial radio service to the UK in order to 
realise profits in the larger markets there. The committee this time round had a 
much clearer idea of what broadcasting actually entailed and how it could 
contribute to the democratic, social and cultural life of the country, which was 
arguably down to the public debates surrounding the developing philosophy of 
PSB within the BBC/UK. However, the report was hamstrung by the proviso that 
there would be no public funding for any service and therefore was limited in its 
options especially the public one, even though it proposed in its interim report 
that this was a desirable option. The 1950s had been a decade of retrenchment 
for nationalised industries and a clear indication of the limits of DeValeras' 
adaptation of Listian economic policy. Thus the efficacy of public enterprise, not 
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for the last time, was under debate at this point in time. 
 
The committee sought to assess the range of options on offer through seeking 
submissions from interest groups and members of the public. However, business 
interests with considerable financial clout benefitted from differential access to 
the policy process were given privilege of access. In the final analysis the cabinet 
however performed an about turn to accept the relatively autonomous public 
model funded out of a mixture of licence fee and commercial revenue. The key 
factors involving this turn around appear to be the concern that national-cultural 
policy objectives would not be pursued within the commercially operated model. 
Even within a system of public regulation it was considered that public authorities 
may have difficulty in compelling well resourced commercial interests to pursue 
social regulatory goals. It appeared that the protracted negotiation with these 
would be broadcasting companies alerted state interests to the drawbacks of non 
structural intervention. Even the Department of Finance was concerned that lack 
of control over advertising may lead to inability to influence advertising minutage 
and content in a way that was sensitive to the national economy.  As Ireland 
entered a period of economic modernisation and liberalisation the new television 
service reflected upon its subjects as primarily national subjects with common 
interests and goals. The development of a national broadcasting monopoly did 
not significantly clash with the emerging economic goals of export-oriented 
'peripheral Fordism' based on foreign direct investment (Barbrook, 1994). 
However, despite the turn to international capital to create an industrial 
infrastructure (and replace failing national industries) , it is significant that public 
policy goals in communications were considered best administered by, notionally, 
semi autonomous mechanisms of bureaucratic governance enabled by the state 
. Broadcasting policy was still driven by national socio normative goals and the 
structure of RTE as a semi independent state body, governed by an Authority in 
the public interest created a vessel for the development of broadcasting policy 
that was in dialogue with both the department and the government of the day. In 
this period, broadcasting policy was now somewhat internalised within RTE. 
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There were thus limits to FDI, liberalisation and privatisation. However, these 
limits were to be eventually called into question. 
 
5.4) Introducing the dual system 
In terms of technological change, the key developments within broadcasting were 
interior to that medium. The switch to colour television, the introduction of 
cabling, the development of UHF all represented technological adjustments that 
were dealt with by the broadcasting policy community of RTE , the Department of 
Communications and various interest groups such as the language interest 
groups and the Church. RTE had become the repository of expertise in this 
respect and was also relied upon to balance public interest objectives with 
institutional self interest. Its position as a monopoly averted the possibility of 
wasteful competition and the fragmentation of resources. In return the attainment 
of economies via diversification was maintained through allowing RTE a financial 
interest in new developments such as cabling. Relatively early on RTE had a 
substantial interest in the cabling business first developed as RTE Relays and 
later Cablelink. RTE continued to grow as a large integrated broadcaster 
maintaining control over the varied elements of content production, scheduling 
and distribution. However, by the 1980s the status of the public sector in Ireland 
was under review once again. Due to the oil crises, growing unemployment, 
rising state deficits and the global economic shocks of the 1970s, the public 
sector was subject to a significant restructuring (Sweeney, 2004). The key 
outcome was to signal the commercialisation of this sector to ensure that state 
assets were not under performing and to relieve some of the pressure on the 
exchequer. During this period RTE was subject to major staff reduction and 
encouraged to commercialise some of its activities and change work practices to 
ensure efficiencies. 
 
In the course of the decade both Fianna Fail and Fianna Gael revealed 
themselves to be in favour of liberalising the sector and introducing private 
competition. There were myriad reasons for this. If all politics is local than the 
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promise of offering local services and potential local enterprise appealed to the 
electorate. Added to this there was a sense, particularly amongst Fianna Fail, 
that RTE's agenda was overly critical of that party in particular. An alternative 
source of news and information, and particularly one that is indebted to the party 
was considered a welcome addition to the information infrastructure. In addition 
to this, the development of broadcasting satellite services indicated that the day 
would come when broadcasting was no longer purely a national affair and that 
small countries may want to get its broadcasting ecology in place before the 
development of international commercial broadcasting. From 1984, discussions 
arose within the EU concerning harmonisation of member states broadcasting 
frameworks. The Hahn report and then the later discussions surrounding the 
potential directive that was to become Television without Frontiers were under 
discussion as the possibility of international broadcasting became more likely. 
Also, popular pressure for alternatives to RTE, or at least its centralised national 
radio service, had become evident in the upsurge of pirate radio displaying a 
demand for local presentation of Anglo-American pop culture (Mulryan, 1988). 
The national/folk/uplift cultural policy of the national broadcaster was thus under 
challenge from various different quarters. The legislation for private commercial 
radio and television, accompanied by an industry regulator, was finally introduced 
by the Fianna Fail government in 1988. 
 
Although the reasons cited above came into play in the introduction of a 
commercial sector, there were also additional factors shaping policy approaches 
to how commercial competition would be introduced, traceable to Fianna Fail’s 
close relationship with business elites in Ireland. Following the investigations of 
the Flood tribunal it was revealed in its interim report that the then Minister for 
Communications, Ray Burke, had pursued broadcasting policy to satisfy private 
interests, in return for corrupt payments, as opposed to the public interest. The 
introduction of local radio had been accompanied by plans for a national radio 
and television station, even though the demand for such services had not been 
previously evident, nor was the general economic environment promising. 
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Subsequent policy initiatives demonstrated the degree of patronage that was at 
work in these moves. The measures brought forward, in response to the 
eventually established, but, faltering national commercial radio and television 
services, had proposed altering the channel identity of RTE's second radio 
station, diverting advertising revenue towards the private sector and disbursing 
the licence fee amongst different broadcasting interests. Whereas these policy 
measures where rejected, Burke did manage to place a cap on RTE's advertising 
revenue and tie it to the licence fee in a way which essentially gave the 
government effective control of RTE's revenue earning potential. The Flood 
tribunal also found that Burke's issuing of a ministerial directive in relation to the 
commercial radio station's use of RTE's transmission network was motivated by 
personal interest and constituted corrupt governance. What has not been fully 
investigated thus far is the role of cabinet compliance in this matter. Significant 
legislation like capping the advertising revenue of the national broadcaster would 
have called for cabinet approval and therefore enters the realm of government 
collective responsibility. Also whereas Ray Burke was rewarded with personal 
enrichment, a cultural of tolerance of such behaviour within Fianna Fail has lead 
to accusations of an ‘unwritten’ policy of elite patronage on the part of that party.  
 
5.5) Institutional change and public policy making in Ireland 
In this section the key purpose is to briefly consider how some of the material 
and political economic changes discussed in the introduction have led to 
structural change in the Irish state, and how this in turn has created new 
contexts, strategies and activities for public policy in the Republic of Ireland. The 
chief concern here is how the state has been rearticulated relative to a global neo 
fordist political economy that has been chiefly characterised by neo-liberal 
management. It is these state strategies and articulations that provide a broad 
outline of the structure and activity of public policy in the Irish context. It is 
suggested that Sean O’Rian’s description of Ireland’s new state strategy as being 
that of a flexible developmental state is well complimented by Boucher and 
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Collin’s characterisation of Ireland’s political economy as that of neo-liberal 
corporatism (O’Riain, 1999, Boucher and Collins, 2003).  
 
In relation to Ireland’s openness to neo-liberalism, Sean O'Riain has argued that 
in terms of economic development, the state has been involved to a degree that 
is uncharacteristic of neo-liberal regimes and indicative of a state oriented to 
taking advantage of the post fordist nature of global capitalism, sometimes 
contrary to the neo-liberal prescriptions of global institutions. To this degree he 
has argued that Ireland has developed a new state style that successfully adjusts 
to the global post fordist informational economy.  
 
O'Rian characterises the emergent state form in Ireland as that of a flexible 
developmental state (FDS). He differentiates it from the Asian Bureaucratic 
Developmental state which he outlines as being more centralised, fordist and 
inflexible. Thus the FDS derives its key characteristics from its ability to 'create 
and animate post fordist networks of production and innovation and international 
networks of capital, and to link them together in ways that promote local and 
national development' (O’Riain, 1999). The FDS thus connects to 'existing flows 
of capital by attracting foreign direct investment and then building local networks 
of production (typically sub supply) and innovation (much more rarely) around 
this imported industrial organisation' (O’Riain, 1999). In general he thus 
addresses the development of economic policy centred on foreign direct 
investment and the development of post fordist indigenous industry, linked to the 
opportunities opened up by global markets, the expertise gained in multinational 
companies and the incidental infrastructure that is created and underpinned by 
wage agreements achieved in neo-corporatist fashion. He points to the centrality 
of the state and state agencies in securing the conditions which have aimed 
primarily to attract foreign direct investment, but, almost as a by-product, have 
created indigenous 'entrepreneurial milieus'. Infrastructural projects, educational 
policies, tax regimes and support services created with the intention of providing 
the requisite socio-institutional environment for foot loose post-fordist industry, 
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thus provide the infrastructure for local innovation (industry is post fordist in so far 
as production takes place across scattered physical sites). The presence of 
global corporate segments of international industry creates the opportunity and 
expertise to develop complimentary companies poised to take advantage of 
opportunities in world markets.  Although O'Riain concentrates mainly on 
software development, this state strategy has underpinned the Irish approach to 
the ‘knowledge based’ sector of the economy. It is within these contexts that the 
state and polity initially turned to the liberalisation and convergence of the 
communications sector, mainly through the intervention of the Department of 
Public Enterprise and its associated agencies (in relation to telecom 
infrastructure). Thus, in relation to the phenomena of economic globalisation, 
Ireland already had a strategy of opening up to foreign direct investment. The 
market liberal turn towards opening up previously sheltered areas of 
communication for liberalisation represented a new area at which this policy 
could be directed. With liberalisation and liberalised convergence, the door was 
thus opened for a flexible developmental approach towards a potential 
infrastructure for the nascent internationally traded services sector. Thus, in the 
Irish scenario, the North American communications corporations, NTL and 
Liberty Media were sufficiently attracted to the Irish cable market whereas Crown 
Castle, amongst other multinational corporate interests, almost became the 
dominant partner in the digital terrestrial operator. This encapsulates the key 
means through which the Irish State had successfully adjusted to the market lead 
post fordist political economy at international level and demonstrates the fine line 
between securing economic development and compromising the role of social 
institutions. 
 
Gosta Esping-Andersen typifies Ireland's adjustments of recent years as being 
distinctly neo-liberal. In recent writings he has suggested that 'the welfare model 
of Ireland and the UK, like the Americans, seeks actively to sponsor market 
solutions. It pursues this via the double strategy of encouraging private welfare 
provision as the norm, and by limiting public responsibilities to acute market 
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failures’ (Esping-Andersen, 2002, p15). Kirby has underlined this Irish neo-
liberalism as developing throughout the 1990s. According to Kirby 'if we 
understand neo-liberalism in its developed form to involve an extensive 
programme of reform of the state and its social policies making them serve the 
needs of a competitive liberalised market economy, than the Celtic Tiger can be 
seen as a very successful example of neo-liberal reform’ (Kirby, 2001, p162). 
The problem thus becomes the evaluation of what are legitimate areas for market 
production and delivery of services, and how to attain the right mix with 
alternative methods, and, on the other hand, identifying the impetus to marketise 
as being based solely on the morality, rationalities and ideologies of neo-
liberalism. Within the neo-liberal solution alternative governance regimes such as 
civil society or differential productive solutions such as state enterprise, the social 
economy, community production and public service are ignored in place of ready 
to hand market solutions that find ready support from economic stakeholders and 
the political interests that benefit from supporting power elites in society. 
 
Boucher and Collins thus sum up the Irish political economy that undergirds the 
strategy of the FDS as being that of ‘neo-liberal corporatism’. This they 
characterize as unique combination of European social corporatism and 
American neo-liberalism. They point to a model wherein, in a corporatist fashion, 
the public sector and the private sector have hammered out a consensual 
approach to managing the economy which sees public and private sector parity 
on wages as the public sector accepts re-structuring such as outsourcing, 
flexibilisation and new public management (all in the name of increased 
productivity and efficiency gains) as a quid pro quo for progressive wage rises. 
What is missing from this consensual approach is any articulation of a general 
public interest that posits the necessity of non-market based institution building 
and the restraint on marketisation of sectors where market failure has harsh 
repercussions for those who do not have a place at the corporatist table.  
 
Chapter Five 
 
166 
 
In general we may see this general political economy and state strategy as giving 
rise to a structure and a number of determinants of public policy/state activity. 
Post fordist neoliberal corporatism presents a paradox in relation to the new state 
style and activity. It offers a combination of the enabling state and the neo-liberal 
state that places a pressure on the space of the social, political and cultural 
developmental agenda. It appears that the state is neo-interventionist in terms of 
its role in shaping Ireland’s relationship with international capital and the 
economy, but passive in its role of framing indigenous social, political and 
economic strategies.  
 
5.6) Communications policy and the competition state  
The 1990s signalled a parallel change in communications policy and inevitably 
broadcasting policy. If the introduction of commercial competition signalled a 
move to a dual system of public/private broadcasting, the rest of the decade 
would witness fundamental changes wherein the overall organisational logic of 
broadcasting became that of the market and the type of governance regime 
moved from one of policy led corporatist statism to that of negotiated market 
governance.  Supply side measures including the supply of labour through 
education, legal stability, infrastructure build (both physical and electronic) and 
regulatory stability (at both the macro and meso level) had become centrally 
important to Ireland’s flexible economic developmentalism. The development of 
communications networks such as cable and telephony became key policy 
considerations under successive governments. With the influences of neoliberal 
ideology and the example of US based market governance, Ireland approached 
its co-ordination of the publicly owned communications network in a similar 
fashion.  
  
As various states and supranational regimes preference varied growth regimes in 
order to negotiate the ’new economy’, the effects of internationalisation, 
incorporation into the world economic system (and its new liberal emphases) 
exerted pressures towards competitiveness between states. Thus the privileging 
Chapter Five 
 
167 
 
of a competition led growth regime underlined Ireland’s re-articulation as a 
flexible competitive state resting on a political economy of neo-liberal 
corporatism, in short hand public/state intervention was to be re-oriented towards 
encouraging private investment strategies and market making activities. As a 
competition state, Ireland had adjusted its social system to ensure its 
attractiveness to international capital whilst also instituting high levels of 
productivity across its product and service producing sectors. In this competition 
led model, the role of the market was now privileged and market structures, 
market relations and market governance were to become the norm. Whereas all 
states conform to this competition regime because of perceived international 
pressures, the ability of the state to retain control over strategic supply side 
areas, shape the growth regime and carve out a role for public enterprise, 
represented important steering mechanisms for protecting social development as 
well as economic growth. This has offered a potential re-socialisation of the 
mode of growth, that is, one that recognises the place of a re-distributive social 
structure as a pre-requisite for long term growth, development and has been 
successfully followed in the social democratic states of Sweden and Finland 
(Castells and Himmanen, 2002, Held, 2004). However, in Ireland, in relation to 
media and communications policy, the state machinery for neo-statist 
intervention appeared relatively absent from government planning, there was no 
continuity from the previous Government’s  media and communications policy 
(nor the will to pursue it), there was new emphasis on public/private partnerships 
in large infrastructural projects (necessary in lieu of the tax cuts for US corporate 
industry), and the political culture had undergone significant change. By 1997, in 
the Irish situation, the competition led model had been privileged by doctrinaire 
liberalism (PDs) mixed with electoral populism/elite patronage (FF) as these two 
parties formed a government.  
 
Whereas democratic forces and social struggles at European level have 
operated to encourage the space for exceptions from and limitations to the 
competition regime, Ireland has thus far favoured fidelity to the competition 
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regime. As such, the competition led paradigm in Ireland emphasises 
marketisation in provision, governance and decision making. This tends to over-
ride the other paradigms of knowledge based economies, ICT or service led 
growth, and de-emphasise the social democratic institutional components of 
western welfare capitalism which can constitute growth. According to Boyer 'the 
form of competition, between firms and nations, is now governing structural 
adjustment in the wage labour nexus (employment flexibility, wage moderation, 
rationalisation of the welfare state), the extent of taxation on mobile and immobile 
factors as well as economic policy formation itself' (Boyer, 2000). Boyer typifies 
the competition led strategy as follows: 
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Emerging growth regimes and the redesign of institutional forms (Boyer, 2000) 
 
In the Irish contexts, Peadar Kirby, has highlighted the tendencies of public policy 
to orientate to competition led dynamics in Irish political economy. According to 
Kirby, drawing on the work of Philip Cerny, a competition state is a state ‘ under 
pressure from economic globalisation which has led not to a decline of the state 
but to the expanision of state intervention and regulation in the name of 
competitiveness and marketisation’ (Kirby, 2002, pp142). For Kirby, the 
identification of Ireland as a competition state helps to explain some of the salient 
features of underlying policy change of the Irish state over the previous 15 years. 
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Kirby, cites Cerny on four features that identify the policy priorities of the 
competition state, a move to microeconomic management based around de-
regulatory and industrial policies, a shift from state lead governance to adaptation 
to developments in international markets, an ‘emphasis on neo-liberal 
monetarism as the touchstone of state economic management’ and supply side 
measures to sponsor innovation and enterprise as opposed to demand side 
measure to increase welfare and social provision (Kirby, 2002, pp143). For Kirby, 
the competitive state model explains the neoliberal dimensions of Ireland’s recent 
model of corporatism which combines public sector growth and wages whilst also 
ensuring market development, private sector participation in state projects and a 
minimalist welfare effort.  
 
It is these varied elements of the state model that justify the consideration of the 
state structure of the previous fifteen years as being that of a flexible competitive 
state, supported by a neo-liberal corporatist consensus and inherently riven by 
structural contradictions. There is potential for flexible post fordist economic 
development, but, limitations have been placed upon it, and the potentially 
developmental aspects of it, by too close an adherence to competitive strictures. 
There is corporatism, but it is also hitched to competitive insertion into the 
international regime, and therefore is, complicit (but reluctantly so for some of its 
participants) in the market making prerogatives of the state. It is not a huge leap 
to posit a relationship between the Irish state’s form and Ireland’s  embrace of 
the global project, as stewarded via the Washington consensus, and diffused 
through the institutional norms of the IMF, World Bank and WTO, as negotiated 
within the EU context. The Irish state thus provides a particular prism for 
evaluating the absorption of macro-institutional innovations filtered through to 
meso institutional norms operating throughout varied organisational fields in the 
Irish context. In the following two case studies, evidence of these institutional 
tendencies will be evaluated in the particular fields of media and communications 
policy.                   
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Chapter Six 
Convergence and DTT in Ireland  
 
6.1) Introduction 
The chapter is primarily concerned with the pressures and emphases exerted by 
market governance in the adaptation of digital technology in Irish broadcasting. In 
general it thus offers a point of comparison for the previous policy approaches 
associated with innovation in broadcasting. The chapter departs from the trend in 
current literature to emphasise digitalisation as the key paradigm shift in 
broadcasting without ignoring the key ways in which the technology constitutes 
the new environment for broadcasting. That is, it is recognised that digitalisation 
raises many questions for traditional broadcasting policy communities whilst 
acknowledging that digitalisation is at the core of a major strand of restructuring 
in western economies which has varying implications for media institutions, 
communications industries, regulation and, more gradually, the cultural form of 
broadcasting. The chapter aims to evaluate Ireland’s approach to co-ordinating 
the switch to digital television with a key emphasis on the attention payed to 
translating the existing broadcasting ecology into a digital environment. Of key 
concern will be the balance between market governance and the role of the state 
in intervening to institutionalise a market structure for and through digital policy. It 
will first consider the background approaches to developing digital television and 
adapting the policy emphases of convergence permeating from the European 
and British discourses. It will then take a detailed analysis of the decision to 
develop a DTT structure as the central element of a neo-statist intervention in the 
digital broadcasting structure. Throughout the chapter there is a concern to 
evaluate the contexts, objectives, contents and consequences of public policy in 
this area. Thus a secondary concern is what it tells us about Irish 
communications/media policy in the period under review and its sometimes 
contradictory selectivity’s and activities.    
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6.2) Convergence and broadcasting: the Irish policy approach 
Against the background of a newly liberalised broadcasting sector (the 
introduction of competition from 1988), Irish communications policy gradually 
turned its attention towards the process of digitalisation/convergence. However, 
the prospects of digital television (DTV) were being primarily driven as a matter 
of technological imperative at European level whilst the UK’s embracing of the 
digital project meant that Irish policymakers would once again need to anticipate 
structural change in its overlapping mediscape. The prospect of liberalised 
convergence opened up a relatively small policy community to varied commercial 
and contrasting state interests and ensured that dependence on RTE’s 
internalised approach to policy making was likely to be insufficient in this new 
environment. The first official recognition of the need for government action in 
relation to digitalisation came in the centre-left Rainbow coalition's 1994 Green 
Paper on Broadcasting7. The paper related the belief that 'we probably stand on 
the threshold of a new revolution in broadcasting'. The Green paper proposed the 
creation of a broadcasting regulator (an Irish Broadcasting Commission)) that 
would be capable of planning and co-ordinating the overall introduction of digital 
television into Ireland. Commenting shortly after the release of the green paper 
one media scholar highlighted it's technological inadequacy,  suggesting that it 
failed to recognise that the scope for digitalisation was already being shaped by 
the European level consideration of convergence8 . Yet the European approach 
to convergence, at this point, was based more on technological imperative and 
de-regulatory discourse as opposed to any realistic consideration of how 
technological change would impact on broadcasting production, practice and 
structures. The European position was evolutionary, as demonstrated in chapter 
four, digitalisation began out of a concern with HDTV and competitive positioning 
                                                           
7
 Department Of Arts, Culture and Gaeltacht , (1994) Active or Passive: The Green Paper on 
Broadcasting in Ireland. (Dublin: DACG). The Rainbow coalition was made up of Fine Gael, 
Labour and the Green Party.  
8
 Treutzchler, W. (1995) 'After the Green Paper: What next for broadcasting in Ireland', Forum, 
Irish Communications Review, Vol. 5 1995.  
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with Japan and the USA, and was then incorporated within the information 
society discourse as the broadcastings varied infrastructures each had the 
potential to become or facilitate digital networks. The Green Paper was a 
recognition that alternatives existed in the route to digitalisation and national 
policy would need to be aware of the European Union approach but also mindful 
of its ability to shape that approach. RTE’s response to the Department’s green 
paper indicated the degree to which it initially favoured a corporatist approach to 
the challenges of  digitalisation and the unknown quantity that was convergence. 
However the Minister for Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands had a different 
analysis for to how digitalisation would affect the future development of 
broadcasting. Whereas it did not exclude RTE, it planned for a much larger public 
body to orchestrate the transition.  
 
The government’s follow up to the consultation process which had followed the 
green paper, Clear Focus, elaborated on the concept of a ‘Super Authority’ first 
mooted in the green paper9. It was proposed that the Irish Broadcasting 
Commission (IBC) would subsume the independent regulator, the IRTC, and the 
RTE authority under this new body which would be responsible for policy 
development and the setting, monitoring and harmonising of standards. The 
independent commission would exist at arms length from the government and 
would chiefly concern itself with ensuring a smooth transition to digital across all 
the Irish based distribution systems. According to Clear Focus, the follow up 
document to the green paper, the IBC would be responsible for 'the introduction 
of this technology and its delivery, ownership, regulation and control'. Here, it 
was clear that the Minister envisioned a single national platform that would 
preserve the analogue situation of a unitary national broadcasting culture. 
According to Michael D. Higgins; 
 
                                                           
9
 Department of Arts, Culture and Gaeltacht,, (1997) Clear Focus, The Governments Proposals 
for Broadcasting Legislation, (Dublin, DACG).  
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'I thought that the issues were too big for RTE in terms of concentration of 
ownership, diversity of production, technological capacity and so on, so 
ideally a super authority would have been able to have an opinion on the 
European side, on digitalisation...you see digitalisation is not RTE’s 
problem, RTE is part of the digitalisation adjustment' 10.  
 
Higgins suggested that an IBC infused with the public interest would carry 
forward public purposes, whereas RTE would only carry forward its own 
dominance. According to Higgins, his judgement was informed by the RTE 
Authority's own view as expressed by the then Chairman, John Sorohan, that 
RTE was primarily a 'corporation and a business'. Higgins was also aware of the 
pressures coming from the Bangemann report to de-regulate broadcasting and 
suggested that a strong content regulator for broadcasting would ensure that the 
cultural role of broadcasting would be recognised within such a structure. RTE 
rejected the criticisms of its motivations (Sorohan was a politically appointed 
member of the Authority, not an RTE executive) and was critical of the super 
authority idea in its response to the green paper 11. RTE suggested that such a 
body would mitigate the benefits of having a plurality of regulators and also blur 
the line between commercial and public broadcasters. Whereas RTE did not at 
this point oppose a corporatist approach to introducing digital broadcasting it 
rejected its incorporation into a larger regulatory structure. Higgins however was 
steadfast in his approach that RTE would be better able to balance the public 
interest and the station interest if it did not have to rely on a single authority to do 
both. This state led neo-corporatist approach to digitalisation was subsequently 
adopted in both Sweden and Finland which were to launch their DTT networks in 
1999 and 2000 12. Higgins had at this point in 1997 finalised legislation that would 
                                                           
10
 Interview with Michal D. Higgins December 2003.  
11
 RTE, (1995) RTE Response to the Government's Green Paper on Broadcasting, (RTE: Dublin).  
12
 Finland has to date on of the most successful launches of DTT with at least 300,000 
subscribers and 99% coverage. The approach was based on a corporatist effort involving all the 
key interests in Finnish broadcasting. YLE the public broadcaster privatised its transmitter 
subsidiary, Digita. YLE later sold on a 49% share of Digita to TDF. Digita also oversees the 
multiplex operation. It is worth, however, considering how this approach may have impacted on 
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enable this neo-corporatist approach to a national digital platform. If the 
legislation had have been brought forward it would have meant that Ireland would 
have developed pre-emptive legislation relative to the situation in the UK, for the 
first time in the history of broadcasting.  
 
The Government, however, lost power and was replaced by a Fianna 
Fail/Progressive Democrat coalition before the legislation could be introduced. 
The IBC approach to transition was thus to be shelved until the idea of an 
overarching authority for broadcasting was refloated by the Forum on 
Broadcasting in 2002. An important issue that the green paper/ clear focus 
debate did put on the agenda was the ability of RTE to ensure that its 
stewardship of the public interest was not conflicted by institutional self interest 
and/or economic necessity. The larger issue was, however, the role that state 
would take in directing the development of digital television. The concept of a 
super commission was recognition of the vacuum and lack of preparedness on 
the part of the state for such a large policy adjustment. RTE by itself was not 
equipped to plan for such a transition and there were no existing state structures 
capable of reacting in a co-ordinated fashion. How could policy makers react 
without state co-ordination, guidance and an overall strategy/goal/activity? This 
was not an unusual position throughout Europe, but Ireland’s economic 
adjustment meant that the vacuum in the requisite state machinery was 
peculiarly noticeable. The Irish executive also displayed its own singularities in 
relation to the characteristics of its weak committee system. In the UK at this 
point in time a significantly resourced parliamentary media committee had 
initiated a widespread and well resourced analysis of the UK’s approach and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the European level opposition to the establishment of a single national platform for digital 
television. In hindsight it may be suggested that the Commission’s opting for a platform neutral 
approach to convergence would have prevented the development of such an entity. However, 
the Commissions approach was not, at this point, definitive and considering the broadcasting 
ministry’s activism at European level, in the previous  period, it may have had an impact on the 
route taken by the Commission. Whether, given that convergence was to be platform neutral, 
the IBC would have ensured that at least one of those platforms developed would be a national 
free to air platform is open to historical conjecture. 
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interests in relation to the emerging digital paradigm. In the Irish situation the 
work of the previous committee, as steered by the outgoing government, was to 
be largely discarded. Much now fell to RTE. Whereas there was little reason to 
suggest in the past that RTE had not managed to juggle its contrary positions, 
the increasing challenges posed by liberalisation, competition and resource 
reduction was beginning to raise questions about how RTE could react to this 
financial pressure without abandoning principle for profit. This was a predicament 
equally neglected by all political parties. 
   
The background to the Fianna Fail/RTE relationship has been well documented 
elsewhere 13.. Fianna Fail's distrust of the status and motives of the public 
broadcaster go back to the beginning of television broadcasting and had been 
expressed in varied different scenarios. For a party that had envisioned itself 
more as a national project than a political party it had displayed ambiguous 
support for the concept of autonomous broadcasting and the role of the state in 
enabling it. Further to this, Fianna Fail had firmly asserted its credentials as a pro 
business party capitalising on its sometimes selective support for development 
and growth. The influence of this philosophy in terms of political decision making 
has been the subject of a number of tribunals15. Fianna Fails' mistrust of RTE 
was reciprocated in equal measure by the national broadcaster. Fianna Fail did 
not underestimate the importance of RTE in Irish public life but had let it be 
known that the national broadcaster was not national enough in its alignment to 
state and government. It was against this backdrop of mutual suspicion that RTE 
and a Fianna Fail minister, Sile DeValera would attempt, in the absence of wider 
input, to hammer out a digital policy for Ireland. Fianna Fail's partner in 
government, the Progressive Democrats, were a party much more closely 
aligned with the international accommodation to marketisation, reduced public 
spending and general neo-liberal philosophy. Its economic philosophy was 
                                                           
13
 Horgan, J. (2000) The Media in Ireland: A Critical History, (London: Routledge). Horgan, J. 
Broadcasting and Public Life in Ireland  
15
 The Interim Flood Tribunal Report (2002). The Tribunal was established to investigate corrupt 
payments to politicians. 
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consistent with the globalising tendency to roll back state intervention and roll 
forward statutory regulation, allowing market provision to replace state/collective 
provision. For RTE, the threat of a single regulatory entity had receded, but the 
need to navigate the ideological, historical and pragmatic antipathies of the new 
government presented an equal challenge. However, RTE was now convinced 
that, in order to avoid continued Government inactivity, it needed to kick-start a 
national digital broadcasting policy that was sensitive to the continued role of 
PSB.  
 
At governmental level, the place of the varied potential platforms within national 
policy had to be addressed. The Department of Public Enterprise (DPE), which 
had overseen telecommunications liberalisation, took the lead and, through the 
newly created Office of the Director of Telecommunications, (ODTR), 
commissioned consultants NERA/Smyth to consider the future of television 
transmission in Ireland with respect to digitalization. The consultants 
recommended that “if the market can support it, all media digitised will mean 
competition objectives in respect of TV delivery and national development 
objectives for the information society will then be promoted, to the ultimate 
benefit of the consumer” (NERA&Smyth, 1998). However, it emphasized that the 
market pressures of the already established cable and satellite infrastructure 
made a timely DTT roll out of paramount importance. In Ireland in 1997, the key 
cable infrastructure was owned by a number of different operators. The 
consolidation that followed, based on foreign investment, was to reduce the field 
to two main players, NTL, owned by a North American telecommunications 
company of the same name, and Chorus, owned jointly by Independent News 
and Media and Liberty Media (a subsidiary of AT&T). During this consolidation 
RTÉ had been forced by the Department of Public Enterprise to sell its stake in 
the Cablelink system that was acquired by NTL. Up to this point the satellite 
operator, BSkyB, had been content to sell its services through the cable 
operators but would likely turn directly to the Irish market once it had 
consolidated its position within the United Kingdom (UK) market. Its satellite 
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footprint covered the whole Irish landmass and, excepting various pockets and 
shadows, would be available to the majority of Irish viewers. The key question 
facing the government was the potential role of the terrestrial infrastructure. 
 
6.3) Developing the DTT platform 
RTE proposed its concept of a public private partnership for DTT to the new 
government in its policy paper 'Digital Television and the Information Society. An 
implementation strategy' 16. Based on commissioned research by London based 
Convergence Consultants, the report emphasised the relative low cost of 
digitalising the terrestrial network along with its potential for near universal 
delivery 17. It also emphasised the necessity of bringing on board an investor 
from the private sector that would share both the risks and the benefits. In early 
1998 the Irish Business and Economic Federation and the Construction Industry 
Federation had successfully lobbied the government to use Public Private 
Partnership's in the majority of major capital projects18. The move by RTE 
anticipated the new government’s proclivity for public private partnerships that 
obviated the need for state expenditure in infrastructure overhaul. The new joint 
venture would be called 'Digico'. Central to the viability of the Digico model was 
the maintenance of an integrated broadcasting structure that would retain the 
functions of publishing, distribution, customer interfacing whilst also incorporating 
the most significant broadcast content producer on the island. The model was in 
contrast to the UK approach outlined in the 1996 UK Broadcasting Act which 
sought to separate out these elements in line with its liberalisation/competition 
based agenda. However, in Ireland, the economic benefits of retaining these 
elements within one broadcaster proved a compelling argument in RTE’s 
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 RTE, (1997) Digital Television and the Information Society: An Implementation Strategy', (RTE: 
Dublin). 
17
 Foley, M. '30channel terrestrial digital tv is recommended to RTE', Irish Times 26/07/97. 
18
 In general public private partnerships replace state service provision as a new form of 
economic governance. PPP's tend to link former areas of state provision to the disciplines of the 
market, whilst allowing extant public policy goals to be maintained. This accommodates the 
market liberal turn without unduly undermining the legitimacy of the state. Former areas of 
public service provision/collective consumption are linked to the disciplines and temporalities of 
the market.  
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proposal. According to Peter Branagan, who was then centrally involved in RTE’s 
digital project management group, the civil servants that worked in the 
broadcasting ministry felt that the Digico model made sense from 'a national point 
of view, from a civil service point of view, an RTE point of view and a government 
point of view' 19. The civil service assessment was crucial in winning government 
support, which eventually consented to its development in July 1998. At this early 
point, RTE was critically aware of the potential advantages of gaining a propriety 
involvement in DTT, as it was to become a key gateway for digital delivery of 
broadcasting and other services to the home.    
 
The potential of a DTT platform addressed many aspects of extant public policy 
goals. The development of the platform would allow for the maintenance of 
universal availability of digitalized free to air broadcast services, which was a key 
concern for both the public broadcaster RTÉ and the government. It would thus 
allow for the continuation of widely accessible Irish broadcast offerings, 
especially those of a public service nature, under Irish regulatory control. It would 
also provide competition to the other widely available platforms preventing a 
monopoly of multichannel service provision; a key concern of the 
telecommunication regulator, the ODTR. It would potentially offer new multimedia 
services, offering a popular and pervasive gateway to the information society, 
also a key concern of the government’s Information Society Commission (ISC). It 
would additionally free up valuable spectrum that could be made available for 
nascent wireless digital services, providing potential revenue for the government. 
The key questions arose as to what shape a DTT option would take. 
 
The original Digico model envisioned utilising the RTE network, content 
production and spectrum resources to offer a combination of multichannel 
television and broadband. RTE, by virtue of its contribution of these resources, its 
relative expertise and its origination of new content as a driver for DTT take up 
would receive a 40 to 45% stake in Digico. Bob Collins the director general of 
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RTE suggested that the cost of digitalising the network would be in the region of 
35-40 million Irish punts requiring substantial equity from whoever was to take 
the remaining stake in Digico 20. RTE would receive one complete multiplex 
allowing for an extra five channels along with capacity for non-programme data. 
TV3 and TnaG (as TG4 was then), would each receive half a multiplex. The new 
Digico entity would develop four other multiplexes based on basic and advanced 
subscription services, whereas multiplex capacity would also deliver broadband 
to the home. Following government approval, an internal RTE engineering group 
working under Peter Branagan was established to develop a broadband offering 
that would allow web access through the television. In order to copperfasten this 
arrangement and deal with the legalistic aspects of a semi state body's 
involvement in it, the government set up a Project Management Group (PMG) in 
August made up of representatives from the Department of Arts Heritage 
Gaeltacht, the Department of Public Enterprise, the Department of the 
Taoiseach, the Department of Finance and RTE. This policy community was both 
similar and different to the earlier policy communities that overseen radio and 
television broadcasting in their analogue form and, importantly, demonstrated an 
interest in ensuring the institutional presence of RTE in any emerging model. The 
process was being politically driven but unlike the earlier committees/groups, it 
was corporate expertise and consultancy that was drawn upon to frame the 
introduction of DTT. Also DTT, as one element of a larger broadcasting digital 
landscape demanded a wider policy community than the broadcasting sector.  
 
The PMG group set about appointing a number of corporate 
financial/regulatory/technical advisers who would oversee the development of the 
Digico entity and launch the public private enterprise. The business model, the 
transaction sequence, the legislative framework, the economic contexts and the 
new policy environment were to all contribute to a multi dimensional de-
stabilising of the Digico model. The original business model was to be re-
assessed following considerable doubt about its ability to offer affordable (or any) 
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 O'Keefe, B. 'Challenge for RTE as Digital Age Dawns'  Irish Times, 6/11/98 
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web access or a full compliment of the UK terrestrial channels. The transaction 
sequence was to prove long and drawn out and included a tangled chain of 
events that was to end the possibility of an integrated model for Digico (see 
below). The legislative effort was equally convoluted encountering considerable 
challenge in the Dail and revealing the broadcasting Ministry’s lack of 
involvement, yet unawareness, of the debates surrounding convergence and the 
regulation of networks taking place at European level. In addition to all these 
factors the new policy was developing in a rapidly changing policy environment 
which had been expanded to include the liberalised television sector and its 
foreign investors who had an interest and past experience in challenging the 
extension of the public service provider in liberalised markets 21. At this point in 
time TV3, the commercial broadcaster backed by Granada and Canwest, played 
a considerable role in organising what had been to then a relatively ineffective 
lobby, AIRS, into the Independent Broadcasters of Ireland (IBI) with a more 
focussed and influential lobbying capacity. The IBI lobbied the legislature to put a 
limit on RTE’s influence in the new DTT structure.  Within this overall multiplicity 
of developments, a public interest trajectory for the development of a national 
digital platform was somewhat diluted by commercial manoeuvring, a lack of 
political focus and a predominant orientation toward institutional self-interest.  
 
RTE estimated in its digital television policy document that the cost of launching 
the DTT platform would be in the region of £70 million. £28 million of this related 
to RTE’s own transition towards digital production, whereas the remaining cost 
related to digitalisation of the transmission infrastructure combined with the costs 
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of subscriber management 22. In its original business model Digico would move 
into profits through a combination of internet service provision and subscription 
television. However, within RTE, there were serious divisions regarding the ability 
of each of these revenue streams to pay dividends. The provision of internet 
access was overseen by Peter Branagan, working with the assistance of 
European Commission funding and later under the auspices of the DVB group. 
The Wireless Integrated Network Digital System, and later, the WITNESS system 
entailed a built in return path utilising the domestic roof top antenna. In 1998 
Branagan was confident that the cost of such a service would be affordable or 
even nil 23. The model however was faced by both regulatory and technical 
difficulties. The regulatory difficulties were to come from the ODTR that was now 
making its present felt in the wake of the convergence debate at European level 
and the move to determine and regulate markets in digital communications. In 
October 1999 the ODTR issued a draft licence for DTT as part of a consultation 
process. It envisioned that 'the purpose of the multiplex licence is to primarily 
provide for the preparation of programme services for transmission' 24. The 
document further related that the licence would involve a data cap on the 
provision of broadband services. The cap, it argued, was the outcome of 
international spectrum obligations as decide by the World Radio Conferences 
and the EU telecoms licensing directive. A problem thus arose in the structure of 
the Digico licence. If the business model were to include internet services, then 
according to the ODTR, it would have to comply with EU licensing criteria, as 
interpreted by the ODTR. The ODTR was, at this point, more interested in 
introducing competition amongst different network 'markets' as opposed to 
enabling a national wireless digital broadcasting structure, as it made clear 
through its criteria for a Nera/Smyth report it had commissioned 25. It had taken 
on a technocratic approach to introducing market competition that was not to be 
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swayed by issues of national broadcasting policy being more closely focussed on 
the EU Commission’s agenda of competitive re-regulation.   
 
Furthermore if DTT was to offer any networked digital services than they would 
be overseen primarily by the ODTR. Through the power vested in it, via EU 
licensing directive 97/13/EC, the ODTR had the ability to, 
  
'limit the number of individual licences for any category of 
telecommunications services and for the establishment and/or operation of 
telecommunications infrastructure, only to the extent required to ensure the 
efficient use of radio frequencies or for the time necessary to make 
available sufficient numbers in accordance with community law' 26.  
 
For the ODTR the spectrum released by DTT would not be efficiently used in a 
DTT broadband system, but instead would be set aside for future mobile 
telecoms usage. In addition to this, if the ODTR were to allow the Digico model to 
carry broadband services, it would have to impose the licensing conditions of the 
EU directive which would have altered the proposed licensing of the Digico entity 
as an integrated model. The EU directive required that, 
 
'Member states shall grant such individual licences on the basis of selection 
criteria which must be objective, non-discriminatory, detailed, transparent 
and proportionate. Any such selection must give due weight to the need to 
facilitate the development of competition and to maximise benefit to users'. 
  
In following these criteria the ODTR would not tolerate the giving away of what it 
saw as a telecoms licence as envisaged in the original Digico model. The 
bundling of telecoms spectrum resource with the physical network, as part of the 
assets to be sold to the Digico entity, would not be 'detailed or 'transparent'. On 
the other hand if the Digico licence maintained a data cap, the ODTR had no 
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reason to get involved in these matters. The ability of the ODTR to now 
determine the spectrum usage for telecommunications use was to become an 
issue throughout the attempted launch of both DTT models. Whereas this 
possible restriction appears not to have registered at departmental level, RTE 
was overtly aware of its consequences for a broadband model for DTT.  
 
Etain Doyle, the then Director of Telecommunications, suggested that the 
technological capacity of the DTT model had been 'greatly oversold' 27. Within 
RTE, the capability of the DTT broadband dimension was also under dispute. A 
senior figure in the network division of RTE subsequently suggested that 
whereas the technology would undoubtedly catch up, there were serious doubts 
in RTE about the capability of both the WINDS/WITNESS systems and its 
potential cost28. In general the architecture of the transmission system was not 
compatible with a return path. The terrestrial transmission system for 
broadcasting is primarily designed for reaching large areas over a long distance 
and not coming back. A return path would require a short return distance to many 
small cells within a short distance from a central transmitter. Ray Maguire who 
was a member of the internal RTE digital project group also suggests that the 
broadband element was always questionable29. Maguire suggests that the kind of 
broadband services that would have been rolled out would have been 'minimalist' 
and incomparable to cable and satellite in terms of capacity and functionality. 
Liam Miller, the senior executive charged with managing RTE’s digital policy, 
suggested mid 1999 that there was an;  
 
'absence of any compelling business plan which would advocate devoting a 
significant capacity within the DTT platform to Data/Internet applications. 
RTE's proposal to government always fundamentally recognised that, in the 
area of competing digital platforms, DTT and digital satellite are primarily 
television delivery vehicles' (IT). 
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These negative assessments were countered by the arguments by the RTE 
engineering team. According to Branagan, the initial winds/witness system would 
probably be unable to deliver the kind of broadband access that users demand, 
but there was very little else that would sell the DTT platform as satellite already 
dominated the pay-tv market. The subsequent collapse of the OnDigital pay DTT 
model in the UK and its subsequent reformulation as Freeview appeared to 
support this assessment. In the UK, OnDigital was experiencing the limitations of 
demand for pay/subscription services and the monopolistic position of BSkyB in 
this regard. According to Branagan, even when the Winds/Witness system was in 
doubt, he argued to RTE executives that 'it was the underlying asset value of the 
spectrum and sites that would over time be able to deliver broadband' and RTE 
should retain involvement in the Digico entity on this basis. Developments in the 
technological capacity of wireless broadband had convinced Branagan that this 
was the way forward, though it meant usurping much of the received wisdom that 
wired networks would deliver the information society. The technological and 
regulatory issues had, however, raised doubts in the minds of RTE executives. 
This doubt over the viability of a DTT business model was re-enforced by the 
many time delays that also cast doubt over the multichannel business model. 
 
6.4) Governance failure 
For many in RTE, the profitability of the Digico model lay in its ability to offer 
multichannel subscription television. Unlike the OnDigital model in the UK, Digico 
would have the added driver of the UK free to air channels on a pay tier whereas 
BskyB had, by 1998, yet to fully launch and market its service in Ireland. Thus 
Digico would offer a basic service that would compete with the cable companies 
and open up the possibilities of offering added pay services to a large majority of 
the population. RTE would achieve buoyancy by being involved in the national 
subscription/pay tv platform. However, the timing of the launch of this model was 
paramount. The ODTR had engaged Nera Smyth consultants in 1998 to oversee 
the potential market for competitive television delivery platforms. It suggested 
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that DTT would only be successful if it established a quick diffusion taking first 
mover advantage30. This advantage was gradually being eroded with the full 
entry of BskyB into the market in 1998 and the ambitious roll out plans being 
touted by the now multinational owned cable companies. Branagan suggests 
that, as time went by before the announcement of government support for Digico 
in July 1998, and further delays in drawing up legislation, combined with the 
internal turmoil of finding a transaction agreement, RTE was beginning to see 
less and less potential in the Digico model. In its dealings with the government it 
was sensing a mismatch between its own business model for DTT and the 
emerging public policy demands of the Information Society Commission. 
Although Branagan was potentially aggrieved at the potential ditching of his 
broadband baby with the Digico bathwater, he suggests that by mid 1999 senior 
executives in RTE were primarily concerned with the cash profit it could realise in 
the constitution of the Digico entity, as opposed to having a long term strategic 
interest in the diffusion of the platform. This was in fact, for RTE, a potential 
opening for government to ensure its access to funds via its allocation of 
potentially disposable assets in the Digico model. Such allocations had occurred 
in both Sweden and Finland and were crucial in ensuring resources for public 
broadcaster’s strategies for entering multiplatform multichannel digital markets.   
 
The period of delay that reduced the likely viability of the DTT platform is 
accounted for in multivariate ways. RTE had begun its mediation on the 
digitalisation process as far back as 1979 and returned to it periodically in various 
publications and annual reports31. It had opted to anticipate the market 
governance tendencies of the new government, or, as it proposed, the issues 
raised by the emphases of 'domestic growth, deregulation and competition law' 
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32. To this extent it accommodated itself to the developing European led 
consensus on liberalised convergence, that is, convergence led by market 
structures and commercial investment. However, the broadcasting department, 
the Department of Arts Heritage Gaeltacht and the Islands (DAHGI) appeared 
unconcerned with processing the overall changes in the communications sector. 
Given the previous broadcasting minister's proclivity to form the Irish 
Broadcasting Commission to manage the overall digital transition, the 
Department now appeared divorced from the European level negotiation of 
liberalised convergence.  
 
In the absence of the Broadcasting ministry's full appreciation of the European 
moves towards a convergence lead policy agenda, it had been the Department of 
Public Enterprise that filled this vacuum. The Department of Public Enterprise 
(DPE) gave Irelands' official response to the European Commission 1997 green 
paper ‘Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information 
Technology Sector, the Implications for Regulation'. The department that had 
overseen the liberalisation of the telecoms sector through the statutory regulator, 
the ODTR, showed itself to be aligned to the re-regulatory zeal of DGXIII, which 
was also working within a telecoms frame of reference in relation to 
convergence. In its response to the green paper the DPE declared that;  
 
'any regulation in this area should ensure, above all, that market forces are 
allowed to generate and respond to demand. The principles on which such 
regulation should be based are those which have been successfully used in 
the process of liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, i.e. ensuring 
competition and access to markets through the EU treaty's competition 
rules and the application of the principle of open network provision in 
relation to access to the service delivery system'33.   
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Further to this the DPE suggested that ' 'in relation to the issue of market entry, it 
is recommended that the broad principles of full competition and open network 
access as used to liberalise the telecoms sector should be applied to new 
entrants to the broadcasting sector in particular'. The DPE was working within its 
telecoms frame of reference with seemingly no understanding of the economics 
of the integrated broadcasting sector or the potential sensitivities of a small 
nation with limited GDP to market fragmentation. Whereas in telecoms, service 
delivery could be opened up to as many operators as are willing to invest, there 
is no issues relating to the symbolic content of that delivery, being mostly private 
voice and image data. In broadcasting, the number of service providers is related 
to the need for economies of scale plus dependable access to attractive content. 
The multiplication of platforms in a relatively small market fragments access to 
premium content whereas the decreasing economies of scale and increasing 
new entrants in content provision fragments the revenue potential of each 
content producer. In general the DPE appeared to assume that convergence 
could be introduced along the same lines of telecoms liberalisation without 
appreciating the dynamics or peculiar economics of the broadcasting sector in 
Ireland and the particular policy goals of DTT. It was working on a model of 
service delivery that had no frame of reference for the symbolic content or the 
mode of communication and its economic base, which, the service was designed 
to deliver. Thus at European level the broadcasting ministry (and thus the 
Government) had failed to articulate the particular or peculiar needs of the 
broadcasting sector in a small country operating in the shadow of liberalised and 
internationalising neighbouring markets. It appeared to be following policy 
dvelopments in a reactionary capacity, whereas the DPE, and the ODTR, were 
both participating in the developing European consensus on liberalised 
convergence. The ODTR, in securing Nera Smyth to oversee a major study of 
potential television distribution systems had, to a certain degree, pre-empted the 
development of a UK style liberalised system. Nera/Smyth had been engaged by 
the UK government and was already working within the 'competition based' 
frame of reference. Whereas platform competition had emerged from the various 
Chapter Six 
 
188 
 
network interests and the UK's lead in this area, the technocratic approach to 
these platforms had arisen within the telecoms regulators. The approach seemed 
to appease all those interests that had fashioned the market convergent 
approach within the DVB, and were looking for a direct line, with minimum 
regulation, to the consumer.          
 
The Department of Arts Gaelteacht Heritage and the Islands had to contend with 
the extension of the DPE/ODTR'S competence into the area of network provision 
of broadcasting, via European policy, yet appeared to disengage with it and the 
framework in which it operated. The DPE/ODTR for its part was primarily 
interested in introducing competition into what it saw as convergent 
communications markets that need not necessarily favour one mode of delivery 
or one set of services over another. Thus a DTT operator could primarily provide 
competition in the multichannel market, but not necessarily in the wireless 
broadband market, and cable could provide competition in fixed line telecoms 
markets and continue in multichannel markets in order to fund network roll out 34. 
Thus the ODTR’s approach to convergence did not necessarily emphasise parity 
amongst platforms but a carefully instituted competition within markets. There 
was no concern here for the public policy issue of maintaining a public service 
provision in DTT with enough resources to remain active in influencing the 
developing broadcasting environment nor indeed any consideration of how 
content of local origination was going to appear on the multiplicity of digital 
networks. 
 
By the time of the European Commission’s 1999 communication ‘Towards a 
Frameworks Directive', the ODTR was already working within the developed 
paradigm at European level35 . From the beginning of the legislative process, to 
establish DTT, internal correspondences demonstrate that the ODTR was 
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consistently in contact with the DAGHI although the attempt at coordination was 
not returned. Three months after the DAGHI had announced its intention to 
formulate new legislation, the ODTR sent a memo to the Department outlining its 
responsibility for the economic regulation of all platforms. Thus the ODTR would 
licence the new Digico entity and would be responsible for any 
telecommunications services that were operated across that platform as well as 
overseeing certain technological aspects such as CAS, EPG and API use that 
may lead to competition issues36. The ODTR was empowered to impose certain 
conditions on the DAGHI in relation to the probity of the licensing of the DTT 
model in respect to the relationship between the multiplex licence and the 
transmission licence and the transfer of RTE licences to the new body. Whereas 
it noted the potential for conflict of interests and objections from the commercial 
sector in relation to the integrated Digico model it did not object to this model per 
se. What is revealed in the correspondence between the ODTR and the DAGHI 
is the degree to which the regulator was to assert its independence of action 
whilst also adhering to the European Commission’s perspective on digital 
development, regardless of Government/Broadcasting generated public policy. 
The regulator was keen to keep the DAGHI within the bounds of the developing 
legal, technical and regulatory issues circulating at EU level in relation to the 
liberalised model of convergence. In light of this it is notable that the Department 
did not consult the Regulator in the framing of the 1999 Broadcasting Bill until the 
bill was at a relatively advanced stage. Even then it was only under exhortations 
from the regulator37 . The broadcasting Minister, Sile De Valera, appeared wary 
of the influence of the ODTR but also seemingly unaware of the horizontal EU 
approach that it represented. She was later to declare her intention of minimising 
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the degree of overlap between her Department and the ODTR 38. However, the 
Minister was too late to address the EU consensus that the regulator now 
represented. Whereas her department had initiated an information share with 
both Finland and Denmark in relation to their approach to DTT, there was no 
attempt to influence developments at European level. Closer co-ordination with 
the ODTR at this stage could have allowed a fuller appreciation of issues such as 
the data cap on the Digico's broadband output and the competition issues arising 
out of the licensing of spectrum resources, governments like to refer to as joined 
up government. As it stands it was only the Departments consultants that 
initiated contact with the ODTR. Closer departmental co-ordination could have 
sped up the drafting of the 1999 broadcasting bill as the late consultation with the 
ODTR entailed significant re-drafting in areas of technical, regulatory and 
competition issues, issues which the Department was not familiar with. The bill 
was to be at preparation stage for the ten months between July 1998 and May 
1999. This was not the 'speedy and effective' introduction that had been 
promised at the beginning of those ten months.      
  
The bill was to stall in journey to an act due to other occurrences both inside and 
outside the Dail. Before the drawing up of the legislation, Michael D. Higgins had 
initiated a private members bill which sought to introduce limitations on the 
ongoing concentration of ownership within Irish media whilst also seeking to 
implement the TVWF directive in relation to the listing of events of national 
importance to remain on free to air television. Both Fine Gael and Labour were to 
vote together on this issue but were less united on the issues surrounding the 
1999 Broadcasting Bill. Whereas Fine Gael accepted the form of the Digico 
entity, Labour was suspicious of the public private entity, seeing it as a route to 
complete privatisation of the terrestrial platform39. Such a development would 
have been consonant with the privatisation of telecommunications and cable 
infrastructure which the Department of Public Enterprise had initiated en-route to 
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liberalisation. Again the DAGHI was proving itself unreceptive to external input as 
the various select committee meetings culminating in a ‘special report on digital 
broadcasting’ amounted, in one committee member’s opinion, to 'a complete 
waste of time'. The fact that broadcasting policy was now being developed 
almost completely by consultancy groups meant that the Minister responsible for 
Broadcasting had little actual involvement in generating decisive policy. In turn 
the Minister herself had deferred to her special advisor, Michael Ronayne, in 
relation to shifting important governance issues to external consultants. In 
general, the turn to market governance was met with a turn to market expertise in 
the form of consultancy expertise brought into the process of policy making. Such 
expertise lay outside of the political domain. At this point the internalised nature 
of the policy community meant that alternative approaches involving consultation 
with wider broadcasting interests were also neglected. By extension, the other 
organs of the legislature, such as the Select Committee, were almost redundant.  
Michael D Higgins, leading Labours opposition to the bill suggested that RTE 
'were so eager to placate the minister in expectation of a television licence fee 
rise' that they offered a public private model. According to Higgins 'what I saw 
with the establishment of Digico (was that) there was no way that company would 
have stayed a public company’. Higgins questioned the appropriateness of the 
selling off of a public property and the motivation of RTE in such a sale. On this 
basis Labour attempted to impede the passage of the bill through the Dail and 
Special Committee stage. However, both opposition parties, it could be argued, 
were working along outdated paradigms in relation to the future ownership of a 
strategic and profitable technological infrastructure. Whereas the question was 
certainly one of where the public interest lay in relation to the ownership of the 
transmission technology, the gateway no longer existed purely in the 
transmission network but had moved to the set top box. This key site of 
development for potential public purpose was not receiving the same degree of 
political attention.  
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During the debates surrounding the 1999 Broadcasting Bill a tangled series of 
events was to see the Digico model undone and RTE’s overall participation in the 
revised entity reduced. At the time the Minister told the Dail, 'difficulties have 
arisen in the process of establishing a DTT entity as originally envisaged...RTE 
had a genuine difficulty with regard to the implementation of DTT'40. Objections 
from both inside and outside Dail Eireann pointed to the ideological forces 
moving to privatise the transmission system in line with the government’s market 
liberal tendencies or the Ministers lack of direction in broadcasting matters41. 
However, the actual events gave credence to all of these assertions. The Project 
Management Group co-ordinated the regulatory, legal, technological and 
business modelling which it hoped would secure the early take off of the DTT 
platform. The business model, technical detail and transaction structure where 
being driven by the government’s consultants AIB Corporate Finance, Mathew 
Ormsby Prentice and NERA/Smyth. In the original government plan RTE was to 
be separated from its transmission network and receive up to 40% share in the 
new joint venture company. The company would be responsible for the 'existing 
analogue radio and television transmission business and other third party 
services, ensure the creation and operation of a six multiplex national DTT 
service and provide DAB services for radio’42. The correspondence between the 
various members of the project management group and their respective advisers 
indicate that the development of the Digio model was relatively consenusal until 
decisions regarding the transaction structure were addressed. How the 
percentage of RTE’s holding in the Digico model would be calculated proved to 
be the key issue on which the unitary Digico model was to perish.  
 
AIB Corporate Finance (AIBCF) had been engaged by the government to 
oversee the transaction structure and therefore evaluate the percentage share 
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RTE would have in the new company. From its early correspondence with the 
department on this matter it indicated that it had a very clear view on how this 
was to be achieved. It outlined its evaluation criteria as follows: 
 
'We consider that the valuation of the network business should be 
calculated using the net cash flows arising from the analogue transmission 
contracts, the digital transmission contracts and the third party revenues 
(e.g. eircell, esat), discounted at an appropriate rate to reflect the 
uncertainty in relation to cash flows. Digico's role as a multiplex operator 
should not form any part of the valuation of the transmission network as its 
value derives from the fact that the minister is designating Digico'. 43     
 
Thus AIBCF suggested that RTE should not benefit from the value attached to 
the multiplex licences that would be sold as part of the overall Digico business. 
An internal letter between two DAGHI officials confirms that this was also their 
reading of the situation, as follows; 'in determining the value that should accrue to 
RTE, as a result of the transaction, I indicated that my view was that a hard line 
approach should be taken initially. Accordingly I felt that cash flows relating to the 
analogue transmission business and the third party revenues only should be 
taken into account in determining the value of the RTE network business' 44. 
Whereas these correspondences occurred in July 1999, it appears that this 
position was not to be related to RTE until late September, two months later.  
 
When the matter had been clarified to RTE, it indicated through its own 
consultants, Arthur D. Little (ADL) that it found this approach unacceptable. In 
general RTE asserted that the potential for the multiplex business rested on the 
existing infrastructure and the expertise and personnel which it would transfer to 
the new company, and that this had been RTE’s understanding of the transaction 
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mechanism all along. It was now concerned that negotiations were now taking 
place outside the realms of the project management group 45.  AIBCF argued that 
there was now only one satisfactory approach that would allow a licence for a 
unitary business model to be auctioned. The value of the network would be pre-
determined and all bids above that value would relate to the value placed on the 
multiplex business46. In addition to its concern about not realising the overall 
profit of the Digico sale, RTE now also had issues with the way in which AIBCF 
sought to calculate RTE’s shareholding in the joint venture. AIBCF proposed 
contrary to RTE’s expectations, a system known as ‘net book value’ that reduced 
the networks expected value. Instead of realising market value AIBCF proposed 
a valuation mechanism based only on the then current income streams of the 
transmission network. This valuation mechanism appeared to be structured so as 
to ensure the lowest possible value for the network 47. Instead, RTE argued, the 
network valuation should take into account projected future earnings that would 
no doubt be a large part of any calculations in an open market bid. RTE argued 
that the gains to RTE from its proposed method of transaction (receipt of all 
monies bid and a valuation of the latent value of the network) would bolster it in 
its public policy role of making DTT a success as the national platform, that is, it 
was reasonable to assume that profits channelled into RTE would ensure it ability 
to offer attractive content on the platform 48. However, RTE was to get little 
sympathy for these arguments as AIBCF countered that they 'would be strongly 
opposed to a structure which determines RTE’s shareholding in Digico as a 
function of Digico's capital requirements' 49.  
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RTE had to make a decision regarding its proposed role in the new entity. At this 
juncture, according to Branagan, RTE had already decided that its strategic 
interest in being integrated into the Digico model was increasingly redundant. It 
had issues with the developing business model, its proposed share of the Digico 
entity was being pared down even before AIBCF revealed the transaction 
structure, and, it was not convinced that the regulatory, technical or commercial 
conditions existed for the developing business model that involved a full multiplex 
dedicated to broadband delivery. The decision not to allow RTE profit from the 
overall Digico sale, the reduced valuation of its network, the calls for a 
percentage of the potential share by the network division staff all suggested a 
situation wherein RTE was now not going to reap financial rewards from the 
proposed model of transaction 50. If the broadcaster was to have a positive 
impact on the public policy side of Digico, it would have to be well resourced to 
do so. Even operating outside the Digico/Digital entity, RTE understood that, with 
the profusion of platforms and services, it now needed significant resources 
gains to maintain its existing public purposes in broadcasting. Following intense 
negotiation and diplomatic efforts on the broadcaster’s part it decided to withdraw 
its support for the unitary model of Digico. The withdrawal from the Digico unitary 
model and the ensuing efforts to develop a new dual entity was to put the 
platform development plans back by another seven months.    
 
There are issues raised by this episode in relation to both strategic and public 
interest agendas related to the digital transition. In the public sphere, the Minister 
suggested that RTE could not be allowed the proceeds of the overall Digico 
licence sale because it could be construed as state aid. That is, if RTE was to 
profit from the multiplex licences which it did not own, this could be construed as 
state aid by the European Competition directorate. However, if such state aid 
was construed as aid in the general interest and considered proportionate to 
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public policy objectives pertaining to RTE’s role in Digico, this issue would not 
have arose. Legal advice to the PMG had advised this to be the case. In an 
internal memo, one of the appointed consultant groups, NERA, suggested that 
any such claims to state aid could potentially be contested. Under the heading of 
State Aid Rules, the consultants suggested that, first, in relation to bundling the 
licence with the infrastructure; 
 
If a third party such as the European Commission could show that the state 
has directly or indirectly channelled resources to Digico either for free or 
without the prospect of a reasonable return, then there would be a prima 
facie case for illegal state aid. This is subject to the important caveat: the 
third party would still have to show that any such aid is capable of distorting 
trade between member states. This may not be so easy to prove as one 
might think at first. We are dealing with the market for terrestrial television 
transmission and it could be argued that this is essentially a national market 
and that there is no competition or even potential competition between 
member states in this market. If the effect of the aid is only to distort 
competition in trade within a member state then the treaty rules on state aid 
do not apply. (NERA, 1999).   
 
The consultant also advised that any benefit to RTE from its share in Digico 
would amount to state aid to RTE as a broadcaster, not to Digico, ‘the market 
distorting effect would be felt in the broadcasting market rather than the 
transmission market’ (Nera, 1999). This arguably would have brought the state 
aid within the remit of the Amsterdam protocol wherein the benefit could have 
been justified as aid in the general interest related to RTE’s role in the digital 
transition. Policy options of this kind do not appear to have been considered by 
the PMG, which was made up of both RTE and department officials. In general, 
RTE’s role in the Digico entity was seen as quid pro quo for the exchange of its 
transmission network. RTE, for its part, appeared to have lost interest in public 
policy goals that were not accompanied by the adequate resources to achieve 
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them. It had already developed a sceptical attitude towards the new media 
aspects of the new platform. As such it sought to strengthen its presence in 
digital multichannel markets, no longer seeing it as a public interest objective to 
develop the terrestrial platform. This course of action was in no doubt linked to its 
precarious financial position which had in part arisen from being overburdened 
with public policy whilst under-resourced to oversee its public service mandate. 
In 2000, RTE’s broadcasting division had made losses of £18.37 million and the 
ratio of revenue from commercial sources relative to public funding stood at a 
ratio of 2:1. According to a Zenith Media report of 2000, ‘converting a broad 
sample of of Western European TV licences into Irish punts illustrates that 
Ireland’s TV licence fee of IR£70 is one of the lowest in Western Europe, the 
average within he sample is £118.76’ (Zenith Media, 2000).  
 
In short RTE needed DTT to provide the resources that successive governments 
had failed to channel towards it, and Fianna Fail had, in the early 1990s, 
channelled away from it (see previous chapter). RTE had to be certain that the 
DTT platform would be a revenue-generating venture. The government, for its 
part appeared unconcerned with making a political decision, linked to an 
understanding of public policy goals, in RTE’s favour. If finance minister Charlie 
McCreevy had been at loggerheads with the ODTR in relation to how much the 
exchequer should profit from the upcoming auction of 3g licences, there was 
plenty of reason to speculate that a maximisation of the government’s yield from 
the DTT licence was also sought. In a low corporation tax economy, 
maximisation of resources from privatisations is one way of boosting the public 
coffers. For its part AIBCF appeared to treat the government as a client in this 
respect, ensuring that the transaction structure would maximise the revenue to 
the public finances without considering the public policy objectives associated 
with resourcing the public broadcaster in this matter. Correspondences between 
AIBCF and the DAGHI officials illustrate that it was providing advice in a dual 
manner, advising the departmental members of the Project Management Group 
both in their capacity as members of that group and as department officials 
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responsible to the Minister. In addition, the valuation placed on the RTE network 
was so unfeasibly low that it would maximise the percentage of the bid that could 
be attributed to the multiplex licences which, as AIBCF had made clear, would 
accrue to public finances. It is likely that a more buoyant evaluation of RTE’s 
transmission network, based on the high investor interest in telecommunications 
and the parallel interest in 3g licences, would have financed RTE’s involvement 
while ensuring the timely launch of the platform. In general terms, strategic 
manoeuvring by all parties appeared to have allowed public interest objectives 
disappear from the agenda. Control of the terrestrial set top box, which had 
become a new gateway in broadcasting, was to be sold off to corporate interests 
with no element of positive intervention or public sector participation involved in 
its development.    
 
6.5) Interest group pressure 
These developments did not occur in a vacuum. The policy community involved 
in broadcasting had changed dramatically in this period due to both processes of 
liberalisation and liberalised convergence. The European Commission Green 
Paper and the responses to it indicated the changing balance of actors in the 
sector as marketisation was more firmly embedded. In the Irish context, the as 
yet disparate cable companies and telecoms operators were sufficiently 
encouraged by emerging European competition legislation to pursue the 
government over any perceived special treatment of the terrestrial platform. The 
interests involved in this sector were later to form themselves into the Telecoms 
and Internet Federation (TIF) within the Irish Business and Economic 
Confederation (IBEC). Those involved in screen content production were already 
organised under the umbrella groups of Screen Producers Ireland (SPI) and the 
Audiovisual Federation within IBEC. In the preparation for digital, co-horts within 
these interest groups found a strategic consonance in the DPE/ODTR axis in 
relation to the potential levelling of competition between network providers and 
the opening up of distribution systems to myriad content services. The potential 
of developing the sector as an element of emerging internationally traded 
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services, as articulated by Enterprise Ireland, emphasised the role of 
decentralised digital content producers more flexibly attuned to opportunities in 
international markets (DPE, 2000). This shift of attention away from the inflexible 
integrated broadcasters of the past appeared to offer a rolling forward of a 
market structure that would benefit these content producers. Once again the 
paradigm of Bangemann style convergence was part of both popular and 
professional rhetoric at this point in time. Yet these groupings were not involved 
in the development of the Digico model leading to a degree of suspicion 
regarding the developing model. At this point, according to the then spokesman 
for SPI not many in the industry supported RTE having a role in infrastructure 
development seeing it as a distraction from its core business of content 
production.   
 
The liberalisation of the broadcasting sector had created a more focussed lobby 
group intent on limiting RTE’s dominance at all points in the emerging 
competitive value chain. This lobby group, organised first as AIRS, later to 
become Independent Broadcasters of Ireland (IBI) with the addition of TV3, 
raised its profile in the Digico episode. TV3 and its prime shareholder, Can West, 
had already expressed unease regarding RTE’s role in the Digico entity. Mark 
Deering the then director of TV3 suggested that Digico sought to 'perpetuate and 
increase the dominance of RTE'51. This sentiment was echoed by Willie Fagan of 
the recently consolidated cable company Irish Multichannel (later Chorus) who 
suggested that 'the establishment of Digico as proposed will create an uneven 
playing field by allowing RTE, a broadcaster recently required to sell its share in 
Cablelink, to re-enter the transmission market with a large share in a 
monopoly'52. When the disagreement over the transaction structure in relation to 
the selling of Digico came to light, TV3 cautioned that 'the European Commission 
might not view it favourably. You could claim that it would be in effect state aid to 
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 Kenny, C. 'Reality bites in RTE', Sunday Independent, 05/12/99 
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RTE'53 . TV3 had organised the intense lobbying by the IBI, now increasingly 
concerned that Digico may become the umbrella project for developing Digital 
Audio Broadcasting. The IBI engaged the services of a lobbying firm and a 
competition lawyer to put pressure on RTE’s involvement in Digico. The lobbying 
had inevitably filtered through to the Dail debates wherein the Broadcasting 
minister was to be confronted with representations from the independent 
broadcasters by a number of her own backbenchers. Running in tandem with 
these tactics TV3 had in early 1999 lodged a complaint regarding RTE to the 
Competition Directorate of the European Commission claiming RTE was in fact in 
receipt of state aid, through its non specified use of licence fee and its 'non 
market priced based' access to the national transmission network54. The position 
of the directorate on the status of mixed funding public broadcasters was not at 
this point clear and therefore neither was the Government understanding of its 
own position. Internal documentation indicates that the move by TV3 served to 
unnerve the Department in relation to the issue of state aid to RTE. Against this 
backdrop of pressure the department had decided that RTE’s right to a digital 
yield was not a battle that they had the will to fight for. The contested position of 
RTE in this increasingly marketised broadcasting landscape was only to be 
addressed in the 2002 Forum on Broadcasting 55.  
 
6.6) Dis-integrated DTT  
The failure of the Digico model was not, however, the end of the governments 
push for DTT, or the end of the public broadcasters involvement in the platform. 
The deal reached in June 2000 meant that RTE would no longer have a role in 
the multiplex side of the DTT operation (Muxco) but would put its transmission 
entity out to market, retaining a 28% share in the new transmission company 
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 O'Sullivan, R. 'Difficulties for RTE's efforts to get 40% share of digital television', Irish Times 
4/03/00 
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 Letter from the Commission of the European Communities to the Permanent Representation 
of Ireland to the EU re: complaint about state funding granted by Ireland to RTE and TnaG 
27/04/99 (DCMNR ).  
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 The Forum on Broadcasting was established in 2002 to advise the minster on structural 
developments in Irish broadcasting and is dealt with in the following chapter.  
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(Netco). The whole sequence of events had been debated in the Dail with Fine 
Gael proposing a no confidence motion in the Minister at the end of March 2000 
'out of a sense of deep frustration and uncertainty created by the inept handling 
of the broadcasting bill' 56. The Joint Committee on broadcasting made an 
attempt to return the Bill to the Dail so that the changes could be debated in open 
session. However the amended legislation was to return to the Dail at report 
stage having travelled through committee stage. The Broadcasting Act as it 
appeared in 2001 had only changed in relation to the proposed structure and 
ownership of the DTT entity, but yet, had taken another 12 months before 
entering into legislation. The multiplex licence and the transmission licence could 
now be sold off as separate entities, although there was nothing to prevent 
ownership of both licences by the one company. The Act was widely enabling in 
relation to the potential functionality of the DTT platform and its responsibility 'to 
promote the development of multimedia services, and to promote the 
development of electronic information services, including those provided by 
means of the internet'57. Further to this the Act asserted that: 
 
'Subject to subsection (3) and (6), nothing in this section shall be 
construed as preventing the multiplex company from using one or more of 
the multiplexes for the purpose of providing electronic information services 
in accordance with the requirements (if any) imposed by any enactment 
relating to the provision of services concerned which is for the time being 
in force' 
 
Against this background, the ODTR was to return to the drafting of two separate 
licences for the new DTT model. Within a week the ODTR had assembled the 
terms for the new licensing regime58.  
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The Department opted to award the multiplex licence through a mixture of an 
auction and what had become known in telecoms’ terms as a 'beauty contest'. A 
new steering committee emerged made up of the officials from the DAGHI, the 
Department of Finance, the Department of Public Enterprise and the ODTR, 
retaining AIB corporate finance as the financial advisers. RTE elected to put its 
network to the market engaging the services of Rothschild. Rothschild 
subsequently issued an information memorandum to interested parties. However, 
the situation had dramatically changed with the telecoms and internet slump of 
2000. The kind of ‘animal spirits’ that had led to RTE and Telecom Eireann’s 
cable infrastructure being sold for £525 million were now nowhere in evidence. 
According to one government source 'the opportunity to make a major windfall 
out of this is long gone'59. In addition to this OnDigital, the DTT platform in the 
UK, had shown the first signs of difficulty that was eventually to lead it into 
receivership60. In the shake out that inevitably follows a bubble, the search for 
investors with credible business models for DTT was to prove difficult. In the bids 
for the DTT licences, one thing became clear, RTE was not the only operator to 
see the economic value lying principally in the transmission structure. Initial bids 
for the its network came from 'leading operators in the transmission and tower 
management industries and private equity firms', namely Crown Castle, Spectra 
Site, American Tower, TDF and a number of mobile phone network operators61. 
The only bid to emerge for the multiplex licence was from Irish company Its TV 
that had been formed by the former RTE chief engineer Peter Branagan. 
Branagan brought with him three other staff from RTE and had put together both 
a financial package and a business model for the Muxco licence. Unsurprisingly, 
as in the original Digico model, the platform was to rely on both multichannel and 
broadband offerings for revenue generation. According to Branagan the 
multichannel business was too low margin while carriage fees were expensive as 
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were the necessary set top box subsidies. Added to this the entry of BSkyB into 
the DTH multichannel market in 1997 meant that the margin of households open 
to subscribing to a multichannel service was becoming ever narrower. Irish 
policymakers still, however, appeared wedded to the UK competitive 
multichannel model of DTV.   In the Its Tv business model, affordable broadband 
would be the key driver whereas a lower amount of channels combined with 
lower power multiplexes would bring down the break even number in relation to 
subscribers whilst also lowering the peak funding requirement. In addition to this 
the broadband offer would compensate for the relatively low resource base that 
makes the developing economics of value added digital television channels 
inappropriate for Ireland. The potential for more significant Irish content in new 
media offerings would also sell the broadband model.  
 
In the wake of the 2001 Broadcasting Act the ODTR had initiated a consultation 
regarding the new split-licensing framework for DTT. In the consultation 
document the ODTR had changed its position in relation to the data cap, but not 
enough to be substantially different. The consultation document stated that; 
  
'while DTT is primarily intended as a platform for the delivery of television 
services, the Director recognises its usefulness as a vehicle for the 
extension of the information society.... A data cap of up to 20% of each 
multiplex at any one time, subject to an aggregate maximum of 15% over a 
24-hour period will apply to additional services'62.  
 
In the follow up to the responses to the consultation document, following appeals 
from some of the respondents, the ODTR elected to move the aggregate 
maximum from 15%to 20%63. For Its TV the data cap was proving to be an 
obstacle in attempting to raise the requisite financial backing for AIBCF’s auction 
criteria. ItsTV had managed to raise £45 million on the basis of a broadband DTT 
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model from US venture capital group Delta Finance, but was unable to access it 
unless the ODTR changed the licence restriction to reflect the conditions of the 
Broadcasting Act. At this point the broad communicative consequences of 
liberalised convergence had been absorbed at governmental level and following 
an election which returned the FF/PD coalition, the DAGHI and the ODTR were 
brought within the sway of a consolidated Department for Communications.   
What was now the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources (DCMNR) was of the mind that the Broadcasting Act took precedence 
over the ODTR draft licence and attempted to facilitate a change in the licensing 
conditions. The DCMNR was itself under pressure from the Information Society 
Commission to resolve what was considered an important element of public 
policy in relation to the elaboration of knowledge-based economy policies 64. The 
arrival of the BBC's Free sat model was also to increase the pressure coming 
from Irish broadcasters looking for a DTT platform to counter mass migration to a 
non-domestic digital platform65.  
 
In July 2002 a meeting took place between Its TV, AIB corporate finance, the 
DCMNR and the ODTR. At the meeting Its Tv made their demands clear in 
relation to the draft regulation licence published a year previously. Its TV outlined 
the following areas: 
1. Removal of the cap on the percentage of non-programme related data 
that may be carried on a multiplex; 
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2. One dedicated multiplex to be permitted for the carriage of internet and 
telephony. Up to five other multiplexes to be used for the carriage of TV 
programme services; 
3. Use of the digital terrestrial RF return channel to be specifically permitted 
in the licence to facilitate interactive television, broadband and telephony 
services. 
 
When the DCMNR pushed the issue further following an inconclusive end to the 
meeting, the ODTR's response was that 'the licence for the sixth data multiplex 
would also be subject to the EU licensing directive 97/13/EC and specifically 
article 10 which deals with the limitations on the number of licences'66. In general 
the ODTR were claiming that an extra licence for wireless broadband would not 
be efficient use of the spectrum resource. In an ironic turn, the spectrum which 
was to be released by the digitalisation of analogue broadcasting was not going 
to be made available to aid in releasing that spectrum in the first place, because 
it belonged to a separate market, which at that point in time, did not exist.  
Further to this the technocratic market driven rationale of the ODTR, as 
translated from European network regulation, informed its segmentation of 
markets along criteria that ignored public policy in relation to the development of 
a national digital platform and the increase of broadband availability via a 
converged DTT model. Elsewhere the ODTR had revealed its rationale in this 
matter suggesting that the introduction of 3G mobile services would create a 
progressive need for increased spectrum access67. The independent regulator 
was working on the basis of instituting markets relative to potential new media 
developments in mobile technology development. 
 
For RTE, the continuing failure to find a multiplex operator was having a number 
of influences on its now revised broadcasting strategy. Having been granted a 
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'derisory' licence fee rise in 2001 and suffering from the advertising downturn of 
that year , the implementation of a costly re-structuring plan and increased 
competition from commercial broadcasters, the need for a cash injection was 
now palpable. However, the failure to find a multiplex operator ensured that the 
sale of the network also stalled. Added to this the failure to launch a national 
platform meant that RTE was now haemorrhaging advertising potential to the, by 
now, leading digital platform of BSkyB, which was by then received in over 
220,000 household68. In April 2002 RTE announced its plans to join the satellite 
platform acknowledging the by now institutionalised European preference for 
platform neutrality in distribution. Its earlier plans to launch three additional digital 
television channels had been predicated on a potential windfall from the Digico 
transaction. According to Gerry Mc Carthy, the chief architect of the digital 
channels, the channels were always considered as pure public service and were 
designed to mainly enhance the public service profile of the original platform, 
following the emerging model of channel expansion and closer thematisation as 
a response to multichannel competition. They were not designed as commercial 
channels but as a public service driver for DTT 69. Ray Maguire of the digital 
development team suggests that following the Digico debacle, RTE no longer 
had the projected cash reserves to 'even to begin to think about channel 
expansion'. This apparent contradiction in government policy, i.e. the need to 
launch a DTT platform to release spectrum and the consistent under resourcing 
of one of the potential drivers of DTT, RTE, was only to be resolved when Sile 
DeValera was replaced in the broadcasting ministry by Dermot Ahern. However, 
for the government and Its TV, RTE’s move to BSkyB created an even larger 
hole in the DTT business plan.  
  
6.7) Converging governance 
Whereas the government now felt that a broadband was both desirable in terms 
of public policy and necessary in terms of DTT viability, it was necessary to 
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resolve the ODTR's stance on this issue. However, the Department officials at 
communications did not feel that they had the necessary powers to direct the 
ODTR on this matter as it was protected by its statutory independence. The 
Director, Etain Doyle, had at this point established her reputation for being 
independent and chiefly focused on the European regulatory agenda. She had 
previously faced down finance minister Charlie McCreevy in the row over the 3G 
auctions and had also irked the government in relation to her protective attitude 
towards her telecom clients. However the lessons of the DTT debacle and the 
changing nature of governance at European level had effected a change in the 
communications governance structure at national level. Following the legislative 
lead of Europe, the broadcasting ministry was, in June 2002, re-absorbed within 
the department responsible for communications in general, the Department Of 
Communications and Natural Resources. Added to this, the ODTR, reconfigured 
as Comreg following the European Frameworks Directive of 2002, was also 
brought under the sway of the DCMNR as its lead Ministry. Thus the reality of 
convergence lead legislation and the necessity of inter systemic co-ordination 
within a single communications department highlighted the impact of 
convergence at departmental and ministerial level. The DCMNR sought a way to 
curb Comreg’s independence. The Department had been formulating new 
legislation to prepare for the developing consensus at European level in relation 
to the Frameworks regulatory approach to Convergence. This provided the 
opportunity to re-organise the balance of power between the Minister and the 
Regulator. Section 13 of the new 2002 Communications Regulation Act allowed 
for the Minister to direct the ODTR in certain matters as follows: 
 
In the interests of the proper and effective regulation of the electronic 
communications and postal markets, the management of the radio 
frequency spectrum in the State and the formulation of policy applicable to 
such proper and effective regulation and management, the Minister may 
give such policy directions to the Commission as he or she considers 
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appropriate to be followed by the Commission in the exercise of its 
functions. The Commission shall comply with any such direction70. 
 
The Communications Act also incorporated the new European Frameworks 
Directive that replaced the restriction on the licence arrangements already in 
place with a less restrictive arrangement for general authorisations. This allowed 
for the Minister to direct the regulator in relation to spectrum use whilst also 
removing the existing restriction on licences.  
 
By the end of 2003, the new minister Dermot Ahern, once again to sought to 
sound out the potential of a DTT model. A department press release related that 
the minister had commissioned 'a detailed and realistic report on the way forward 
for digital television in Ireland'71. According to the release, the Digital Switchover 
Plan would examine all the issues relating to the roll out of digital television in 
Ireland including the issues of DTT and broadband provision. Tentative meetings 
took place between the minister and the rest of the industry. The Department 
was developing a new approach to developing the sector that involved a degree 
of consensus building based on networking, consultation and organisational co-
ordination. In general the state commissioned institution of consultancy driven 
market expertise was to be balanced with a negotiated corporatist approach to 
restructuring broadcasting and the communications sector. One of Ahern’s first 
moves was to widen the consultation on the development of digital television to 
the members of the broadcasting section of the Telecoms and Internet 
Federation within IBEC. According to one source in RTE, Ahern proved more 
pragmatic about the necessary role of RTE in floating the DTT model, 
recognising that across Europe, the initial leanings towards marginalising PSB 
were being replaced by a market governance model that laid an emphasis on 
PSB in shaping the public interest dimensions of the emerging markets. This is 
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supported by internal department documentation that shows that RTE’s ability to 
drive digital take-up has remained a constant issue in relation to the department’s 
assessment of the licence fee increase. The experience of underperformance in 
domestic television programme production from the independent television 
contract holder, TV3, no doubt, also informed this trajectory. In addition to this, in 
the UK, the failure of OnDigital and the re-integration of the BBC into the 
multiplex business, drawing on its marketing and content management expertise, 
appeared to have been a relatively beneficial move as judged by the subsequent 
success of Freeview. The high tide of market liberalism seemed to be receding 
as new statist intervention was to gain tacit acceptance at European level. The 
potential of moving back towards a Digico model with RTE holding significant 
equity in the new entity was no longer out of the question. In addition to this, 
technological development in wireless broadband delivery appeared to have 
vindicated the ItsTv business model of broadband delivery.   
 
The newly reconstituted department also displayed an increased concern with 
policy developments at European level. The DCMNR became involved in the 
reconsideration of the TVWF directive in the period from 2002 on, more mindful 
of its implications for a smaller nation operating in an overlap with one of Europes 
most successful and liberalised broadcasting markets. By 2004, BSkyB was now 
the largest digital platform available in the Republic of Ireland, with subscription 
rates of 330,000 (out of 1.3ml households). It had extended some of its 
interactive services and was also developing Irish directed content as well as opt 
out advertising for the Irish market from 1999 on. The media auditing firm Billets 
Ireland suggested that whereas RTE controlled 81% of commercial revenues in 
2000, that number was likely to drop to 60% by 2004, the largest gains being 
made by channels available via Sky’s satellite service (Billets, 2004). Under the 
terms of TVWF, Sky was regulated under a non domestic licence from the UK.  
The ODTR had previously attempted to affect some regulatory sway over BSKYB 
(mainly in response from complaints from the cable providers based in the 
Republic), but was not in a position to do so under TVWF. The government was 
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also more aware of Sky’s growing unregulated dominance via its high profile 
purchasing of coverage rights to Irish soccer internationals and its avoidance of 
regulatory control in relation to standards in advertising.  
 
This scenario, coupled with the ODTR’s failure to find a way around the TVWF 
directive, led the Irish government to attempt to change that directive to allow for 
regulatory intervention on the part of the country being targeted by broadcasts, 
such as, through opting out of advertisement, as opposed to the country of origin 
of those broadcasts. The DCMNR, outlined its proposals in its submission to the 
2003 Review of the TVWF directive. As a follow up it arranged for an informal 
Conference of broadcast ministers as part of Ireland’s hosting of the presidency 
of the EU in March 2004, with non domestic regulation being at the top of the 
agenda. The government made it clear that it respected the principle of mutual 
recognition but made a case that services originating from one state that were 
specifically aimed at a neighbor state should be treated differently. However, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, the activism of the ministry was to come to nothing. The 
concept of TVWF represented the core of European broadcasting policy’s 
alignment with the Treaty of Rome’s provision for the free movement of goods 
and services in the internal market. Following the informal conference, the EU 
commissioner for Audiovisual Affairs, Viviane Reding (as cited in Oliver, 2004), 
underlined the consistency of TVWF with the Treaty of Rome by stating “that is 
the general rule of the common market. It is not possible to change that.” 
However In the run up to the development of the 2007 Audio Visual Media 
Services Directive (TVWF III) the Irish government backed by Swedish support 
managed to get some recognition that governments should co-operate on issues 
were domestic broadcasters targeted audiences in another state.  
 
6.8) Towards DTT #3 
The minister Dermot Ahern, had taken on the government’s overall emerging 
policy style of negotiated governance twinned with corporatist co-ordination and 
was to pass this onto the incoming minister, Noel Dempsey in 2005. Dempsey 
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was to follow this more consensus lead approach to developing a DTT model. In 
looking to determine a new model for DTT roll out, in the context of the 
multinational owned competitive infrastructure which now made up the digital 
broadcasting landscape, the government returned responsibility to the 
department, the industry regulators, Comreg and the BCI, and the civil servants 
with ongoing links made to pan national regulatory associations such as the 
European Platform for Regulatory Authorities and public/private initiatives such 
as the DVB groups and the DTG group. The gradual internationalization of 
broadcasting, broadcasting policy and the political economy of broadcasting thus 
seen the emergence of a international networked policy structure that has 
attempted to network knowledge and co-ordination creating a public alternative to 
the global market consultants.  
 
Trials for a potential DTT model were started in 2006 with a limited pilot trial 
launched to test the network and technologies followed by a phase two trial, 
involving the public in 2007. The pilot network was developed by BT (multiplex 
technology), NEC (transmission systems) and RTE NL (transmission sites). 
Content providers were then invited to contribute to the phase 2 public element. 
Phase 2 consisted of an initial panel of 500 public participants in the Dublin and 
Louth areas of the country. The trial involved the distribution of set top boxes and 
the digital delivery of 16 TV channels, 12 radio channels and one high definition 
television channel. Content on the trial was provided by RTE, TV3, TG4, Today 
FM, Channel Six, Sky, BBC, Setanta, Extreme Sports and UKTV History. During 
the trials, testing of interactive services and capabilities was minimal, partially 
due to departmental fear over the status of the MHP license fees being 
demanded by patent holders and therefore the availability of a suitable receiver. 
This combined with the lack of demand for interactivity by participants in the trial 
suggests that it will not be pursued in the initial commercial roll out. Once again, 
whereas policy was more networked, and the competition regulators, the BCI and 
Comreg were further involved, it was proposed that market demand  would lead 
policy development as opposed to political will.   
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The trials were accompanied by new legislation in 2007 which created a legal 
basis for the new DTT structure. The legislation delegated responsibility to RTE, 
the BCI and Comreg for the development of DTT in Ireland. RTE would upgrade 
its network to digital capacity (and therefore become the DTT carriage provider) 
and manage a multiplex made up of RTE, TG4 and TV3 channels in digital form. 
The BCI defined and advertised the licenses for three multiplex providers, the 
winners of which would oversee the commercial roll out of DTT in Ireland. 
Comreg would allocate spectrum capacity for DTT and license RTE and the BCI 
for their respective use of spectrum. Whereas the central offering would be no 
less than 24 television channels, capacity was also reserved for epgs, interactive 
services, digital teletext and high definition television. It is, in 2008, likely that 
alongside the Irish terrestrial channels, the UK channels that featured in the trial 
will also feature in the public version of DTT. RTE has also been preparing for 
the development of a HDTV service whereas digital teletext will also be part of 
the value added element of DTT. The Department predicted a roll out date of late 
2008 and has committed to an analogue switch off date of no later than 2015.   
 
6.9) The evolving governance of broadcasting 
The governance of broadcasting at national level in Ireland has been significantly 
affected by a number of cross cuttings developments. The above case study is 
instructive in documenting the changed co-ordinates of communications policy 
making in Ireland. The adaptation of US style economic globalization, via a vis 
marketisation of broadcasting, through the filters of the European governance 
and UK policy transfer are significant influences on Irish broadcasting and 
communications policy development. The domestic features of a under 
resourced state machinery for dealing with national industrial, economic and 
politico-cultural developments is also significant, as is the competitive pressure to 
reduce public spending and sweat public assets for treasury coffers. The reliance 
of private resources and international capital also shape the development of 
network infrastructure. The institutional features of a legislature that pays little 
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attention to its own committee structures or the European industrial and 
regulatory agendas that shapes its operations is another contextually significant 
element. The lack of co-ordination between different policy making communities 
and state agencies in relation to policy areas relative to digitalisation which now 
cut across myriad areas of communications, media and cultural policy were also 
features of this particular policy adjustment. The increased importance of interest 
groups in the overall policy style of negotiated governance, as a feature of 
market governance also signals significant change. Overall a state approach to 
media and communications policy which has been primarily reactive, pragmatic, 
and underdeveloped, has left a vacuum in state strategies and activities. The 
institution of market governance has sharply tested this lack of a coherent policy 
focus as the necessary statist activities to, paradoxically, shape market 
governance, were absent.       
 
The increased competences of the EU in relation to network regulation and its 
interest in developing competitive and new media markets has put shape on the 
market environment generalised to its member states. The way in which 
broadcasting is now implicated in its reliance on infrastructure that, in its 
digitalised form, is utilised to develop different markets such as broadband 
provision and mobile multimedia services has generated a level of systemic 
complexity that had not encroached on broadcast regulation hither to this point. 
The general institutionalisation of a disaggregated broadcasting structure and the 
introduction of competitive market dynamics to hitherto integrated relationships 
have also meant that the policy community with an interest in broadcasting 
stretches out beyond broadcasters. Content producers, carriage providers, 
channel packagers, and customer interfacing interests all have a role in the 
development of broadcasting as a market segment of an evolving digital 
communications landscape. Initial moves to maintain a separation and an 
insularity of policy approach by the DAGHI proved to be contrary to the emerging 
systemic contexts of DTT. A latter-day recognition of the convergence agenda, 
the importance of networked governance and continued support for indigenous 
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content producers, vis a vis a sensitivity towards their relationship to content 
distribution has characterised broadcasting policy from 2003 on.  
 
The original attempts at bureaucratic governance relying on market expertise to 
institute the marketised structure for convergence was undermined by the 
emerging systemic complexity of the market system for communications. The 
convergence of regulation via the integration of all communication regulation 
within the Department of Communication and National Resources and its 
attempts to negotiate systemic complexity via a inter-organisational networked 
governance and inter systemic context steering, has, to date, proved a more 
successful approach to the emerging conditions of policymaking. Yet despite the 
improved performance of the ministry in relation to its grasp of market 
governance and the integration of public concerns within it, it is still the case that 
market governance as such presents a number of contradictions and challenges 
for the strategies and activities of the state overall. The development of 
competitive platforms has done little to expand the potential for he extension of 
broadband provision as per state policy. The competitive platform structure 
poses challenges for the development of indigenous content, forwarding EU 
nostrums in relation to competition norms without realising some way of ensuring 
that national content production is somehow compensated for its loss of revenue 
via audience fragmentation and it ability to adjust to the new digital logics of 
production/distribution/consumption. Lastly, the role of positive intervention has 
been undermined by a political economy of governance that has little resources 
to intervene in such a way, either by the development of new institutional 
structures to shape the market landscape (beyond those that merely manage it) 
or continued interventions via distribution, marketing and subsidy. Indeed existing 
resources for positive intervention, i.e. licence fees are now open to 
fragmentation and redistribution.  
 
Existing as it does within the Anglo American policyscape, and the EU’s 
continued appropriation of it, it remains an open question as to how Ireland can 
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master market governance for public policy ends and whether it can break with 
its institutional past to experiment with neo statist approaches to networked 
governance in the internationalised, marketised digital environment. Given the 
emergence of a new paradigm for capital accumulation and regulation, societal 
plurality and complex economic interdependence, a neo-statist model does not 
mean a simple return to top down bureaucratic governance twinned to state 
administered redistributive social systems, but a heterarchical governance 
system consisting of mixed approaches to bureaucratic, market and networked 
governance capable of varying its response to policy issues in specific and 
variable contexts whilst weighing the claims to both private gain and the 
continued importance of a public domain and a public sphere in any economy 
that claims to be based on human capital, not to mention social development.  
This is also an important critical standard for institutional development in 
media/communications.        
 
6.10) The challenge of a liberalised convergence model 
The process of liberalised convergence (convergence via liberlisation) has 
proven problematic in the majority of European states in which it has been 
attempted, Ireland proving no less problematic. The concept of liberalised 
convergence is the most significant communications policy endeavour to arise 
out of the European Union and reflects its concerns with growth and 
development of communication industry and infrastructure on a Europe wide 
scale adapting the US model being generalised to the world of regulated market 
capitalism. It also runs concurrently with state/policy endeavours to open up 
national markets in the traditionally protected cultural industries and public 
services and re-orient them towards new modes of networked accumulation. In 
general the communicative landscape occupied by broadcasting has been 
marketised in pursuit of economic policy, co-ordinated at the European level. 
Contrary to extreme predictions, the continued existence of public broadcasters 
has been carefully defended, but the maintenance of a public service system of 
telecommunications and broadcasting has been replaced by marketisation. The 
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double challenge of this digital marketisation along with analogue liberalisation 
has lead to a more challenging environment for residual public broadcasters. 
However, developments in the Irish situation challenge the claims to the 
appropriateness of the liberalised convergence approach taken at European 
level. The failure to develop a competitive domestic environment as outlined in 
the discussion above raise questions about the appropriateness of this model for 
the Irish situation. In general the concept that a low margin business such as 
broadcast content carriage would thrive amongst a potential of four different 
delivery platforms in a small market of 1.2 million television households (with 
heavy competition from internationalising corporations in its neighbouring 
country) has always been a dubious one and defensible only through the most 
elaborate economic modelling, e.g. Nera Smyth, 1998. In addition to this, basing 
national communications policy on the projected revenues of a yet unknown 
revenue potential of new services on different platforms leans far more to market 
interests than a polity representing the public interest should potentially tolerate. 
As an exercise in meta governance as opposed to direct government it appears 
to have deep problems in realising the majority of its objectives. It certainly 
cannot be construed as efficient, effective and economic.  
 
The liberalised convergence model drew very heavily on experiences in the UK, 
which in a circular fashion were repackaged as policies for all of Europe. The UK 
had demonstrated its ability to float a number of platforms in a market of 26 
million households, on the crest of an economic boom that could be expected to 
support a plurality of platforms. In Ireland the ascent of the liberalised 
convergence model helped frustrate the development of national platform, as did 
the absence of a strong state co-ordination on public policy issues. In general the 
government was constrained in its actions by the liberalised model that 
developed in line with its telecommunications policy 
 
In Ireland the DAGHI appeared to be operating in a vacuum, with many of the 
important decisions being made on digitalisation, overall, coming from the 
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telecommunications side of government/state activity. Consonant with 
government policy, the public private partnership of Digico appeared to be 
conceived and deliberated with very little consideration of the liberalised 
convergence which would surround it. The decision of the Minister to follow the 
public/private route engendered problems for the unitary model of Digico that 
could, in any case, have been debated at European level. However, the Minister 
chose to ere on the right side of competition law and sought to boost government 
coffers rather than re-invigorates a public service. Despite the apparent hostility 
of the competition directorate towards the potential for market distortion through 
public services, the Directorate, under Karl Van Miert, allowed for a lot more 
room for manoeuvre. Decisions made in relation to myriad cases brought against 
public service broadcasters by private operators indicated that firstly, the 
Directorate did not consider itself to have competence in deciding on the extent 
of public services, and secondly, would only rule on funding that was not 
proportionate to that range of public services. Under this regime of regulation it 
would have been possible to argue any digital yield could be seen as state aid to 
RTE/Digico in order to develop content and broadband elements of the Digico 
platform as a matter of public policy. Without such a yield, and, quick diffusion of 
the platform, RTE was not in a position to carry a terrestrial platform as another 
element in its public policy requirement. It was already showing the strains of 
being under resourced whilst overburdened with public policy.  
 
This approach to DTT would, however, only have been possible if the 
government had secured the support for a national platform at European level, 
rather than accepting the large country model of liberalised convergence.  At this 
juncture the liberalised convergence model has been fully implemented through 
the Frameworks Directive adopted by Member States in 2003. The situation in 
Ireland, wherein, only BskyB had the economic resources to ride the economic 
downturn of 2000 and expand its services, has lead to many questions regarding 
the viability of liberalised convergence in the Irish context. In general, this means 
that there has been no public service innovation in digital services. It also means 
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that a system that would have maintained the existing public services at the 
centre of a national broadcasting culture in Ireland, whilst also ensuring 
additional resources in an increasingly fragmented environment, has seen its 
potential market dwindle with the diffusion of digital satellite and cable services. 
New and innovative services in digital television are developed outside the state 
in a commercial paradigm wherein profits also migrate outside of the state. Even 
where liberalised convergence has been adopted in European countries, a form 
of neo-statist intervention has ensured that the newly dis-integrated public 
broadcasters have been resourced enough to remain central in such an 
infrastructure. This situation did not pertain in Ireland.  
 
6.11) Digital issues facing public broadcasting policy in Ireland 
In the light of recent developments there is substantial evidence of the need for a 
wider conceptualisation of the public interest in Irish broadcasting. RTE for its 
part cannot be expected to be burdened with public policy but under resourced in 
regards to public finance. In such conditions it devotes its energies to strategic 
manoeuvring for revenue generation as opposed to being strategically orientated 
towards the public interest. Whereas the 2002 Forum on Broadcasting appeared 
to have addressed this issue and put pressure on the government to increase its 
public finances, this may have been too late to ensure the strategic floating of a 
public DTT service.   
 
For RTE there are more pressing issues. The new regime of platform neutrality 
puts rte in the position of offering its services on all platforms, regardless of the 
fact that this may involve supplementing the profits of rival broadcasters such as 
BskyB. This solution to universal service in a liberalised convergence model will 
potentially raise cost issues for the public broadcaster. At present, for RTE, the 
cable companies carry the public channels for free as part of a 'must carry' 
requirement. RTE is also carried on the satellite provider BskyB at little charge to 
the broadcaster. This reflects BSkyB's need for Irish content in order to expand 
into the Irish market. There is no guarantee that either of these situations will not 
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change in the future. Further to this, the question of paying transmission fees to a 
DTT operator will also arise, as does the issue of paying the independent 
regulator ComReg. In the UK the BBC reported a drop in its transmission costs 
with the move to digital terrestrial but a substantial rise in relation to its 
multiplatform transmission costs (BBC). In the interim period of network roll out 
RTE will also have to consider the amount of resources it can direct towards new 
digital services, considering that there is a period of non-universal service 
involved. This raises questions in relation to the universality of the licence fee. 
Can RTE use licence fee money on service that cannot be universally received 
whereas on the other hand can it delay a digital strategy until analogue 
switchover? The related question of which new services to develop is also a 
pressing issue. The services will have to be effective in a strategic sense on four 
different platforms, this requires careful planning and modelling. The kind of 
services possible will also be determined by the technology of each platform. The 
proprietary standards of the different set top boxes entails the development of 
new services and interactive innovations with four potentially variant interfaces. 
In the platform neutral scenario the development of services that favour any one 
platform will be seen as derogation from its universal service mandate. The key 
problem for the public broadcaster at present is how to maintain visibility and 
presence in a multichannel, multiplatform, multi-media digital scenario. On the 
face of it, RTE does not have the resources of the BBC to become a sizeable 
public presence across all media (as has been ensured by neo-statist 
intervention by the same political culture that initiated the liberal convergence 
model). In the digital transition, however, it has been barely resourced or 
encouraged to achieve such a goal.      
 
6.12) From positive to competitive regulation 
 It is suggested that the current trend in communications policy is underpinned by 
a neo-liberal turn in western political economy. However, in the case of the 
convergence paradigm, it is more accurate to emphasise market liberalism as an 
underpinning logic of change. Thus we see, not the de-regulation of the 
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communications sector, but the re-regulation of a marketised communications 
sector. The Bangemann Report and associated documentation are often cited as 
proof of the neo-liberal turn, but the actual settlement of the convergence issue is 
more complex. Bangemann succeeded, not through getting the necessity of 
deregulation accepted, but by articulating the need for new forms of competition 
within electronic communication networks via a technological argument based on 
a technological potential of convergence. The necessity of a competitive model 
was introduced via a paradigm shift based on an inaccurate and inappropriate 
assumption of real convergence at all points of the so-called value chain. 
Whereas the unrealistic nature of this situation came to light via actual 
developments in broadcasting and discursive testing of the Bangeman report at 
European level, an important paradigmatic or ideational shift was achieved. 
Within the liberalised convergence model the horizontal regulatory measures 
associated with network convergence have been formulated at European level 
and implemented through statutory regulators at national level. Concurrently, 
vertical regulation of content still remains a mostly national affair, taking into 
account the already existing European interventions, pre-existing broadcasting 
regulators/policy communities can still shape developments at national level. This 
however, requires co-ordination with throughout the communications sector at 
national level. It is this institution of the liberalised landscape, a market structure 
of operation and re-regulation for competition that became one of the backdrops 
against which states needed to restructure their public broadcasting systems, 
that is the subject of the following case study.
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Chapter Seven 
Reshaping public broadcasting in Ireland  
 
7.1) Introduction 
The current chapter is primarily concerned with the political economy of policy 
involved in the restructuring of the principle public service broadcasting 
institution, RTE in the period under review. The varied challenges that have 
beset public broadcasting as both extant public policy and a general philosophy 
of the public sphere have been variously summarised as technological, 
ideological, socio-cultural, spatial and material. In general, digitalisation, neo-
liberalism, internationalisation of distribution and consumption, cultural relativism 
and issues of funding and commercial competition help to delineate the various 
pressures/rhetoric’s that have made the restructuring of public broadcasting a 
policy object for policy makers in Europe and elsewhere. In keeping with the 
materialist explanation of neo-fordism outlined in Chapter Two, one key element 
that informs the reshaping of public broadcasting is the realisation of 
broadcasting as an expanding cultural industrial sector, its export potential, its 
employment potential and its overall contribution to the post industrial sector of 
the economy. The marketisation of broadcasting to realise this aim and the 
changing institutional norms expressed in emerging forms of competition, 
property forms and forms of exchange provided a structural emphases for the re-
articulation of PSB relative to these new conditions. The emergence of a 
regulatory regime that regulates for competition also presaged the need for a 
rationalisation of public broadcasters. These are the structural emphases of a 
global market system and they are negotiated and filtered through both supra 
state arrangements such as the EU and the structural and institutional features of 
a given state. The current chapter traces this adjustment in the Irish context 
focussing on the effects of such normative and institutional emphases on the 
programme production element of RTE’s value chain.          
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As has been recounted in Chapter 6, in the mid 1990s PSB became an object of 
policy at European level, initially through the Competition directorate, DGIV, and 
latterly through the European Parliament and the Amsterdam protocol. Together 
these institutions guaranteed the continuing support of PSB as a service of 
general interest to be protected by European law. Whereas PSB had to be 
defined, transparent, proportionately funded and competition friendly, the 
structure, funding and purpose of PSB was a subsidiary matter to be dealt with 
by national governments in a ‘vertical’ manner. However as has already been 
suggested the internationalisation of broadcasting distribution, the creation of 
market structure at EU level and their related regulatory regimes all produced 
varying pressures and emphases that were to be felt at national level. The 
present chapter addresses the restructuring of public broadcasting in Ireland 
through the consideration of the public deliberative strand of restructuring and the 
private consultant lead strand of restructuring. At public level RTE as a central 
element of ongoing broadcasting policy was legitimised and restructured relative 
to a new charter, a new set of commitments and a new governance structure. At 
the structural level new operational; structures drawing on market logics were 
brought to bear on the broadcaster. This chapter in line with its concern with the 
political economy of governance concentrates on this latter level whilst drawing 
attention to its implications for the discursive re-articulation of public broadcasting 
that took place within the public sphere.  
 
The chapter follows a broadly chronological trajectory as it traces policy 
development from the restructuring of RTE's programme production capacity to 
the transition to market governance within RTE. Specifically it traces the broad 
implications of the developing relationship between RTE and the independent 
sector, the move towards the regularisation of the license fee mechanism, the 
development of new governance/organisational structures for the broadcaster 
and the deployment of a framework for the public broadcaster as a 
complimentary element within in the wider re-configuration of broadcasting as a 
cultural industry. In general, it traces the re-orientation of RTE to the new 
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contexts of a liberalised broadcasting sector constituted by the institutional norms 
of the market.  
 
7.2) The Politics of PSB in Ireland 
The 1995 Green Paper on Broadcasting in Ireland posited the need for an 
evaluation of public broadcasting in Irish national culture and politics. It proposed 
that the maintenance of a strong public broadcaster provided the forum for the 
negotiation of national culture and a mode of publicity that prioritised shared 
public life and a political culture. It evaluated the increased commercialisation, 
corporatisation and internationalisation of cultural production and argued that the 
maintenance of public broadcasting would secure a degree of pluralism in the 
emerging landscape as well as securing the basis for the ongoing politicisation of 
public life. Generated by a Labour minister with considerable academic input, the 
Green Paper was a marked departure for policy statements on public 
broadcasting in so far as it articulated a public philosophy with a strong liberal 
pluralist continental orientation. The key contexts for this paper where not only 
the potential global reach of corporate media through new technologies but also 
the influences of the liberalising UK broadcasting landscape, both ideational and 
material. In the UK, policy discourse had been brimming with the rhetoric of neo-
liberalism whereas the granting of a non domestic licence to BSkyB and its 
steady progress in re-ordering the broadcasting landscape there illustrated the 
reality of a pending internationalisation of distribution in broadcasting. Within the 
UK, the ‘decline and fall of public broadcasting’ was becoming a common trope 
of discussion and the question of what to do with public broadcasters as 
broadcasting became a business appeared to be the key concern. In Ireland the 
culture minister, Michael Higgins, was centrally involved in securing support for 
the Amsterdam Protocol on public broadcasting at European level (see chapter 
Four) as he detected this shift in the normative considerations underlying 
broadcasting policy. But it was the incoming government that would have a key 
input to the restructuring of public broadcasting in Ireland over the coming ten 
years.  
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These were the immediate ideological backdrops that informed the consideration 
of the place of public broadcasting in Ireland in 1997. On the face of it the 
incoming government would appear to be less committed, if not hostile, to the 
concept of public broadcasting. Fianna Fail had historical baggage in its 
relationship with RTE, it had been the party that introduced commercial 
competition in 1988, and perhaps paradoxically, as a republican party, had little 
time for the theoretical abstractions of the public sphere. However, FF had also 
been the party that sanctioned the structure, funding and (however 
compromised) autonomy of public broadcasting in Ireland in the first place and 
thus had shown itself to have ambiguous attitudes to PSB. Their partners in 
Government, the Progressive Democrats were doctrinaire neoliberals with a 
commitment to reduced public spending, pro market policies and rationalisation 
of the public sector. The PD’s political philosophy aligned them to a dogged 
pursuit of the competition state, and to the re-invention of Ireland as a primarily 
economic, as opposed to ethno nationalist, entity, e.g. Ireland plc (see chapter 
five). They entered cabinet with economically influential ministries in the 
Department of Finance and the Department of Public Enterprise. In so far as they 
demonstrated a proclivity in communications policy, the PD lead Department of 
Public Enterprise had been at the forefront of the liberalised convergence agenda 
outlined in the previous chapter.   
 
It was not clear what impact these mixed and complex political emphases would 
have on public broadcaster RTE. Fianna Fail had shown, historically, its 
propensity to intervene in broadcasting to ensure a national broadcasting culture 
free from undue commercial influence but did so not out of philosophical resaons, 
but in order to create a broadcast system which principally reflected the accepted 
norms and values of a catholic corporatist state,  a cultural nationalism and a 
notion of formal citizenship. (It has also been grudgingly receptive to its civil 
service and the state resources available to it). In broad brush terms, Celtic Tiger 
Ireland was steadily moving from a catholic corporatist state to a neo-liberal 
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corporatist state, and it was not clear how those older values and norms would 
fair, or what broadcasting structures would best be suited to reflect new ones. 
How does a nationalist party re-articulate the national at a time of socio-cultural 
and economic globalisation?        
 
7.3) Restructuring PSB; the policy process 
Following the frustrations of finding a policy response for digitalisation in Ireland, 
the question of public service broadcasting, in the period from 2000 on, came to 
the centre of public policy towards broadcasting. In retrospect the attempt and 
frustration of RTE to drive policy on digital broadcasting most probably signalled 
the end of the broadcaster’s privilege in developing national broadcasting policy. 
Whereas Sile DeValera had earlier suggested that a review of RTE would be in 
the pipeline, this was later extended to a full-scale Forum on Broadcasting to 
evaluate the overall structure of broadcasting, and the place of an institution of 
public broadcasting within it. In the re-orientation towards a marketised 
broadcasting sector, with its market institutions, the form, functioning and 
purpose of public service broadcasting had become a central policy problem for 
European Union member states. How should public broadcasting integrate into 
newly liberalised international; digital broadcasting markets? Would institutions of 
PSB still be as effective in addressing the political, cultural and social policy roles 
once entrusted to them? Had the political, social and cultural changed to the 
point wherein PSB in its traditional form no longer had resonance? Would 
digitalization and the logics that underpin it render existing broadcasting 
institutions ineffectual? Would PSB institutions, now operating outside of the 
overall public service system of governance still serve as a central public service 
policy tool? These were the questions that that Forum on Broadcasting, an ad-
hoc body convened by the government in 2002 was tasked with answering.  At 
the centre of the Forums' deliberations would be the question of the role and 
status of public broadcasting in the Irish broadcasting landscape. However, 
whereas the forum on broadcasting was initiated as a public, deliberative 
consultative body, allowing for an input from the varied stakeholders, both formal 
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and informal, changes in the form and function of RTE were occurring at a less 
public, but, arguably equally consequential level. At this level, the contexts of 
change could be related to the wider processes of market governance in 
European broadcasting, the rationalities of a government intent on re-interpreting 
the relationship between governance and the public sector and the presence of 
new stakeholders in the marketised broadcasting environment, all creating 
pressures and emphases vis a vis the prioritisation, formation, adoption and 
implementation of new institutional norms. To a large degree the re-articulation of 
the form and function of RTE occurred outside of the public domain and 
illustrated how market governance had penetrated to the centre of broadcasting 
policy whilst being accompanied by deliberative policy generation 1.  
 
In short, the re structuring that occurred outside the public domain was centrally 
concerned with adjusting RTE to emerging institutional norms of competition, 
exchange and an emergent property form in broadcasting. If this had occurred in 
the BBC in 1990s under John Birt’s re-orientation of that institution, then it was 
now RTE’s turn for a similar treatment. RTE, as a legacy monopoly broadcaster 
with a bureaucratic governance structure, was out of step with the market logic of 
market governance, competition at all levels of the value chain (programming, 
distribution, customer interfacing, service delivery etc), the potential monetary 
value of its programming as commodity form and contractual and transparent 
levels of exchange in its production process, the norms of the market economy. 
RTE’s unionised structure and the associated delicacies of tinkering with a semi 
autonomous public broadcaster, had previously allowed the broadcaster to assert 
its autonomy over its own structures and operations. But the normative contexts 
and political culture had now changed. Competition, liberalisation, rationalisation, 
developing the services dimension of the knowledge based economy combined 
with RTE’s own financial crisis and public funding deficit appeared to have 
                                                           
1
 Section 243 of the 1960 broadcasting act obliges RTE to conduct its affairs in a way in which 
can meet all of its commitments out of its current account. This essentially allows 
Government to re-size the organisation, as a legislative requirement, through withholding 
licence fee funding.   
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created very a different environment for negotiation. One element of RTE’s 
integrated structure that had exercised successive policy makers since the 1980s 
was its production process and the degree of autonomy it exercised over 
allocating revenue towards different programming genres. The political economy 
of RTE’s programme budget has thus had political and economic interest for 
policymakers and its historical trajectory serves as indicative of the associated 
policy development which has re-oriented the broadcaster in recent years.   
 
7.4) The political economy of independent programming 
Within the overall context of marketisation of the broadcasting sector, separation 
between the varied elements of the value chain is deemed to introduce 
efficiencies whilst also making costs more transparent. Within the European 
context, it offers the potential of de-nationalising programme production and 
creating a common market for programming that may provide the basis for better 
performance in global markets. The vertical disintegration of the value chain in 
the US broadcasting landscape is often cited as proof of this formula although 
many critics suggest that it is the economies of scale arising from a linguistically 
homogenous land mass as opposed to the operation of market criteria which 
underpin US exports success2.  European intervention in this area in the form of 
Directive 89/552/EEC aimed to ensure that the support of this sector received a 
level of commitment from national governments without being overly binding. The 
cultural criteria for this intervention were justified in terms of the goal of 
encouraging cultural diversity through pluralistic programme supply. However 
from the 1980s on, the potential of an independent television production sector 
as a significant post-industrial sector of the economy, gained increased policy 
interest throughout Europe. The development of Channel Four in the UK 
alongside the mandates for independent productions in broadcaster’s schedules 
in the 1990 Broadcasting Act was indicative of this approach. 
 
                                                           
2
 Sinclair, Jacka and Cunningham, (1996) New Patterns in Global Television, (Oxford, OUP).  
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Within the Irish context, independent production had been a feature of the 
broadcasting landscape since the inception of RTE in 1961 with a loose number 
of operators contributing, in an artisanal fashion, to the national broadcaster’s 
schedule on an informal basis. Following RTE's poor financial performance in the 
early 1980s, at the Governments behest, consultants Stokes Kennedy Crowley 
carried out a review of RTE which recommended a more formal approach to the 
role of independents in producing for RTE's schedules. In its rationale for such a 
recommendation the report suggested that the benefits of a developed 
independent sector would be as follows; 
 
 To offer some alternative employment opportunities to professional television 
staff in Ireland 
 To provide a more varied range of programming 
 To produce programmes more economically 
 To create additional employment in a business sector with significant growth 
potential3. 
 
 The 1990 Broadcasting Bill proposed a formula of dividing up the license fee 
amongst commercial broadcasters that would in theory stimulate demand from 
independent broadcasters. The bill was comprehensively opposed but made it 
through to legislation as a cap on RTE's advertising income in order to stimulate 
the development of a commercial channel. The strategy was a profligate failure 
                                                           
3
 Stokes Kennedy Crowley, Review of RTE, 1985. From 1987 RTE made moves to formalise its 
relationship with the independent sector. By 1990 the sector consisted of 139 mostly small scale 
companies made up of 257 full time employees and 600 freelance jobs. The development of 
policy towards independent production in the UK, especially the creation of Channel Four as a 
publisher/broadcaster, opened up an outlet for Irish producers whilst also offering a template 
for organised action in relation to policy development in Ireland. The Irish polity now had an 
obligation to formalise the role of the sector vis a vis the Television Without Frontiers directive 
of 1989 . Whereas the directive was not overly restrictive the purposeful ambiguity of Article 5 
opened up the potential for multiple interpretations which ensured conflict between RTE and 
the burgeoning sector. The Fianna Fail government, however, was finding its approach to 
broadcasting policy problematic. The attempt to kick start a commercial private television sector 
was meant to open up additional opportunities for independent production but proved unviable 
in the existing economic conditions. 
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and entailed a continued disoriented policy direction towards the independent 
sector. The Fianna Fail/Labour coalition of 1993 signalled an alternative to this 
approach to stimulating development through a commercial broadcaster. The 
then Labour Minister with responsibility for broadcasting, Michael D Higgins, 
sought to deflect policy away from commercial broadcasting and retain RTE as 
the central focus for broadcast developments. The 1993 Broadcasting 
Amendment Act reversed the cap whilst also addressing RTE's statutory 
commitments to the independent sector. The act stipulated that RTE would make 
available £5million for spending on independent production in 1994, with stepped 
increases bringing it to £10million in 1998. Eventually by 1999, the sum spent 
would settle at either £12.5 million or 20% of television expenditure, whichever 
was the largest sum. By 1999 a Fianna Fail/PD coalition was to step into an 
RTE/FMI dispute about what in fact was the correct calculation of 20% of 
programme expenditure and set the amount at £16.5 million. In the 2001 
Broadcasting Act, the amount was reset at £20 million per annum rising each 
year in line with the cost price index. This was a compromise but still ensured a 
commitment that was above the 10% mandated in European legislation. The 
move to set a limit on the exponential burgeoning of the independent quota was 
directly related to RTE's dire financial circumstances which were in turn partially 
engendered by the rising fixed cost of its commitment to the independent sector. 
In this entire period of directing RTE resources towards the independent sector it 
had not received a license fee increase in recognition of its expanding policy 
commitments.              
 
The rationale behind Michael D. Higgins move to a rigorous quota system was a 
synthesis of reactions to the varied pressures on broadcasting policy at the time. 
As Higgins suggests himself, the possibility of reconciling all these policy 
demands was problematic. To deflect attention from the commercial option, 
whilst adhering to European legislation and providing impetus for a potential 
international export market implied giving RTE a large responsibility for this 
purpose. The assessment is telling in so far as it indicates the burden of policy 
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that falls on the public broadcaster in the absence of wider state policy and 
mechanisms. However, Higgins argues that the approach itself was not divorced 
from public purposes in broadcasting. According to Higgins, it was felt that RTE, 
because of the hostility of the previous government and an over-zealous 
commitment to commercialism, had become considerably blunted in its approach 
to critically interrogating public issues. Added to this, ex RTE staff argue that 
RTE's managerial ethos was not particularly interested in allocating resources 
towards cultural programming and when it did, tended to over manage the 
production process 4. Finally, the persistence of a single culture of television 
production in RTE, and thus in Irish television broadcasting overall, was seen as 
limiting the potential meanings, values and identities that could be brought to 
bear on output. In the UK, the development of Channel Four as a publisher 
broadcaster had allowed access to the airwaves for a plurality of voices offering 
diverse and often critical perspectives. It was thus that Higgins saw the 
independent sector feeding into RTE's remit to stimulate the pluralistic production 
base and diversity of output of the broadcaster whilst also engendering a growth 
area that would give Ireland a 'cultural space' both at home and internationally5. 
At the time SIPTU, representing staff within RTE had led opposition to the 1993 
Act stating that; 
  
'just as the station has an opportunity of progressing in an orderly fashion to 
develop the entire Irish broadcasting industry, the minister threatens to 
undermine this by placing too great a burden, too quickly on the station, to 
its detriment and to the detriment of the industry as a whole' 6.  
                                                           
4
 Interviews, ex-production staff, RTE, June 2004. This is a general perception of a small sample 
of ex RTE staff now working in the independent sector, who, for obvious reasons, requested 
anonymity. 5 producers previously employed on both full time and part time contracts at RTE 
complained of restrictions arising out of the reference upward system in RTE. This perspective 
has been echoed by other written critiques of the broadcaster. However, these producers also 
suggested that they were left to their own devices when producing independent material for the 
broadcaster.    
5
 Interview Michael D. Higgins,  
6
 Irish Times, 11/05/93, SIPTU attacked on Broadcasting Bill. 
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Higgins suggests that there was never intended to be pressure on RTE's 
production base and for this reason had inserted a clause that allowed the 
amendment of the quotas if it led to negative impact on 'the employment or 
recruitment of staff by the Authority' 7. In Higgins calculation, developing 
European markets would ensure that RTE was not be the only buyer of 
independent programming and therefore the sector would expand without unduly 
burdening RTE. The fact that half of independent production companies had 
already won commissions from UK broadcasters at this point appeared to 
support this assessment. However, it appeared that, later on, Higgins over 
estimated both the financial health of RTE and the export potential of Irish audio-
visual content.   
 
By 1997, just before the designated sum rose to £10 million, RTE was beginning 
to sound the alarm bells in relation to its commitment to the independent sector. 
In its 1997 annual report the Chairman of the RTE Authority, drew attention to the 
fact that the 'the increasing obligation to commission from the independent sector 
was a further financial strain on RTE's resources'8 . The comment led to a series 
of public exchanges in the pages of the Irish Times, with James Hickey, the then 
spokesperson for the industry body, FMI, accusing RTE of displaying a lack of 
commitment to the sector. According to Hickey, a large proportion of FMI's 
lobbying capacity was then directed towards ensuring that there was no political 
climb down on RTE's commitments. However, RTE made clear that its objections 
related to the fact that its commitments were not underpinned by the requisite 
resources. It had had one licence fee rise in ten years and this was almost 
entirely to fund its concurrent commitment to provide programming to the Irish 
language channel TnaG (established in 1996). At a time of difficult commercial 
conditions RTE's licence fee stood at a ratio of 2:1 commercial revenue to licence 
fee revenue. By the year 2000, when RTE was then spending a required 
                                                           
7
 Broadcasting Amendment Act, 1993.  
8
 RTE,1997, Annual Report 
Chapter Seven 
 
232 
 
15.5million on independent commissions, it publicly articulated the relationship 
between the commitments to the independent sector and the erosion of its own 
production base. According to Joe Mulholland, the then managing director of 
television, 'should more funding not become available, then, as the amount spent 
on external production increases, that spent in making programmes within RTE 
must decrease'9.  
 
It is difficult to isolate the impact of the independent quota on RTE's productive 
capacity as it tends to be one in a number of constituent factors related to market 
competition which include the fragmentation of advertising revenue, 
organisational re-structuring and the spiralling costs of programme rights. In 
political terms, subsequent decisions not to raise the licence fee alongside an 
increasing litany of public policy commitments such as TnaG (the Irish language 
channel to which RTE contributes 365 hours of programming per year) and DTT 
also had an impact. The resulting financial squeeze within RTE has been 
typically characterised as a product of its inflated cost base (which has 
necessarily had to adjust to remain competitive in a market environment). Thus 
increased reliance on outsourcing programming is presented as part of the 
solution to the circumstances it has helped create. The impact of this circular 
policy rationale is illustrated in the figures for the volume and value of rte's 
commissions from the independent sector over the previous decade; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
9
 Irish Times, 7/01/00, RTE a broadcasting miracle in that it can produce so much. 
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Volume and value of RTE's independent commissions. 
Year Hours Amount 
1988 136.25 £2,482,500 
1989 161.75 £3,342,775 
1990 168.75 £3,633,321 
1991 159.75 £2,984,000 
1992 250.00 £3,767,000 
1993   
1994 258.00 £5,000,000 
1995 261.00 £6,071,402 
1996 290.00 £6,624,356 
1997 300.00 £8,500,000 
1998 430.00 £10,000,000 
1999 531.00 £16,100,000 
2000 534.00 £16,302,534 
2001 641.00 £24,970,491 
2002 701.00 €30,696,906 
2003 513.00IPU 
(171.00 additional) 
€46,148,898 
2004 905 €50,156,000 
2005 1,010 €72,801,000 
2006 1,034 €68,320,000 
 
Sources: The Independent Television Production Sector Report, 1992, Review of 
RTE's Structures and Operations, 1998, The Strategic Development of the Irish 
Film and Television Industry, 1999, The Irish Times, 1998, Review of Application 
made by RTE for a Licence Fee Increase, 2001, IPU Annual Reports 2000-2006.   
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The percentage of spend is now considerably higher than either the amount 
mandated in the 2001 Act or the 20% of the previous 1993 Act. One central 
reason the growth of RTE's commitment to the sector has now reached beyond 
that which it statutorily obliged to commission is because it no longer possesses 
the capacity to meet its programme commitments 'in-house'. Also under the 
terms of its organisational restructuring/licence fee increase deal (dealt with 
below), its commitment to outsourcing were to become a structural feature of its 
ongoing operations. 
 
In international terms it is possible to give some indication of the scale of the 
public policy commitment by relating it to arrangements in other European 
countries. In the Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the approach to article 5 of 
TVWF is structurally flexible. In each of these countries the broadcasters are free 
to interpret whether they want to reserve 10% of their broadcasting time or to 
invest 10% of their budget in European independent programmes. These are 
countries with relatively strong public finances for the public broadcaster, but 
small population sizes of below 10million resulting in reduced economies of scale 
and less revenue surplus to the requirement of maintaining the existing audio-
visual production base. In contrast, those countries with larger populations and 
proportionate public funding tend to make fixed commitments based on their 
greater surplus of resources. Thus the UK, Italy, France and the Netherlands all 
have structurally fixed interpretations of Article 5 as well as extra commitments. 
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Country/Public  
Broadcaster 
Operating 
Income 
1996 
£million∗ 
Flexible 
Interpretation 
of Article 5 
(2001) 
Fixed 
interpretation of  
article 5 
(2001) 
Extra Commitments 
(2001) 
United Kingdom, BBC 1,981  25% of its output in 
any relevant period to 
consist of independent 
progs. 
Provisions concerning 
type of content, language 
requirements and origin of 
content 
Italy, RAI 1,688  20% of relevant 
transmission time for 
independent 
productions 
Promotion of independent 
production and type of 
content 
France, F2, F3 1,286  11.5% of turnover to 
independent works 
+3% to 
cinematographic 
works 
Provisions concerning 
type of content and 
language requirements 
Netherlands, NOS 564  25% of television 
broadcasting time 
across national 
channels 
Provisions concerning 
type of content, language 
requirements and origin of 
content 
Denmark, DR, TV2 
 
 
436, 10% of 
Programme Time 
or Budget 
 
 
 Flexible targets in relation 
to content/ language 
Sweden , SVT 310, 10% of 
Programme Time 
or Budget 
 Flexible targets in relation 
to content/ 
language/origin 
Finland, YLE  10% of 
Programme Time 
or Budget 
 Flexible targets in relation 
to content/ language 
Ireland, RTE  (Proportion of 
programme 
service) ⇒ 
£2000,000 plus, rising 
annually with CPI 
Co-operation with 
independent sector and 
indigenous programme 
quota 
∗Indicative operating income, public funding, excludes commercial income.  
Sources: Mc Kinsey, 1999, European Commission, 2001, YLE, 1996,  
RTE, 1996. 1990/2001 Broadcasting Act, Ireland.  
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Historically, RTE has been poorly publicly funded relative to commercial 
revenues. It is also working from a relatively low audio-visual production base, 
because of population size/GNP and the related implications for revenue 
generation. In the 1990 Act, the interpretation of article five did not lay down a 
specific quota but proposed that 'a reasonable proportion of the programme 
service' be given over to independent productions. Subsequently, the 1993 
Broadcasting Amendment Act and the 2001 Broadcasting Act translated this to 
fixed, above base, commitments. Whereas Ireland is in a more comparable 
position to those countries with a tighter (but less tight than Ireland) pressure on 
their production base, the Irish public broadcaster is committed to a fixed 
interpretation of Article 5 comparable to those of the larger European public 
broadcasters. This lack of flexibility entails additional fixed costs for the public 
broadcaster. Flexibility must thus be found in other dimensions of RTE's 
operation.    
 
7.5) Re-scaling the public sector 
The reduction of productive capacity within RTE is also a consequence of re-
structuring in relation to its loss of status as a monopoly operator. In general 
terms this relates also to RTE's re-orientation as a partially dis-integrated 
programme producer in developing markets. Since the SKC report of 1985, RTE 
has been in the process of re-sizing its cost base in recognition of these new 
realities. However, the balance between re-structuring and under-resourcing has 
been a fine one in the opinion of representatives of staff in RTE. The level of its 
staff and staff commitments is seen as a fixed cost within RTE which is chiefly 
characterised by government as being the key cost driver in its operation. As an 
integrated producer/broadcaster RTE's programme production has typically 
drawn on resources from internal support divisions such as graphics, wardrobe, 
construction, production design, post production and location amongst other. In 
its 2002 application for a licence fee rise RTE outlined the extent of its 
rationalisations for 2000/02. 
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 Staff reduction, a net reduction of 500 staff in 2000/02/03. Of this number 
400+ were permanent and pensionable. 
 Closure and outsourcing of TV outside broadcasting unit, negotiated through 
RTE's partnership and IR mechanisms with no loss of service resulted in 
annual savings of €1.5ml+ or equivalent volume of operations 
 Closure of construction workshops, which was a costly and inefficient 
operation because of the seasonal nature of demand. Negotiations with four 
different craft unions achieved full closure without dispute or service 
disruption. 
 Reduced TV Studio Crewing, including the introduction of unmanned and 
remote control camera facilities and implementation of the single operator TV 
News headline facility. 
 Stills, the closure of this operational activity, no longer essential to RTE 
production activities, was achieved through negotiated early retirement and 
redeployment. 
 Introduction of desktop self operating video editing and other work change 
practices10. 
 
However, staff now claim that rationalisation of these operations has for a long 
time gone beyond services and is cutting into programme production. The fixed 
cost of the quota commitment to the independent sector, however, increases 
relative to the loss of critical mass within RTE.  
 
Internal efforts to quantify the loss of staff vis a vis the outsourcing of production 
to the independent sector were attempted by an internal review group11.  The 
figures suggest the function of programme making was under pressure despite 
industry claims that RTE still had room to squeeze out some of the non-
programme making fat. However, James Hickey of Screen Producers Ireland, 
                                                           
10
 RTE, 1998, Review of RTE's Structures and Operations, RTE, 2002, Draft application for a 
licence fee rise.  
11
 The RTE internal team estimated that a decrease in around 9% of internal output would mean 
job reductions of around 50 staff from programme making. 
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suggests that RTE's problems still stem from its self image as a monopoly 
broadcaster or national institution that continues to carry too many staff not 
related to its programme making function;  
 
The practicality of the matter is how many people in RTE actually work in 
television production in the first place. My understanding is that there are 
less than 30 full time television producers, from a staff of 2,135. Begs the 
question of what everybody else does since the most important part of 
RTE's output in terms of the level of cost and the level of impact on the 
public is its television programme expenditure. How come there are less 
then thirty producers internally in a staff of 2,135. You would think there 
would be more. The trouble is that they are paying attention to many 
matters which in my view are not central to what rte should be doingO12. 
 
As long as this is the case he suggests, then RTE does not offer value for money 
as broadcaster and more production should therefore be outsourced. The 
assessment tends to be a key legitimation for replacing RTE production with 
private sector production. However, this could equally legitimate the need for 
replacement of jobs with relevant increases in the production divisions of RTE13.  
 
7.6) Broadcasting and copyright issues 
The arguments associated with the partial privatisation of its production base has 
diverted attention away from the challenges that await RTE in the digital 
environment and the need for it to retain a critical mass for production in such an 
                                                           
12
 Interview James Hickey, 15/07/04. 
13
 RTE's internal review of 1998 suggests there are circa 800 staff directly involved in 
programme making. Looking into the digital future the pressure is on RTE to re-configure itself 
as a fully functioning content producer/publisher in its own right. Thus RTE needs to focus its 
public purposes across a wide range of programming in order to secure a public service 
presence into the technology neutral multi-platform future. Thus RTE would have to present its 
arguments for shelving industrial policy whilst developing public rationale for programme 
production. This would entail further transformation of its internal structures to guarantee the 
orientation of its resources towards broadcasting. 
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environment. The market structure for broadcasting has created an environment 
were generation of content and its marketing and distribution require significant 
resources and planning. Tied to the future of revenue generation and public 
purposes in an internationalised digital environment will be the ability of the 
broadcaster to retain rights, which, with the changing terms of trades with the 
independents, may only be possible if it generates programming itself. Whereas 
some members of SPI have called for RTE to be fully realised as a publisher 
broadcaster along the lines of Channel Four in the UK, this is not the official 
position of the organisation.  However, the official position taken by FMI in its 
submission to the forum on broadcasting suggested that whereas RTE should 
maintain editorially sensitive programming such as news and current affairs in-
house, all other domestic production or at least 25%, should come from the 
independent sector and, in more recent arguments, the rights to this 
programming should lie with the independent production company as opposed to 
the broadcaster14. This strategic orientation would point to the likelihood of a 
restriction of possible activities for the broadcaster in digital re-distribution. 
 
Strategically speaking, by the end of the 1990s RTE now had to make choices in 
relation to absorbing the pressure on its production base. Attempts to retain a 
resource base capable of producing a range of programming was now proving 
problematic. In 1998 an internal review group made up of employees of RTE 
attempted to confront the transformations needed; 
 
'The shape and mix and sourcing of RTE's future programme schedule will 
dictate the specific changes required in RTE's functions...in determining the 
implementation of a reduction in internal programme making, there are 
many options available. Each one of these will have a huge impact on 
programming policy, editorial control, finances and employment. In 
determining which programming should be transferred to the IPU, RTE 
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 Screen Producers Ireland, 2002, Submission to Forum on Broadcasting. Screen Producers 
Ireland, 2003, RTE, 2003, Submission Draft Public Service Broadcasting Charter. 
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must decide to outsource programmes with a high cost to employment ratio, 
or programmes with a low cost to employment ratio'15. 
  
Achieving a complimentary relationship between in house and commissions was 
also increasingly necessary because of the wider pressures pushing down on 
RTE's production base. RTE's precarious financial situation led to the wider 
'transformation programme' designed to appease the government in 1999 and 
seen as a precursor to any decision being made on a licence fee increase. The 
programme was aimed at reducing RTE's cost base and entailed decisions made 
about the structure of RTE's programme production arrangements now had to be 
hastened. Again the political decision to identify the staff in RTE as the fixed cost 
that was responsible for financial difficulties also represented a political choice 
related to reducing RTE's status as a monopoly provider, allowing a 'crowding in' 
of the market. 
  
By the late 1990s the policy goals associated with growing the independent 
sector from within RTE have considerably changed. The original intention of 
combining growth of this sector with a more plural mode of programme supply in 
RTE had proven difficult to reconcile. Whereas the history of programme supply 
from the independents would suggest that it had contributed range and diversity 
in terms of programming, it has also led to a degree of concentration in terms of 
supply. In general programming was coming from less plural sources and even 
less so from differentially organised production companies.  Compared to the 
artisanal period of 1960-1985, and the semi-professional phase of 1985-1993, 
the current corporate phase saw at least half the number of commissions go to a 
small number of expanding businesses. In 1995, the Independent Production 
Unit annual report related that 'the total value of commissions to the top six 
independent television production companies in 1995 was £2.3ml, which 
represents 41% of commissions'16. Thus in the second year of its operation the 
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 RTE, 1998, Review of rte's structures and operations, 1998 
16
 RTE, 1995, Independent Production Unit Annual Review. 
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conspicuous presence of large-scale operators raised questions vis a vis the 
issue of plural supply. In the period since this percentage was to drift steadily 
upwards so that by 2003 the IPU report of that year could relate  'Commissions of 
a value of €15.7ml representing 50% of the total sum were awarded to six 
independent production companies and a further sum of €5.3ml representing 
17% of the total sum was awarded to a further six independent production 
companies'17. The types of programming undertaken by these commissions also 
pointed to the degree to which the oligopolistic structure was self re-enforcing. 
The skills, capital and commissions accumulated by these twelve companies 
gave them the critical mass to deal with the types of long run programming that 
ensured annual profits and the potential of current programming being re-
commissioned into the following year. For these companies innovation was 
arguably less important than repetition as the initial investment in formats yielded 
larger returns, when reused, over longer periods of time. For the smaller scale 
operators, the converse was the case, with commissions being confined to single 
spot programming and a resulting necessity for diversification into advertising, 
corporate and educational production. Ironically, some of the criticisms pertaining 
to the structure and organisation of RTE appeared to be duplicating themselves 
in the 'independent' sector. The benefits of critical mass in a programme making 
organisation were being demonstrated in the success of the large-scale 
commercial independent operators. A second category denoting plurality which 
pertains to the economic bases of the production companies providing 
programming also arose as an issue. For the most part the super Indies and the 
smaller organisations are funded through commercial revenue with little or no 
production coming from not for profit community or social economy media 
initiatives. Again this raises questions about the intentions towards plurality 
articulated in the policy measures.  
 
If the policy rationale vis a vis plurality appeared to be increasingly compromised, 
then the overall rationale of stimulating an export oriented television production 
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 RTE, Independent Production Unit Annual Review 2002. 
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sector appeared also to be contradictory. For RTE, the purpose of its schedules 
is to provide a service for a national audience. It has thus commissioned 
programming from the independents which compliments its scheduling and 
overall strategies in public service terms. The principle of Article 5. is thus 
presented with a structural contradiction. The export potential is circumscribed by 
the national bias and complimentarity of the programming. This combined with 
the abject failure of TV3 as broadcaster and the BCI as the independent 
regulator to produce any notable level of demand from TV3 to the independents 
means that the export goal of the policy is somewhat under realised. Those 
working in the sector suggest that this export dimension is not an issue for them. 
As one producer suggests 'we are too busy making programmes for an Irish 
market. Our programmes are made with an Irish market in mind, that is where 
the demand is'18 . Another producer re-enforces this suggesting that it is the case 
in other European countries also:  
 
We don't make programmes for broadcast in Ireland that we hope to sell on 
internationally; we just directly approach the international broadcasters with 
a view to making programmes for them. If we were to change some of our 
programmes it would dilute the essence of it. I went to see an international 
distributor, used to be Chrysalis television, they were saying that 95% of 
domestic programming just will never travel, if you are aiming to sell stuff 
internationally some times you can compromise it so much, that it doesn't 
even appeal to the domestic audience any more, better off making Irish 
programmes for an Irish audience and in terms of selling stuff 
internationally, your better off trying to sell ideas internationally rather than 
programmes,19 .  
 
In 1996 RTE had signalled its awareness of this issue, under pressure from 
government reactions to Independent sector lobbying.  As it suggested in its 
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 Interview MD of independent production company  #1 
19
 Interview M.D. of independent production company #2, May, 2004. 
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1996 report: ‘during the year, the IPU became increasingly aware of the valid 
ambition of several Irish producers and production companies to expand into the 
international sector, and it began to examine what role, if any, it should play in 
such an expansion’ 20. By 1999, RTE announced an international development 
fund as part of its efforts to assuage the demands of the larger independents who 
now firmly established in home markets sought expansion into non domestic 
markets; 
    
‘The IPU launched a targeted strategic initiative in 1999 to assist in the 
development of the independent productions sector. Many companies find it 
difficult to allocate the small but critical amounts of development finance 
necessary to put a potentially attractive international programme proposal 
into the international market. RTE's funding meanwhile is normally directed 
towards material for the domestic schedules and resources do not flow 
towards projects primarily intended for international sale by production 
companies. RTE recognises however that the continuing dependence of 
most Irish companies on Irish broadcast income is an inhibition to the 
development of a healthy and viable production sector’21.  
 
RTE however did not fully commit to this strategy and continue to point to its 
central purpose of serving Irish audiences. As such, the export dimension of 
Article 5 and its interpretation through national legislation appears to have little 
relevance in developing the export potential of smaller nations. In European 
terms the application of the European directive has been recently shown to 
benefit mostly larger countries who can sell on product to smaller neighbouring 
countries which share linguistic and cultural commonalities22. That is, Ireland still 
demonstrates relative low export capacity whereas it provides a market for UK 
product.   
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 RTE, Independent Production Unit annual review 1996 
21
 RTE, Independent Production Unit annual review 1999 
22
 David Graham Associates, 2004, Impact study of measures concerning the promotion of TV 
programmes, DGA, London, 2004. 
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The diversion of revenue into the independent sector thus stands as a subsidy to 
a domestic commercial industry which, despite the caveats above, has 
contributed a degree of plurality in provision and greater range in programming to 
the programme schedules. However, as the purposes of the legislation has been 
otherwise it is still not clear how the independent contribution is, without 
reservation, public money well spent. Whereas the existing rationale of this policy 
appears to be somewhat moribund, the public interest rationale that may pertain 
has not been fully explored. Considering that the amount of spend on domestic 
programming within RTE now stands at a ratio of two to one in terms of in-house 
to commissions, how do independents consider their role as elements in a public 
service? The process of commissioning and producing programmes creates a 
considerable degree of overlap between the organisation and the independents. 
There are commissioning rounds, on-going production meetings and a core set 
of guidelines used by both in-house and independent programme makers. 
However, it is clear that the independents do not approach their programming as 
part of a public service per se. The key personnel of five successful production 
houses were only able to articulate their relationship to a public service in the 
slightest of terms. According to one company director, the ‘entertainment sector 
isn't really a public service role, that would be more like the educational or 
documentary strands’23 . Another company re-enforced this attitude in the 
following terms 'I understand their public service remit as both a viewer and a 
producer, but in terms of what we do we are very much involved in the 
entertainment and comedy end of things, we just try to make funny programmes, 
public service broadcasting remit wouldn't enter our heads when we're doing 
stuff'24 . A third interviewee suggested that the public service element of RTE's 
operation was no longer of great relevance; 'RTE are caught between a rock and 
a hard wall, while they would view themselves as a public service broadcaster, 
they are primarily driven by commercial realities, it our job to understand those 
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realities'25 . From this perspective it appears that public money is directed to 
funding indigenous commercially driven content. However, the reality is perhaps 
more complex.   
 
Within RTE the contribution of the independents in producing content for an 
overall public service is not questioned, what is questioned however is the 
industrial logic of their continued expansion without consideration of a specific 
role and balance between pure commercial and semi commercial production. 
According to one producer who is also involved in the RTE trade union group; 
 
We don't have a problem with the independent sector doing well, what I do 
have a difficulty with is the growth of the independent sector, a growth 
pattern which effects our ultimate sustainability. It depends on what model 
you use, if you look at the likes of New Zealand that went through a 
nightmare of de-regulation, if you look at America and television production, 
and so-called independent or commercial radio there, there is very different 
regulation, there is essentially market domination, by one giant 
conglomerate, Clear Channel, and that's the kind of situation that has now 
developed within the independent sector in the UK, with the recent mergers 
there, and to a certain extent here, we have seen the emergence within the 
independent sector of four to five, key players as opposed to the ideal of the 
independent sector, which was meant to be relatively small creative units as 
opposed to the Tyrones and that kind of thing'26. 
 
A producer working within the television division of RTE concurs with this 
suggesting that the logic of developing the industry tends to obscure the logic of 
commissioning for public purposes27. There is little consideration of what type of 
programming should be kept in-house in order to utilise the institutional strengths 
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 interview MD of independent production company #4, June, 2004 
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 Interview, RTE Producer and Head of Trade Union Group, June 2004.  
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 Interview Producer, RTE, November 2004. 
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of RTE whereas there is no appreciation of how the structure and organisation of 
independents may lend itself to other types of programme making. Initially 
programming was commissioned based on what the independents had the 
capacity to produce. He suggests that there has been a convergence in the way 
both production cultures operate, with RTE becoming more business like and 
independents appropriating RTE practices and sensibilities, but, little effort has 
been made to articulate the ongoing differences. These differences stretch 
beyond the question of handling editorially sensitive programming such as news 
and current affairs. In the most obvious cases they can apply to situation wherein 
programming creates a direct interface with the public most notably in reality 
television genres. In such a situation programming that needs to be dealt with 
within the public service ethos is now often produced under the logics of 
commercial companies operating according to the bottom line. This can lead to 
damage for the public service profile, reduce the readily appreciable 
distinctiveness of RTE as a public broadcaster and contradict RTE's claims to 
address its audience as citizens. As it would appear that it is government policy 
to harness the independent sector to drive the re-configured commercial 
dimension of RTE's programming, the question of the division of labour in 
programming between RTE and the commercial sector thus needs to be 
addressed. Thus the depth and range of RTE's production base becomes a key 
question in relation to the overall commercialisation of its content.       
 
7.7) Organisational change and new rationales for commissioning 
One of the key successes of the governments approach to changing the form 
and function of RTE was its pressuring of the organisation to embrace the 
expertise of consultants instead of relying on its own rationale for organisational 
change. In the period from 1997, choices made by elected representatives were 
being considerably supplemented by the input of hired expertise. This, arguably, 
is indicative of both the absence of requisite state machinery to make such inputs 
and a surrender of responsibility by both government and state 
agencies/employees to make decisions in the public interest. As such it 
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represented the replacement of expertise based on normatively derived social 
goals to governance based on the supposedly value free realms of 'budget, 
accountancy and audit'28.  In 2001 RTE was granted a licence fee increase that 
was just 20% of the sum it had initially requested. One of the key reasons cited 
by the Government was the evidence produced by Price Waterhouse Coopers 
investigation that RTE was not making sufficient progress in its own internal 
transformation agreements29. The impending financial crisis had thus forced RTE 
into a corner resulting in the commissioning of a consultancy report from 
KPMG/Logical on a strategic framework for the organisation’s future 
development30. The then recently appointed RTE authority understood that the 
only reasoning that consultants would find acceptable, would be that of other 
consultants. If RTE’s internal Project Teams report had been a bottom up 
exercise the KPMG/Logical exercise represented an entirely top down exercise. 
The report highlighted the necessity of developing a programming strategy that 
would create a complimentary efficiency between in house and commissioned 
programming. It highlighted RTE's inflexible cost base as a key factor in RTE 
failing to manage its programming commitments in a cost efficient way. 
According to the report 'other international broadcasters including those with a 
public service remit have a cost base aligned with their mix of commercial and 
licence funding, so far RTE has not, the mismatch means that RTE faces 
uncertainty in its revenues which it cannot adjust adequately’ (KPMG, 2002). In 
general the report suggested that the broadcaster was overstretching itself in 
relation to its public policy/public service duties without be able to adjust its costs 
as revenues demanded it. Its commitment to public purposes was not reflected in 
the amount of licence fee that it received from the government, and thus, it 
needed to adjust its operations to reflect the fiscal value put on public 
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 As has been noted such realms are normatively derived from rationalities of government 
based on the supremacy of free market economics and the (asocial) rationally maximising 
subject at the centre of new liberal governance. 
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 Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2001, Review of application by RTE for a license fee increase, On 
behalf of the Department of Arts, Heritage, The Gaeltacht and the Islands.  
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 Logical Strategy and KPMG Corporate Finance, 2002, Report to the RTE Authority: A Strategic 
Framework for RTE.  
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broadcasting by successive governments. It thus suggested as a key strategic 
move that RTE needed to 'increase flexibility, enabling RTE to adjust to 
variations in revenue by shifting from fixed to variable cost structure, in particular, 
steadily outsourcing a greater proportion of television production' (KPMG/Logica, 
2002). In general the report suggested that RTE needed to reduce programming 
that utilised high fixed costs (full time staff and facilities) and balance out its 
schedule with programming that represented more variable costs (independent 
production). This technocratic parlance suggested that RTE could source 
programming from the independent sector above the fixed cost of its statutory 
commitment and thus incorporate flexibility in relation to programme performance 
relative to commercial revenue generation. The consultants suggested that this 
was the only option open to RTE as its existing high fixed cost base was no 
longer tenable due in part to the additional fixed cost of the 'Independent 
Production Unit funds'. Thus existing staff would have to be reduced to match 
standard levels of demand as opposed to peak levels and remaining staff used in 
a way that maximised their cost efficiency. In order to achieve both of the aims of 
increasing flexibility and maximising cost efficiency in a complimentary fashion 
the report suggested that RTE move to what it termed 'focussed production in 
television'. Focussed production would entail a restructuring exercise wherein 'all 
long running predictable programming is retained in-house, as well as 
programming of key strategic importance, such as Sports, where RTE should 
hold the rights. As a result in house programming of approximately 350hours a 
year would be transferred to the independent sector'. In the appendix to the 
report the type of programming that would remain in-house was summarised as 
follows; 
 News 
 
 Sport 
 
 Current Affairs 
 
 Fair City (tri weekly 
soap opera) 
 
 Winning Streak 
(games show) 
 
 Fame and Fortune 
(game show) 
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Thus full capacity programmes would fully utilise a reduced work force whereas 
the ability to commission from the independents, at will, would introduce the kind 
of flexibility that would allow RTE to control its costs. Inevitably it would also 
introduce a division of labour between what RTE producers got to produce and 
that which is out sourced to the independent sector.  
 
Following the submission of the report to RTE management, RTE later related in 
a correspondence to the Department of Communications that 'the broad 
principles (of the KPMG report) have been accepted by the authority'31. RTE 
moved to implement the recommendations as part of its overall pitch for a licence 
fee rise in 2002, through an internal organised project group, the Strategic 
Targets and Results team. The implications of moving to a 'focussed 
programming' were soon observable in the stations spend on its commissioning 
strategy. In 2000, 2001 and 2002 RTE's spend on the independent sector was 
broadly in line with its statutory commitment to the sector. In 2003, RTE's 
statutory commitment to the independent sector, under the Broadcasting Act 
2001, stood at €27,732,689. However in 2003 RTE's spend on the independent 
sector amounted to €46,148,898, a significant increase on its statutory 
commitment32. With in-house productions then standing at €76,223,000, 
commissions from the independent sector then represented 37% of RTE's 
domestic spend in 2003, thus beyond  the 20% mandated in the 1993 Act33. In 
the IPU report for 2003, the list of commissions in each genre is in excess of that 
for previous years although the general category of genre types is consistent with 
the strategy outlined by KPMG. In the industry RTE's move to the process of 
'focussed programming' was illustrated by the discontinuation of its contract with 
Tyrone Productions to produce the popular mid afternoon studio based magazine 
programme 'Open House'. Whereas the move baffled both Tyrone and certain 
commentators it was in line with its strategy of bringing 'long run predictable 
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 RTE, Strategic Targets and Results Team, Presentation to Department of Marine 
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programming' in-house34. The boon to programming hours was however also 
directly related to RTE's commitment to the provision of new programming as 
part of its statement of commitments related to its new charter resulting out of the 
2002 licence fee settlement. The adjustments made by RTE to essentially 
outsource flexibilisation contributed to its successful bid for a license fee increase 
in 2002. The long petitioned demand of a licence fee rise that was index linked to 
cost price index (so that the fee would rise each year in line with inflation) now 
allowed RTE to move ahead in its strategic planning. Another factor in RTE’s 
successful licence fee campaign was the intervention of the Forum on 
Broadcasting which broke with its agreement not to comment on funding levels to 
suggest that RTE’s lack of license fee revenue was a central issue in the future 
of Irish broadcasting.    
 
Within RTE it was felt that the reduction of the production base and the 
increasingly economistic logic of utilising production capacity had gone too far. 
The pressure to achieve optimum flexibility had led to a division in programme 
production which had little to do with programming logic yet restricted RTE's in-
house programming to a considerable degree. Programme producers within RTE 
have found them selves restricted to mostly studio and set based production 
whereas location production has gone out to the commercial sector. The 
developments have led to concerns that RTE's production base can no longer 
address a wide range of production within a public service ethos but must allow 
commercial companies to deal with large categories of programming. According 
to a producer and member of the TUG group: 
  
What commissioning editors do then with their budget, particular types of 
production particularly ESP, (out and about), an awful lot of that has gone 
outside, the type of factual type programming, stuff like ear to the ground, 
the travel programmes, that kind of thing has tended to go out a lot more 
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quickly.... There would be a concern, but not just amongst producers, but 
also journalists that would have worked on factual type programmes in the 
past, would you believe, that kind of thing, increasingly they see a decrease 
in the number of outlets available for them, the type of programmes which 
they are now doing are studio based, more light entertainment variety type 
programming, from a career point of view, people do not have the same 
types of career developments opportunities that they would have had, even 
10 or 15 years ago, it has impacted on our ability to undertake certain types 
of programmes, staff have been let go in the areas necessary for outside 
production, if we want to do something along those lines now we cant35.  
          
Central to this complaint is the fact that market governance logic has supplanted 
a dialogue based approach to the genres and programming should be 
approached within RTE and what programming could easily go out. Another 
producer points out that much studio based light entertainment and arts 
programming could easily be commissioned out but that it is important to 
discursively 'identify the areas where that type of programming could just as well 
be made by in-house as by independent, and the kind of programming that could 
only have been made in-house or could only have been made independently'36. 
What is of additional concern is the fact that this type of programming is now 
certainly prone to a higher degree of commercialisation. That is, in so far as 
RTE's role in broadcasting news/current affairs/informational based programming 
is perceived as being its core contribution to public service, the remaining 
'indigenous' content is not deemed to be editorially sensitive and therefore open 
to drive RTE's commercial performance. Central to this approach is a negation of 
the proposition that public interest programming may pertain to non-informational 
genres of broadcasting. Whereas it was hoped that the licence fee rise prompted 
by the Forum on Broadcasting may allow more flexibility on this issue, the 
increase and its attendant statement of commitments and charter have, for the 
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most part, tended to bypass RTE production and flow out to the independent 
sector. Concerns about the reduced capacity were both anticipated and 
expressed only by the then DG Bob Collins: 
 
 ‘We have taken very significant measures to ensure that our 
 cost base is as low as possible. Part of our concern is that the cost base 
 is much lower than it should be in terms of making the range of 
 programming we believe is necessary for the audience’37.   
 
Once again the issue of diversity in the cultural output of the broadcaster comes 
to the fore as the drama, reality and lifestyle genres of programming are more 
closely tied to the commercial necessities of the broadcaster. The demands of 
commercial revenue places innovation, criticality and diversity in these genres 
within a whole new context.   
 
7.8) Organisational structure and the shifting balance of programming 
Under circumstances of financial strain, governance and structural changes had 
been coaxed out of RTE before the Forum intervened on the issue of public 
funding. Focussed production radically re-orientated RTE's production base 
whereas the move to Integrated Business Divisions (IBDs) heralded a new 
culture of production within the organisation. The introduction of integrated 
business divisions sought to uncover the distribution of costs and revenues within 
the organisation. The move to IBD’s was suggested by the KPMG logical report 
and was essentially tied up with the transformation programme demanded by 
government in return for increased public funding. The report was also a result of 
the fact that PWC had cast doubt on the previous transformation programme and 
its benefits, contributing to the less than substantial licence fee increase in 2001.  
The central concept of the IBDs was to ‘increase accountability for performance 
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and introduce transparency in measuring performance’38 .  In a presentation to 
Government RTE management proposed that ‘divisional areas are not 
accountable for the revenue sides of their business, giving control of both costs 
and revenues to the IBDs will achieve greater and more effective level of 
performance’. The IBDs were to be the start of a new ‘organisation design, which 
devolves many operational, commercial and support responsibilities directly into 
new IBDs’. The ibds were to break down into three large units, Television, Radio 
and News, with each of them being responsible for both costs and revenues. 
 
For RTE this represented a modified version of producer’s choice, the version of 
new public management that had been introduced to the BBC in the 1990s. 
Whereas in the late 1990s RTE management had toyed with the introduction of 
producer choice and even introduced it in various experimental projects, the 
problems associated with its operation in the BBC coupled with internal 
resistance led to its withdrawal. Whereas producer choice fragmented the BBC 
into miniature cost centres, the IBDs integrate the various elements involved in 
programme making into spatially related organisational structures. A key reason 
for this move was to make the programme maker’s cognisant of the cost and 
revenues associated with their programming.  Premised on the assertion that 
RTE 'output units' lacked accountability for costs and transparency for how those 
costs were incurred the 'change to a full business division structure in which 
there is full accountability and responsibility for all activities providing output, 
creating costs and generating revenue in one place for each of the major types of 
output provided by RTE’. In an evaluation of the move to this model 
Pricewaterhouse Cooper related ‘the existing output/production/editorial focus of 
the TV and radio divisions is therefore expected to change to a managerial focus 
which recognises the financial and revenue implications of production 
decisions'39. Thus the new IBD's sought to encourage the three e's of economy 
efficiency and effectivity without necessarily going as far as introducing internal 
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markets. According to one producer working within RTE the move to IBDs has 
meant awareness of a financial rationale for programme makers and that ‘a 
significant amount of responsibility upon the producer was probably a good idea, 
financial responsibility, we have actually moved towards that, producers do now 
have more financial responsibility than we used to have, and we can do certain 
degree of trading off on budgets, shaping budgets, we wouldn't have had that ten 
years ago'. The same producer suggests that being aware of costs and revenue 
is not the same as being driven by them and the ethos of public service in 
programming still dominates. However, according to the same producer, the Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI), designed to monitor the performance of the IBD's, 
prioritise the awareness of market share without a fuller elaboration of whether 
the organisation is meeting public purposes in its programming. According to the 
producer 'You are conscious of dealing in a world in which performance is 
measured, and sometimes measure in terms of figures, and sometimes you do 
wonder the extent to which other equally important measures of the success of a 
television programme are being used'. 
    
Following RTE's move to focussed programming and Integrated Business 
Divisions, the Government consented to a considerable increase in the licence 
fee. Following the report from the Forum on Broadcasting, one of the key roles of 
the future converged content regulator, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, 
was outlined as being the oversight of the charter agreed between the Minister 
and RTE. The Charter as outlined by the Forum's interim report was presented 
as a reform of the situation wherein 'RTE is not bound by any precise rules on 
the content or timing of the material it broadcasts'40. It suggested that a charter 
would ‘express in definite terms the precise scope of RTE's role and 
commitments which we require of it, under statute, as the designated public 
broadcaster'. The charter would, in the Ministers view, become the key means 
through which RTE's use of public funding would be made accountable to the 
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public. Having reversed decades of depressed public funding, the Minister was 
keen to ensure the organisation would legitimise the increased public funding. 
The development of Charters for European public broadcasters was by this stage 
an intrinsic part of the process of articulating the relationship of those 
broadcasters to the market. The RTE charter would detail certain 'identified and 
measurable deliverables' that would provide a benchmark for RTE's 
performance. Whereas the discussion concerning the qualitative dimensions of 
what RTE should deliver had not progressed greatly from the previous 
Broadcasting Acts’ characterisation of public broadcasting, the charter was quite 
clear on how much of it there should be.  
 
The question of the balance between quantity and quality had been an element 
of RTE’s original pitch for a substantial increase in the licence fee in 2001. The 
2001 application from RTE, reviewed by consultants PWC, wrestled briefly with 
the issue. In their original application RTE had proposed that additional licence 
fee would contribute towards what it termed 'enhanced programming' and would 
'preserve existing improvements in service and permit more and better Irish 
programmes'41. PWC, though not making any judgements themselves, posed the 
question of whether 'there is a clear relationship between cost of output and 
quality of output'42. RTE attempted to address this question more fully in its 
following application for a licence fee rise suggesting that its production base 
allowed both value for money whilst ensuring quality. It first set out that, relative 
to the UK, its cost per hour of production was highly competitive offering good 
value when compared with like for like programming. It also pointed to the 
evidence of its own historical experience that levels of production spend tends to 
demonstrate a high co-relation with audience share. If audience share was taken 
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to be one indicator of programme quality, then the evidence suggested that high 
levels of production spend, for core programming was a necessity43.  
 
RTE's arguments were met with little support in either the 2001 or the 2002 
licence fee applications. In 2001 PWC queried whether 'enhanced' programming 
was in fact a climb-down from its previous commitments to increase its domestic 
output. Following this the director general of RTE Bob Collins submitted a 
subsequent letter suggesting that levels of output would increase from 40% to 
47%. He suggested that increased output would; 
 
1. Redress the decline in indigenous television output which had occurred over 
the past number of years and 
2. Differentiate its programming from other broadcasters operating in the market 
by producing original quality indigenous programmes which will drive TV ratings 
which in turn will help drive advertising revenue44.  
 
In 2002, despite the derisory licence fee rise of 2001, RTE once again stated that 
it recognised the necessity of providing clear objectives in its statement of 
commitments but continued to caution that 'the commitments will be in 
quantitative and qualitative terms, because more does not always equal better'. 
RTE suggested that in order to invest in qualitative dimensions such as 
innovation, production values, technical quality enhancement, original and 
challenging programme making, then any charter would have to allow for 
investment in training, research and development, and the nurturing of 
journalistic and creative talent. 
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 A comparable analyses taking place in the UK under the auspices of the Independent 
Television Commission, found that the historical evidence also suggested that 'mid level' 
television budgets tended to provide the basis for quality without demanding the kind of 
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7.9) Interest group pressure 
The logic of the market, in terms of quantitative measures for value for money, 
was re-enforced by a wider pressure from those who stood to benefit from this 
market logic. In general the Minister was absorbing pressure from different 
interest groups in relation to RTE's commitments to the independent sector. 
According to James Hickey, Screen Producers Ireland were unhappy about the 
lack of attention paid to independent producers in the licence fee settlement of 
2002. The €20million, rising annually with CPI, was now according to Hickey, out 
of proportion to the licence fee. According to Hickey, 'the Ipu figure is now 
therefore less as a percentage of RTE's overall television programme 
expenditure then it was in 2001'45. SPI put pressure on he government to rectify 
this and even though they were satisfied with RTE's increased spend on 
commissions they demanded a statutory guarantee of no less than 25% of 
production spend. Both TV3 and the Independent Broadcasters of Ireland also 
publicly and privately lobbied on these issues. In its submission to the Forum on 
Broadcasting, TV3 had insisted that there be 'a number of phased steps, under 
the administration of the BCI, to ensure that state funding provided to RTE and 
TG4 is concentrated exclusively on producing Irish content'46. At the time of the 
Minister consideration of the licence fee increase in 2002, TV3 contacted his 
office to advise on a linkage between public spend and indigenous content. 
Writing in the contexts of RTE's out bidding of TV3 for the rights to the UEFA 
Champions League that year, TV3 complained that; 
 
'Rte will now spend in excess €2.5 million to broadcast these matches. 
Regrettably, we calculate that the amount bid by RTE to secure the rights 
will require a substantial contribution from the licence fee. This type of 
behaviour is damaging to Irish broadcasting as these funds could have 
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been used for Irish programming development in Ireland since tv3 could 
have continued to provide the Champions league coverage for free as it has 
for the past three years. The licence fee payer would surely be better 
served if this mandatory levy was invested in Ireland'.  
  
In its later submission to the charter review (which was to set out the general 
parameters of RTE’s operations) TV3 re-enforced the point stating that ' the 
justification for a compulsory and universal licence fee is that it will provide a 
choice of Irish public service programming alongside the massive and growing 
consumer led choice available (and) that the relevant programming...is provided 
in prime time47. In general TV3 were looking for an exit strategy for its own 
commitments to indigenous programming but also, and critically, a narrowing of 
the public service remit to that of 'distinctive' as opposed to 'distinctive and 
popular' (McKinsey). The Independent Broadcasters of Ireland followed a similar 
tack suggesting that RTE restrict its licence fee use to funding indigenous 
material of a factual and educational nature48 
 
In general, these varied pressures and RTE's previous move to focussed 
programming entailed a large increase in public funding flowing into a production 
base that had been re-structured to work well below capacity in order to 
introduce flexibility into its cost structure. This in fact meant that the money 
flowing to RTE from the licence fee rise was in fact, bypassing in-house 
production and for the most part stimulating increased demand from the 
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 This was a strategy that had proven results as parent company Can West had used similar 
tactics in its base market to influence the debate on CBC, the Canadian public broadcaster. CBC 
now produces only indigenous material but has lost substantial audience share in the process. In 
simple terms the strategy emphasises the licence fee increase as a form of subsidy in the 
audiovisual economy, with public funding flowing towards an area of indigenous industrial 
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finance would have been. The department had committed itself to a low tax regime with public 
finances coming from other innovative sources. A licence fee that represented an injection of 
public finances, and a potential of the majority of that going towards an indigenous growth area, 
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independent sector. The evidence for this is clear in the 2003 figures for 
commissions (see table above). Whereas 513 hours of programming were 
commissioned by the IPU via the standard arrangement an extra 171 hours were 
commissioned on top of this.  According to the 2003 IPU report, 'in addition to 
IPU activity as detailed above, RTE also provided additional funding and/or 
facilities to the value of €12,644,377 in respect of other independent programmes 
which were commissioned, completed or developed in 2003 (RTE : 2003). This 
was in addition to the expenditure recorded on the statutory Independent 
Television Programmes Account and arose primarily as a direct result of the 
Licence fee increase granted in 2002'. (IPU annual account 2003). The cost of in-
house productions for 2003 stood at €76,223,000 whereas the cost of 
commissions stood at €45,904,000. Thus the balance of programming had 
significantly shifted towards the independent sector with commissions in 2003 
accounting for just over 37% of indigenous programme costs. The addition of the 
charter in 2003 with its commitments to specific genres appears to lead to a 
further need to draw on independent sector commissions whilst maintaining its 
own production base at pre-licence fee increase levels. The penalty for RTE not 
meeting these targets is an adjustment in the degree to which the licence fee can 
be increased yearly in line with cost price index which, for the present, is a 
Government decision. Effectively, RTE’s finances are subject to direct political 
decision on a yearly basis.  
 
The key issue here is the extent to which RTE’s integration into the logic of 
market governance supersedes the bureaucratic governance within RTE, and the 
potential of a democratic governance agenda, such as the Public Trust structure 
of the BBC or the Scott Trust of the Guardian newspaper, that engenders public 
input on an ongoing basis. As with the removal of the capacity to decide on what 
programming should be produced in-house and what programming should go 
out, the rationalising logic introduces a means/end approach that does not 
consider the purposes of the organisation under review. A similar approach is 
thus taken in relation to the decision as to how much of RTE’s license fee rise to 
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direct towards programming as the ‘measurable deliverable’ of a licence fee rise 
as opposed to enhanced training, structures and innovation as a less tangible 
measureable. The governance approach ensures that only that which can be 
counted is considered worthy of measuring. In the contexts of a politically 
unprecedented licence fee settlement, RTE was surrendering a degree of its 
programme making and organisational autonomy. The Minister was aware that 
the licence fee rise would have to have legitimacy amongst the other interest 
groups involved in the policy process, but also that it could be justified to the 
citizenry via tangible and measureable outcomes. The effect was to introduce an 
incentive for more populist programming into RTE. This was not inconsistent with 
the public service mission as a degree of populism mixed with a public 
knowledge agenda is possibly the only strategy for public broadcasters existing 
within a expansive market driven industry. However, it also introduces the 
exclusivities of the market via its attention to market mechanisms of measuring 
performance. Would expanded television programming driven by advertising be 
capable of addressing the needs of plural audiences?, what cohort of consumers 
would be most served by this structure? Would the broadcaster be able to 
develop its central role in generating critical publicity and discursive testing 
without being able to cross subsidise expensive political journalism? Could the 
Indies do investigative journalism without the security of organisational support 
for labour and time intensive development and production? With a surplus of 
revenue directed towards the independent sector there is space for RTE to 
commission or invest in programming arising from other production bases. This 
however, would involve a degree of consultation with community and ethnic 
media concerns to attempt to widen the cultures of production contributing to the 
national broadcasting agenda.       
 
7.10) Deliberative policy generation and the discursive re-articulation of 
PSB 
One important development in government policy on broadcasting in this period 
was the emergence of a deliberative policy style. Beginning with the Forum on 
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Broadcasting, public forums became a testing site for a new consultative 
approach to policy development. Using a range of methods including the creation 
of the Forum, the Department also hosted public events on issues such as 
Broadcasting policy and Sport, issued consultations on the development of 
RTE’s charter and statement of commitments and invited submissions and 
participation in relation to the development of broadcasting legislation. Thus, 
whereas the political economy of broadcasting was very much an internal 
departmental and community specific matter (illustrating a politically determined 
drive to institute market mechanisms into RTE’s functioning), the Ministry opened 
up the discursive construction of public broadcasting to the wider public. This 
represented a significant departure in Irish policy terms but was in keeping with a 
more open a dialogic approach to policy generation across Europe in this period. 
It was also characteristic of the emerging Fianna Fail policy style of negotiated, 
consensus-lead governance and the way in which the government supported 
public service broadcasting, but not necessarily in the shape it was in.   
 
The 2001 Broadcasting Act had provided a wide and all embracing definition for 
public broadcasting as required by European Union competition concerns in this 
area. The broad definition of PSB could be interpreted as tacit support for the 
continued internal re-interpretation of public broadcasting free of any specific 
generic definitions. In the legislation PSB was defined as having ‘the character of 
a public service’, free to air and available to the whole community. It would 
provide mixed genre schedules; carry news and informational programming and 
programmes of cultural relevance to the Irish public. However, such generality 
also made it difficult for the government to determine specific policies for the 
broadcasting sector.   The Forum on Broadcasting had been convened by 
Minister, Sile DeValera, in the summer of 2002 with the specific remit of 
addressing the distinct roles for public and commercial broadcasters; the 
arrangements for funding for PSB; the role of the independent television 
production sector; the potential roles of all broadcasters in relation to national, 
regional and local level programming; the role of broadcasting in the promotion of 
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the Irish language; the responsibilities of different broadcasters for the production 
of cultural content and the preservation of audio visual material. The forum 
addressed these questions both internally whilst also holding a number of public 
meetings and inviting submissions from the general public on pre defined 
matters. The forum was eventually to report to the Minister a year later and 
helped to set the agenda for a number of issues. Internal documentation from the 
Department helps to reveal the role of the Forum in placing certain issues on the 
policy agenda. The key issues relative to public broadcasting and RTE which the 
Forum had an impact in generating to the top of the policy agenda were the 
continued public support for the public broadcaster RTE; the necessity of 
requisite public funding to support RTE’s remit; the necessity of increased 
regulation of RTE via an overarching sector regulator, the generation of a charter 
and the development of a set of programming commitments from RTE in order to 
increase its accountability to the public.  
 
Fianna Fail, continuous with its historically ambiguous support for PSB, 
assimilated this advice and added its own support for a public broadcaster which 
presented a ‘uniquely Irish voice’ with an ability to reflect on ‘the life of the nation’ 
(DCMNR, 2002). Whereas in the 1920s 2RN had come into being as reactive 
policy to modernity and post colonialism and in the 1960s RTE emerged from 
government concern over the threat of commercial imperative to cultural policy, 
in 2002, RTE’s digital future was being secured in response to the perceived 
threat of Globalisation to a distinctive Irish identity. The new minister Dermot 
Ahern was working with tacit knowledge of Sky’s domination of digital television 
distribution, the EU’s moves to develop the internal market and the difficulties of 
directing positive interventionist policy within the regulatory state (see previous 
chapter). Public broadcasting was thus becoming discursively and structurally re-
aligned with Fianna Fails vision of a distinctly Irish national (de-politicised) 
cultural producer, albeit one that was open to populist re-interpretation by myriad 
contributions to the broadcaster’s schedules. This was in some contrast to the 
politicised public broadcaster of the 1995 Green Paper. However, support for 
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RTE still needed to be tested to ensure no electoral damage was experienced 
through the support of an increased licence fee.  The Forum helped to secure the 
legitimacy of the public broadcaster RTE and shored up government 
interventions in this area. Public opinion, perhaps also driven by anxiety about 
cultural globalisation, was in broad support of the maintenance of a distinctive 
national public broadcaster capable of undertaking national cultural production. 
The government was able to announce an index linked licence fee increase in 
2002 partially through its effectiveness in restructuring the organisational basis of 
the broadcaster but also through the general support for RTE that had been 
generated in the public sphere. However, whereas the forum had begun the 
process of re-articulating the importance of public broadcasting in a general 
meta-culture that had come to link privatisation and liberalisation with the 
economic success of the Celtic Tiger, the Government still sought a closer 
reading of what PSB might entail. With the announcement of a licence fee 
increase for RTE in 2002 it also announced what it referred to as a fundamental 
restructuring of public service broadcasting. RTE’s governance would be 
subsumed within a proposed single regulator for the broadcasting sector, the 
Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (legislation pending 2008). It would become a 
commercial state company with a board of 12 members. 5% of its licence fee 
would be re-distributed as contestable funds for programming of an Irish cultural 
nature (see below). It would generate a renewable charter that was to be a 
statement of its activities and a contract between it and the Irish viewer and it 
would annually state its programme commitments in clear terms so that the 
public service customer could be clear about what they were getting for their 
money.    
 
Both the charter and the statement of commitments were developed within an 
open consultative style. The DCMNR generated a draft charter in late 2003 to 
allow the submission of comments on its contents. In general it restated the 
public service character of RTE, to provide choice in its public service offerings, 
to adhere to a set of guiding principles in relation to the general character of its 
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programming and to adhere to competition laws so as not to disadvantage its 
commercial rivals. The charter published in summer 2004 was itself was a 
relatively broad but important document. It set out RTE’s legislative commitments 
under both Irish and EU law whilst also attempting to define the general 
character of the public broadcaster.  It restated the public service nature of the 
broadcaster emphasising its commitment to reflecting the democratic, social and 
cultural values of the country, its contribution to media pluralism, its commitment 
to geographical, cultural and political diversity and its objective and impartial 
approach to informational programming. This was a forward looking update on 
the public service remit that demonstrated a general understanding of the place 
of broadcasting within the nation and how that related to the wider mediascape. It 
was in keeping with the European Union’s definition of public broadcasting and 
its less nationalistic and more socio-culturally pluralist sense of public purposes 
(CEC, 1999b).  However, a key question arises as to whether these general 
aspirations were matched by the shifting political economy of the broadcaster. 
Would the broadcaster be able to programme material relative to the emerging 
diversity of the country if its commissions were chiefly tied to driving advertising 
revenue? How would it manage its commitment to diversity as well as reflecting 
the majoritarian views of the country and generating healthy advertising revenues 
via the mass audience? How would the broadcaster decide on what political, 
cultural and social values were reflective of the majority? The discursive 
construction and material restructuring of public broadcasting appeared to be 
riddled with contradictions, albeit contradictions that could be institutionally 
resolved if the political will to mitigate the incentives towards consensual 
majoritariansim were to be addressed.       
 
Whereas the consultation on the charter had a lower public profile than the forum 
on broadcasting it did attract considerable response from industry and non profit 
interests. In general the response from the sector combined with some of the 
earlier responses to the Forum help to plot the policy strategies of myriad interest 
groups as mapped below; 
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Policy actor interests in restructuring of RTE 
 TV3 (Can West/Granada/Doughty Hanson) sought to limit RTE's 
competitiveness in high profile acquisitions through arguing its necessary 
commitment to the indigenous production sector. 
 Independent Broadcasters Ireland replicated those (Can West generated) 
arguments 
 Fianna Fail sought to re-orientate and de-politicise RTE as a national cultural 
broadcaster 
 Community media interests pointed to the vacuum in 'public' programming left 
by RTE's commercialism. 
 The Broadcasting Commission of Ireland downplayed the significance of the 
integrated public broadcaster to boost its own competencies as an 
overarching regulatory body. 
 The independent sector lobby groups sought to divert as much revenue as 
possible towards their members. 
 State agencies un-related to broadcasting emphasised programme 
production as a significant area of export development for SME's. 
 
Overall the consultation process served to legitimate RTE, the licence fee 
increase and a new policy style based on ongoing consultation and discussion 
whilst also introducing an updated conceptualisation of PSB. It also 
demonstrated considerable support for the governments strategy of re-structuring 
RTE to produce more indigenous popular and culturally relevant programming, 
albeit, as the result of the strategic motives of some of the actors as much as for 
a wider cultural rationale.  Whereas the process of agenda setting still lay with 
government and government appointed bodies, discussion of the governmental 
agenda was now open to an input from a wider array of interests. Whether this 
meant that RTE itself was open to wider input from civil dimensions of 
consensual governance is, however, a moot point. What is clear is that the 
national broadcaster would reflect the emerging neo-liberal corporatist state in its 
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priortising of culturally relevant programming determined in large part by its re-
alignment to market operation.    
          
7.11) Top slicing the license fee 
As part of a package of reforms for RTE, the decision to top slice the licence fee 
is illustrative of the market-based solutions pursued by the government in relation 
to re-articulating public broadcasting. Five per cent of the 'net proceeds' of the 
license fee was 'ring fenced as a special broadcasting fund for new, additional, 
innovative content, from which all free to air broadcasters (independent 
broadcasters licensed by the BCI and RTE, with special emphasis given to 
locally based community broadcasters), can draw' 49. The decision to include 
such a policy innovation, however, was not derived directly from the Forum on 
Broadcasting’s recommendations50. In the invited responses to the Forum’s 
consultation on broadcasting, the lobby group the Independent Broadcasters of 
Ireland, which had been lobbying on this issue since 1993, were the only 
respondents to moot the top slice51. Whereas the FOB had accepted the claim 
that independent broadcasters had in relation to attaining some measure of 
compensation for their public service duties, the Forum had insisted that such 
funding should not come from the license fee. According to the Forum, extra 
funding should be derived from direct government grants and the license fee 
maintained as indivisible. The 'top slice' appeared to be a reprise of a policy 
approach that had met with considerable opposition when it first appeared as 
part of the 1990 Broadcasting Bill. In that Bill the Minister of Communications 
Ray Burke had proposed setting aside 25% of the license fee to fund the public 
                                                           
49
DCMNR Press Release, 11/12/02, 'Dermot Ahern announces fundamental reform of public 
sector broadcasting'. 
50
 The Forum stated in its report 'The forum rejects the contention that commercial 
broadcasters should benefit also from public funding in proportion to their contribution to 
current affairs and cultural matters. Arguments were put forward in favour of a pool or central 
fund to which all broadcasters would have access and which would be administered by an 
independent agency. This, however, would simply fragment the public service element of 
broadcasting and would not achieve the desired result. The most likely outcome would be that 
funds would be widely disbursed to fund cheap programming'.   
51
 Previously called Association of Irish Radio Stations, before TV3 became a member. 
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service duties of the commercial broadcasters that had come into being via the 
1988 Radio and Television Act. At that time the bill was defended as an 
important element of public policy. According to Dick Roche, addressing the Dail 
in this period; 
  
'multiple choice in the airwaves has been introduced through licensed and 
legitimate stations. Up to 600 people are now being employed in legally 
operating stations outside RTE, an additional television channel has been 
franchised and broadcasting is now a growth industry...there is nothing new 
in the notion of giving grants to areas of the private sector where this is 
deemed to be in the public interest or where it is desirable to achieve 
certain national policy objectives'52 .  
 
However the 'notion' of funding this sector was a volte face on the governments 
own policy which had outlined that access to national resources (spectrum and 
licenses) as well as access to consumers had been deemed privilege enough for 
commercial broadcasters to undertake content requirements. In 1988 the Bill met 
with considerable opposition both within and outside the Dail and was eventually 
amended to remove the top slicing of the licence fee53.  
 
The rationale behind the revived 'top slice', however, appears to be linked more 
so to developing market based policy solutions to the 'problem' of 
governing/measuring public broadcasting, satisfying the remaining stakeholders 
in the broadcasting ecology and finding ways of encouraging public service 
programming from broadcasters in the coming era of perceived digital plenty54. 
The immediate interest groups to whom the Fund was addressed were those of 
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 Roche, Dick,  Dail Debates. 
53
 The idea of splitting the licence fee also made a re-appearance in the debates surrounding the 
1995 green paper on broadcasting. However it was shelved again on this occasion.  
54
 Practitioners from the independent production sector tend to see the top slice as adding to 
the bureaucratic minefield by creating another commissioning body but acknowledge that it is 
funds that they will potentially benefit from. 
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the community broadcasting and independent broadcasting sectors. In an 
internal briefing note on the licence fee increase the Minister suggested that 'the 
5% fund for other broadcasting entities will allow effective benchmarking of Irish 
public broadcasting costs and quality’55. The implication was that as well as 
encouraging public programming the fund will provide a further measuring stick 
against which RTE's organisational performance could be measured. The fund 
would thus help regulate RTE's cost base by allowing the operation of 
competition to cost this area and thus provide indicators applicable to RTE. No 
doubt, the implication was that the top slice could be increased and decreased 
depending on RTE's performance vis a vis the benchmarking of the private and 
not for profit sector. The problems of such an approach (apart from the fact that it 
opens up another potential avenue for government control of the broadcaster 
through funding) was that it: 
 
1. Ignores the fact that programming represents units in an overall service which 
should serve as the basis for measuring 'public broadcasting'  
2. Public interest programming is in itself a profitable exercise. 
3. The value of the licence fee is embodied in forms that indirectly contribute to 
output such as training, ensuring access to services and investment in new 
technology etc.   
4. 'Public interest' programming is not necessarily confined to specific genres 
such as news, documentary, cultural and educational programming 
5. Quality comparisons can already be ascertained from what the market 
provides (or fails to provide) at present in Ireland.  
 
The minister also received internal advice that the top slice was problematic. A 
senior civil servant in the minister’s own department, Ciaran O'Hobain advised 
that fragmenting the licence fee was unwise on at least two counts. First that any 
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 DCMNR, 2002, Briefing note for Minister Ahern for Government Meeting on RTE's Application 
for a licence Fee Rise. The key emphasis of this memo is the investment in indigenous 
programming that the licence fee increase represents. 
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decision in this regard should be taken by the proposed unified broadcasting 
regulator, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, and second, that the handing 
over of public money that could potentially find its way to private shareholders 
was not 'good public policy'. In this instance, the introduction of competitive 
structure, with a regulator essentially becoming a commissioner of programmes, 
in order to simulate market conditions in broadcasting was perceived to be 
beyond the legitimacy of a public body using public money, as adjudged by the 
bureaucratic governance structure of the Department of Communications. In 
support of his argument O'Hobain suggested that 'the forum on broadcasting 
strongly argued that licence fee funds should not be made available to private 
broadcasters' and that 'if a fund as envisaged is to be established then it would 
be better to increase the licence fee by a lesser amount and to provide additional 
exchequer resources to the BAI'56. O'Hobain also made the point that the 'top 
slice' would re-enforce the attempts of vested interests to narrow the definition of 
public broadcasting while transferring funds to private interests for an area of 
activity that was already profitable in its own right. In comparison to the 
opposition that had greeted Ray Burke’s top slicing initiative, the response was 
more muted. The Minister pressed ahead despite the advice of his own officials 
illustrating the relationship between the Ministry and the Department, and the 
latter’s relative passivity in relation to headline policy development. Bob Collins, 
Director General of RTE in a letter to the department pointed out that; 
 
'the decision to make available a portion of licence revenue represents a 
fundamental shift in broadcasting policy in Ireland. It is moreover a major 
policy change without consultation of any kind by the department...there are 
many reasons why I find this course of action is undesirable...In the first 
instance, the principal beneficiaries are most likely to be shareholders of 
companies located outside the state. Secondly, the decision would in effect 
represent a cap on the extent to which the (RTE) authority can have access 
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 Ciaran O'Hobain departmental note, ‘Re: Draft Memo for Government arising from 
consideration of the recommendations of the forum on broadcasting‘, November 2002. 
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to licence revenue for the purpose of providing programme services 
towards which licence payers have always known their licence fees to be 
directed'57 .  
 
Collins in the latter point had highlighted a key implication of the 'top slice' i.e. 
that, in he publics understanding, the link between public funding and a 
dedicated public broadcaster would now be broken. Collins suggested that the 
general policy moves away from an integrated institution of public broadcasting 
was diluting the concept of RTE's role as the national public broadcaster. If the 
licence fee was to become a ‘trust fund for innovation’ then the structure and 
purposes of the public broadcaster would become less of a priority in public 
policy. However the top slice was legislated for by the 2003 Broadcasting 
Funding Act, and following a brief period of review by the EU competition 
directorate, was brought into operation in 2006. The policy concept of subsidising 
indigenous production across the schedules of all Irish based broadcasters may 
ultimately be timely and beneficial but whether it represents a proper use of 
public monies is problematic whereas the value of resources diverted from the 
public broadcasting institution is damaging to its capacity. Moreover it is 
indicative of both the Government’s emphasis on culturally relevant 
programming, giving another clear indication of Fianna Fail’s preference for 
national cultural public purposes in broadcasting public policy and the paucity of 
resources made available by the state to expand public purposes without 
cannibalising the existing ones.    
 
The rationale behind the commissioning of one off programming for distribution 
on varied broadcasters is an appropriate response to the increasingly competitive 
scheduling of indigenous broadcasters, often unwilling to risk once off 
programming in conservatively stripped schedules. However, the utilization of the 
licence fee to achieve this is indicative of the limitations on public finances to 
secure public policy outcomes. Once again the space for positive intervention is 
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 Bob Collins letter to Brendan Tuohy, Secretary General, DCMNR, 04/12/02 
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limited in the market led competitive approach to broadcasting and the funds 
available for existing positive interventions look set to be fractured by well 
needed but ultimately questionable policy interventions.     
 
7.12) Re-structuring as marketisation  
Whereas RTE received the license fee increase that it had been deprived of for 
so long there are outstanding policy issues that remain relatively un-contested. 
Of considerable issue is the perceptible shift of discretion, decision making and 
power away from the public institution of RTE (bureaucratic governance) and 
towards an instituted market rationale (market governance). In general public 
funding has been characterised as necessary for maintaining editorial 
independence in news and current affairs and support for indigenous cultural 
production. Government policy has invested faith in markets solutions and has 
utilised them to replace spheres of agency with their measurable, calculable and 
predictable presence. As has been indicated above, this perceptible move 
towards market governance initiates the process of diminishing the rationale for a 
full capacity public broadcaster and replaces many of its operations with market 
mechanisms. This creates structural contradictions in relation to the discursively 
generated public purpose of the public broadcaster and the pressures and 
emphases that emerge from its political economy. The large and rising presence 
of the independent contribution to programming means that a sizeable section of 
RTE's programming is made by private operators working to a mixture of public 
and market logic. The restructuring of RTE in terms of its operative and 
governance structures means that this is also true of its own production base. In 
general terms there is increasingly less reason why programming can not be 
produced by any broadcaster with a copy of the BCI’s production rules and 
guidelines. The addition of a charter based on a logic of quantity as against 
quality also stimulates a degree of demand that RTE cannot in itself supply. Thus 
a sizeable market for independent productions is fashioned from the perception 
that RTE has historically failed to react to consumer demands. Markets, shadow 
markets and pseudo markets have been implemented in myriad different ways to 
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create a correspondence between production and consumer and advertiser 
demand. The organisational arrangements have been changed to make 
producers more aware of 'other customers', that is advertisers. The broadcast 
programme fund is being developed to create a mechanism through which the 
market costs of public service programme production can be assessed. In 
general what all these mechanisms point to is a diminished trust in the expertise, 
logic’s and ethos of the public broadcaster, a trust which is now replaced by 
market mechanisms. The re-orientation of the organisation towards the expertise, 
logic’s and ethos of commercial operation  mean that there is a reduction in the 
distinctiveness of the organisation and a drift towards a situation wherein other 
private operators will be just as well equipped to deliver a public service mandate 
that has been re-orientated towards market operation. The eventual dissolution 
of the Authority, the combination of the public service and commercial 
broadcaster regulation into a new authority and the re-constitution of RTE as 
state owned commercial enterprise all point to its perceptible blending with the 
market. A vacum in the articulation of an an ethos directed towards renewed 
norms for the public interest has contributed to this move to market logic.  
 
A concomitant issue arises in relation to the public policy objectives associated 
with the diversion of public monies towards the independent sector. Whereas the 
ostensible logic of this policy is economic there are valid cultural criteria related 
to goals of plural programme supply. A perfunctory analysis of schedules over 
the 1990's indicates that there is increased vertical diversity in programme 
genres that mirror the increased involvement of the independent sector in 
programme production. This is however partly due to RTE's shift in 
commissioning emphases following the 1985 Stokes Kennedy Crowley review. 
The public charter has also laid new emphases on the obligation of RTE to 
commission genres which it used substitute with imports and has led to increases 
in such areas as drama which were relatively neglected. (it may also be noted 
that complaints about RTE's utilisation of licence revenue for sporting and film 
rights, usually from the commercial broadcasters, stand in stark contrast to 
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government demands that RTE be more commercially minded in its operation). 
However the contradiction inherent in the goals of plurality and the economic 
development of the sector has led to the situation wherein just twelve companies 
can attract 67% of commissioning funds. Further to this, the logic of growth 
suggests these larger companies must increasingly look to international markets 
to realise increased profits. The question of whether commercial product can 
continue to supply the needs of domestic schedules whilst orienting towards 
international markets is a point of considerable debate in the UK at present. The 
development of the format as the prime exportable television commodity places 
limits on both genre innovation and the depth of cultural reflection possible within 
such constraints.   Expansion and growth in international markets also prompts 
further questions about the continued commercial autonomy of such companies. 
In the current conditions of convergence, media concentration has considerably 
increased as varied media groups look to opportunities to secure their control on 
as many areas of the value chain for the myriad delivery of content that is now 
possible. Should public money be directed, without condition, to the growth of 
companies that may easily be bought by larger media interests? Public money 
would thus subsidise media concentration as opposed to the plurality it is 
supposed to support58.  Added to this is the question of whether cultural diversity 
is best expressed through companies chiefly attuned to the new commercial 
imperatives within RTE. The chief competition that may be offered to the 
independents from differentially funded broadcasters should be from RTE itself. 
Yet RTE has lost the ability to offer such competition through the progressive 
restructuring of the organisation to cut its costs back to those of an under funded 
broadcaster. Thus the question of economic plurality in programme supply raises 
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 One precaution against such a situation arising is the more even distribution of funds across 
producers. There is also the possibility of the gradual build up of equity for the public 
broadcaster in such companies so that future profits offer return on the broadcasters 
investments and can be channelled back into public programming. This would only be 
recognition of the actually existing inter-dependency of these companies. It may also be 
preferable that when companies reach a certain size and stability they operate outside of RTE's 
statutory quota and therefore provide programming on the same basis as acquisitions. This 
would also prevent RTE becoming dependent on a dominant supplier which may be bought up 
or shift allegiances to a competitive content provider in the developing digital environment. 
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the issue of de-coupling RTE from market led efficiencies in order to allow the 
funding and development of programming that do not necessarily originate from 
commercial operators, depend on market demands nor aim primarily to satisfy 
commissioners through satisfying advertisers. 
 
All of these questions point towards the issue of programming autonomy within 
RTE and the structures that should oversee its operation. Public broadcasters 
operate in a peculiar field of interpreting the tastes, demands and needs of 
increasingly plural collectivities existing within nation states. The operation of 
purely economistic rationale in how they should be structured to do this 
considerably undermines their purposes. Thus the somewhat random division of 
programming capabilities between in-house and independent producers based 
on how RTE can operate most cost efficiently considerably circumscribes that 
which can be undertaken by the public broadcaster. The fact that such a division 
pays no heed to the sensitivities of what is apt for public and commercial 
producers to undertake point to the inadequacy of the approach. The discontent 
within RTE in relation to the types of programming that are no longer  available to 
producers arise to some degree from trade union concerns but are also borne 
out of a concern that recognition of RTE as a public broadcaster may be 
damaged by the abandoning of public service intent for certain highly popular 
broadcast genres/programmes. A related incursion into programme autonomy on 
the part of the public broadcaster is the quota system set out in the charter that 
measures by genre the commitments to indigenous programming that RTE 
should commit to. Added to this the enforced constriction of RTE's production 
base, overall, leads to a contraction in the amount of programming it can produce 
so that licence fee rises tend to be re-directed to the independent sector limiting 
not only the type but the amount of programming which RTE can reasonably 
become involved in.  
 
Finally, the approach to the restructuring of RTE points to one final irony in the 
move towards market governance in Irish broadcasting policy. The public 
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broadcaster, its resources and structures has become the only way in which 
government can intervene and direct policy. The attention given to RTE in this 
regard is testament to the failure to establish institutional governance over the 
marketised broadcasting landscape as a whole. RTE and the licence fee have 
become a proxy for a wide range of policy measures that have no other outlet. 
Whereas re-regulation has proceeded on the basis that markets can be directed 
towards public policy goals, via regulation for competition and more markets, the 
situation in relation to RTE tends to suggest that the reality is otherwise. Thus 
RTE, (arguably along with TG4) is the focus for growing the independent sector; 
internationalising indigenous independent television producers; funding PSB 
programming across the schedules; increasing popular programming output.  
Whereas all these elements are evidence of the increasingly economistic 
direction of broadcasting policy they also point to a considerable vacuum in 
relation to the development of a system wide re-regulation that has the ability to 
marry incentives with public policy commitments to create potential interventions 
in the broadcasting system. But this, in itself, points to a policy environment that 
is considerably in tune with the logic of the market and less open to vertical policy 
interventions by governments acting according to socio-cultural logics.  
 
7.13) Summary 
RTE’s development of a third way emerges out of a combination of both 
pragmatism and incremental adaptation that is the hallmark of the development 
of public broadcasting in Ireland. However, whereas it has much that is beneficial 
in terms of securing the broadcaster’s future and also developing its programme 
repertoire, there is space for development of its capacity to forge a relationship 
with an increasingly pluralistic society, via both representation and access to the 
airwaves. If anything, this is where a structural deficit has emerged in Irish 
broadcasting with the commercial and political incentive to serve a broadly 
homogeneous concept of the audience. Critics charge that centralized 
parliamentary politics and the consumer culture tend to be over-represented in 
relation to the needs of securing as large an audience/licence fee as possible. 
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This makes it difficult to depart from largely consensual areas of experience and 
thus has a tendency to under represent non-party politics and the under-
consuming classes in terms of allowing access to circulation of their own stories 
and representing those to the majority culture. The relationship between the 
public broadcaster and the independents points to increased diversity vis-a`-vis 
RTE´ ’s previous schedules but also a degree of convergence between RTE’s 
present output and that of UK, European and American channels now available 
to the majority of the population. Given the nature of RTE’s reduced production 
base and large capacity spend on outside programming there is space to take 
risks and innovate in ways that may not always please the productivist logic of 
governance. This can involve co-productions between Indies/community 
producers, communities/public broadcasters in varied combinations. In the past 
this type of programme approach has been shown to hold its own in schedules 
when approached in imaginative and creative fashion. In fact the emergence of 
factual entertainment, if handled within a public service mode, can engage with 
complex issues of social change whilst also allowing access to the screens and a 
degree of control over representation for invisible groups within society. It is 
strategies such as this that point to the future of a distinctive public broadcaster 
with a justifiable access to public funding. However, given the structural 
pressures towards the consensual dynamic, rationalisation and competition, it 
demands imaginative policy making to allow for this space. RTE´ has previously 
been successful in expanding the plurality and diversity of programming available 
across the airwaves. What is now missing is any conceptualization of how a 
publicly owned institution may, in terms of procedure and output, further 
contribute to the plurality of production and diversity of output. As in most third 
way politics, the mysterious third sector appears to be missing in Irish national 
broadcasting. Attempts to shift the frame in relation to the challenges facing 
public broadcasting in increasingly plural and diverse societies suggest the 
potential for an innovative institutional design for the public broadcaster that may 
meet some of these challenges. If community broadcasting is to be more than 
local commercial broadcasting it needs a degree of public support. Conversely, if 
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RTE´ is to expand its access beyond the independent commercial television 
production sector it could develop a relationship with this dimension of 
programming. This can occur through straightforward transfers via 
commissioning or through a level of infrastructural support in relation to 
technology transfer, training and subsidies. As RTE´ looks to the digital future 
and expanded channel capacity, it could stand to gain a community channel that 
schedules a programme mix of offerings from around the island. This again 
would enhance RTE’s legitimacy as a public service provider, widen access, 
deepen plurality and enhance communities. These are the new contexts in which 
an institution of public broadcasting needs to consider its mission. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
 
8.1) Introduction 
This thesis has utilised a theoretical framework drawing on political economy and 
institutionalism to evaluate policy reactions to wider emphases of political, 
economic, technological, spatial and institutional change in the Republic of 
Ireland. Two case studies were carried out in order to investigate the hypotheses 
introduced in Chapter Two. This final section will evaluate the findings that have 
emerged from the combination of the theoretical framework, the research 
methodology and the varied methods used to generate the theoretically informed 
knowledge. The section will first present a brief summary of the chapters that 
have preceded the present one. It will then move onto presenting the key findings 
or knowledge arising out of the overall project, the tentative findings that require 
further development, and, proposed avenues of research that arise from the 
research. It will then consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
project overall and the specific strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical 
framework, the research strategy, the methods and the research process overall. 
Finally it will consider the potential applications of the research in the field of 
media/communication analysis and potential avenues for further research.   
 
8.2) Summary 
The thesis has evaluated an alternative explanation of why marketisation as a 
process is prevalent in media policymaking and undertook a case study in Irish 
broadcasting policy to evaluate those propositions. The thesis has 
operationalised a research framework that places policymaking at the centre of a 
nexus of institutions which are partly shaped and constituted by the political 
economic contexts which are re-produced by them. It has sought to evaluate 
policy responses to key structural changes in the communications field and 
locate them within institutional contexts that are ultimately the outcome of macro 
institutional changes that carry an inherent market logic. Moving through the 
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frames from political economy to macro-institutionalism to meso institutionalism it 
has posited that the contexts of institutional change in policymaking towards 
broadcasting in western media systems, have undergone paradigmatic change in 
the period from the 1980s, and, that this can be partly traced to the ‘neo-fordist’ 
model of capitalism that has found expression in the international system. 
Whereas other accounts have emphasised marketisation as a key ideological 
dimension of media policy norms in the period from 1980 to the present, this 
thesis has posited that the marketisation in this period also relates to a variant 
mode of production, a successor to the decline of fordist political economy, which 
inherently channels market logics. The literature began by evaluating processes 
of marketisation through a detailed analysis of institutional changes in the public 
service system in the UK and Ireland. It also reviewed the EU’s stewarding of 
responses to technological, spatial and political economic change in order to 
situate Irish responses to policy problems and gauge the pan European 
articulation of the wider institutional changes posed in the theoretical framework. 
In the middle section a detailed policy history of broadcasting policy in the 
Republic of Ireland was presented drawing on the macro and meso level 
institutional co-ordinates of policy making, both to contextualise the case studies 
and also trace the historical institutional legacies in Irish broadcasting policy as 
path dependent features of the Irish broadcasting system. The thesis then moved 
into contemporary Irish broadcasting policy with a case study of the policy 
approaches to instituting digital television into Ireland with a focus on DTV as a 
nationally controlled dimension of policymaking. The second case study provided 
an analysis of policy towards the ‘restructuring’ of public broadcasting which 
provided a significant opportunity to test the wider hypotheses in so far as it 
demonstrated a ‘clash of institutional dynamics’ stretching across old and 
emerging paradigms for broadcasting policymaking. 
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8.3) Findings 
The findings of the research relate to the degree to which the case studies shed 
light on the theoretical premise of institutionally shaped policymaking. In the first 
instance it is useful to refer back to what was proposed in the theoretical 
framework. The phenomena of marketisation in Irish broadcasting policy is partly 
an outcome of maco-institutional change which structures political economic 
change, referred to here as neo-fordism. It is also the outcome of meso 
institutional change arising from the varied sites of governance of the 
media/audiovisual sector and related to changing state strategies, changes in the 
norms of governance, changes in conceptions of the public interest, changes in 
the scale and level of policymaking, and that this level of meso institutional 
change is an outcome of regulatory and societal responses to normalising or 
stabilising a new mode of accumulation that arises out of macro institutional 
change. Thus, in simplistic terms, marketisation is both a product of changes and 
consistencies within the capitalist mode of production and economic and extra 
economic responses to that scenario. What evidence was there for these 
theoretical suppositions and did they provide reliable frameworks for analysis?   
 
Firstly, there was strong evidence in the research that market logics have 
become central components of the mode of governance of broadcasting in the 
Irish context. In relation to policy responses to the digital transition in television 
distribution, it is clear that policymakers adapted the strategy of creating a 
competitive platform structure to enable a process of ‘liberalised convergence’ in 
the Irish communications structure. This has been the outcome of incremental 
developments in overlapping policy fields. What was also clear was that this 
policy dynamic was an outcome of the preferred approach to digital transition that 
has been gradually elaborated at European level governance of media and 
telecommunications. The findings of this thesis suggest that this strategy has 
produced considerable difficulties for the digital transition in Irish communications 
creating related difficulties for the digital transition in broadcasting. Each of the 
supposed competitive platforms have experienced setbacks in their roll out plans 
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whereas the continued absence of a DTT platform and the difficulties in attracting 
investors points to a significant weakness in the overall approach. It is clear that 
the economic conditions for multiple platform roll out present difficulties for small 
economies in adapting the competitive platform approach to convergence. The 
availability of resources are limited relative to population size, financial capital 
and audience revenues, making the fragmented provision of delivery 
mechanisms a policy problem that has not been sufficiently dealt with. Whereas 
economic difficulties have generated problems for the overall model of transition 
they have also generated problems in relation to the political and social 
dimensions of public policy in this area, with requisite support for the domestic 
broadcasting ecology being undermined by the lack of development of a DTT 
option. DTT represents a public policy option referred to as the ‘public service 
platform’, in so far as it provides a plank for policy developments based on 
universal service, public service, access, diversity and plurality norms. Thus the 
findings of this first case study illustrates that policy makers have attempted to 
initiate a market structure in television delivery whilst instituting a form of overall 
market governance of that structure. The adaptation of this strategy has been 
largely unsuccessful partly due to a lack of adequate attempts to incorporate a 
public element that would help drive developments regardless of the prevailing 
market conditions. This has been the grounds of success for multiple platform 
provision in comparative countries that have so far successfully developed their 
transition models.  
 
The second case study also demonstrates strong market logics at work in the 
policy approaches that were taken to restructure the public service broadcasting 
institution in the period from 1999 to 2007. The findings of the analysis suggest 
that the public service broadcaster has been pressured into adapting practices 
aligned to market logics that on the one hand strengthen its legitimacy through 
increasing its indigenous output but on the other hand weaken its discretion and 
distinctiveness as a public service broadcasting institution. Restructuring of 
RTE’s production base has relied on economic rationale creating constraints on 
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the ability of the organisation to produce a range of genres in-house. 
Programming that is central to the public service remit is increasingly outsourced 
to the independent sector whereas the alignment of this programming to 
advertising dynamics give it a considerably populist character. What is at stake 
here is the degree to which popular genres are being precluded from carrying 
public purposes whereas the overall profile of RTE’s schedules is in danger of 
converging with that of the private sector. Whereas popular legitimacy for RTE 
may be delivered by such a strategy, the lack of distinctiveness and the variable 
quality of programming at the level of originality, innovation and public purpose, 
ultimately leads to an undermining of the institutional distinctiveness of the 
broadcaster. RTE’s restructuring emerges from the norms of corporate strategies 
as generated by global consultancy firms. There is lack of an alternative logic 
based on concepts such as ‘public value’ or ‘public purposes’ (Barnett, 2008). 
This development is accompanied by a governance logic that decidedly de-
emphasises the existing institutional basis of public broadcasting in Ireland. 
Evidence of this can be seen in the top slicing of the licence fee, the re-
articulation of the BCI as a public service commissioner and the moves towards 
the absorption of the governance structure of the public broadcaster within a new 
centralised broadcasting regulator. Whereas there are arguments for economies 
of scale in broadcasting regulation in a small nation, there are also strong 
arguments for regulatory plurality in relation to maintaining a distinctive culture of 
regulation for public broadcasters. The governance of public institutions require 
application of different knowledge, norms and regulative mechanisms if concepts 
such as ‘public purposes’ and ‘public value’ are to have meaning. The dangers of 
eliding public and commercial governance are that the cultivation of institutional 
practices will become blurred. 
 
There was strong evidence that the norms of governance articulated in Irish 
policy responses to both the digital transition and the re-orientation of public 
service broadcasting have become strongly economistic and technology lead. 
Here there appears to be an elision of concepts of the public interest with those 
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of economic efficiency and technological development. These concepts are 
strongly linked to sustained concern about the maintenance of competitiveness 
at both the institutional and national level. In the communications field, and 
specifically in broadcasting, the apparent inconsistencies in the ability of market 
mechanisms to deliver these levels of competitiveness appear to go unheeded. 
In a related fashion, the tangibility of economic and technological 
competitiveness as a ‘public interest’ test appears to be preferred to socially, 
politically or culturally generated criteria. This is linked to the singular dynamic of 
the Irish state in the previous twenty years as it has emerged as a flexible 
competition state. Whereas the public service persists, the articulation of public 
purpose that may institutionalise public services that deliver distinctive value and 
generate distinctive social relations appear absent. Thus a strong dynamic of 
governance relates to the generation of consensus on the market making 
proclivities of the state as a symbolic gesture to the states integration into the 
wider political economic system of the Washington consensus. What is clear is 
that there is little reflection upon the relative impacts of the logics of marketisation 
in the Irish contexts or any clear indication of the benefits of extending the realm 
of market co-ordination over evermore spheres of experience. Marketisation 
appears to be accepted as an end in itself. For example, the proliferation of 
distribution outlets and extension of market segments across the broadcasting 
field is not accompanied by consideration of the impacts on the content 
generating dimensions of the Irish broadcasting field. The increased 
fragmentation and penetration of international distributors and channels in the 
Irish context is an outcome of the market making proclivities of EU level 
audiovisual policy, itself a response to the global level moves to realise 
broadcasting as goods and services to be traded. The attainment of 
marketisation in national contexts extends the domain of international 
commercial operators whilst creating pressure on local operators in relation to 
the attainment of content, resources and audiences. This agenda that is strongly 
supported in larger audiovisual markets tends to benefit operators with 
economies of scale within those markets. Whereas governance in the Irish 
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broadcasting field supports this agenda, once again, with little benefit other than 
a symbolic commitment to the open economy market agenda. Government 
reflexivity in relation to both EU and Global policy agendas in audiovisual 
communication has been demonstrated sporadically but could be developed into 
consistent policy strategy that acts to shape those larger agendas. Adapting the 
logics and norms generated elsewhere will not suffice. At stake is the 
maintenance of plurality, diversity, access, freedom and accountability in 
broadcasting available to Irish audiences. In more general terms the thesis 
demonstrates the mechanisms whereby market structures are generalised to 
national contexts, an indication of one of the key outcomes of economic 
globalisation under US hegemony. This extends earlier considerations on the 
globalisation of production taking place through the strategies of global 
corporations. These market dynamics appear to result in trade off between 
economic growth and political sovereignty/autonomy in different spheres of 
experience. In addition the thesis confirms that there are new market dynamics 
that arise out of an alignment to neo-fordist political economy.              
 
There was strong evidence in the research that Irish broadcasting and 
communications policymaking has absorbed neofordist logics related to a 
particular regime of accumulation arising from Anglo American political economy, 
and that this has implications for previously existing market regulation. It is 
evident from the case studies that the overall governance of broadcasting has 
adapted structural features of an after fordist political economy. The overall 
structure of broadcasting has become de-composed into constituent elements 
referred to as ‘value boxes’ in the literature. This decomposition has been 
pursued and supported in Irish policymaking towards broadcasting with, for 
example, RTE increasingly loosing transmission, regulatory and production 
faculties that previously characterised it as an integrated broadcaster. This is part 
of the move away from the organisation of production into monopoly and 
oligopoly towards a competitive system that is based on encouraging as many 
content and service outlets as is possible in the broadcasting field. The varied 
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policy measures directed towards outsourcing, developing the independent 
sector and creating contestable funds also point to the increased flexibilisation of 
content production in the broadcasting sector. Once again this is resembles 
wider changes in the macro institutional form of the wage labour nexus 
increasing the casualisation of work contracts, introducing flexibility into RTE’s 
operations and generating economies of scope on the basis of outsourcing. 
Lastly, the overall logic of technological neutrality in content provision, processes 
of digitalisation and moves towards the ‘anytime anyplace anywhere’ dynamic of 
service provision is consonant with changing norms of consumption. It is thus 
logically plausible to suggest that structural changes in the Irish contexts are 
responsive to the macro institutional changes that characterise neo-fordist logics 
of economic development and that these institutional shifts have been absorbed 
by policymakers. However, it is arguable that it is the European policy lead in this 
dimension that generalises these institutional adjustments through the extension 
of its influence in the media and communications field. 
 
The following finding can only be posited in a tentative fashion reflecting the need 
for extended research on this subject. It appears evident that Ireland has 
absorbed the market making institutional norms of the anglo American policy 
sphere whilst accepting the internal marketisation policies of the Europeanization 
project. It is also arguable that the macro institutional dynamics of the neofordist 
regime of accumulation necessarily channel new sets of market dynamics that 
de-emphasise socio-regulatory features of the previous regime of accumulation. 
These macro institutional adjustments channel codified social relations that 
articulate a victory for the logics of capital accumulation contra the political, social 
and cultural regulatory mechanisms that stabilise growth regimes. This 
encourages a new dynamic of market making that pervades social relations.   
Flexibilisation, competitiveness, consumer sovereignty and financialisation of the 
economy appear to rest on accumulation dynamics that undermine the capacity 
of states and societies to normalise or regulate economic relations relative to 
social, cultural and political purposes. These macro institutional adjustments, 
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geared towards the extension of flexible product markets, structure broadcasting 
policy without much deliberative debate on their systemic logics. This is an 
extension of market forces and systemic logics into spheres of experience 
previously shaped by political and social domains. In Habermassian terminology, 
the public dimension of both the ‘systems world’ (formal politics) and the 
‘lifeworld’ (community) are increasingly structured by the private dimensions of 
the systems world (economy). Whereas it is clear that there is political and public 
legitimacy for continuation of democratic control of systems development, there 
appears to be little political or public will or means to pursue it.  
 
8.4) Strengths and weaknesses 
 The theoretical framework has allowed a multi-tiered analysis of structural 
change in Irish broadcasting. It has enabled the drawing together of political 
economic, institutional and policy study approaches to provide an insight to the 
myriad contexts which shape broadcasting policy in the Irish context. It has also 
allowed for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of marketisation arising 
out of structuralist accounts of political economic change, to complement the 
abundance of ideological ones in the literature. Overall, the theoretical framework 
has allowed for a deep contextualisation of structural change drawing attention to 
political economic, institutional and governance issues that are essential to 
understanding change in the broadcasting sector in particular and in media 
policy/production in general.  
 
The strategy of choosing two key policy issues also yielded rich results by 
allowing for the application of the analysis to different policy problems within the 
broadcasting field. The transition to digital television allowed for a wider analysis 
of changes in the communications field and the relative effects of processes of 
technological convergence, providing an account of the negotiated nature of 
convergence as a structural change. It allowed for a deeper reading of emerging 
communications governance by the EU and its impact on it’s member states. It 
also provided a significant case for understanding the process of market 
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institution, so often presented as the outcome of naturally occurring processes of 
human behaviour or mere ideology. It provided a useful snapshot of the 
interaction of different levels of governance on issues of technological change 
and the continued transition towards market lead governance in the broadcasting 
and communications sector. The case study on public broadcasting allowed for a 
deep analysis of the interaction of deep structural change arising out of global 
processes but interacting with national dynamics. The reconfiguration of the 
balance between public and private broadcasters and the inter-systemic mixing 
of the two provided a complex picture of the continuing survival of PSB. Public 
broadcasting is in transition rather than decline, but there is a price to pay for 
survival that raises questions about the quality of the public purposes in 
broadcasting we are left with. From this perspective this case study 
complimented the previous one by illustrating how marketisation is not just an 
issue for structural change in contexts, but that marketisation from within is also 
an issue. 
 
The weaknesses of the approach arguably arise from the span of the theoretical 
framework. Drawing on structural change in production and regulation related to 
wider political economic shifts and mobilising different levels of governance from 
the global to the national, whilst drawing attention to the intersecting relationship 
of ideology and interest groups with the institutional determinants of 
policymaking, often proved unwieldy. Whereas this framework helped to 
generate a panorama of the contexts of policy making, it proved somewhat 
difficult to operationalise and lead to a too scant analysis of some of the issues 
raised. At different points of the thesis different elements of this approach are 
brought to the fore, sometimes creating a degree of disconnection in the 
sequential analysis. However, an upside of this, is the degree to which it has 
opened up numerous avenues for future research.  
 
Weaknesses also emerged in the method of research especially in the balance of 
interviews across the sector. Whereas numerous interviews were carried out it 
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proved difficult to attain interviews from current government ministers and 
officials which would have allowed for the testing of some of the propositions 
presented in relation to the mismatch between official policy and outcomes, and, 
official mentalities regarding public service broadcasting. However this is a 
problem of carrying out contemporary research on ‘live’ policy issues. This 
explains the recourse to freedom of information documentation.  
 
8.5) Future areas of research 
The research has opened up many areas for potential development, both 
theoretical and substantive. The scope of the theoretical framework, the 
Regulation, political economy and neo-institutionalist dimensions all provide 
useful conceptual tools for production oriented media and communications 
analyses. The varied macro institutional dimensions provide broad areas of 
political economic contexts for media and communications systems along 
multiple lines of inquiry, whether it be in relation to changing media-work 
dynamics, the competitive dynamics of media firms, the financialisation of 
capitalism and its requisite impact in the resourcing of media, the changing 
consumption norms of media audiences, the role of the state and the relationship 
between national media systems and the international regime. The political 
economy approach elaborated in the earlier chapters also continues to provide a 
useful in-point to contextual analyses of media policy and/or the structure and 
output of media. There is certainly room for elaboration of the state, market and 
society relationship in the Irish context and the way in which it interacts with other 
variables to shape the character of the media. Neo-institutionalism has proved a 
useful methodology when placed within the theoretical contexts of Regulation 
theory and critical political economy. There is further scope for the elaboration of 
institutionalist analyses of both broadcasting and policymaking organisations, 
perhaps on more targeted and meso-level. 
 
At the substantive level there are also many areas for future research suggested 
by the findings above. The thesis would have benefitted from a comparative 
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dimension, to test the hypothesis that size really matters when it comes to the 
adaptation of generic media policy and market dynamics. From this perspective 
there is useful research to be done in comparing the experiences of smaller 
European nations in adapting to both structural change (spatial, technological 
and socio-political) and governance change (as it arises in different spheres of 
policymaking). A related area for further research would be the relationship 
between Irish governance (or, more generally, national governance) and EU 
policy towards the audiovisual sector. How does Ireland fit into the schema of 
liberalist/dirigiste in media policy? Which nation’s media politics tends to gain 
clearest expression at European level? This would provide illumination on one of 
the key relationships shaping present day media policymaking in Ireland and 
once again could be generalised to include comparisons of the influence of other 
‘small media nations’. The ongoing transition in public service broadcasting is 
another area for further analysis. How do PSB’s adapt to technological, 
international and market dynamics whilst also negotiating socio-cultural change 
and claims to legitimacy? Elements that have not gained lengthy enough 
treatment in the thesis also suggest fruitful areas for further research. The overall 
transition in regulatory dynamics and the emerging post-liberalisation tool kit in 
broadcasting is  an area for further development and, combined with normative 
assessment of media policy, would provide a yardstick for measuring the degree 
to which economistic and techno-centric policy making has replaced concerns 
with the socio political norms of media policy making.                                           
References 
 
290 
 
References 
Aglietta, M. (2001), A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience. 
Verso. 
 
Anderson, B, (1983), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and 
spread of nationalism, (London: Verso). 
 
Barbrook, R. (1992) 'Broadcasting and national identity in Ireland' in Media, 
Culture and Society, Vol 14 (1992), (Sage: London). 
 
Barry, N (2000), Modern Political Theory, (London: Macmillan). 
 
Barnett, S and Docherty, D, (1991) ‘Priority or Pragmatism: Principles and 
Practice of Public-Service Broadcasting’, in, Blumler, J and Nossiter, T (eds), 
Broadcasting in Transition, (New York: OUP). 
 
Barnet, S. (2008) ‘Can the public service broadcaster survive? Renewal and 
compromise in the new BBC charter’ in Lowe, G, and Bardoel, J. (2008) From 
Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Communication, (Nordicom).   
 
Blumler, J. (1992). Television and the Public Interest, (London: Sage). 
 
Born, G. (2003). 'Uncertain Futures: Public Service Television and the Transition 
to Digital-A Comparative Analysis of the Digital Television Strategies of the BBC 
and Channel 4', in Media@LSE Electronic Working Papers No. 3.  
 
Boyer, R. (2002) ‘The origins of regulation theory’ in Boyer and Saillard, (eds), 
(2002) Regulation Theory; The State of the Art, (London: Routledge). 
 
Boyer, R, and Saillard, Y. (2002) ‘A summary of regulation theory’ in Boyer and 
Saillard, (2002) Regulation Theory; The State of the Art, (London: Routledge).  
 
Boyer, R. (2001) The Future of Economic Growth; as new becomes old, (Edwin 
Elgar).  
 
Boyer, R. (2000) 'Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? 
A preliminary analysis' in Economy and Society 
 
Boyer, R. and Hollingsworth, J. (1997) 'Coordination of Economic Actors and 
References 
 
291 
 
Social Systems of Production' in Contemporary Capitalism: the embeddedness of 
institutions, (CUP: Cambridge). 
 
Branston, J, (1998), ‘Histories of British Telelvision’ in Geraghty, C and Lusted, 
D, (Eds), The Television Studies Book (London: Arnold). 
 
Brants, K and Siune, K, (1992) ‘Public Broadcasting in a State of Flux’ in Siune, 
K and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, Broadcast and 
Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
 
Briggs, Asa. (1966), ‘Broadcasting as a Public Service’ in The History of 
Broadcasting in the UK, Vol. 1, (Oxford: OUP). 
 
Brown, M.B, (1995), Models in Political Economy, (London: Penguin). 
 
Burglemann, J. (1999) ‘The Future of the Welfare State and its challenges for 
communication Policy’, in Calabrese, A and Burgelman, JC. Communication 
Citizenship and Social Policy: Rethinking the Limits of the Welfare State (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield). 
 
Calabrese, A and Burgelman, JC. Communication Citizenship and Social Policy: 
Rethinking the Limits of the Welfare State (London: Rowman and Littlefield). 
 
Castells, M. (1999), The Rise of the Network Society  (Oxford: Blackwell).  
 
Castells and Himanen, (2001), The Information Society and the Welfare State: 
the Finnish model, (Oxford: OUP). 
 
Collins, R, (1994), Broadcasting and Audiovisual Policy in the Single European 
Market, (London: John Libbey) 
 
Commission of the European Communities (CEC), (1992) ‘Pluralism and media 
concentration in the internal market’, Green Paper, Com (92). Brussels, 
21.12.1992 
 
CEC, 1993, ‘Growth Competitiveness and Employment: the challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st Century’, White Paper, Com(93) Brussels, 05.12.1993 
 
References 
 
292 
 
CEC, 1994, ‘Europe and the Global Information Society, Recommendation to the 
European Council. Report by the high level group on the information society’, 
(Bangemann Report), 1994.  
 
CEC, 1997, ‘The convergence of the telecommunications, media and information 
technology sectors and the implications for regulation’, Green Paper, Com (1997) 
623, Brussels 03.12.1997 
 
CEC, (1998) ‘Report on the Digital Age European Audiovisual Policy’, High Level 
group on Audiovisual Policy, 26.10.1998 
 
CEC 1999a, ‘Communication from the commission on the convergence of the 
telecommunications, media and information technology sector, and the 
implications for regulation; results of the consultation on the green paper’, 
Com(1999) 108, Brussels 14.12.1999 
 
CEC, 1999b, ‘communication on principles and guidelines for the community’s 
audiovisual policy in the digital era’, Com (1999) 657 Brussels, 14.12.1999 
 
CEC, 2001, ‘communication on the application of state aid rules to public service 
broadcasting’, Com(2001) 320 Official Journal of the European Communities.  
 
Considine, (2001) Enterprising States, (Cambridge: CUP)) 
 
Corcoran, F, (2003) RTE and the Globalisation of Irish Television, (Intellect). 
 
Coriat B., G. Dosi, “The Institutional Embeddedness of Economic Change. An 
Appraisal of the “Evolutionary” and the “Regulationist” Research Programme”, in 
K. Nielsen and B. Johnson (eds.), Institutions and Economic Change, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1998 
 
Curran, J and Seaton, J. (2003). Power Without Responsibility: The Press and  
Broadcasting in Britain, (6th Edition), (Routledge: London). 
 
Curtis, L, (1984), Ireland, the Propaganda War, (London:Pluto).  
 
Crissel, A. (2002) An Introductory history of British Broadcasting, (London: 
Routledge).  
 
References 
 
293 
 
Dahlgren, P. (1996), Television and the Public Sphere, (London: Thousand 
Oaks). 
 
Davies, G et al, (1999), The Future Funding of the BBC; Report of the 
Independent Review Panel, (London:DCMS) 
 
De Bens, E and Bakke, M (1992) ‘Television content: Dallasification of Culture?’ 
in Siune, K and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, 
Broadcast and Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
 
De Bruin, R and Smits, J. (1999) Digital Video Broadcasting: Technology, 
Standards and Regulations, (Massachusetts: Artech). 
 
Doyle, G. (2002) Understanding Media Economics (London: Sage).  
 
Duffy, N, Davis, J and Daum, A (1998) ‘The Economics of Digital Television’ in 
Steemers, J (1998), (ed) Changing Channels: the Prospects for Television in a 
Digital World, (University of Luton Press: Luton). 
 
Dyson, K and Humphreys, P.J. (1988) Broadcasting and New Media Policies in 
Western Europe, (London: Routledge) 
 
Dyson, K and Humphreys, P, (1990) The Political Economy of Communications: 
European and International Dimensions, (London: Routledge).  
   
Epsing Andersen, G. (1996) The Three Worlds Of Welfare Capitalism, (Oxford: 
Polity Press). 
 
Esping Andersen, G. (2002). 'Towards the Good Society Once Again', in Esping  
Andersen (Ed). (2002) Why We Need a New Welfare State.  
(Oxford: OUP). 
 
Esping Andersen, G. (1999) The Social Foundations of Post-industrial Societies 
(OUP: Oxford). 
 
Euromedia Research Group, (1997/2004), The Media in Western Europe, 
(London: Sage) 
 
European Parliament, (1996), ‘Motion for resolution: the future for public 
television in a multichannel digital age’, (The Tongue Report), Doc, A4-0243/96 
References 
 
294 
 
 
Feigenbaum, H and Henig, J. (1997), ‘Privatisation and Political Theory’, Journal 
of International Affairs: Winter 1997.  
 
Feintuck, M, (1999), Media Regulation, the Public Interest and the Law, 
(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press). 
 
Ferguson, M, (ed) (1986) New Communication Technology and the Public 
Interest: comparative perspectives on policy and research, (London: Sage) 
 
Flew, T. (2007) Understanding Global Media, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York). 
 
Flew, T and Gilmour, C. (2003), 'A Tale of Two Synergies: An Institutional 
Analysis of the Expansionary Strategies of News Corporation and AOL-Time 
Warner', Paper presented to Managing Communications for Diversity, Australia 
and New Zealand Communications Association Conference, Brisbane. 
 
Flynn, R. (2002), 'Broadcasting and the Celtic Tiger: from promise to practice' in 
Kirby, P and Gibbons, L. Re-Inventing Ireland: Culture, Society and Global 
Economy (London: Pluto). 
 
Fraser, N. (1995) ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 
Post Socialist Age’,  in New Left Review 1/212 July-august 1995 
 
Freedman, D. (2003), ‘Cultural policy making in the free trade era: an evaluation 
of the impact of current World Trade Organisation negotiations on audio-visual 
industries’ in International Journal of Cultural Policy, 9:32003, pp305-318.  
 
Galperin, H. (1999). 'Cultural Industries in the Age of Free-Trade Agreements'. 
Canadian Journal of Communication [Online], 24(1). Available: http://www.cjc-
online.ca/viewarticle.php?id=505. 
 
Galperin, H. (2004a), 'Beyond Interests, Ideas and Technology: An institutional 
approach to communication and information policy', in, The Information Society, 
20: 159-168 (Taylor and Francis). 
 
Galperin, H. (2004b) New Television, Old Politics, (Cambridge: CUP). 
 
References 
 
295 
 
Gandy, O, (1997), ‘The political economy approach, a critical challenge’ in 
Murdock, G and Golding, P (Eds), The Political Economy of The Media. 
(Cheltenam: Edward Elgar) 
 
Garnham, N and Locksley, G, (1991) 'The Economics of Broadcasting' in 
Blumler, J. Broadcasting Finance in Transition, a Comparative Handbook (New 
York: OUP).  
  
Garnham, N, (1980) Structures in Television, (London: BFI). 
 
Garnham, N, (1990) Capitalism and Communication, (London: Sage) 
 
Garnham, N. (1999B) ‘Barriers to convergence’ in Dutton, W.H. Society on the 
Line: Information Politics in the Digital Age (New York: OUP). 
 
Garnham, N. (1999A) ‘Information Politics: The Study of Communicative Power’ 
in Dutton, W.H. Society on the Line: Information Politics in the Digital Age (New 
York: OUP). 
 
Garnham, N. (1999C) ‘Legal and regulatory issues of convergence’ available 
from http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/lab/960430/garnham.html 
 
Garnham, N, (2000), Enlightenment, the Media and Modernity, (Oxford: OUP). 
 
Gibbons, T. (1998) ‘De/Re-Regulating the System: The British Experience’ in 
Steemers, J (1998), (ed) Changing Channels: the Prospects for Television in a 
Digital World, (University of Luton Press: Luton). 
 
Gorham, (1967) Forty Years of Irish Broadcasting, (Dublin: Talbot Publishers). 
 
Graham, A and Davies, G. (1997), Broadcasting, Society and Policy in the 
Multimedia Age. (London: John Libbey). 
 
Graham, A. (1998) ‘Broadcasting Policy and the Digital Revolution’ in The 
Political Quarterly, (Oxford: Blackwell). 
 
Grant, P and Wood, C. (2004) Blockbuster and Trade Wars; popular culture in a 
globalized world (Quebec: Douglas and McIntrye)  
 
Habermas, (1989), The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (Polity) 
References 
 
296 
 
 
Hall, E. (1993) The Electronic Age; Telecommunication in Ireland, (Dublin ;Oak 
Tree Press ) 
 
Hall, S, et al (1978), Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order, 
(London: Macmillan). 
 
Hancock, D. (1998) ‘Digital Television: A European Perspective’ in Steemers, J 
(1998), (ed) Changing Channels: the Prospects for Television in a Digital World, 
(University of Luton Press: Luton). 
 
Harcourt, A. (2006), The European Union and the Regulation of Media Markets, 
(Manchester; MUP).  
 
Hargreaves, S. (2005) ‘Television in a Digital Age: What Role For Public 
Broadcasting?', Economic Policy, Jan 2005 (Blackwell Publishing). 
 
Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity (London: Sage). 
 
Harvey, D. (2007) A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: OUP).  
 
Hay, C. (2004) Ideas, Interests and Institutions in the Comparative Political 
Economy of Great Transformations’, Review of International Political Economy, 
11 (1), 2004. 
 
Hayek, F.A., (1997), The Road to Serfdom, (London: Routledge). 
 
Held, D, (1990), Models in Democracy, (Oxford:Basil Blackwell). 
 
Held, D. (2004). Global Covenant, The Social Democratic Alternative to the 
Washington Consensus. (Cambridge: Polity) 
 
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2002). The Cultural Industries, (London, Sage). 
 
Hirsch, M and Petersen, V. (1992), ‘Regulation of media at European level’ in 
Siune, K and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, 
Broadcast and Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
 
Hobsbawn, E. (1994), Age of Extremes; the short twentieth century (London: 
Abacus). 
References 
 
297 
 
 
Hood, S and Petterson, TT. (1997), On television, (4th Revised Edition) (London: 
Pluto). 
 
Horgan, J. (2001) Irish Media, A Critical History, (London: Routledge). 
 
Holmes, D. (2005), Communication Theory; Media, Technology and Society, 
(London: Sage) 
 
Holznagel, B. (1998), ‘New Challenges: Convergence of Markets, Divergence of 
the Laws?’ International Journal Of Communications Law and Policy, Issue 2 
winter, 1998/99. 
 
Humphreys, P.J. (1996), Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
 
Humphreys, P and Patterson, (1988), ‘The context of new media politics in 
Western Europe’ in Dyson et al, (1988) Broadcasting and New Media Policies in 
Western Europe, (Routledge: London).   
 
Humphreys, P, and Lang, M. (1998) ‘Digital Television: Between the Economy 
and Pluralism’ Steemers, J (1998), (ed) Changing Channels: the Prospects for 
Television in a Digital World, (University of Luton Press: Luton). 
 
Hutchison, D, (1999), Media Policy, An Introduction, (Oxford: Blackwell). 
 
Idate, (2000), The Development of Digital Television in Europe. (Idate: Paris).  
 
Isofides, P. (1998), ‘Regulating Digital TV: the Greek experience’ International 
Journal Of Communications Law and Policy, Issue 2 Winter, 1998/99.  
 
Jackson, Peter and Price, Catherine (1994) ‘Privatisation and Regulation a 
review of the issue’s in Privatisation and Regulation: A review of the issues, 
(London: Longman). 
 
Jessop, B. (1994) ‘Post Fordism and the State’, in A Amin (ed) Post Fordism: A 
Reader (Oxford Blackwell) 
 
References 
 
298 
 
Jessop, B, (2000) 'From the Keynesian Welfare National State to the 
Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime' in Lewis, G. Gewitz, S. and 
Clarke, J. Rethinking  Social Policy (London: Sage). 
 
Jessop, B. (2001), 'Institutional returns and the strategic relational approach', 
accessed on 15/06/2008 http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/papers/jessop-
institutional-(re)turns.pdf 
 
Jessop, B. (2002), The Future of the Capitalist State, (Cambridge, Polity) 
 
Jessop, B. (2005) ‘The governance of complexity and the complexity of 
governance (revisited)’, accessed on 15/06/2008, http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/218/ 
 
Lister, M et al. (2003) New Media: a critical introduction (London: Routledge). 
  
King, A. (1998), ‘Thatcherism and the emergence of Sky Television’ in Media, 
Culture and Society, Vol 20:277-293, (London: Sage). 
 
Kirby, P. (2002), The Celtic Tiger in Distress: Growth with Inequality in 
Ireland, (Hampshire: Palgrave). 
 
Keane, J. (1991), The Media and Democracy, (Oxford: Polity). 
 
Kleinsteuber, H.J. (1998), ‘The Digital Future’ in Mc Quail, D and Siune, K, (eds) 
(1998), Media Policy, Convergence, Concentration, and Commerce, (London: 
Sage). 
 
Kleinsteuber, H.J. and Rosenbach, M. (1998) ‘Digital broadcasting and 
convergence’ The Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 4, European Institute of the Media. 
 
Konert, B. (1999), ‘Multimedia strategies in the audiovisual industry: new 
challenges for comparative analysis’ The Bulletin, Vol 16. No. 4, European 
Institute of the Media. 
 
Lash and Urry, (1994) Economies of Signs and Space (London:Sage) 
 
Levy, D. (1999) Europes Digital Revolution: Broadcasting Regulation, The EU 
and the Nation State, (London: Routledge). 
 
References 
 
299 
 
Levy, J. (2006) ‘The state also rises; the roots of contemporary state activism’ in 
Levy, J, (ed), The State after Statism, (Harvard, USA).  
 
Lister, M, Dovey, J. Giddingd, S, Grant, I, Kelly, K. (2003) New Media: A critical 
Introduction, (London:Routledge).  
 
Lowndes, V. (2002) 'Institutionalism', in Marsh and Stoker (eds) Theory and 
Methods in Political Science (2nd Ed) (New york: Palgrave).  
 
Marsden, C.T. (1999) ‘Pluralism in the Multimedia Market: Suggestions for 
Regulatory Scrutiny’ International Journal Of Communications Law and Policy, 
Issue 4, Winter 1999/2000. 
 
Marquand, D. (2004) The Decline of the public: the hollowing out of citizenship, 
(Polity). 
 
Mazzoleni, G and Palmer, M, (1992), ‘The Building of Media Empires’ in Siune, K 
and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, Broadcast and 
Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
 
Mc Cabe and Stewart (Eds), (1986) The BBC and Public Service Broadcasting. 
(Manchester: MUP). 
 
Mc Chesney, R. (2001) ‘Global Media, Neoliberalism and Imperialism’ available 
at http://www.globalresearch.org/view_article.php?aid=114907024 
 
Mc Chesney, R. (2002) ‘The Global Restructuring of Media Ownership’ in Raboy, 
M (ed) (2002), Global Media Policy in the New Millennium, (University of Luton 
Press: Luton). 
 
McKenzie, D, and Wacjman, J. (1999) The Social Shaping of Technology 2nd ed, 
(Milton Keynes: OUP).  
 
Mc Quail, D and Siune, K, (eds) (1998), Media Policy, Convergence, 
Concentration, and Commerce, (London: Sage). 
 
Mc Quail, De Mateo, Trapper, (1992) ‘A Framework for Analysis of Media 
Change in Europe in the 1990s’ in Siune, K and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), 
Dynamics of Media Politics, Broadcast and Electronic Media in Western Europe, 
(London: Sage). 
References 
 
300 
 
 
McQuail, D. and Van Cuilenberg, J. (2003) 'Media Policy Paradigm Shifts: 
Towards a New Communications Policy Paradigm' in European Journal of 
Communications, Vol 18(2), (London : Thousand Oaks). 
 
Mc Quail, D et al, (1998) Media Policy; Convergence Concentration and 
Commerce, (London: Sage).  
 
Michalis, M. (2007) Governing European Communication, (Lexington Books).  
 
Miller, T, (2007) Cultural Citizenship; cosmopolitanism, consumerism and 
television in a neo-liberal age, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).   
 
Mosco, V, (1996), The Political Economy of Communications, (London: Sage). 
 
Murdock and Golding, (2000) 'Culture, Communications and Political Economy', 
in Curran and Gurevitch (eds) Mass Media and Society (London: Arnold). 
 
Murdock, G. (2000) ‘Digital Futures; European television in the Age of 
Convergence’ in J. Wieten et al (eds) Television Across Europe, ((London: 
Sage). 
 
Negrine, Ralph. (1985), ‘The end of the public service tradition’, in Kuhn, R. 
(1985) The Politics of Broadcasting (New York: St Martins Press). 
 
Negrine, R. (1994), Politics and the Mass Media in Britain, (2nd Edition), (London: 
Routledge). 
 
Negroponte, N. (1994) Being Digital, (London: Hodder and Stoughton).  
 
O'Riain, S. (1997) 'An Offshore Silicon Valley? The emerging Irish Software 
Industry' in, Competition and Change, The Journal of Global Business and 
Political Economy, 2, 175-212.   
 
O, Riain, S. (2000) 'The Flexible developmental State, Globalisation, Information 
Technology and the Celtic Tiger, Politics and Society vol 28, no 3 pp3-37,  
 
O Riain, S. (2001) 'Flexible States in the Network Polity: The case of Industrial 
Policy in the Republic of  Ireland'. (online paper).  
 
References 
 
301 
 
O’Siochru, S, and Girad, B, (2002) Global Media Governance: a beginner’s 
guide, (Rowman and Littlefield).  
 
Ostergard, B.S. and Kleinsteuber, H.J. (1992) ‘The technology factor’ in Siune, K 
and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, Broadcast and 
Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
 
Ostergard, B.S. (1998) ‘Convergence: Legislative Dilemmas’ in Mc Quail, D and 
Siune, K, (eds) (1998), Media Policy, Convergence, Concentration, and 
Commerce, (London: Sage). 
 
Pauwels, C. (1999) ‘From citizenship to consumer sovereignty; the paradigm shift 
in European audiovisual policy’ in Calabrese, A and Burgelman, JC. 
Communication Citizenship and Social Policy: Rethinking the Limits of the 
Welfare State (London: Rowman and Littlefield). 
 
Pauwels, C. and Loisen, J. (2003) ‘The WTO and the Audiovisual Sector; 
Economic Trade Vs Cultural Horse Trading?’ European Journal of 
Communication, Vol 18 (3). 
 
Pine, R. (2002) 2RN and the Origins of Irish Radio, (Dublin: Four Courts Press). 
 
Polanyi, K. (1975), The Great Transformation: The political and economic origins 
of out time (New York: Octagon).  
 
Powell, W. (2007) ‘The New Institutionalism’ in The International Encyclopaedia 
of Organisational Studies, (Sage).  
 
Preston, P. (2001) Reshaping Communications. (London: Sage).  
 
Raboy, M, (Ed). (1996), Public Broadcasting for the Twenty-first Century, (Luton: 
University of Luton Press). 
 
Raboy, M (ed) (2002), Global Media Policy in the New Millenium, (University of 
Luton Press: Luton).  
 
Roll, E (1994), A History of Economic Thought, (London:Faber) 
 
Sanchez-Taberno, A. (1994) Media Concentration in Europe, (Dusseldorf: The 
European institute of the media).  
References 
 
302 
 
 
Sarikakis and Chakravartty, (2006) Media Policy and Globalization, (EUP: 
Edinburgh).  
 
Sarikakis, K. (2002) ‘Supranational Governance and the Shifting Paradigm in 
Communications Policy Making: The case of the European Parliament’ in Raboy, 
M (ed) (2002), Global Media Policy in the New Millennium, (University of Luton 
Press: Luton). 
 
Sassen, S.(1999) ‘The State and the New Geography of Power’ in Calabrese, A 
and Burgelman, JC. Communication Citizenship and Social Policy: Rethinking 
the Limits of the Welfare State (London: Rowman and Littlefield). 
 
Savage, R. (1996) Irish Television: The Political and Social Origins (Cork: CUP). 
 
Scannel, Paddy. (1989), ‘Public Service Broadcasting and modern public life’, in 
Media Culture and Society Vol. 2. 
 
Scannel, P. (1990), A Social History of British Broadcasting, Vol. 1, (Oxford: 
Blackwell). 
 
Scannel, Paddy (1996) ‘Britain, Public Service Broadcasting; from national 
culture to multiculturalism’, in Raboy, M, (Ed). (1996), Public Broadcasting for the 
Twenty-first Century, (Luton: University of Luton Press). 
 
Schiller, D. (1999) Digital Capitalism; networking the global market system 
(Massachusetts: MIT) 
 
Schlesinger, P, (1991), Media, State and Nation, (London: Sage).  
 
Sen, A. (1995) Inequality Re-examined, (Oxford: Clarendon). 
 
 Siune, Mc Quail, Truetzschler, (1992), ‘From Structure to Dynamics’ in Siune, K 
and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, Broadcast and 
Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
 
Siune, K and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, 
Broadcast and Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
References 
 
303 
 
Steemers, J, (1999), ‘Between Culture and Commerce: The problem of 
redefining public service broadcasting for the digital age’ in Convergence, Vol. 5, 
No. 3. 
 
Steemers, J. (1998) ‘On the Threshold of the ‘Digital Age’: Prospects for Public 
Service Broadcasting’ in Steemers, J (1998), (ed) Changing Channels: the 
Prospects for Television in a Digital World, (University of Luton Press: Luton). 
 
Steemers, J (1998), (ed) Changing Channels: the Prospects for Television in a 
Digital World, (University of Luton Press: Luton). 
 
Stevenson, Nick (1995) Understanding Media Cultures, Social Theory and Mass 
Communication, (London: Sage). 
 
Strange, S. (1994) States and Markets (London: Pinter) 
 
Sussman, G. (1997), Communication, Technology and Politics in the Information 
Age, (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage).  
 
Swann, Dennis (1993) 'Privatisation, Deregulation and the new right', in Public 
Policy and the Impact of the New Right (London: Pinter). 
 
Swank, D. (2002) Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in 
Developed Welfare States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
 
Sweeney (2004), Selling Out? Privatisation in Ireland, (Dublin: New Island 
Books) 
 
Tracy, M. (1998), The Decline and Fall of Public Service Broadcasting, (Oxford: 
OUP). 
 
Trappel, J and Meier, W. (1998) ‘Media Concentration: Options for Policy’ Mc 
Quail, D and Siune, K, (eds) (1998), Media Policy, Convergence, Concentration, 
and Commerce, (London: Sage). 
 
Trappel, J and Meier, W. (1992) ‘Small states in the shadow of giants’ in Siune, K 
and Truetzschler, W, (eds) (1992), Dynamics of Media Politics, Broadcast and 
Electronic Media in Western Europe, (London: Sage). 
 
References 
 
304 
 
Van Cuilenberg, J. (1999) ‘On competition, access and diversity in media, old 
and new’ in New Media and Society,  Vol1(2):183-207. 
 
Veljanovski, Cento, (1989) Freedom in Broadcasting, (London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs). 
 
Venturelli, S. (1998) Liberalizing the European Media: Politics, Regulation and 
the Public Sphere, (Oxford: Clarendon). 
 
Ward, D. (2003) The European Union Democratic Deficit and The Public Sphere: 
An Evaluation of EU Media Policy, (Oxford: IOS Press). 
 
Waters, M. (2001) Globalization, (London: Routledge). 
 
Webster, F and Robbins, K. (1994) Theories of the Information Age, (Routledge: 
London). 
 
Wheeler, M. (1997), Politics and the Mass Media, (Oxford: Blackwell). 
 
Whittaker, C, (2001), ‘How the BBC pictured itself’  in Roberts, G and Taylor, P, 
The Historian, Television and Television History, (University of Luton 
Press;Luton). 
 
Williams, R. (1974), Television: Technology and Cultural Form, (Glasgow: 
Fontana). 
 
Williams, R. (1973) Communications, (London: Pelican). 
  
Winseck, D. (2002) ‘The WTO, Emerging Policy Regimes and the Political 
Economy of Transnational Communications’ in Raboy, M (ed) (2002), Global 
Media Policy in the New Millennium, (University of Luton Press: Luton). 
 
Winston, B. (1998), Media, Technology and Society: a history from the telegraph 
to the Internet, (London: Routledge). 
 
Wood and Isin (2001) Citizenship and Identity: Consuming Identities (London: 
Sage) 
 
Zhu, C And Nieland C., (2004) 'Marketization and Social Protection Reform', in 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 15:4 Routledge 
References 
 
305 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
